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NOTICES

THE Assistant Secretary will be at 74, Grosvenor Street, W. 1, on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday mornings, and on Monday, Wednesday, and Thursday afternoons.

All Members home from abroad are asked to notify their change of address.

Members are recommended to correspond, except under special circumstances, about lecture tickets, the Journal, and the election of new members, direct with the Assistant Secretary and not with Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Yate, who is mostly away in Shropshire. By doing this both time and postage will be saved.

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CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at No. 74, Grosvenor Street, London, W., on Thursday, November 10, 1921, when a lecture was given by Captain L. V. S. Blacker, Q.V.O. Corps of Guides, Frontier Force, on "Wars and Travels in Turkistan, 1918-1919-1920." The Rt. Hon. Lord Carnock, Chairman of the Society, presided. In opening the proceedings,

The CHAIRMAN said: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I hope the change of lecture hours will meet with the approval of the Society, and I think, judging from the attendance to-night, I may confidently say you will approve it. We had to do it because many of our members served in public offices or other businesses, and found half-past four too early for them to attend; so, with your approval, we thought it would be well to change the hour to half-past five. Before introducing Captain Blacker, I will ask Colonel Yate to make a statement.

The HON. SECRETARY (Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Yate): Since July last fifty-nine new members have been elected. I do not propose to read the whole list, because time is valuable. I may mention that there are, in addition to several ladies, Viscount Chelmsford, Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, Sir R. T. Coryndon, Governor of Uganda, Sir Alfred Hamilton Grant, late Foreign Secretary in India, Sir William S. Meyer, High Commissioner for India, Sir Vernèy Lovett, late Member of the Viceroy's Imperial Legislative Council in India, General Sir Claud W. Jacob, Chief of the General Staff in India, and six other officers of General rank. I will limit myself to that.

The CHAIRMAN: It is now my pleasant duty to introduce to the meeting Captain Blacker, who has kindly consented to read us a paper upon "Wars and Travels in Turkistan, 1918-1919-1920." Speaking for myself, my own information on what passed during those eventful years in that remote district is exceedingly scanty, so I am sure I am echoing the feeling of all here that we are exceedingly pleased to have first-hand information from the gentleman who took most adventurous journeys in those regions. I will now ask Captain Blacker to read his paper. (Applause.)

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WARS AND TRAVELS IN TURKISTAN, 1918-1919-1920

BY CAPTAIN L. V. S. BLACKER,
Q.V.O. Corps of Guides, Punjab Frontier Force.

VERY many people have ascribed a still greater number of explanations and reasons for the outbreak of the War of August, 1914. I venture to put forward to you one of my own which I do not think has yet been demonstrated in public. This map* which you now see on the screen is one which I hope will make clear my meaning. The part coloured red indicates the countries ruled by a predominantly Aryan race, and I think it may fairly be said that the Aryan race is characteristically the European one. The line dividing this from the yellow is, I think it is reasonable to say, the real racial frontier between Europe and Asia, and may I be pardoned for suggesting that such a frontier can be drawn only on a racial basis? You will notice that the yellow colouring which I have used to indicate the Mongoloid strain, and those countries in which the dominant race is Mongoloid, extends over most of Prussia, all of Hungary, Bulgaria, and the territory of the Turks. I think no one will deny, least of all anyone who has confronted Saxon—that is, Aryan—troops on the Western Front, that these four races were the backbone of the hatred, and hence of the murderous fighting, against the Aryan in the war. It also accounts for the wonderful and spontaneous goodwill with which the Moroccan Berber, the Circassian of the Caucasus, and the fair-skinned Punjabi and Pathan, came in on the side of their Western Aryan cousins and against the call of religion. Few people realize that the best districts of the Northern Punjab lost as big a percentage of their voluntarily enlisted men killed in the war as any English county did under conscription. Ulster and New Zealand are the only countries to which we can look for a rival to this record.

In the autumn of 1917 great things were happening in Central Asia, the home of the Mongoloid races. The Prussian, having been spurned by Islam and the Aryan wanderers of the plains, remembered Attila, his forbear, and harked back to the Steppes of Turan, to the "White Wolves" of Hulaku, and the monstrous iniquities of Chingiz Khan before the Arab brought a Moslem civilization to Samarkand and the heart of Asia. The "Drang nach Osten" changed its line from Bagdad and Basra to Batum, Baku, and Bukhara. Many

* The map illustrating his lecture which Captain Blacker showed on the screen has been reproduced at the end of vol. lviii., No. 3, of the *Geographical Journal* for September, 1921.—A. C. Y.

factors favoured the enemy. Enver Pasha dreamed of collecting sheep-skinned hordes of Kipchaps, Kirghiz, Kalmuks, and Usbeks; enemy agents worked in the cities of Afghanistan against our ally, Habibullah, the King of Kabul, and by a strange chance nearly 200,000 prisoners of war of the late Austrian Army, the bulk of whom were Mongoloid Magyars, had been behind the barbed wire in the camps and cantonments of Russian Turkistan. The revolution had added a fresh element of disorder and instability, and the Soviets had released this great mass of trained soldiers. Some of them had found their way to Afghanistan, where Osmanli drill-sergeants and Magyar gun-layers lent a new skill to Afghan regiments and batteries. Three Missions were sent to investigate and find out what effect there might be on the Great War from these unchained forces that dreamt of sweeping through the passes of the Hindu Kush to the rich valleys of India, as so many of their forbears had done in days gone by. My own regiment has had for the last eighty years a very strong connection with mid-Asia, and there are no cities of consequence from Lhasa to the Caucasus and from Mombasa to Moscow that have not seen a man of the Guides. Those who have read of the doings of the *Légion Étrangère* at Sidi-Bel-Abbés will at once call to mind the many Central European princelings who have served in the ranks of that gallant regiment that lent a share to make the glory of "*La Première Division de la France*." In the same way not a few scions of ruling houses of Central Asia have worn, and wear, the silver shoulder badges of the Guides. Among these was even the heir in direct line of the mighty Tamerlane, who but a few years ago wore the sword of a simple trooper.

It was not surprising, therefore, that the most easterly of the three Missions that plunged into the blue of Turan in the spring of 1918 included as the military element sixteen soldiers, of whom all but two were Guides.

Our first objective was Kashgar, where the Mission came under the command of Sir George Macartney. The men remembered that their regiment had, as far back as 1873, had the honour of carrying the Queen's badges into the unmapped and unexplored North, into the region that later became part of Russian Siberia—I mean the vast fertile province of Semirechensk. There were many interesting things to see during our long march over the snows to Gilgit, to no less hospitable Hunza, and over the Pamirs—where, again, we met a detachment of the Orenburg Cossacks, loyal troops in the midst of a sea of Bolshevism—to Kashgar. We spent a few weeks in the city, and it became very clear that distances were too great and veracity too uncommon to collect from there any useful information, and to transmit it to India in time for it to be of service in influencing the progress of the Great War.

At last we got permission in June to go ourselves to Tashkend, the seat of the Turkistan Soviet, that had already spread the Red Terror into the flourishing cities of Bukhara and Kokand, whose narrow streets had run with the blood of thousands of the faithful. Kolesof, the "Anacharsis" Kloutz of Turkistan, had massacred many thousands by machine-gun fire in Kokand alone, and had razed the city to the ground by shelling with high explosives. Those of you who have seen the ruins of Ypres must multiply it by four to get an idea of what the Bolsheviks did to Kokand in February, 1918.

We reached Tashkend early in July, after a journey devoid of any special incident; for, indeed, it was so unexpected to the various Soviets that we passed *en route* that they did not quite know what to do with us, and characteristically allowed the matter to lapse into the hands of the Headquarters of the Turkistan Republic. Not only were the politics of Central Asia in a very curious state about then, but our own relations towards and dealings with the various revolutionary councils could scarcely be described as clear-cut or crystallized. Officials of our Embassy, including the gallant Captain Cromie, had been massacred without reparation or amends in Petrograd. British troops fought the Reds in Archangel, and a British battalion had found its way into Siberia. Moscow was wholeheartedly hostile to the Western Allies, but Tashkend was cut off from Moscow by a loyalist army of Orenburg Cossacks that operated on the Steppes by the Sea of Aral. Another Cossack army held the Reds between that Sea and the Caspian, whilst a handful of the Semirechensk Voisko carried on a guerrilla warfare near the Mongolian frontier. In the south-east, in the rich valley of Ferghana, the descendants of the Emperor Baber fought, and still fight, any parties of the Red Army who left the protection of their armoured trains. In the south-west, in the deserts of Transcaspia, a wonderful motley assemblage of Tekke Turkoman, sheep-skinned, bonneted, and red-cloaked, dissolute mechanics from the big railway workshops of the Central Asian at 'Ashqabad, and a handful of loyalist Russian gunners and troopers, mostly officers and N.C.O.'s of the old imperial army, had driven the Reds out of their city and established touch with Sir Wilfred Malleon's Mission and the tiny British force in North-East Persia. This was the second of the British Missions that I have alluded to, whilst the most westerly one was the biggest, under Major-General Dunsterville. Its arrival and its doings on the Caspian and in Baku have been admirably described by him in a recent book. The Bolshevik Soviet was somewhat bewildered, then, when we unexpectedly called upon them in their Foreign Office. To us, fresh from the Western front, it gave a sort of Alice-through-the-Looking-Glass feeling to walk in the streets through a jostling crowd in field grey. Of course, we had to explain that we were semi-official to a remark-

able degree, and that our reasons for being in that capital were other than they really were. The "Lewis Carroll" sensation was intensified in their case when three companies of the 19th Punjab Infantry, plus some of the 28th Light Cavalry, irrupted into Turkistan in response to an appeal from the Turkoman General, Oraz Sardar, and the 'Ashqabad Provisional Government. This was a great surprise to us, and we hardly believed it when the Foreign Minister confronted us with the news. Needless to say, the Reds forthwith decided that we were English spies, and talked very pointedly about blank walls and firing-parties. Fortunately the atmosphere of bewilderment was very much on our side; though wireless messages came from Lenin insisting on the early "liquidation" of all British and French officers, and though the extremist element, headed by the Hebrew Tobolin, kept on clamouring for our blood, yet the Soviet as a body were too nervous of their own security to take a step which they thought would certainly compromise them with the British Government. The five fronts on which their armies then fought were as much as they could do with, and they had reasons to think that the Afghans too might attack them. And hence they preferred not to be too ready to fall in with the fiery demands of the despotic Duumvirs of Moscow. The Punjabis, on whom fell the brunt of the hard knocks, as is always the case where Punjabis are concerned, caused us intense joy by tumbling the Red Army into rout every time they met them. This joy, however, had to be concealed from the Soviet during our various interviews with them, and with some care. In fact, we had to disown our very good friends the 19th by explaining to the Soviet that they were not His Majesty's troops at all, but pensioner and discharged Hazaras, Afghan subjects who had left the British service and were fighting purely as mercenaries for Denikin and the Mensheviks of 'Ashqabad. The Soviet, by no means a highly educated or enlightened coterie, accepted this explanation with some misgivings, since their imagination boggled at the idea of a British Mission coming to an enemy capital in the same week that a British army invaded the country, as well it might. We remembered what a tangled web we weave when first we practise to deceive, as one of the hospital trains back from the 'Ashqabad front, just after the action of Artik, brought, wounded, to Tashkend—amongst others—a well-educated Austrian *Gefreiter*. He, with his patrol, had been fallen upon by a patrol of Punjabis and smitten hip and thigh. Though much out of breath, he had managed to escape with a mental picture of the Punjabis' ragged khaki uniform and accoutrements that bid fair to give the lie to us when the Soviet heard about it. Tobolin, the leader of the party of the Two Tribes that unfortunately were not lost, himself ran a newspaper called *Sovietski Turkistan*, and in his leading articles he permitted himself to use some deplorable

expressions in our regard, whilst he clamoured for that firing-party to attend to us. This made the matter of the Austrian lance-corporal somewhat ticklish, but personal contact with him, sweetened by some hardly got beer and palm oil, caused him to go back on his story, and we breathed again.

Anyone who did any fighting for the Bolshevik in Asia was almost certain to be an Austrian or a Magyar at this time. The riff-raff of the bazaars who made up the numbers had no use for anything like fighting at all. The very few Regular officers and N.C.O.'s of the old army, to their credit be it said, held aloof from it; the hundred or so self-styled Cossacks of Semirechia, who had gone renegade, filled up their time posing picturesquely and singing charming part-songs.

The strong Israelitish element had all its time taken up with "indispensable" departmental and political work beyond the reach of Punjabi bayonets. Meanwhile we continued our parleying with the Soviet, and one of our principal tasks was to see that the many thousands of pounds of baled cotton that had accumulated for the last three years on the wharves and sidings of Turkistan did not reach Germany. Cotton is an indispensable raw material for the manufacture of propellants, and there is no doubt that had this vast store come into the hands of the enemy the collapse of the Central Powers would have been postponed. We came into contact with many curious comic opera matters during our stay in Tashkend, but with none less so than the half-dozen secret societies that plotted in true South American style to upset the Government, though, of course, we had no direct concern with these.

First-hand acquaintance with the Red Army, especially when they were fighting against our own men, was a curious business. One of their crack regiments, composed of ex-convicts from penal settlements in Siberia, was called the Zhlobinskis, and this was hastily withdrawn from the Northern front to endeavour to stay the victorious progress of the Punjabis, who had already driven 5,000 excellently gunned and equipped regular Austrian soldiers back nearly to Merv. This regiment, even in the Red Army, who were by no means Little Lord Fauntleroy's, were conspicuous for a cut-throat ruffianism. They detained at Tashkend and marched straight to the White House, the seat of the Soviet, demanding 5,000,000 roubles. The haggle that followed was seasoned by a few pistollings, but at last the regiment got the money, on condition of going straight on to the South-Western front. They agreed, but changed their mind at the next station south of Tashkend, and marched back to prise away another 5,000,000 from the frightened Soviet. At last they met the Punjabis, but were cut to pieces by them at the battle of Kaakha. The regiment ceased to exist and their commander died of his wounds. During the second visit one of the Zhlobinskis

resolved to call upon the War Minister to discuss some small grievance with him. The private took with him a stick-grenade to emphasize his arguments, and a bellyful of vodka to lend him eloquence. Quite understandably, the Minister was not at home, and the secretarial staff projected the visitor down the steep stairs. When the broad road seemed to have settled down a bit, he found himself sitting on the edge of the high pavement with his fevered brow against a cool white-stemmed poplar, the grenade still in his hand. An unoffending aborigine was sweeping the road a dozen yards or so away. He decided not to waste the bomb, so withdrew the pin and hurled it at the scavenger. The bomb burst, and the stick came back and, with poetic justice, killed the thrower. The native remained unscratched. The Red Army of 1918 did not suffer from a too pipeclayed discipline.

We now found ourselves up against the difficulty of getting the information that we had gathered back to where it would do most good; many messengers volunteered to go to Kashgar, had taken our money and slipped our communications into their great jack-boots without tangible results. An attempt to employ another means had failed, coming literally within exactly half an inch of costing a very useful life; and as it was clear that we could now do nothing more in Tashkend towards winning the war, there was nothing to keep us there any longer, however picturesque our adventures might have been had we stayed.

After some remarkable interviews between us and the Soviet, Sir George Macartney secured a special train, which took the Mission back to Andijan. We had been nearly three months in Sovdepija, and even at the last the Reds attempted to bring off some treachery against us.

In about twenty marches, moving by little-known short cuts, we had got back to the Chinese Pamirs, where most of my soldiers, after some adventures of their own, had managed to concentrate. This was already the end of September, and news of an impending German break-up in the West had filtered through to Central Asia, and clearly German emissaries and agents in North Afghanistan were on the move. We got news at Tashkurghan, early in October, that an armed party of some 200, comprising Germans, Turks, and Afghans, had moved across from the Russian Pamirs down the wild, menacing gorge towards Yarkand. I gave chase with eight of my own men and seven of the Orenburg Cossacks, and after three days and three nights of scrambling over cliff faces and marching in almost untrodden valleys, found that we were on the wrong trail. Meanwhile, Sir George had pushed on towards India to get the results of the Mission's work into the hands of the Foreign Office as quickly as possible. My little force overtook him a couple of marches farther

on, at a place called Dafdar, where we struck a fresh trail. I received orders to follow this trail leading up into the desolate, uninhabited valley of the Oprang, which abuts on to the greatest mountain barrier in the world. If I came on any definite signs I was to follow the trail and capture the party that made it, since it was quite clear that no one but enemy agents would use such a route. Sir George continued towards India, and I exchanged the Cossacks for half a dozen deep-chested, iron-limbed men of the Hunza Scouts. We pushed on into the snow, a long march, to a couple of tiny tents, where the wife and sister of a wandering shepherd awaited the gathering of the flock to proceed to more genial climes at lower levels. That night the two girls confirmed the midnight passage, seven or eight days before, of fifteen mounted armed men. We followed them over the very difficult Ilisu Pass in snow-storms, over ice-bound rock faces and snow-fields, which showed unmistakably their tracks; then two days down the long valley to the great Raskam. We crossed the swollen river with very little to spare, and then began a series of mighty passes. We crossed six of these in four days, only one of them under 16,000 feet, whilst one or two had snow cornices on their summits and verglas on their slopes that killed not a few of our wretched ponies. We had no kit beyond the clothes the men stood up in, their sheep-skin cloaks and saddle blankets, plus a small bag of flour and tea in their wallets. Some of our bivouacs, waterless, fuelless, and devoid of grazing, in holes scraped in the snow, in open valleys at 14,000 feet, were unforgettable. If the Pamirs are the "roof of the world," here in the crags of the Kuen-Lun we were certainly amongst its chimney-pots. At last, having seen no living thing for several days, we dropped down from the great height into the jungle and brushwood-filled valley of Kulan Aghil, where we found human beings and secured a bag of flour and a sheep in time to stave off starvation. Better than this, even, we had caught up four days on the enemy, who, strangely enough, instead of marching straight into Yarkand over a single pass, turned sharply to the eastward into the great unknown, unmapped valley of Chup. We followed them, exchanging our worn-out ponies for the fresh animals of a few Kirghiz whom we met. We had long been down to one meal a day, cooked on flat stones, at the short midday halt, since we had neither time nor food for more. From Chup we climbed over a great weird pass into the equally unknown valley of Bulun, where was a hamlet whose inhabitants told us we were now only forty-eight hours behind the pursued. Unfortunately, here we lost the track, and had to make a nightmare march through unexplored Shaksu and Pokhpu over four great unmapped passes, of which I never even found the names of two, since we met no human being in all those great valleys and deep, cliff-walled canyons. I estimate that we climbed up

and down something like 30,000 feet on that memorable day. At the little clump of deserted huts in the waterless valley, named after the Archangel Gabriel, we were still off the trail. Now we were in the sandy foothills. Our first drink for forty-eight hours was one we got from a woman at Ak-Masjid; it was one of those drinks one never forgets. A very few hours' sleep and then a night march by compass over the sandy range into the next valley of Tiznaf. Then a long nightmare march through the whole of the day and the whole of the night took us to Khan Langar, where we again met the mighty Raskam River where it debouches into the plain. Again a few short hours' halt, and very early next morning we found ourselves in a garden before the walls of the ancient city of Yarkand.

A few discreet inquiries, and then we were mounted again and, trotting quickly through the narrow alleys, burst through the great iron-studded gates of the Badakshi Sarai. The first rays of the morning sun gleamed on the men's bayonets as they rushed in, and nearly a hundred extraordinarily startled Afghans put up their hands above their heads with unwonted suddenness. It only remained to search out the ones we wanted, and to divest them of their Austrian rifles. To our great disappointment, there was no German amongst them, but, at the same time, there was no doubt as to the true character of the gang. Three days later we had handed over our prisoners to the Chinese Tao-Yin in his Yamen at Kashgar, and were hastening back on our Arctic march over the Pamirs in December.

I remember how it gave me a queer little pang to hand over Aryan Afghans, scoundrels though they might have been, fettered and manacled, into the hands of Mongoloid Chinese, however cultivated, *instruit*, and courteous, as these were. We lost no time over the return march. It was so cold that once in the middle of the day on the highest part of the Pamirs a leg of mutton, which my young orderly had tied to his saddle, froze solid so that fragments broke off it.

After the men had had a very few days' leave, and after I had handed over the results of my work in Tashkend to the General Staff at Delhi, I received orders to proceed with my detachment to the Merv front. This meant a railway journey to railhead on the frontier in Persian Baluchistan, and then an 800-mile march over the deserts and rocky, barren mountain ranges to the Central Asian Railway, which we struck at Dushakh, the scene of the Punjabis' victory in September. We were soon at the front at the eastern edge of the Merv oasis, where matters had settled down into a sort of static warfare. The force had expanded and regularized itself a little from the band of insurgents it had commenced as, and it was a pleasant change to find oneself on the correct side of the front. The Reds summoned up enough audacity to attack us during

February, but their troops were driven back to Repetek, only a very short distance from the Oxus, by a well-timed counter-stroke delivered by one of the companies of the Punjabis. Orders from home forbade us to follow up the Red Army any farther, or to go on and complete the conquest of Turkistan, which was far from being beyond the bounds of possibility. For this reason a counter-revolution which was brought off in Tashkend by one of the many secret societies we had known, under one Osipof, came to nothing, and the resulting Red reprisals cost a great number of lives.

We had time to look round and familiarize ourselves with the ruins and historic buildings that told us the story through the ages of the wonderful city Merv, that had been the queen of the world. Besides this, it was a great pleasure as well as a duty to get acquainted with the Turkoman, and especially with their courteous and venerable chiefs. The Turkoman are a fine race, and genuinely pro-British, besides being devoted in their allegiance to their Crown. A great deal could have been done had this spirit of loyalty been developed and utilized on the right lines. My non-commissioned officers were utilized as instructors to the regiments of Turkoman horse and battalions of foot levies. They carried out their drills actually upon the position itself, and once they were even bombed by a Bolshevik aeroplane whilst at work. Armoured trains were the mainstay and pivot of manœuvre of either side, since they alone could carry guns through the sandhills and dunes of the desert. Naturally, great ingenuity was displayed on the subject of mines. First of all, the line would be blown up in the rear of the enemy's armoured train by a half-squadron that had to make a long and very thirsty detour for several days to carry out its object. Then a contact mine showed better results. This was countered in the usual way by placing an empty truck to take the force of the explosion. The attack put on their thinking-caps and devised a mine that only responded to the tender caress of something that weighed several tons, such as a gun-truck or a locomotive. This was a trump card that took several tricks, till the eyes of both sides became so wonderfully penetrating that they could spot a mine, however well concealed, several hundred yards away in time to stop the train. Then a truck loaded with old rails was pushed in front of each train to take the bump, and this was countered by a mine with a delay-action fuse. But the most effective of all was the last act, in which a half-squadron removed the rails in front of the Bolshevik train and spiked them down again an inch farther apart. They did this over a length of a mile or so and retired, covering up their traces. Next time the Bolshevik train advanced the engine-driver found himself bumping along the sleepers though his wheels were still between the rails.

Another item of interest was the development by irrigation of the

Tsar's estate that formed the Canal Colony of the Murghab at Bairam Ali. Two or three of the men of my regiment actually held land there as tenants of the Tsar, and the chances and changes of war had taken them back over scores of weary marches to their own homesteads. The men were Hazaras, and incidentally it was to my platoon that the honour fell of realizing Kipling's dream, put into the mouth of the British soldier of the 70's and 80's, of cooking their camp kettles in the palace of the Tsar, where they were billeted.

In April we were relieved by Caucasian troops of General Denikin's Volunteer army, and we marched back into Persia. The officers and N.C.O.'s of this force were good enough, but the men were nearly all Armenians. For some time they held on to our old position, whilst we considered the defence of Persia against the Bolsheviks. During April the commander of the force and myself paid a visit to a very marvellous place, Kelat-i-Nadiri, the wonderful natural stronghold of the Emperor Nadir, the forbidden fastness of Khurasan. Very few Europeans have ever set eyes on this remarkable place, ringed round as it is by a natural perimeter of some 50 miles of 1,000-foot cliffs, inaccessible even to goats. Four or five narrow gorges and rough tracks give access to the interior, which we were able to photograph. Curiously enough, it is held by a tribe of Turks, whose Khan holds the fief in return for defending this frontier against Turkoman raiders. We had only been inside a few days, and were still wondering where Nadir could have concealed the £7,000,000 worth of treasure from Delhi that he buried somewhere in this stronghold, when we were surprised by the sudden outbreak of the Afghan war and hastily recalled to Headquarters at Meshed to cope with another "Alice through-the-Looking-Glass" situation; for our tiny army was on the wrong side of Afghanistan altogether, and confronted by a whole Afghan division. Fortunately, perhaps, for us, no important military operations took place, though my N.C.O.'s again occupied the place of honour on the actual Afghan frontier and in close contact with the Afghan outpost troops. This lasted for several weary months, and in the meantime the rest of my detachment was employed all over Northern Khurasan mapping the wild, rocky valleys, in many of which no surveyor had yet set foot. During this summer of 1919, next winter, and all the next summer, two or three N.C.O.'s managed to map some 14,000 square miles, a good proportion of which was previously unexplored.

In July and August the Mensheviks lost Bairam Ali and Merv, and were retiring towards 'Ashqabad. In October they lost this city itself, thereby laying bare the head of the only metalled road really fit for wheel traffic that leads from Turkistan into Khurasan. The Afghan war was no longer of importance, and so my detachment was moved back again to the north to watch the road and 160 miles of

rugged frontier-line in view of the incursion that the Bolsheviks were certain to make into Persia.

That winter was a very busy one; the topographical portion of my little force was busy through blizzard and snow-storm, mapping the many inhospitable valleys, inhabited by unruly tribes, over which fighting was likely to, and eventually did, take place. The remainder of the men, expanded by some fifty-six Kurdish levies, patrolled the stern rocky defiles of that rugged frontier, and caught many a hireling Armenian and greasy Tabrizi Turk carrying packets of Red leaflets, Communist brochures, and propaganda of every sort, into Persia. In January a Mission from Moscow came to Tashkend with the avowed intention of making the Red Terror still redder. Over the doorway of Army Headquarters of the first Red Army in 'Ashqabad was inscribed the legend: "Our Mission is to Set the East in Flames." There is no doubt that the Jew, Broido, his colleague, Eliava, and the puppet-General Novitski kept this ever uppermost in their minds. And Tashkend became a happy hunting-ground for revolutionaries of all sorts, hailing from any slums between Stambul and Calcutta. An interesting poster that one of my men secured depicted a typical John Bull with projecting teeth, ginger whiskers, and bull-dog pipe, in white drill clothes and sun helmet, standing at the tail of a plough, into which were harnessed three naked, emaciated Dravidians. He brandished in one hand an automatic pistol and in the other a nagalka. Russian, Turkish, and Persian texts told us that this is how the English plough in India. Even the stodgy and unimaginative Turkoman laughed immoderately at the sight of it. Meanwhile crowds of deserters of every nationality came to us, expanded by refugees of both sexes, escaping from the Red Army and the Red Terror. Our tiny village received Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Wallachs, Slovenes and Italians, Rumanians and Poles, Austrians and Germans, Tatars, Kalmuks, Kirghiz and Circassians, Usbeks and Armenians, Georgians and Cossacks, but the bulk were Magyar officers and soldiers. It was no little problem to deal with this extraordinary influx of almost every European nationality; but well as I thought I knew the Punjabi, I was surprised at the wonderful capacity with which my trusty Awan, Subadar Waris Khan, and no less capable Squadron-Dafadar-Major, Ahmad Shah, dealt with the situation. One would think that they had spent half their lives in feeding, clothing, dry-nursing, and cheering up the moral of a dozen Central European nationalities. My own task was to separate the sheep from the goats—Bolshevik spies from bone-fide prisoners of war and genuine loyalists. In February the Red Army took Krasnovodsk from the remnant of the Volunteers, and the Reds were now free to devote their attention to their incursion into Persia. The volatile Afghan, however, provided a diversion which kept them

busy for some time, and drew off their troops to Panjdeh and the neighbourhood of Khushk. The Red Political Department could no longer get spies to go to Persia, as the ever-active patrols had made it too dangerous, so they adopted another method. Remembering the modicum of success that the puppet Kuchik Khan had had in Gilan and Madanderan and the subsidies that another Red assembly had sent to "citoyen" Tippoos, they bethought themselves of one Khuda Verdi Sardar. He was a disgruntled petty Kurdish chieftain who found himself in 'Ashqabad. Before our troops and the Cossacks had come into Khurasan he had plied a flourishing trade as the Macheath of those parts, and the deprivation of his means of livelihood gave him a grievance against the forces of law and order, and made him a ready tool to the hands of the Soviets. They supplied him with several hundred magazine-rifles, some machine-guns, and even, it was said, a couple of quick-firing mountain guns. These convoys were run through the precipitous mountain paths of the Kupeh Dag; and though my N.C.O.'s managed to keep in touch with their movements, they were not allowed to interfere, since the matter was justly considered an internal Persian affair. This gun-running was spread over April, May, and June, and during the latter two months the Red General Staff, now manned by conscripted ex-Regular officers, made every effort to concentrate a full division of their troops on the metalled road that led through Bajgiran into Persia. This would give them scope to utilize their armoured cars, heavy artillery, motor-lorries, and aircraft, to which we had nothing to oppose. The insurrection that they reckoned Khuda Verdi Sardar would be the leader of was intended to divert our troops and our attention from the decisive point. Meanwhile, the influx of deserters and refugees, often frost-bitten and in the sorest straits from hardships and privations, continued. We even got a young Serbian officer from Siberia, who explained to us the real meaning of an extraordinary piece of Bolshevik propaganda. After Kolchak's retreat from Perm, the Reds secured a number of prisoners, whom they paraded in the streets of Tashkend in British uniforms, with the lion and unicorn on their buttons, and in our web equipment. The Soviet newspapers made great play with this in their leading articles, calling the thousand or so captives "Tommy from Tomsk." The ignorant Sarts and other natives of Turkistan, and even the Austrians and Russian mujiks who saw them, seemed to believe they were British soldiers. The Serbian lieutenant explained that they were Mongol Buriats (Kara-Buruts) of the Menshevik Army clothed and equipped by the Allies, and their ignorance of any language but their own had helped the Bolsheviks in this very typical piece of deceit. In February a quaint incident happened which threw some new light on Kurdish temperament. The Kurds were always very friendly and cheery towards us,

no doubt from a subconscious recollection of their Nordic ancestry. One morning I was riding round the outposts with the new commander of our Kurdish Mounted levy, accompanied by three or four men. Half a mile outside a Kurdish village that we had often visited we came upon, sitting under a boulder by the side of the track, a bevy of some forty comely Kurdish maidens, all in their very best Sunday-go-to-meeting clothes, and coiffed with the snow-white voluminous headgear that reminds one of the ladies of a medieval court. When we got closer they suddenly sprang out at us with loud cries, seized our bridles and stirrups, and hauled us off our horses by main force. My old mare, who would have eaten the face off any man who ventured to lay violent hands on her bridle, took it all quite calmly from her own sex, doubtless being in league with them. When the din and chatter subsided it was explained to us that this was a Kurdish New Year custom; for the first ten days of the year the ladies chased the men of the village out to roost on the hill-sides, whilst they picquetted the track, seized any stranger and made him pay his footing. This little ceremony over, we were allowed to go upon our way. My patrols and mapping-parties seemed to fall into a good deal of this sort of thing during this ten days. By a strange chance one morning a patrol, under a N.C.O., a Yusafzai, who had served in the Salient during the first gas attack, came suddenly round a corner to encounter a little tattered, footsore group in *bleu horizon*. They saluted the N.C.O. with a "Bon jour." He replied in the same language, which rather startled them. Then it turned out that these were several Algerian and Moroccan soldiers who had escaped from the Reds, and of whom three had served in the Salient in April, 1915, alongside our own division.

In July the Afghan menace had been lifted from the Soviet, and Khuda Verdi Sardar's insurrection was allowed to blaze out. One of our young subalterns and the doctor were visiting a detached post some 22 miles over a rough, rocky pass from Headquarters, and that evening they found themselves in the midst of one of the gun-runnings of Khudu, as we now called him familiarly and for short. A night scuffle was the sequel in a narrow defile, in which the subaltern became the first casualty. In a few hours the whole countryside was in flames, and every ragged adherent of the chief's that owned a three-line rifle or a Territorial Lee-Enfield hurried on his shaggy stallion to join the standard of his leader. My little patrols, dotted all over the countryside, moving boldly, yet warily, through hostile valleys, concentrated at Jiristan, where the subaltern's skirmish had taken place. Hustled by their two or three Regular Pathan N.C.O.'s, our Kurdish levies, who to a man remained true to their salt, soon had the ramshackle buildings put into a state of defence. In a day or two they were reinforced by a couple more

troops of the levies under Captain Cassim Shah. Meanwhile the Red Army and a Pan-Turk force called the "Adalat" continued to mass in our front. Jiristan was invested by several hundred of Khudu's Kurds, and the Red Army waited for an opening. Soon the garrison at Jiristan began to come to the end of their scanty stock of ammunition. An overbold young Punjabi Lance-Dafadar attempted to bullock his way through the defile with a couple of new loads for them, but lost nearly all his half-dozen men in the first close-range burst of fire from the well-armed Kurds. The arrival of a company of young Punjabi infantry reinforced the company of Indians already at outpost Headquarters, and made things a little easier. It was urgently necessary to relieve Jiristan. On account of the imminent advance of the Soviet forces, none of the unwounded British officers could leave Bajgiran. The platoon commanders of the Indian company had no experience of hill fighting, while those of the newly arrived Punjabis did not know the country; so it fell to my Wurdi-Major (Assistant Adjutant), a very capable Pathan officer of the Kuki Khel, to lead the tiny relieving column.

He disposed of a couple of sections of Kurdish horsemen as his cavalry; his artillery was represented by a Lewis gun and its team of Regular Khatak gunners, and a bombing squad of my own men of the Guides; the infantry of the force was a platoon of Mongol-Hazara foot levies, whilst his chief of staff was a scarred Yusafzai N.C.O. of few years but many campaigns.

They marched out in the afternoon of July 12 at twenty minutes' notice. A very few miles brought them into the mouth of the valley and in touch with the enemy, and here they picked up the wounded of the first patrol. Covering their advance with a Lewis gun, bayoneteers and bombers cleared spur after spur and knoll after knoll, driving the Kurds up the cliff-walled valley before them. The situation was very ticklish, since just over the frontier a few miles to the Wurdi-Major's right was a force of 4,000 under Turkish officers, adherents of Enver Pasha; to his left was the tumbled, tower-dotted valley of Ogaz, the hotbed and nest of the revolting tribesmen. The Pathan officer accepted his risks and devised a new method of minor tactics to deal with the new situation, for picquetting on the recognized frontier plan was clearly impossible from the very few men he had in his force. Instead of this he used his Lewis gun from alternate positions on each side of the valley to fire obliquely across it, and to cover the advance of his bayonet-men to drive the Kurds successively out of their sangars.

They fought and marched all that night, and it was early morning before they could snatch a few hours' sleep under cover of their sentries, still within shot of the enemy on the slopes of the pass itself. Next day they made good the pass and spent many weary hours,

panting and sweat-stained, hunting Kurds out from crannies and behind rocks on the western slopes. Very early next morning they stormed the little thatched village of Namanlu, Khudu's headquarters, and the flames of the burning homesteads lit up the narrow valley. The youthful Khatak Lance-Naik, who commanded the Lewis gun, judged a range of fully 800 yards to a hair, and a well-aimed burst of fire from his weapon killed seven Kurdish leaders, the mainstay of the besiegers. This broke the back of their resistance, and in a few minutes the mounted men of the relieving column were galloping across the mile or two of level fields that separated them from Jiristan. The bold action and excellent tactics of the Wurd-Major were a death-blow to the revolt; most of the young Kurdish chiefs who had followed him now came to us and explained naïvely how they had been led astray. Khudu fled to his castle, buried away in the rugged hills near Shirwan, where he was surrounded by Persian troops. Red Army Headquarters were sorely disappointed, and got rid of their spleen by means of rude messages to Khudu. The whole affair was irregular in the extreme, and a charming change from the formalism and cut-and-dried, unskilled warfare of the Western front. I went out myself a day or two later with a little column that was sent to clear up any remains of opposition in the Bardar Valley, and as we came back after a long day at dusk I tramped through a Kurdish hamlet at the head of a wild-haired platoon of Khataks; suddenly a tall, sheep-skin-bonneted Kurd happened suddenly upon us from round a corner. He looked at me and ejaculated in Turkish: "Janum! Aghri Bashi!" as one who should say: "Good Lord! Here's the head brigand himself!"

Very soon Khudu fled to 'Ashqabad, and we received orders to evacuate North-East Persia. We said good-bye to our many friends, Persian, Kurdish, and Turkoman, sorrowfully, for we had had many pleasant times together, even if events had been somewhat exciting, and even if we did not always see eye to eye with everybody.

The last stage in our wandering was the march of nearly 800 miles back to the single-line railway that now traverses Western Baluchistan. We soon forgot the scorching desert and the weary climbs over the devastating and barren backbones of the mountain ranges of Khurasan in the fleshpots of Quetta.

During its three years' campaigning my little detachment had marched nearly 9,000 miles in many remote regions of Central Asia. Yet I think that it is not overstating the case to say that all these hundreds of marches and these visits to strange cities and to uncharted valleys and lung-racking climbs, over untrodden ice-bound passes, was yet but an infinitesimal portion of the great and unsung work that has been carried on by the Corps of Guides incessantly and unremittingly during the last eighty years, and one that is not fully

known to most officers of the Frontier Force itself, let alone those new arrivals into the higher spheres that "know not Joseph."

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—Before asking you to join in the vote of thanks to Captain Blacker, I should like to know if there is anyone present who wishes to make any observations, or ask any questions on the very interesting lecture we have just heard.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. YATE: I would like to say a word or two. Our lecturer mentioned Kalát-i-Nádiri. He said, I think, that during the last 150 years very few Europeans had been inside it. As I happen to be one of those few, I thought I would rise for a moment. I would also like to refer to what ought to be interesting to this Society—that is, the reference the lecturer made to the Mission to Kashgar in 1873. The only member of that Mission who, to my knowledge, survives to-day is General Sir E. F. Chapman, K.C.B.,* Colonel-Commandant R.A., for a number of years a member of this Society. Two others—General Sir Thomas Gordon and Colonel Sir Henry Trotter—have been Chairmen of Council, and therefore this Society is well associated with the first British Mission sent from India to Kashgar. At that time an adventurer named Yakub Beg was endeavouring to substitute Mahommedan for Chinese rule in that quarter, and we, in view of Russian ambition, thought it politic to send a Mission up to him. That was the Mission of 1873, under Sir Douglas Forsyth.

With regard to Kalát-i-Nádiri, I had in June, 1885, left the Afghan Boundary Commission near Herat, having to go back to India via the Caspian, Caucasus, Constantinople, and the Red Sea. I was very anxious to see Kalát-i-Nádiri, which from a physical point of view is a singular formation, and is also of great interest as being associated with the great conqueror Nadir Shah. I stopped a day or two with Abbas Khan, who was then the British agent in Meshed, and to him I said: "Do you think it is possible for me to get admission to Kalát?" He replied: "I will give you an introduction to the Commandant." With that introduction I marched up about 80 miles, camped outside the Arghawan Shah Gate, and sent it in to the Commandant. To my great satisfaction, I received a most polite invitation to come in. I went in, and spent three very pleasant days there, my host, Sartip Abdullah Khan, a Persian of rank and wealth, treating me with all courtesy and kindness. I wandered freely everywhere, and was specially taken to the northern slopes of this curious natural fortress, which is an oblong of about 50 miles in circuit, and from thence I looked down upon those plains of Central Asia of which Captain Blacker has set before us some excellent pictures. My description of Kalát-i-Nádiri appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* on

* I have since heard from General Sir E. F. Chapman that Colonel John Biddulph is also living.—A. C. Y.

August 27, 1885, and is buried there. Lord Curzon of Kedleston refers to it, as also to those of MacGregor, O'Donovan, and Valentine Baker, in his "Russia in Central Asia" and in his "Persia," vol. i., p. 123, where he tells us of his great disappointment at not being admitted to see the interior of this Nature-built fortress when he went there in the autumn of 1887. Lord Curzon's description of Kalát-i-Nádiri in his "Persia" (vol. i., chap. vi.) is *the* best. It is, of course, a compilation from all available sources. Among descriptions by travellers who have visited Kalát, that of MacGregor is the most thorough. The rough plan which I put in my "Afghan Boundary Commission" map of 1886 gives, I think, a fair idea of the place.

The CHAIRMAN: If nobody else wishes to address the meeting, I think I shall meet with your full concurrence in expressing our very best thanks to Captain Blacker for the interesting lecture which he has given us. He has related episodes and adventures which I think none of us had heard of before, and the results of which, and the manner in which he undertook them, reflect the very greatest credit on himself and the small force under his command. (Applause.) I wish to present our most hearty thanks to Captain Blacker for the lecture he has been good enough to give us this evening. (Renewed applause.)

This ended the meeting.

THE QANUN AL ARADHI*

By E. B. HOWELL, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

THE words "Qanun al Aradhi" mean the "Law of the Lands," or the "Land Code." They are Arabic words, and I prefer to pronounce them in the Arab fashion, as they became familiar to me in that guise during the four and a half years which I spent in Iraq (Mesopotamia). For the last two years of that period I was in charge of the Revenue Department, which is directly concerned with the land and the public revenue derived from it. The name is an Arabic name, but the legislation to which it applies is, of course, Turkish legislation. The object of my paper is, then, to give you some account of the Turkish land and land revenue system as we found it in Iraq, and to draw some comparisons between it and the system which has been evolved in British India.

"Land revenue," I know, has a repellent sound about it, and those who have turned out on a cold winter night to listen to a lecture on so unattractive a subject deserve at the outset the cordial thanks of the lecturer. Land revenue seems to us a thing altogether remote from our daily lives. We inhabit an island richly endowed with minerals. Harbours abound upon our coasts; and our geographical situation offers almost every imaginable advantage. Our national prosperity therefore depends, or perhaps I should say, used to depend, mainly on the sea, on coal, on shipping and on commerce. Comparatively few of us own any portion of the earth's surface or take any direct part in the cultivation of crops. Amongst us the days are wellnigh forgotten when the State, or the Sovereign as the embodiment of the State, was the universal landlord, although, as you are aware, there are those in our midst who desire to restore that condition. For the present, however, it is not so, and it is not the proceeds of any land tax that form the sheet-anchor of our national finances. Our position in this respect is exceptional, and for us it requires a strong effort of the imagination to conjure up a picture of conditions as they are in countries where the State takes the direct interest of a partner in all the operations of agriculture. It does so in most Eastern countries, and the revenue systems of those countries have therefore an enormous political importance. "The Political

* Lecture given before the Central Asian Society on December 8, 1921, Lord Carnock in the chair. Before Mr. Howell commenced his lecture, the Honorary Secretary, Lieut-Colonel A. C. Yate, read out the names of sixteen new members who had that day been elected to the Society.

Officer," as it has been written, " may reserve his suavity for princes; the magistrate has terrors only for the breakers of the law; the wisdom and integrity of the judge are of little direct benefit to those who have sense enough to compose their differences at home. But the tax-gatherer, like death, knocks at every door, and upon those who control that unloved functionary chiefly depends the stability of every Oriental administration."

Nor is this true only of Oriental governments. It is generally admitted that an oppressive taxation, of which the chief burden fell upon the land, largely contributed to the decline and fall alike of the eastern and western empires of Rome. Now we know surprisingly little about the details of the finances of the Roman and Byzantine Empires, but we do know that land revenue was one of the chief heads in their budgets, and we do get a glimpse here and there of their methods. The Greek historian Dio Cassius (A.D. 487) records that the dictator Julius Cæsar, shortly before his death, passed an order for the commutation into a fixed money payment of the tithe and other dues paid upon their lands by the provincials of Asia, and so he "got rid" (*ἀπελάσεν*), or perhaps only hoped to get rid, of the tax-farmers, whose operations during the later years of the Republic had been such a crying scandal. It may be remarked in passing that this order is possibly by no means unconnected with the Dictator's murder. For the Roman nobility, the honourable Brutus prominent among them, were much mixed up with the tax-farming syndicates, and made huge sums of money out of the connection. Be this as it may, Cæsar gave the order, and was duly murdered. A period of civil war followed upon his death, in which, as we may suppose, effect was not given to his benevolent intention. It fell, therefore, to Augustus, after he had consolidated his position, to carry out the scheme, and thus "It came to pass in those days that there went out a decree from Cæsar Augustus that all the world should be taxed. And this taxing was first made when Cyrenius was governor of Syria." The passage means, of course, not that taxation and Christianity came simultaneously into a world previously unacquainted with either, but that the birth of the Founder of Christianity happened to coincide in time with what in Indian official parlance we should call "the first summary settlement of land revenue" in the province of Syria.

Whether it was devised in this settlement or not, in later times the Romans took as the unit of assessment a thing which they called the "jugum." Jugum is the same as our word "yoke," and from the point of view of the settlement-officer it meant a piece of land—

"As much as two strong oxen
Could plough" . . .

not from morn to night, but in the ploughing season for the crop under

preparation. Consequently, though for assessment purposes a fixed unit, in terms of land it denoted a variable quantity, according to conditions of soil, climate, and crop. I mention this jugum because I believe that it may turn out to be a good instance of the tenacity of life with which land revenue arrangements seem to be endowed. The jugum was the basis of assessment in the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire, Iraq among the rest. When these regions passed from beneath the eagles to Persian or Parthian hands I believe that the jugum survived, and that the Persians translated its name by their word "juft," which has the same meaning. This name later on the Turks in turn took over, and the curious may find what seems to be the Roman jugum defined in Art. 131 of the Turkish Qanun al Aradhi, which deals with the "chiftlik." In parts of Iraq the equivalent Arabic word "fiddan" still preserves the same meaning, and is still used as a basis of assessment.

I am inclined to admit the identification of the Roman jugum with the Turkish chiftlik and the Arab fiddan, and I believe that in other points too the Turks have preserved the nomenclature and the practice of Rome and Byzantium. But I am aware that identification or grounds of resemblance can easily be overdone. Similar problems give rise to similar solutions all the world over, and because two civilizations have found the same solution it does not always follow that one borrowed from the other.

The general resemblance between the Roman and the Turkish systems of land tenure is, however, I think, too close to be ascribed wholly to coincidence. The basis of both systems really consists in the recognition of varying degrees of limitation on the plenary right of ownership and the division of land into classes accordingly. The classification of lands on this basis which is given in the introductory articles of the Turkish Qanun corresponds very strikingly with that set forth in the second book of the Institutes of the great Roman lawyer Gaius, who lived in the third century of our era. At one end of the scale under this classification we find land in which the plenary right of ownership has been recognized by the State as vesting in an individual proprietor. The Turkish law, using the terminology of the religious law of Islam, calls such land "mulk"—i.e., "property" in the full sense of that word. Mulk land remains subject to a land tax, unless specially exempted, and on the failure of all heirs revert to the treasury. Otherwise the State has nothing to say to it, and the proprietor can dedicate, sell, pledge, mortgage, or give it away at his pleasure. The next class is that which the Romans called "ager publicus" and the Turks "aradhi amiriyah," or, more shortly "miri." The title of the State originates by conquest, and the bare ownership—Roman "dominium," Turkish "rakbah"—remains vested in the State. A private person can only acquire a right

possession (Latin "possessio," Turkish "tasarruf") in such land. Under the Roman law he could not acquire this by user as against the State. Under the Turkish law he can, unless he is incautious enough to admit "that he took possession of the land without any right when it was vacant." He has to pay the State dues on such land, and these consist of "the tithe and other taxes." If without valid excuse he leaves his land uncultivated for three continuous years, his right perishes, but he has the option of buying in again at a figure below the market price. With the permission of the State, a possessor whose right has been recognized, though he cannot sell, can "vacate" for a price paid by another party, who thereupon receives the vacated right. He cannot mortgage, but, with official permission, he can make temporary transfer of the land to a creditor, either for a fixed period or until the extinction of the debt. Foreclosure may result from this, and the temporary transfer may become permanent. Without official permission the possessor cannot dig clay for bricks or tiles, build, plant trees or vines, or bury a corpse. I do not say that all these rules applied also to the Roman possessor, but parallels here and there can be traced. The table of succession prescribed in the Turkish law for the devolution of rights in State land is altogether different from that laid down in the religious law for succession to private property. The circle within which a right of succession is recognized is narrower, and on the failure of heirs within the prescribed degree the State resumes, though it recognizes what is in effect a sort of right of pre-emption on favourable terms—first, to those who have inherited from the deceased mulk trees or buildings on the land; second, to co-possessors; and third, to inhabitants of the same locality who are in absolute want of land.

The third class of land is land in respect of which a dedication to some pious use has been made. The Turks call this "mauqafah," and it corresponds pretty closely with the Roman "ager sacer" or "religiosus." With regard to mauqafah land it must be noticed that the dedication may be in respect either of the State right in it or of the individual right, or both. No dedication purporting to affect the State right can be made except by or with the permission of the head of the State, whether the Roman Cæsar or the Turkish Sultan.

There remain two classes under the Turkish law—"aradhi matrukah" and "aradhi mewat"—for which the Roman law had no especial names, though it recognized them both. Aradhi matrukah comprises two classes—(1) lands left for public use, such as highways and the like; (2) the common lands of a village or other community. Aradhi mewat means dead lands, and is thus defined as "land which is not in the possession of anybody and has not been left for the use of the public. It is such as lies at such a distance from village or town that the loud voice of a person from the extreme inhabited spot

cannot be heard—that is, about a mile and a half to the extreme inhabited spot, or a distance of about half an hour.” According to this standard the bulk of the land in Iraq would be correctly classed as *mewat*, but the term is not in general use there. The definition, I may say, is taken from the translation by Mr. F. Ongley, which has the merit of having been made direct from the Turkish original.

With regard to such things as mines, quarries, salt-pans, fisheries, and forests, the Turkish law generally follows the Roman in classing them as State property. As under the Roman Empire, they are usually worked by contractors to whom some sort of monopoly is often given. Pastures, too, are as a rule treated as public property under both systems, and a grazing tax at so much a head is recovered from those concerned on account of animals using them.

In Republican times the management of the Roman *ager publicus* was in the hands of the censors, who fixed the rate of assessment by what was called their “*lex dicta*.” This held good for the “*lustrum*” for which it was made, a period which very early came to be set at five years. In the eastern provinces, where Greek was the official language, *κάνων* was the accepted equivalent of *lex*, and it is perhaps not unduly fanciful to detect the same term still surviving in the title of the law which I have chosen as my subject to-night. One may even catch an echo of it in India in the name “*qanungo*,” the title of a class of land revenue official. Under the early Roman Emperors, when the administration was at its best and direct collection was the rule, the public domain throughout the Empire was carefully surveyed and mapped and a record of rights of some kind was made. The office where these documents were preserved was known as the “*tabularium Cæsaris*,” which I should like to identify with the Turkish “*daftar khaqani*.” This organization postulates a numerous and reasonably efficient staff, which, as we know, was maintained throughout the Byzantine period, though its efficiency naturally varied greatly at different epochs. The Byzantine bureaucracy, in so far as it was non-military, survived the Turkish conquest, and the French scholars Rambaud and Diehl have shown that in many cases Turkish official titles are but translations of those borne by their Byzantine predecessors.

There is another respect in which the revenue systems of the Roman and the Turkish Empires are alike, and that is the constantly recurring tendency to farm the taxes. There are some taxes which, I agree, can best be recovered in this way, but resort to it in connection with land revenue seems to be the hall-mark of a weak executive, served by officers whom it does not trust, and perhaps further perplexed by currency fluctuations. No other origin than pure coincidence need be sought for this resemblance. But it is instructive to note how strong is the tendency under both empires, as also under

the Moghal Empire in India during the period of its decline, for those who begin by making themselves responsible for the land revenue, whether mere tax-farmers or not, to develop into territorial magnates.

Enough has, I think, been said to indicate the main source whence the Turkish system is derived. But it is not the sole source. During the period while the Turks of various hordes were rising to the mastery of the Middle East, they were exposed to another and a wholly different set of influences. They enter the limelight of history pagans. They hold the stage as the bulwark and the champions of Islam—a position which, as we have cause to know, they have not even yet wholly relinquished. Now, the religious law of Islam, perhaps through the influence of the famous schools of Berytus (Beirut) may, in administrative matters, be under some obligation to Roman models. But it is animated by a wholly different spirit, and naturally the two influences have often been in mutual opposition. In matters connected with the land, as in other spheres, the Turks have found it convenient to develop ever more and more the Qanun, the law of human origin, which can be amended when necessary, and to circumscribe the activity of the other. A third influence, which has been increasingly potent since the beginning of the nineteenth century, is the desire to imitate modern Europe. France especially has been taken as a model, and the Turkish Land Code, like the Majallah or Civil Code, the Administrative Code, and the Code of Commercial Law, all of which appeared during the middle part of the century, owes a great deal, at least in form, to the Code Napoléon.

The Land Code consists of the Land Law itself, which was promulgated in 1858, and a number of subsidiary enactments, which appeared during the next twenty years. The objects aimed at in this body of legislation seem to have been fourfold:

1. Security to the cultivator—the keystone of agricultural prosperity.
2. The resumption by the State of the right and duty of direct dealing with all possessors of State lands.
3. The removal, so far as State lands are concerned, of distinction between Moslem and non-Moslem revenue-payers.
4. The more efficient protection of State rights and interests in such lands, in the management of which the State, acting through the Ministry of Tapu, obviously contemplated taking an active part.

Before we proceed to such further examination of the code as is necessary, a word of explanation as to this Ministry of Tapu is unavoidable. As we have seen, the Turks inherited an elaborate Department of Land Records from the Byzantines. Sultan Suleiman, called the Magnificent (A.D. 1520 to 1566), whose reign marks the zenith of the Turkish Empire, and who was in his day beyond question the most powerful ruler in the world, caused this machine to be thoroughly

overhauled and reorganized. At the same time he divided his dominions into twenty-nine governments, over each of which he set a Pasha, and each of which, in matters affecting the land at least, he allowed to maintain its own separate Qanun-Namah, or book of customary law. At the same time something like a survey was carried out, and the chief archives of the Doomsday Book thus brought into being were housed in the head office of the department, the Daftar-Khanah, at Constantinople, while documents of less importance were filed at the local centres of administration. The instrument thus prepared by Suleiman naturally shared in the general decline of Turkish institutions which followed his demise, but two attempts to revive its efficiency and to codify the divergent Qanun-Namahs had already been made before that with which we are now concerned. These had proved abortive, and it was hoped that on this occasion, by placing the department in the charge of a special ministry, better results would be obtained. An Arab official of my acquaintance has suggested that the name of the ministry may be derived from the Greek *τόπος*. We know that in the eighth century A.D. the word *τόπος* was used to denote a man's "holding" of land. For it occurs in this sense in the famous *Νόμος Γεωργικός*, or Farmers' Law, which is attributed to that century. Nevertheless, the derivation seems to me fanciful. But whether it is correct or not, the connotations of the word *Tapu* are of such importance that I shall quote to you in full the article *sub verbo* "Tapu" in Redhouse's Turkish Lexicon:

"*Tapu*.

- (1) An act of homage.
- (2) Acknowledging oneself a vassal, accepting conditions of service of a lord, sovereign, or government, especially by the acceptance of a feudal fief.
- (3) A title-deed of a feudal fief, formerly given to a yeoman by his superior lord.
- (4) A title-deed of the freehold of a landed estate delivered by the office of the Ottoman Doomsday Book (Daftar-Khanah).
- (5) The fee payable for a title-deed.

Tapu-sanade.

A copyhold title-deed of a landed estate held under the Ottoman Sultan or Government.

Ardh tapu.

Crown land held by any proprietor in fee simple.

[*Ardh*] *ba tapu*.

(Land held) under a title-deed delivered by the Daftar-Khanah authorities.

Haqq tapu.

(1) The rights and conditions on which crown land is held by a proprietor.

(2) The fee for delivery of a title-deed called Tapu."

Now, ladies and gentlemen, I hope you all clearly understand what Tapu means. At any rate, if you do not, you have the satisfaction of reflecting that you know as much about it as Redhouse.

The Land Law is not long. It contains 132 articles, divided between the introduction, which we have already examined, and three books. Its provisions are not applicable to mulk land and true waqf land—i.e., mulk land dedicated to pious uses. The first book deals with State lands in four chapters:

1. Concerning the Nature of Possession.
2. Transfer of State Lands.
3. Devolution of State Lands by Inheritance.
4. Escheat of State Lands.

Book II. similarly treats of land classed as *matrukah* and *mewat*. Book III. contains miscellaneous provisions. I have already given to you the substance of Book I. To what I have said I have now only to add that the declared object of the statute, read in conjunction with the other Acts above mentioned, is to compel every occupant of land or immovable property, whether he is a plenary owner of mulk or a possessor of State land, to take out a proper Tapu sanad for what he occupies; second, that no penalty is attached to the omission to comply with this direction; and third, that since ten years' undisputed occupation of State land entitles the occupant to a title-deed free of charge (other than departmental fees), there seems to be no great need for anyone to bother himself about getting one. I would also say that while the Imperial Government declared the statute to be in force from date of promulgation throughout the Ottoman Dominions, the Minister of Tapu, by subsequent departmental circular, interpreted the articles relating to the acquisition of title by ten years' undisputed occupation to be inapplicable, both as against the State and as against a third party, in Iraq. Finally, the articles which restrict the powers of the possessor of State land have all been repealed by subsequent enactment, though this was not generally known in Iraq. The Act therefore, although no doubt an honestly conceived attempt to improve conditions of land tenure, has to a great extent in practice broken down. So far as Iraq is concerned, it seems to have had just enough spark to enable it to backfire, as well-intentioned measures so often do in the East. For Iraq it would have been better if it had broken down altogether and at once, for its operation there has wrought incalculable mischief. I should explain

that, although this is not stated in the Act, the intention seems to have been that a Tapu sanad should not be issued until all disputes regarding the land in question had been finally settled, and that a sanad, once issued, should be indefeasible. Whether such a result would have been possible elsewhere in the Ottoman dominions—or, indeed, in any old inhabited country—or not, I cannot say. But in Iraq it was lunacy to expect any such thing. Conditions in Iraq may be summed up in one word—Instability. In the first place, the two rivers on which the life of the country depends are and have throughout the historic period been in a state of highly unstable equilibrium. Subject to a violent annual flood, heavily charged with silt, they run upon causeways of their own making, and the minimum of human interference, with a view to irrigation, is apt to have the most devastating consequences. Over a great part of the country agriculture is no less dependent on flood protection than on irrigation, and flood protection is an arduous and risky business. Even where irrigation and flood protection have been combined, the agencies of salt and silt are at once let loose to set a period to the term for which the same lands can be cultivated from the same canal. Altogether apart from floods and from the chances of the river wholly changing its course, agriculture is also unstable by reason of the numerous pests to which it is exposed. Again, there is economic instability. The Arabs, before they settled in Iraq, had been nomads for generations, and they have never wholly divested themselves of the nomadic instinct and habit. There is no pressure of population on the soil. On the contrary, the possible cultivators are all too few for the limitless acres capable of cultivation. Finally, there has always been political instability. It was not until the middle of the sixteenth century that the Ottoman Turks conquered the country, and they have since more than once had to dispute with Persia for its retention. At times of crisis they have been able to put strong forces into the field, but they have never held the country in such strength as to be irresistible. They have never made any real attempt to break the power of the Arab tribes, or to render the tribal system obsolete by securing life and property without it. Iraq is a country of vast spaces, unmapped, unregistered, and unknown. Here with their herds of camels and their flocks of sheep dwell the Arabs, often at war, and always at feud, amongst themselves. Here and there they scratch the ground to grow sufficient wheat and barley for their needs; but the cornlands of one year are often the desert of the next. There are thousands of date-growers, it is true, and a few favoured regions where rice can be grown. But even here the water-supply is always shifting to and fro, and its movements provide a never-failing bone of contention, should other causes of quarrel fail. Numerous small towns dotted about the country furnish the markets which the tribesmen need; but these are scarcely

less ephemeral than the cultivation. They spring up in a season, and flourish for a generation, perhaps, or less. Then the river takes a turn and goes elsewhere. Forthwith the town is deserted, and in a few years its buildings of mud and brick have crumbled away into shapeless mounds, strewn with broken pottery, and only to be distinguished by the expert eye from the ruins of ancient civilizations. Still, if the Turks had had the wisdom to confine the operation of their precise code to the towns and to the belt of gardens by which most towns are surrounded, and if they had provided a skilled staff to work the system, it might conceivably have been of benefit. As a matter of fact, for reasons which we shall examine shortly, it did not work well anywhere. But in the tribal area such a system was unworkable, and any attempt to introduce it was bound to do harm.

It is Midhat Pasha, Wali of Baghdad from 1869 to 1872, who is generally held to blame for the trouble. Midhat was an honest man, a sincere patriot, and, as you know, a prominent reformer of the doctrinaire school which was in his time predominant in Turkish politics. He had received instructions to reduce the amorphous province to which he had been appointed into shape more in conformity with the symmetrical arrangements which the Turks were then endeavouring to introduce elsewhere. He saw that instability was the curse of Iraq, and, acting according to his lights and with the best intentions, he addressed himself to the correction of the evil. He saw that the tribes lacked security of tenure and had no motive for cultivating properly. He tried to benefit them, and he thought to do so by setting up the Tapu system. But the Arabs had good cause for looking on the Turks and the gifts of the Turks with suspicion. They feared conscription or some other plan for their undoing, and, with few exceptions, the tribesmen took no advantage of the facilities held out to them. What followed is instructive. The tribesmen held aloof. But others were not so backward. Rich merchants and other men of influence of all kinds, by the payment of small sums, which did not always find their way into the Treasury, obtained title-deeds for huge tracts of agricultural land, with boundaries and areas filled in pretty much at their discretion, regardless of the tribes who all the time remained in actual occupation of the soil. Townsman and tribesman in Iraq had for generations been at daggers drawn, and the creation of a large class of possessors of State lands from among the townsmen, with a perfectly good legal title, which relegated the tribesman to the position of a tenant at will, greatly increased the mutual hostility of the two classes. But the tribes lacked cohesion, and were not always ready to be openly defiant of authority. The Shaikhs, their natural leaders, were often bought with the land, and the purchaser was often content at first to bide his time. When the authorities were complacent and strong enough to enable him to

recover the share of the produce due according to custom to the landlord, he recovered it or something less. When times were adverse, he would come to terms with the tribal Shaikh, to whom very often he would lease his rights for a fraction of their nominal value. In some areas, such as the neighbourhood of Basrah and Baghdad, where the tribal system had disintegrated, as it does in the vicinity of large towns, the new possessor was generally able to consolidate his position. Here we found a large class of "absentee landlords," very few of whom had ever visited their properties. They were content simply to lease their rights from year to year to middlemen and enjoy the proceeds. Elsewhere, as at Hillah, the tribal element had remained strong, and the possessors, with a few exceptions, who laid themselves out to be good landlords and develop their estates, had existed only on sufferance. On the lower Euphrates events took a slightly different turn. The Muntafiq tribal confederacy, who dwell in that region, had for centuries acknowledged as their overlords a widely ramifying family of Saiyyids from Mecca, known as the "aulad Sa'dun." The tribesmen, who are Shias, while the aulad Sa'dun are Sunnis, had long been content to follow their banners in war and in peace to acknowledge their existence, as being of superior clay, by a not overburdensome tribute from the produce of their fields and gardens. The Sa'dun took out Tapu papers for the tribal lands in the same fashion, and perhaps to some extent in the same spirit, as some men take tickets for a lottery. They bought them in books a hundred at a time. Thus armed, they began to enlarge their old customary dues into a claim for the full fifth, which is the landlord's share in that region. This the tribes would not stomach. They rose in revolt and drove the Sa'dun from their lands. But the rising, in true Arab fashion, was neither simultaneous nor universal. Not all the Sa'dun were expelled. Those whose good sense outweighed their rapacity—a temperament rare amongst Arabs—remained unaffected. These are still living amid the tribesmen, out of whom, in one way or another, they get enough to keep them in considerable state. The rest were at the time of the British occupation of Basrah still in exile—a thankless, thriftless, unamiable crew, who continually brandish their precious Tapu deeds under the noses of all comers, and have only two ideas in life—camels and "mellakiyah" (rent).

In the Mosul Wilayat, which, I suppose, must be counted as forming part of Iraq, the Tapu system did not have such dire results. Conditions there are not so unstable as in the Land of the Two Rivers. But even there it did not benefit the peasantry, as it was intended to do. On the contrary, there, too, persons of influence were able to secure deeds giving them rights of possession in large tracts of country, where they had no real claim, to the detriment of the peasantry. But at least the chaos which now reigns in Basrah and Baghdad has been

avoided. It is difficult to imagine anything more fantastic than the condition to which the Department of Land Records has been reduced in the two last-mentioned wilayats. I have myself seen one Tapu-sanad of a date-garden on the right bank of the Shatt-al-Arab near Basrah, whose western boundary was given as the Red Sea. The Syrian Desert, without further definition, occurs quite commonly as a boundary. I have seen another deed whose boundaries are stated as follows: "On the north, 'al hor' (the marsh); on the west, 'al hor' (the marsh); on the south, 'al hor' (the marsh); on the east, 'al hor' (the marsh)." The marsh in Southern Mesopotamia, it must be remembered, advances and recedes many hundreds of yards every season, and apart from these seasonal variations most marshes in the country are on the move, so that one thing at least can be predicted about them twenty years hence, and that is that, wherever else they may be, at least they will not be where they are now. Fraud as well as ineptitude is often glaringly apparent. According to the Turkish law, if the boundaries of an estate are mentioned in the title-deed, and can be identified, a misstatement as to area in the document is of no consequence. This provision, sound enough in itself, has produced fraud in two different ways. A document will either cite as boundaries insignificant natural features or other things incapable of identification, and will give the area as many thousands of donums. This means that the Tapu clerk was of an accommodating disposition, and was for a consideration willing to add ciphers *ad lib.* to the figure of area without enhancing the price. Alternatively the boundaries will be given as well-known and unmistakable landmarks, lying many miles apart from one another, and the area will be given, with an appearance of great exactitude, as three donums eleven dhras, say two acres one rood and five perches. This means that the clerk, or some higher official, was stupid and knew nothing about the natural features, so he was content to accept the area given as the basis on which fees should be paid. Nevertheless, these preposterous documents, unless fraud can be proved—which, in the absence of the Turkish officials who committed it or connived at it, is practically impossible—are treasured by all the most influential men in the country, and generally regarded as being unassailable in law.

Even State lands where no possessor has been recognized present problems of their own. For the tribal occupants recognize amongst themselves a sort of quasi-right to these, which they call *sakaniyah* (squatters' right). This they are accustomed to sell or mortgage amongst themselves. The transactions are quite equitable, but were never recognized by the Turks.

So much for estates affected by the tribal question. Now let us turn to the small properties and holdings in the regions near the towns, where better results might have been expected. I quote from a report written by the Baghdad Land Settlement Officer early in

1920: "One reason for the non-existence of Tapu documents is clear. The holdings are so small that the expenses of procuring a sanad bear an altogether unreasonable proportion to the value of the holding. One owner of a small plot, which he valued at Rs.200, pointed out that it would cost him Rs.51 to get a Tapu sanad. If this is the state of things to-day, it is scarcely surprising that in Turkish times sanads were not taken out for small freeholds. In spite of this there is one instance of a document for a single tree. But the absence of documents is not the only difficulty. Disputes are not more frequent where they do not exist than where they do. Even where no dispute exists and the facts of the case are quite clear, the Tapu sanads can rarely be made to fit the ground. At the outset it is necessary completely to disregard the points of the compass as given in the sanads. Even the river itself is more often than not incorrectly placed. Nor is the description of the boundaries much better, owing, in the first instance, to the absence of any attempt to keep them up to date. If the eastern boundary of a property is shown in a document 100 years old as 'the garden of Haji So-and-So,' it will almost certainly be the same in the most recent document, though Haji So-and-So's garden has changed hands many times in the interval. A striking instance is one of the Dabbaghiyah sanads, which gives the boundaries as follows: 'East, North, West, and South, Haji Hassan Beg's garden.' Unfortunately, no one now knows which is the garden of Haji Hassan Beg. Nor does any attempt ever seem to have been made to co-ordinate the documents of neighbouring properties. A striking instance is to be found in the sanads for Jaibachi and the surrounding miri lands—Zuraijiyah, Hulaijah, Awairij, and Kuwairish. These all have Jaibachi as one of their boundaries, but no single one of them is mentioned in the Jaibachi sanad. Areas are practically never mentioned. Where mentioned, they are, without exception, incorrect, often to an incredible extent. Length and breadth measurements are sometimes given, but they, again, are always inaccurate."

Land tenure has detained me for so long that I have but little time left to give to the principles on which land revenue is assessed or the methods by which it is collected. A brief comparison between Turkish principles and methods and those evolved in British India may, however, be instructive. In British India, or at least in the northern provinces, with which alone I can claim some measure of personal acquaintance, the unit of land revenue administration is the "mauza," or estate. In the Punjab this is usually a village inhabited by a homogeneous community who cultivate the surrounding lands themselves. Historically these lands are State lands. The members of the village community originally had no right in them, except on condition of paying the land revenue, which meant theoretically the whole surplus after the cultivator had got his livelihood out of the land. What exactly constitutes a livelihood and how much surplus there

may be naturally becomes a matter for bargain between the representatives of the State and the cultivators or their representatives. Hence the use of the word "settlement," and hence also the middleman, who comes between the "raiyat" and the "raj," and contracts for the cultivation of the lands pertaining to one or more villages for a fixed sum, making himself what he can out of the cultivators. As we have already remarked, during the decline of the Moghal Empire resort was had more and more to this practice of farming the land revenue. Those who entered into engagements of this nature were called "zamindars," a name which, strictly speaking, does not mean "landowners" in our sense of the word, but persons responsible for the payment of land revenue. These zamindars were naturally persons of very various origin. I quote from Mr. Briggs, an officer who wrote a book on "The Land Tax in India," published in 1830. "We find the hereditary descendant of a line of princes," says this authority, "the feudal Thakur or Baron, the district collector, the farmer of the revenue, the elderman or mucuddum of the village, and member of the village copartnery, each styled zamindar." On this chaos entered the servants of the Honourable East India Company, their minds quite naturally obsessed with the English notion of private property in land. They found zamindars, and they left landowners, subject always to the obligation of paying the land revenue. The land revenue demand under British rule has been reduced from the whole to half the net assets, and as a matter of practice assessing officers are generally careful to leave a considerable margin even on this standard when framing their calculations. The demand, on this basis, is assessed as a lump sum on the "mauza," or estate, as a whole; and where no intermediary has been recognized, an agreement is made with the representatives of the cultivators, usually the "lambardars," or headmen of a village, for its due collection and payment. In theory each member of the cultivating fraternity is jointly and severally responsible with all his fellows for the payment of the whole sum assessed upon the estate. But the individual share of each member is worked out with great nicety, and though the headmen remain responsible for the whole, in practice joint responsibility as against individuals is seldom, if ever, enforced. As may readily be imagined, it is not possible to determine what are the assets—i.e., the surplus over and above the expenses of cultivation—without exhaustive inquiries and elaborate calculations. If the agreement is not with the cultivating body themselves, and the zamindar, now recognized as a landowner, takes what we may now call his rents in cash, the rental represents the assets, and the determination of the State demand is comparatively easy. But where there are no cash rents it is exceedingly difficult. A huge and ubiquitous staff of "patwaris" and "qanungos" (village recorders and supervisors) is kept to maintain voluminous and comprehensive statistics, and in the light of con-

clusions drawn from their figures the demand is revised from time to time by officers specially appointed for the purpose. Revision is periodic, and the intervals are usually from twenty to thirty years. A record of rights for every estate is maintained, but it is a record of possession intended primarily for the use of the revenue collector, who must know from whom he is to recover. It is not, and does not profess to be, a register of title. Questions of title are decided by the civil courts, and entries in the record of rights have to be altered, when necessary, in accordance with the decision of the court. Where an intermediary has been recognized and has become a landowner, it is not uncommon to find certain classes of cultivators protected against him by the grant of what is known as an occupancy right, which means that the occupancy tenant cannot have his rent enhanced except by order of a revenue court, and cannot be evicted as long as he pays it. All this seems to presuppose four things:

1. The State is prudent, and by giving security to the cultivator and time for him to reap the reward of any improvements which he may make, aims intelligently at keeping the land in good heart.

2. The State is moderate, and endeavours to make others follow its example.

3. The State is prepared to take infinite pains to arrive at an equitable assessment and to distribute the burden of the assessment when made as fairly as it can.

4. It has complete confidence in the integrity of the officers by whom the system is controlled.

A great deal of the credit for these things is no doubt due to the British administration; but though they have improved, they did not create. The model was there before they came, and the same principles upon which they work may be discerned underlying the revenue policy of Akbar. The Turkish Empire never had an Akbar, and the lack of such a one is painfully apparent.

There is no unit in the Turkish system. Their principles of assessment rest upon a decimal basis. How, when, and where the tithe arose is a question of acute controversy into which we need not enter. The prophet Muhammad gave it his sanction, though I have been unable to trace any reference to it *totidem verbis* in the Quran. However, having been accepted by him in practice, it thereby became the standard as between rulers and their subjects when both were followers of the faith of Islam. Before the hosts of Islam had gone very far on their career of conquest, however, statesmanship and religion came into conflict. Their commanders began to give protection to those who submitted but did not embrace the faith. This, naturally enough, they did upon terms, and it was felt as only proper that non-Moslems admitted to protection should pay at a higher rate than the faithful. Hence arose the imposts known as the "kharaj" and the "jiziyah," which, we may suspect, in provinces that had been

Roman, were only the Roman "census soli" and "census capitis" under a new name. Then emerged a further difficulty. If land passed from the hand of a non-Moslem to a believer—a thing desirable in itself—the State lost revenue. It was therefore decided that land once liable to the kharaj remained so, whether it passed into Moslem hands or not, and no less a person than the Caliph 'Umar himself declared that this applied to all lands in Iraq. So the Turks, while preserving a nominal respect for the tithe, had pretty good grounds for weaving embroideries upon it, and this they proceeded to do in a fantasia which makes the uniformity of the Indian half net assets seem very cold and tame by comparison. It should be premised that there is no agricultural land classed as mulk in Iraq, and that the Crown properties, the Aradhi Sanniyah, latterly known as Aradhi Mudawwarah (Transferred Lands), are a law unto themselves. The late Sultan Abdul Hamid acquired enormous areas in Iraq as Crown land. His methods of acquisition were sometimes dubious, but once he had got an estate, he looked after it well, and his memory is highly venerated as a model landlord and father of his people—so differently do the same men appear in different aspects! When in 1908 the constitution was established, the revenues of these lands were transferred from the Civil List to general revenues, but the rates at which the tenants paid remained unchanged. This was never less than 40 per cent. of the gross produce, seed being advanced by the management, and the whole administration of these lands was a curious blend of rapacity and benevolence. Even apart from these, however, the assessment was sufficiently various. On lands watered by rain alone the Turkish Government demanded only the tithe, though towards the close of the nineteenth century they added to this a cess of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., the proceeds of which were to be devoted to the cost of public education and military equipment. They observed the same rule on lands irrigated by mechanical contrivance. From lands upon the Tigris watered by flow they took a double tithe, presumably one for the land and one for the water, though the proportion may perhaps have been derived from the share set aside by the early Caliphs for the Treasury from the spoils of war. On the Euphrates, or at least on that part of it commanded by irrigation from the Hindiyah barrage, on lands where no Tapu possessor was recognized, they seem to have recollected that the State as landlord was entitled to the landlord's share, one-fifth, as well as to tax. So they claimed 40 per cent., and sometimes got it. The basic fact seems to have been that in a country where land was unlimited and cultivators few; where the silt brought down by the rivers entailed heavy annual labour on the clearance of canals, and the annual flood necessitated even greater toil on the erection and maintenance of flood-banks, a population of nomadic origin could not be brought to cultivate at all, unless the cultivator, the fellah, were secured at least a half-share

in the proceeds of his labours. Thus two fractions became rigid—a "cold half" ("nuf barid") to the cultivator, and 20 per cent. payable as tax to the Government ("khums al miri"). The remaining 30 per cent. has always been debatable. Two-thirds of it, or 20 per cent. of the gross produce, are commonly regarded as the owner's share, whether that owner be a private person or the State or the Sultan. The remaining 10 per cent., with or without a slice of the owner's share, is the perquisite of the tribal headman, who alone was in a position to organize labour for common purposes and alone could give protection against aggression. This theory, I think, provides the key to the bewildering variety in the shares of the crop claimed in different parts by the State and the other parties concerned.

The amount to be taken by the State having been somehow or other determined and expressed in a vulgar fraction which everyone could understand, the game of collection could begin. Here, again, methods were multiform. There were few fixed rules, and I believe that most of those who took a hand in the game rather enjoyed it than otherwise. In Basrah and part of Qurnah the virtuous Midhat Pasha had placed a fixed assessment on the date-gardens at so much per jarib of planted land. That was fifty years ago. Many gardens have since come into bearing, and many have disappeared. But Midhat's settlement carries on unchanged. On the Middle Euphrates, when the Government was strong enough for officials to exercise authority without danger to their lives, it was customary to measure the crop. The system of measurement, as may be supposed, was not scientifically accurate. Each donum measured was then assumed to yield a fixed quantity. The yield assumed for wheat and barley was 500 kilos (half a ton) per donum. Allowance for variation of quality was then made, not by reducing the assumed yield, but by proportional deduction from the area measured. In practice this system, which was called "tajbir" (deduction), penalizes the good farmer. One tribe in this region once thought to steal a march on Government by cutting lengths off the measuring ropes. They worked the fraud successfully, but confessed to it afterwards when they found that it had the unexpected effect, not of reducing, but of greatly enhancing the demand. Another common method was that of estimation, like the Indian "kankut" or "tip." The crop was examined by impartial experts, who looked either at the standing corn or at the "baidhar," the heap upon the threshing floor, and calculated the gross yield from that. Given goodwill on the part of the experts, they could produce results of surprising accuracy by this method. But goodwill was not always there. I remember one estimator who came sobbing to the Political Officer to complain that he had been called "Isa bin Miriam" by a Shaikh whose bribe he had refused. When the yield had been calculated, the Government share, one-tenth, one-fifth, two-fifths, or whatever it might be, was put up to auction.

In the wheat belt of the north and east, where there are sturdy village communities, the revenue-payers themselves would often buy in the right to collect their own revenue. It may sound complicated, but in practice this was one of the least objectionable methods used. If the share was not auctioned, the threshing-floor was put under guard, and the corn, or what was left of it after the guard and the cultivators had come to terms, was divided when threshing was finished. Near Baqubah there were traces of assessment on the plough—the fiddan—as already mentioned. In Amarah the country was parcelled out into large tracts, and the right to cultivate, or at least to collect the Government revenues off, these, was auctioned for a fixed term, usually five years. As this was something approaching a fixed demand, it was called “muqata ‘ah,” and the name was naturally extended to cover the tract included in the agreement. Frantic bidding between rival Shaikhs was encouraged, and default was not rare.

A word as to the Turkish administrative system is necessary. Mosul was one wilayat or province, Baghdad a second, and Basrah a third. The Wali, or Governor, of Baghdad, where in the old days the ruling Pasha had been a very important personage, almost an independent potentate, as a rule, but not always, had supervisory control over his colleague at Basrah. Sometimes, indeed, the two wilayats were merged into one, with headquarters at Baghdad. Each wilayat was divided into a number of sanjags or liwas, each under a Matasarraf, and qadhas, each under a Qaim Maqam. There were smaller subdivisions inside the qadha. The Turkish mind apparently did not grasp the principle of subordination in civil administration. So local affairs pertaining to the headquarters of a wilayat were, in theory, dealt with by the Wali himself. It was as if, for example, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab were also ex-officio Commissioner of the Lahore Division, Deputy-Commissioner of the Lahore District, and Subdivisional Officer as well. If we are tempted to laugh at them for this, however, we should recall that until the time of Lord Dalhousie the Governor-General in India was also Governor of Bengal, and that the title Lieutenant-Governor owes its origin to this circumstance. To return to the Turks, the Wali, Mutasarraf, and Qaim Maqam, were executive officials corresponding in status with an Indian Lieutenant-Governor, Commissioner, and Deputy-Commissioner. Each had general control of the non-special branches of the Administration within his area, but to what extent they actually decided revenue questions is not quite clear. The Wali had a revenue official called the Daftardar as one of the departmental chiefs under his orders, and similarly the Mutasarraf or Qaim Maqam had a Mudir Mal under him; but the principles on which they worked are not known to me, or to any authority whom I have consulted. I am also not quite clear as to the functions of the Daftardar and his

subordinates. One thing, however, I am sure of about them, and that is that they had no official connection with or control over the Tapu office, which went about its mysterious business independent alike of the executive and the revenue, regulated only by circulars from the head office at Constantinople. Every executive official had a council, nominally elected, except for the official element, to assist his deliberations. But the council was purely advisory, and had little real power. The elections, of course, were an utter farce.

Land revenue proper appeared in the accounts under two heads—"muqata 'ah" (fixed or farmed revenue) and "'ushr" (tithe). The latter was used irrespective of the real rate of incidence. Besides this there was a wilderness of other taxes, some of which fall within the scope of my paper, while others do not. There was the Wirgiu, or tax on immovables (not collected in Basrah); the Kodah, or grazing tax; the date tax; the fruit tax; the melon tax; the vegetable tax; the wood tax; the fish tax; the tax on reeds and mats; the tax on lime, bitumen, and other minerals, including salt; the tax on oil; the tax on liquorice, gall-nuts, gum tragacanth, and other forest produce; the tax on tobacco; the tax on brick-kilns, and others. There is also the whole subject of municipal taxation. But enough is as good as a feast. We will let them go.

The general Arab verdict on the Turks is "Ma 'indahum al siyasah." (They had no "siyasah.") Siyasah means all or any of those qualities which are apt to accompany intellectual quickness, and may include anything from sympathetic insight to that discretion that is the better part of valour. This may be true. They had their faults. From the economic standpoint their land and land revenue system was about as bad as it could be. But it was congenial to those who worked it, and those who lived under it did not dislike it. Apart from the Tapu nightmare, it was easy to understand and cheap to operate. Under Turkish administration, it must be remembered, Basrah and Baghdad brought in more than they cost, military charges included. Law and order of a kind were to some extent maintained, and when one reflects on the very exiguous means which they employed one must allow to the Turks a "siyasah" of a very high order, which enabled them to keep their end up year after year in so difficult an environment.

On the motion of the Chairman, a most cordial and appreciative vote of thanks was accorded to Mr. Howell for a lecture which exhibited exceptional research and knowledge.

NOTE.—It is regretted that the report of Sir Michael O'Dwyer's important speech commenting on the subject of Mr. Howell's lecture has not been received in time for publication in Part I. of the Journal for 1922. It is hoped it will appear in Part II.—A. C. Y

THE SOUTHERN KURD

BY MAJOR E. B. SOANE, C.B.E.

LITTLE known, feared by his neighbours, a slayer of Christians, merciless in the raid and morose in peace, a creature of lowering brow and dark thoughts, a hater of government and a lover of strife.

In a word, Kurd, with moustachios, cloak, and bloodstained dagger complete—the costume in which most travellers dress him for popular display. Such, indeed, may be his stage properties, but—like many an actor—he is not necessarily in real life the man he appears when made up for the part by imaginative writers who know him little or have but made his acquaintance as a brigand.

As a matter of fact, he is very much what his country makes him. Living among high and difficult mountains, in the deep valleys or up among the crags, in a climate intensely cold throughout a long winter and not unpleasantly hot in the summer, he has the characteristics of most highland people. Society is divided into nomad and settled peasant, the latter predominating in the south. Insecurity has always been a feature of such a life, raids from mountain to mountain one of its component parts. It would seem that comparison with Highland Scotland of the fourteenth century is the nearest parallel to Kurdistan of to-day, and the following disconnected notes and anecdotes may give an idea of some aspects of Kurd character and habit.

Apropos of the Kurd as brigand. When in late 1917 the British occupied Khaniqin (in the extreme south of Kurdistan) a number of brigand bands had to cease operating, to their considerable dissatisfaction, and the outcome of deliberation among them was a deputation to me of large-turbaned individuals in riding-boots, empty bandoliers, and heavy overcoats with scarlet lapels, who sat around the office in the dead silence which in Kurd society takes the place of the compliment-overture of neighbouring peoples.

With characteristic directness Mahmud Beg began:

“Years ago, when you were travelling light and rapid, you were my guest at my little castle of Kanibiz. You know, placed there astride the border, how well I lived. Persian pilgrims going to Baghdad, caravans of goods coming from it, and an occasional raid on a Turkish or Persian post for rifles and ammunition, kept me and

mine in an affluence which enabled me to have the pleasure of adequately entertaining the passing guest, and of sending him on his way with some souvenir.* You lived among us for some years; you know that the most honest and most hardworking section of the people were the brigands. They tilled their fields in peace, kept among the people the taxes the Government would have devoured, and brought in a steady stream of wealth. It was a hard life, but an honest one. Now the canons of your code abolish us, and I find myself looking upon a dismal future, made blacker by reflections upon my responsibility to the rest of the party here, my faithful assistants, some of whom are known to you personally. Since, then, you have made our trade unlawful and taken the bread out of our mouths, you are naturally the man to whom we turn first for assistance. We know that you will want irregular cavalry. We are cavalry, and prepared for any degree of irregularity you may order, and have therefore come to enlist. If it is necessary to refer to the General, you yourself can give the best testimonials on our behalf."

Which said, he lit a cigarette at his own mouth and handed it to me, and the company, after remaining in silence for some minutes more, filed out with no further word than *Khwafta*, the Kurdish "Good-day."

I engaged them; their irregularity was comprehensive and sometimes embarrassing, but it is fair to mention that they ended by gaining the commendation of a critical G.O.C. It is also fair to mention that they returned to their ancient profession when the Arabs revolted in 1920.

Brigandage and outlawry are naturally closely connected. The one is not less worthy than the other. The brigand is a potential outlaw, and it is part of the outlaw's duty to be a practising brigand. Moreover, there are cases where a farmer, feeling himself oppressed or offended by the local government, may declare himself outlaw, and send a message to the local authorities advising them of the fact. Such was the case of one Mahmud Khidhr in 1920, who, having declared himself outlaw, satisfied tradition by formally appearing near the "county town" and carrying off a few worthless animals from a field. When in the course of his wanderings as an outlaw he needed supplies he raided in a neighbouring administrative division. This was quite in order, and should not, under the unwritten law, have been considered a crime. His indignation was therefore bitter when he was pursued across the border one day and attacked. He retaliated by falling upon some Kurdish troops escorting a convoy outside their own division, and thus established precedent for the widening of an outlaw's operations. In another case, an outlaw, who

* On the occasion to which he referred he had pressed upon me a mare, and a typewriter which had been consigned to a missionary in Persia.

had been kept on the move throughout the summer and autumn, pleaded for forgiveness as winter came on, and advanced as a reason the consideration that he had not consummated official outlawry because he had not raided during his term as a fugitive.

The outlaw's life is not a merry one, but at the same time he is fairly secure from capture. The countryside is with him; no village will refuse him a night's lodging and food and information of the movements of Government forces. With a perfect knowledge of the mountains and the extraordinary mobility granted him by his catlike little horse, he usually continues till he is pardoned. If, on the other hand, pardon does not seem to be forthcoming, he will, as winter comes on, descend to the plains and join one of the Kurd aghas there for the winter brigand season, hoping for better times next year.

Such is one class of the Kurd community, the class which has conferred the popular character upon the race. It is inferior numerically, and in parts like Southern Kurdistan, with a predominance of villagers as against nomads, the class is not important nor powerful.

Except for occasional outbursts of temper, the settled Kurd is usually a somewhat stolid fellow, suspicious of innovation, generous and humorous, little touched by the nominal Muhammadanism of the country, living a life centred in his own valley, but seldom selling the rifle which is hidden under the bedding. He is a very poor liar, from whom the truth is easily extracted if he talks at all—and he is the first to admit on discovery that he had tried to lie and failed. If, however, he is determined not to reveal the truth, he stands in a sulky silence and suffers punishment sooner than break it.

Murder is not regarded as a very heinous crime, and quite frivolous reasons are frequently sufficient for its perpetration. I have known of a man killing a total stranger in order to try a new rifle. Fortunately, this is not the usual method of testing firearms.

In the winter of 1919-1920 two men were snowed up in an outlying house of a hamlet near Sulaimani, the capital of South Kurdistan. The house contained the usual store of firewood and some flour, and the two existed till supplies grew low, but, like most humans in similar case, tiring of one another's society. Supplies decreased, the snow still fell, and the day came when the flour was finished and nothing remained of the wood-pile but two pieces of oak. The depressing prospect of cold and hunger worked them up to the point of mutual hatred, and one fell upon the other and succeeded in killing him with one of the last pieces of firewood. The murderer was then seized with remorse and the fear of pursuit (the latter probably predominating) and attempted to escape through the deep snowdrifts. His frozen body was found later near by. The villagers did not con-

sider this affair anything but rather unfortunate, and spent more sympathy on the frozen man than upon the murdered one, who, at least, died warm.

On the other hand, it is pleasant to be able to relate that on the occasion of another and very foul murder by a hedge priest of his mother-in-law, the man's own brother denounced him, and all the villagers who possessed information gave it readily and with a sincere desire to see punishment overtake the criminal. The attitude of the wife was peculiar in this instance. She escaped from her husband and, taking up a position on the main road, intercepted a passing motor-car and demanded a lift into town, where she reported the matter to the police, making a very clear deposition, subsequently proved correct. She accompanied the police to the scene of the murder on the mountain-side and assisted them to find clues, providing such evidence as convicted him at his trial. Her attitude had been one of quiet determination to avenge her mother. Once, however, vengeance was assured by the death sentence, she considered the matter ended, and insisted on feeding and looking after the prisoner till he was executed. She finally married one of his brothers.

Enough, however, of lugubrious reminiscences. Here is a story which shows at once Kurd simple-mindedness and love of a practical joke.

During the deepest snows of 1920, at Halabja in the extreme south, a party was seated round the fire chatting. Conversation turned on the large numbers of sparrows driven into the little town by the cold, and one present, an Englishman, gravely described how in his village the sparrow pest was combated. The principal man present was a local notable named Micha Agha. To him was detailed the method of sprinkling pepper upon stones. By this system the sparrow, mistaking the pepper for food, investigated it, and, inhaling some, sneezed violently and became insensible, when he could be destroyed. No one present had ever had occasion to study the habits of sparrows or to observe the effects of pepper upon them. It was not unnatural, therefore, for Micha Agha and his friends to make considerable purchases of pepper next morning, which they planted upon stones carefully cleared of snow, some of them, like the sparrows to come, sneezing freely. The trap set, the party retired to an upper window, and after watching for some considerable time, they perceived that they in turn were being watched with considerable amusement by the Englishman, with some initiated friends, and realized the nature of the incident.

Some months after, in April, the same party was again assembled. The Englishman, who occupied a little house adjoining that of Micha Agha, was complaining of the hordes of spring fleas in his house, which, as he said, had pushed him out of bed and stamped on him

all night long. Micha Agha expressed some surprise at this, as he said his house was singularly free from fleas—the reason doubtless being that the Englishman's was a very old building of poor brick.

"But," he said, "I am thinking of going to one of the other villages in a few days, and if you like I will try and get Qadir Agha, the landlord of my house, to let to you till I return."

This was arranged after some negotiation and the lease duly signed. The Englishman moved in one evening, after having bid farewell to Micha Agha. In the morning he arose—not awoke, he had been awake all night—and surveyed the floor and walls of his chamber, undulating with multitudes of fleas—surveyed also the tumbledown, tiny place he had exchanged for his new and larger one, and while ruminating upon his folly in being so precipitate, and vowing vengeance upon Micha Agha, was hailed by that same over the dividing-wall.

"Ha! Good-morning!" he beamed, "so we shall not be parted after all; I found I had to stay in Halabja, so took the opportunity to hire your empty house. If you find any fleas in your new abode, why not try a little pepper on the stones?"

No description of Kurdish life would be complete without mention of the status of women in Kurdistan.

Not only are women sometimes farmers and landholders in their own right and as employers, but are on occasion village "headmen." One such was actually appointed as a local official in 1918 in the Piran country, and carried on with great success. The status of the famous Adela Khanum of Halabja, who was publicly decorated in 1919, is renowned. Practically owner of Halabja, and largely responsible for its progress in recent years, she exerted her great influence in British favour in the rebellion of 1919, and after it was quelled received and entertained British Generals openly and with uncovered face (the veil is unknown in Kurdistan), and I recollect her gratified interest at seeing her photograph in *The Times Illustrated Supplement*.

Both in such walks of life and in humbler ones the woman can often do more than hold her own.

A few months ago a local governor sent in a woman under arrest on a charge of wounding her husband by hitting him with a stone. The pair had been harvesting their little wheat-patch together, and the man had called her by an objectionable name during a squabble, whereupon she threw a stone and hit him on the head. She then caught up the sickle and chased him up the hill-side till both breath and anger evaporated. The man himself had not dared to complain, and the woman told the court that, so far from being penitent, she would give him a good flogging if the rest of the wheat was not in when she returned.

However, such incidents are fortunately rare; husbands and wives in villages usually get on very well, and, indeed, are restrained from violence by the danger of individual fights developing into village uproars owing to relatives taking part.

Labour in a mountain village is fairly divided, and one seldom sees the sight, so common among the Persians and Arabs, of the male population loafing while the women drudge. The man has his ploughing, the care of his beasts, his tobacco and fruit culture—in short, all the heavy outdoor work, while he has to carry his fruit and tobacco to market, often involving a journey of two or three days over difficult mountains. In the winter he carries firewood to the town, and these journeys, in deep snow and over passes infested with the grey wolf, are often little short of heroic. The woman's part is the dairying, tobacco-drying, preserving fruits, walnut-picking, and making and mending of all descriptions. The life is hard but healthy, and the food is good, though of the simplest.

There is naturally little amusement in such a life. The only general pastime is the national dance, a slow step-dance in which all join, men and women alike, linked arm in arm in a long crescent-shaped row, which slowly circles round the drum and fife band in the centre.

I suppose the Kurd is unique among Muslim peoples in countenancing and practising mixed dancing for adults, at which the local priest is often present; in fact, in one village I saw it being performed in the yard of the mosque. But in this, as in many other characteristics, the Kurd is very un-Oriental. His mentality and habits are very much more those of the East of Europe than Asiatic.

The lack of fanaticism is most remarkable. The European official is expected to put up for the night in the mosque (if the village possesses one), and the village priest performs his official duties in the same room, undisturbed by the presence of his Christian guest. Nor is the latter asked to vacate on a Friday when the people assemble for public prayer, though as a rule he contrives to be absent. Such freedom of mind is in very striking contrast to the dour fanaticism of the neighbouring Persians, who consider the mosque defiled by the mere glance of a passing European.

Among Muslim communities the removal or destruction of a grave is considered to be highly sacrilegious, but here again the Kurd is not exacting. Last year, in the course of road-making, the alignment was interrupted by a large erection of stones marking the grave of a man fallen in fight. Enquiries led to the discovery of some relatives of the deceased, who were quite willing that the monument be removed and bones displaced if the road-makers would re-erect the cairn somewhere off the road, which was done to their entire satisfaction.

The hospitality of the villager, and indeed of all classes, is of the

highest quality. In touring it is often difficult to proceed more than a few miles each day, for it is impolitic to pass a village without accepting its hospitality, which may range from a cup of tea and some fruit to a heavy lunch or dinner, which, when the party is large, is a very serious strain on the resources of a little community whose wheat has to be fetched from a distance and whose daily life is of the simplest. And if to pass by without partaking be a slight, to make an offer of payment or presents is to arouse real enmity. The habit is so developed that in many villages the headman or local official is kept in a condition of permanent impoverishment.

As the country produces practically everything necessary for life, including homespuns and shoes, there is little marked poverty, and one is often surprised at the extreme paucity of worldly possessions which actually appear to be sufficient to maintain the humbler families.

A case illustrating this came before one of the administrative officers during a tour in the mountains. The man lived in a minute half dug-out, half hut, high up on a crag beside a trickle of water. A sprinkling of soil on the steep slopes afforded space for the cultivation of a crop of wheat amounting to about 4 hundredweight. His tax on this was some 40 pounds of grain, payable at the Government granary. This he conveyed across fifteen miles of very rugged mountain by loading it on his nine-months-old calf.

His principal possessions were a rug, two saucepans, two cows, and the above-mentioned calf, besides a few odd tools. He related how he had had a hen, but had lost it to a roving jackal. His family consisted of his wife and two daughters, and with the aid of the wheat-patch (upon which rice was sown in the summer), the cows, and the not inconsiderable natural products of the mountain-side, they lived somehow. He also possessed a dog, upon which he placed great value, and he described with feeling how it had, during the snow, been attacked by the wolf. He had gone to its rescue with an axe, to little effect, for the savage animal turned upon him, and the situation was only saved by the timely arrival of his wife, who attacked the wolf with a sickle and drove it off.

Not even this simple family was free from domestic trouble. Two years previously the wife had run away and taken refuge with one Nasir Agha, who had eventually reconciled them. This Nasir Agha had fallen in love with one of the girls, and this circumstance, while gratifying enough to the father, was at the same time one of his greatest worries. Nasir Agha being a man of some substance, it would be necessary not only to provide a suitable dot for the girl, but a worthy entertainment at the betrothal feast. The good man's perturbation was not lessened by the proposal of Nasir Agha (who was by way of being a wag) that he would so regulate the numbers at the

party as to make the two cows and calf just suffice, and would then forgo the dot.

It is not unnatural that in this secluded little world ideas of the outside are very hazy. It was not a generally accepted fact that hostilities between Turkey and the British had ceased till well on into 1920, and though in the towns people were moderately well informed as to events in Baghdad, the great bulk of the country-side did not even realize that South Kurdistan was politically connected therewith, many still believing that the country was in the government of Mosul, as in Turkish times.

Nevertheless, with all their backwardness and ignorance, it stands to their credit that in the widespread rising in Mesopotamia of the summer of 1920 it was these people who remained quiet, continued paying their taxes, and even offered assistance against their turbulent neighbours.

REVIEWS

THE RAIDERS OF THE SARHAD. By Brigadier-General R. E. H. Dyer, C.B. London: H. F. and G. Witherby. 1921. Price: 15s. net.

As time goes by, books are published which shed light on campaigns waged during the Great War in remote corners of Asia by small bodies of Indian troops, which generally lacked most of the adjuncts of modern warfare. However, local difficulties, scarcity of men and munitions, have merely brought out the dominant personality of the British officer, which, in war-time, has been proved to be among the most valuable assets of the State. Of this the campaign of General Dyer is a notable example.

In 1916, the British were rightly alarmed at the serious results that would happen if large German missions reached Afghanistan across Persia. A cordon was therefore formed, running from the British frontier at the point where it meets Persia and Afghanistan on the hill termed Kuh-i-Malik-i-Sia, along the Perso-Afghan boundary to Transcaspia, a distance of perhaps 600 miles. The East Persia cordon, as it was termed, was divided into two sections, the smaller or northern being guarded by Russia, and the southern by the British based on Quetta.

In the previous year, the Germans had swept the little British colonies, composed of consuls, bankers, and telegraph officials, out of Central and Southern Persia, and had occupied various centres, among them Kerman. They had sent emissaries in every direction, and especially to the Sarhad, a wild, bandit-infested land, to the south of Sistan, marching with the desert which runs from the Perso-Baluch border, almost to Quetta. The Sarhaddi tribesmen, whose occupation was raiding, were only too delighted to be paid for following their hereditary occupation, with the result that convoys, on which the cordon depended, were cut up, and finally the service was stopped. Unless this state of affairs was speedily changed, the cordon would have collapsed.

Dyer was sent to put matters right. His success was almost miraculous. He gave out, through his secret agents, that the handful of men at his disposal formed the advance-guard of a resistless army. He attacked the Sarhaddis with two guns (they fear guns intensely), and they surrendered. But, in due course of time, they saw through

the bluff, turned nasty, and besieged Dyer in the Persian fort of Kwash, which, until then, had been visited by only two or three travellers, so remote a country is Sarhad. Small but welcome reinforcements of Indian troops arrived in the nick of time, and Dyer immediately reassumed the offensive, and finally forced the wild tribesmen to submit and accept service as "levies."

The whole campaign is a thrilling drama, and will appeal strongly to members of the Central Asian Society.

P. M. SYKES.

TWO YEARS IN KURDISTAN: EXPERIENCES OF A POLITICAL OFFICER, 1918-1920. By Captain W. R. Hay. (Sidgwick and Jackson.)

In the manner, in which this book is written there are faults which the matter—good as some of that is—will be hard put to it to counteract. The author's rather naïve wonder at the multifarious nature of his duties is merely absurd, but his assumption of the tone of a despotic monarch is a serious blemish. No servant of Government should speak of "*my* police" or of "*my* terms" (to rebels); and it is unpardonable to write such sentences as this: "I assured the new chief that as long as he remained loyal to me, I would regard him with the same devotion and treat him with the same favour as I had shown to his predecessor." And finally there is an accumulation of exact detail, important and unimportant, which, admirable as it might be in an official report, will not please the general reader. Even one acquainted to some extent with the places and people found his spirits flag, in the midst of an otherwise exciting story, on being told what Mr. So-and-so did on a given date at three o'clock in the afternoon.

These defects are the more to be regretted in that they probably do a gross injustice to the author, who had a very difficult task to perform, and acquitted himself "to the satisfaction of his superiors." The area with which the book deals is not all, strictly speaking, in Kurdistan, but on the very fringe of Southern Kurdistan, and the author's headquarters were at Erbil, a town mainly "Turcoman" in population. Nevertheless the country population is almost exclusively Kurdish, and the title may be allowed to pass. The book gives a detailed description of these Kurds, their country, their customs and their way of living, and an account of various incidents—some of them too exciting to be agreeable—in which the author took part. The book will be essential to any student of the British occupation of Iraq up to the establishment of the Provisional Arab Government in October, 1920. It gives a glimpse of the good work done by a few of the officers who were flung by force of circumstances into positions of responsibility, often without any training in administrative work, and often—as in Captain Hay's case—entrusted with a district where

the leading officials, being Turks, had fled, and the whole machinery of government had broken down. Captain Hay had the additional disadvantage of being on the border, with tribes wilder than his own as neighbours. There were no troops to enforce the order "of him whose was the order"; and all the time there was wild speculation about strange things called Leagues of Nations, and about a quite new commodity called liberty, which, it seemed, meant no punishment for crime and no taxation. Finally there was a rising in the adjacent districts which shook the power of the Government to its foundations.

A pleasant trait in the book is the author's personal attachment to some of the leading figures in his district. Attractive pictures are given of the Kurdish Agha who, when Government authority broke down, took control in Erbil and saved the situation; and of other Kurdish and Turkish friends of the author; and there is a moving description of the death of Kanabi, the coffee-man, who when he might have escaped the ambush set for his master preferred to proclaim himself the Governor's man and be killed.

The book contains a tribute to Colonel Leachman and other members of the Civil Administration (but J. S. Mann, in some ways the most remarkable of them all, should not have been omitted) who lost their lives in the execution of their duties in Iraq; but the story itself is a tribute to more than one man—British and Indian—who played a gallant part in these troubled regions, and who, if they escaped with their lives, lived in constant risk of losing them.

The book is illustrated with excellent photographs. There is one—a stony hill path "alluring up and enticing down"—which helps to explain the fascination which the country has for Captain Hay.

W. R. B.

AN ADMINISTRATOR IN THE MAKING: JAMES SAUMAREZ MANN, 1893-1920. Edited by his Father. Longmans, Green and Co. 1921. Price: 15s. net.

Of the many biographical books having for their subject a young officer whose life has been lost in the past few years, this is one of the best.

Captain J. Saumarez Mann was one of the later recruits to the Administrative Service of Iraq, and did not join it till 1919. He was one of many sacrificed to the result of what he well describes as "the delays of the Peace Conference, and the well-intentioned self-determinators who knew no facts, no Islamic doctrine and no ethnology."

His letters, from the time of his going to France till his last from Iraq in 1920, picture the very rapid development of the man from the youth, and the courage to admit the prejudices of inexperience. The most noteworthy example of this was the wholesale abandonment of

high theory on nationalistic matters acquired in a university atmosphere when he met real life.

Few young men have the application to write frequently, and still fewer the ability to write well. Mann had both. Though his letters on arrival in Mesopotamia indicate that his first impressions were in no way different from those of most first arrivals in that unbeautiful land, when he arrived at his post at Umm Ba'rur he commenced a series of thoughtful, illustrative letters which enable the reader to see, not only the Arab, his characteristics and country, but the development taking place in the young man set alone to initiate an administration under great difficulties. The fact that he was a born linguist must have facilitated matters for him, but the characteristic by which he is best remembered, his power of converting into active support the liking he inspired in the Arabs, did most for him. Many other officers have been liked well enough, but few could, in time of trouble, reckon upon that feeling moving the Arab to tangible support or assistance.

His letters contain such a mass of well-conveyed impressions of people and life that it is difficult to select from them.

He began by being vastly impressed by Sir Arnold Wilson, and those who know the latter will appreciate the description of him as "very strong, and with a truly Homeric joy in his strength."

The greatest difficulty of the stranger in Mesopotamia was solved for him immediately on arrival at his district. He began by liking the place and people and seeing their humours. There is no other specific for the discomforts and disappointments of life in Iraq.

Of Arab sheikhs he very truly writes: "They are a marvellous mixture of culture and savagery, these old gentlemen, and as they all sat around they formed a pretty picture of crime, intrigue, vice and cruelty." One very wealthy one was soliciting a loan in the hope the British would evacuate before repayment time. Another, equally rich, had been deported for refusing to pay taxes. His neighbour, a most pleasant fellow to meet, "was famous for a vice not mentioned in England, and other notable crimes." Another with seventeen wives and an indeterminate number of sons; and his friend who, having been given sixty thousand rupees to build a dam with the labour of his tribe, built the dam and forgot to pay the labourers. So, as Mann says, "my neighbours are interesting people, even when taken singly."

The first impression of Najaf, that most holy city of the Persians, is an admirable pen picture, but too long to quote. The second impression is irresistible and wholly true: "A city so vicious that the most sober account of it could not be printed in England: one can only say that every vice known to the most unpleasant Greek and Roman authors . . . flourishes there publicly."

"A city of corpses, the bazaar seeing all day an endless stream of bodies, many reeking abominably, uncoffined and only wrapped in rough cloths, being carried from the temple to burial or from the road to the temple."

Shortly after his arrival he unexpectedly met an English lady who is very well known in Iraq. His portrait of her is so true that it is unnecessary to mention her name:

"She was in great form and talked the whole time, full of the most interesting information, for she knows, of course, all the secrets from Constantinople to Afghanistan. . . . It gives quite a new direction to one's views on one's own individual problems to hear her talking about the big general questions of Baghdad, etc. . . ."

His reflections upon the Arab and self-government were interesting, though his conclusions were not always right. In fact, he had believed it impossible for a rising to occur in his own district.

Writing some months before the rebellion, he says: "Any idea of an Arab State is simply bloodstained fooling at present, and this country cannot be handled without some sort of an army in the background." How true is the last sentence we yet may see.

And to close a long tale of quotations I cannot do better than present the following: "It's a sad country in this way, that it's utterly without any self-consciousness, and utterly without a ghost of public spirit."

Mann was killed by a stray shot at the siege of Kufa, and the Administration was deprived by the bullet of one of its cleverest officers and most whole-hearted workers.

The book is fairly illustrated, and the editing, which is admirable, is obviously the work of an accomplished hand.

E. B. S.

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CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held on Thursday, January 12, 1922, at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., General Sir Edmund Barrow, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., presiding, when a lecture was given by Mr. Frank Grove, O.B.E., M.Inst.C.E., entitled "A Railway Engineer's Journeys in Persia." In opening the proceedings—

The CHAIRMAN said: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I must first of all apologize for the unavoidable absence of Lord Carnock. In his absence I have been suddenly asked to take the chair. I must first ask Colonel Yate to read to you the list of members who have been recently elected.

The HON. SECRETARY (Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Yate): We have to-day elected the following fourteen members of the Society: Brigadier-General F. J. Moberly, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., etc., Brigadier-General C. H. Uvedale Price, C.B., D.S.O., I.A. (retired), Colonel Alfred Rawlinson, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., Mrs. Rawlinson, Mr. George Milne, I.C.S., Lieutenant-Colonel A. Olver, C.B., C.M.G., Major J. U. F. C. Alexander, Mr. Sydney Armitage-Smith, C.B., Mr. V. H. W. Dowson (Mesopotamian Agricultural Department), Captain L. A. Lynden-Bell, M.C., Seaforth Highlanders, Captain Campbell, I.A., Captain Renshaw, I.A., Captain Thompson, 15th Lancers, I.A., Captain E. S. Storey-Cooper, M.C. There have during the past year been altogether eight resignations and one death among the members of the Society.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—Before introducing to you the Lecturer, I think the members of the Society would like to express their gratitude to the Royal United Service Institution for placing their theatre at our disposal to-night, and at future lectures. I believe it will be more convenient for a large number of our members here to come to this theatre rather than to go to our very inferior lecture room in Grosvenor Street. (Applause.) The subject of the lecture to-night is, as you know, "A Railway Engineer's Journeys in Persia," and we have been fortunate enough to secure for the purposes of this lecture Mr. Grove, who was a servant of the Persian Railway Syndicate connected with Messrs. Pearson and Co.; and he, having spent two years since the Armistice in prospecting for railways in Persia on behalf of those Syndicates, is as well qualified as anyone to address us on the subject. I hope there are also a few members of the audience who know the scene of operations sufficiently well to join in the discussion after the lecture is over. I beg to present to you Mr. Grove, O.B.E. (Applause.)

A RAILWAY ENGINEER'S JOURNEYS IN PERSIA

My journeys in Persia during 1920 were over well-beaten ground on and near the British lines of communication from Quraitu through Kerind to Kermanshah, Hamadan, and Kasvin. This country has been frequently described, and is probably well known to many now present, but I shall show a few lantern-slides which I hope may be interesting. In August of 1920 I made a journey by pony and mule transport to Tehran via Noberan, or by the direct road from Hamadan, which is now little used, and then went on for a short distance into the Elburz Mountains and examined the coal mines in the Demavend area.

In the spring of 1921 I journeyed to Ispahan from Hamadan via Saltanabad and from Ispahan southwards through the Bakhtiari country and the Karun gorges to the oil-fields and Ahwaz.

I should explain that these journeys were made on behalf of the Persian Railways Syndicate and of Messrs. S. Pearson and Son, agents for the Syndicate, and that a survey and estimate has been completed for the construction of a railway from Khaniqin to Tehran, as agreed with the Persian Government early in 1920.

It is intended, so it is understood, that the terminus of the metre-gauge railway through Irak from Basra to Baghdad and onwards to the Persian frontier shall be at Khaniqin Village, and not at Quraitu or Tairuq as at present, and in this event a short length of twenty-three miles would be abandoned.

An approach to the Persian plateau, the higher ranges of which are seen in the blue distance from Khaniqin, is offered by the Helouan or Alwand River valley. This river, a tributary of the Diala River, rises in the foothills near Saripul, and is fed by perennial springs and tributaries flowing from the higher mountains which are there approached. The level plains of Mesopotamia, or Irak, lie to the south and west, and a country of low and eroded hills and broken rocky spurs is entered with little cultivation except near the river, and there only in patches. There are wide grazing areas, however, and in the spring and early summer Kurdish nomads, who in the winter live at Qasr-i-Shirin or Khaniqin, move about with their flocks of sheep and goats. Later on in the summer it becomes only a little less arid and hot than the parched plains of Irak, and the nomadic tribes move to higher pastures.

The villages of Khaniqin and Qasr-i-Shirin, places with a population of 3,000 or 4,000, are distributing centres for the fringe of Kurdistan which lies near, and this latter village has importance by reason of its Persian custom house; also archæological interest in the ruins of the Palace

of Shirin, which was built for the beautiful queen of Kosros II. Some portions of the walls, or fortifications, which surrounded the palace still stand. While the configuration of the country was doubtless the same in the seventh century when Qasr-i-Shirin was in its glory, it seems probable that with a greater rainfall the hills were then clothed with vegetation. It is recorded that the palace walls surrounded beautiful gardens.

From Saripul the road winds through the foothills and approaches the Pai Tak Pass. The vegetation increases, and stunted ilex or scrub oak are scattered on the face of the hills. We are now near the historic highway from Media, which was probably used by the military hordes of Cyrus and Darius in their expeditions against the inhabitants of the plains and since that remote period down through the ages for military and trade purposes until recently reconstructed and improved by our military expedition of 1917-1921. This is part, at any rate, of the mountain front called the "Persian Ladder" by Diodorus Siculus from its abruptness and the succession of terraces rising from the plains.

The motor road at present zigzags up a steep slope which would be quite impossible for a railway, so that a route had to be looked for elsewhere, and a valley known as the Darband Gorge, roughly parallel to the south, provides a practicable ascent on a 1 in 50 grade with some short tunnels and viaducts. From Saripul, which is nearly 2,000 feet above sea-level, an ascent of 3,000 feet has to be made to the Kerind Plain, which is 5,000 feet above sea-level, and this is accomplished in a distance of a little over forty miles.

The Darband Gorge is formed by a stream draining the southern slopes of the Kuh-i-Nau Mountain Massif, the northern slopes of which are followed by the motor road. A dry torrent bed takes an almost straight course through an immense upheaval of limestone and sandstone, and while on one side the mountain slopes are very precipitous, on the other, that followed by the alignment of the proposed railway, they are less abrupt and are covered with good grass and ilex trees with a park-like appearance, though there is no depth of soil above the rock. This gorge in its upper portion is probably a small "clef-cañon." Such "tangs" or gorges in the Zagros Mountains may be due, as Lord Curzon observes in his book on Persia, "not to the erosive action of water, but to primordial fracture in the crust of the earth." A gap through the hills provides easy access to the Kerind Plain, and from here to Bisitun beyond Kermanshah the motor road, though not closely followed, formed at least a convenient base from which to survey the country and fix the best location for a railway. I should like to mention that the official maps published under the direction of the Surveyor-General to the Indian Government were of the greatest help in enabling me to place our parties of engineers out in the field rapidly for the detail work required.

Kerind, the first Kurdish village to be passed after reaching the higher levels, is romantically situated under a rocky mountain slope and at the opening to a ravine, well wooded with walnut and mulberry trees, through which a perennial stream flows, and as it falls to the lower levels through the village, grinds the wheat in the primitive but effective flour mills by passing through vertical shoots on to wooden turbine wheels. Below the village lies a good mile or two of rich cultivation, and beyond the plain—almost a dead level—surrounded by hills and mountains. This plain, as also others in the vicinity, is almost entirely overgrown with wild liquorice plant, and evidently the Kurdish cultivator has a great struggle to keep his patches of wheat and barley clear of the weed. The soil is dark and loamy and would doubtless yield splendid crops were it possible to exterminate the weed, which is only useful as fuel. The gardens, hedged with wild rose, are typical of those throughout the highlands of Persia. Vineyards are everywhere, and are surrounded by fruit-trees—pears, apples, peaches, plums, and sometimes fig-trees, all yielding rather poor fruit—and walnut-trees, almonds, and pistachios. The vines produce many varieties of grapes, black and white, and are generally excellent either fresh or when dried as raisins.

While the surrounding hills and higher portions of the plains are dry and arid during the summer months, the mantle of snow which covers the country during the winter and the spring rains produce a thin covering of grass, herbs, and resinous bushes. Near the water-courses and villages, poplar-trees and willows are grown for building purposes, and the irrigated portions of the country are bright with wild flowers. Wild hollyhocks, pink and white, spring up amongst the crops, and here and there in the narrower and better watered valleys one sees clumps of hawthorn, blackthorn, dewberry, and common briars. There is a briar with a fine, single yellow blossom which is seen here and there near Kerind and Kermanshah.

The belt of ilex, or scrub oak, is roughly fifty to eighty miles in depth, and fringes the whole edge of Kurdistan and Luristan bordering Irak. The trees are stunted and rarely exceed 18 inches in diameter at the butt. Throughout this belt, which extends to the Bakhtiari Mountains of Arabistan, where there is a wealth of vegetation, there is an abundance of fuel and grazing grass at the higher altitudes, the rainfall probably varying between 11 and 18 inches.

It is an easy run by car from Kerind to Kermanshah, passing the villages of Firuzabad, Harunabad, Hassanabad, and Mahidasht. The railway would avoid the climb near Hassanabad, but would ascend the Chehar Zabar divide. This is the highest point before reaching Kermanshah, 5,500 feet above sea-level, and, in order to provide a gradient not exceeding 1 in 100, a summit tunnel is necessary. This ridge, or watershed, separates the flow of streams to the Kara Su,

which joins the Kharka River through Luristan, from those with a western flow to the Irak plains ; but the geography of the head waters of these rivers some miles south of Kermanshah is still very vague.

We now pass through typical scenery of the higher plateaux, arid ridges of eroded sandstone with highly folded and broken strata alternating with nearly level plain sloping towards the mountains. The dominating colour is yellow, but this is relieved by red and purple in the hills, and by the dusting of grey-green bushes and herbs—especially in the spring—and by the oases of cultivation and lines of fruit-trees and poplars near the villages. The whole scene is beautified by the clear air and sunshine and the blue haze of immense distances.

It is apparent that while much is done to conserve and utilize the limited supply of water by open irrigation channels and by "kanats," or underground channels, which I shall describe later on, much more might be done. Thus it is only where water is comparatively easily obtained by gravitation that cultivation appears. There are rivers, especially between Kermanshah and Hamadan, passing through narrow valleys, where water might be conserved by the construction of dams, and not allowed to run to waste on the melting of the snows, as at present. It would also seem that, with enterprise and the introduction of agricultural machinery, such as motor tractors and ploughs, a system of "dry farming" might be successful, and many thousands of square miles be thus brought under cultivation.

The population of the Persian plateau is sparse for apparently the following reasons : A limit set by recurrent specially dry years, when the snow and rain fail and, secondly, by the lack of transport facilities to dispose of to advantage an abnormally large surplus of grain, or even to transfer a surplus from a district well favoured to one where grain is badly needed. I was told by a Persian landholder that a very good year did not pay as well as a moderately good one, for in the latter case there would be a better market and higher prices obtainable near at hand.

These conditions will be modified and improved by cheap railway transport, both by stimulating enterprise and the introduction of machinery, by distributing grain at periods of famine, and also assuring a wider and better market for surplus produce at all times.

Kermanshah, a town with some 45,000 inhabitants, is built on sloping ground at the foot of a ridge, which is avoided by the proposed railway alignment ; but the road is graded over a spur behind the town. It looks across a level plain, drained by the Kara Su, towards the Kuh-i-Parau, a fine range of mountains rising abruptly to a height of 10,000 feet above sea-level. At the foot of this range, north-east of Kermanshah and six miles away in a straight line, are the interesting sculptures of Tak-i-Bustan.

A stream of clear and cold water gushes out at the base of the limestone cliff and forms a pond, the stream continuing beyond over the plain, fringed with willows and cultivation. The carvings consist of two archways cut into the solid rock; the larger and more complete one is 34 feet high, 24 feet wide, and 22 feet deep. On the right of the archways there is a separate panel of four figures, one being prostrate. The larger archway at the back contains a panel above a colossal equestrian figure: these, and also the panels at the sides, are carved out of the solid rock. The panel above the equestrian figure represents Kosros II., or Kusru Parvis, wearing the Sassanian diadem, and two officials presenting him with chaplets: It is thought this group commemorated the double gift by the emperor Mauricius to the Persian King of his Christian bride, the beautiful Shirin, and of his crown. The same monarch is represented by the equestrian figure, the horse and rider being covered with a coat of mail. Above the left-hand panel, at the spring of the arch, there is a comparatively modern representation of Mohammed Ali, son of Fath Ali Shah, Governor of Kermanshah in the early part of the nineteenth century, representing himself sitting in state with his attendants. At the sides of the cavern are beautifully carved panels, that on the right representing a deer hunt, and on the left a wild-boar hunt, in both of which the monarch with his courtiers plays a prominent part. Elephants and camels are engaged in carrying away the game. It is apparent that pigs flew in those days at a convenient range for bow and arrow, and that a band of musicians was necessary at the deer hunt to stimulate the sportsmen and probably also to frighten the game and cause it to break cover. The period is A.D. 599 to 628, some 600 years before the invasion of Persia by the Mongols.

The exterior panel represents two crowned figures standing on the prostrate body of a third, and holding the "cydaris," or royal circlet, while behind the left-hand king is a fourth figure, whose head is surrounded with a radiated nimbus. This is generally accepted as representing the investiture of Shapur I. by his father, Ardeshire Babekan, with a share of the royal dominion, in the presence of the god "Ormuzd." The prostrate figure is thought to be that of Artabanus, the last Parthian king. The smaller cavern is not completed, though some inscriptions have been deciphered, and there are figures believed to be of Shapur II. and III. The period is the fourth century. I am indebted to Jackson's "Persia, Past and Present," and to Sir Percy Sykes's "History of Persia" for the historical details.

These old monarchs were evidently great sportsmen, and the modern Persian is also keen with the fowling-piece and in riding down gazelle or driving ibex, but their methods of disturbing the country for miles round with crowds of beaters and mounted gunmen shooting in all directions at once do not appeal to British sportsmen.

While dealing with this subject, I should mention that there are still plenty of gazelle to be found in the more remote portions of the highland plains, and ibex, also a species of wild sheep, on the higher ranges. Feathered game is restricted to blue rock pigeons, common sand grouse and the imperial sand grouse; also the "kowk," a species of red-legged partridge, is the best game-bird, and to this must be added quail, woodcock, and pheasant, but the latter only on the Caspian littoral. Snipe, duck, geese, and many kinds of wild fowl migrate through the country in the winter seasons, and there are some hares, but not many. Quite a number of wolves come near the villages and towns in the winter, and there are a few foxes.

The plain continues twenty miles from Kermanshah towards Hamadan, and there the valley contracts, and to the north the imposing rock of Bisitun rises abruptly near the road. Upon the face of this rock, some 200 feet above the road, is the very interesting triumphal record of the reign of Darius, son of Hystaspes, in the form of a sculptured panel and cuneiform inscriptions.

The panel or bas-relief depicts Darius receiving obeisance from the nine rebel kings whom he had conquered in battle, and his foot is planted in triumph on the neck of Gaumata the magian. The period is that of 521-485 B.C. The cuneiform inscriptions, which are engraved in three languages—ancient Persian, Susian or Elamitish, and Babylonian—cover an immense area, but are not easily seen unless special ladders are taken to climb the rock. The slide shown was taken with a telephoto lens, and for the negative of this and most of those shown of Tak-i-Bustan I am indebted to Mr. C. E. Matthews, an engineer of our staff. The historical significance of this bas-relief and translations of the script by Rawlinson are so well known that I need only briefly remind you that this grand old monarch ruled twenty-three countries, including Babylonia, Assyria, Asia Minor, Arabia, Egypt, Thrace, Macedonia, and the Grecian Islands of the Mediterranean. He is also believed to have received tribute from the Punjab and Sind.

Beyond Bisitun the proposed alignment of the railway follows the valley of the Gama Siab River to its head waters north of Nihavand, and finally turns in a northern direction towards Hamadan at the village of Nanaj, which is only some eight miles north of Dalautabad, thereafter grading over the Gardaneh Zaga Pass and through Zamanabad. Thus the more difficult route taken by the motor road over the Assadabad Pass is avoided, and the Kuh-i-Alvand Mountains, which rise to a height of 13,000 feet above sea-level, immediately behind the town of Hamadan, are completely rounded.

While a fertile plain lies in front of Kermanshah and for many miles in the direction of the confluence of the Kara Su and Gama Siab Rivers, also towards Kangavar, the head waters of the latter river are shut in between hills and spurs, and cultivation disappears. The

Gama Siab is a perennial stream, and the valley offers a good site for water conservation. Both the rivers named have a large catchment area, and the plains near the road are annually flooded on the melting of the snow. The summit of the Gardaneh Zaga Pass is the highest point on the alignment. It is 6,780 feet above sea-level, and the grade up and down is 1 in 100. There will be a few short tunnels but no special difficulties in this section. The point where the alignment makes a northern trend at the village of Nanaj is important. It is here, or near this point, that a "take-off" would be found for a connection through Burudjird with Dizful, Ahwaz, and the Persian Gulf, through Luristan, though it has been quite impossible during the last two years, owing to tribal conditions in Luristan, to enter the country and to test an alignment in any direction.

Luristan is almost a "terra incognita," although a comparatively well-watered tract of mountainous country lying centrally and in an important position geographically, and Sir A. T. Wilson and Major Edmonds, the most recent travellers, only got through with great difficulty a few years ago. Anything like detailed survey work or railway construction would be quite out of the question until these truculent tribesmen are brought into subjection by the Persian Government.

Hamadan is a town of some 60,000 inhabitants, and is an even more important centre of distribution than Kermanshah. It is now surrounded by a good motor road which it owes to our military expedition. The streets are narrow and dirty and blocked with snow during the winter months, which is pitched off the flat roofs sometimes on to the heads of the foot passengers. It is an amusing sight to see the old men and small boys, by way of useful exercise on a cold morning, stamping on the mud roof after it is clear of snow to make it more or less impervious to moisture. I should explain that the roof is formed of poplar poles laid similarly to floor joists and covered with reeds, brushwood, or mats, and then with 6 or 8 inches of mud, and it is nearly flat. Notwithstanding these efforts, however, the water drips through into most Persian houses, especially during the melting of the snow and the early spring rains. Houses and walls which are built of mud and sun-dried bricks frequently tumble down and crush the inhabitants, but all this is suffered with customary Mohammedan stoicism. Most of the foreign residents have better houses roofed with timber trusses and covered with old Russian oil drums beaten out flat. Sheet iron, so procured, is used very widely in all the large towns in the place of corrugated iron, which is too expensive to import. It makes good stoves and pipes for wood fuel, and is useful in all sorts of ways.

Persian architecture has its strong points in making the most of native material and the local woods, also, as in the brick arching of

covered-in bazaars, considerable ingenuity is shown; but I am afraid British engineers would join in condemning it as most inconvenient and insanitary.

All sorts of nationalities make up the population in these highland towns. The bulk of the successful merchants are Jews, either Persian Jews or Baghdadis. Hamadan was packed with Armenian and Urmian refugees during 1920-21, and a good many Russians drifted down. Large numbers of Armenian and Assyrian Christians are employed by merchants and the public services as clerks, as well as Persians.

The Armenian carpenter is a good workman, and is found at his trade in an amicable manner alongside the Persian, who is clever, too, in his own way, especially as a blacksmith, tin and coppersmith, and wheelwright.

Hamadan is the headquarters in Persia of the Oriental Carpet Manufacturers, Ltd., and this firm obtains the bulk of its rugs and carpets for export from villages within a fifty or sixty mile radius. The village people are supplied with wool and cotton yarn and dyes, and are paid for the finished articles less the value of material or cash advanced. The rugs produced in this manner are rather crude in design and colour and go chiefly to America, where a drastic process tones down the colouring and entirely changes the appearance of the fabric. There is a factory at Hamadan where large carpets are made under careful supervision, and these are generally beautiful in design, colour, and workmanship. The whole of the carpet or rug is hand-knotted, and takes three months to one year to make. The women who do this work, and whose fingers move so deftly in tying the knots and clipping the face of the carpet, earn the equivalent of only a penny or two each day.

Hamadan, which is 6,200 feet above sea-level, looks over a vast plain stretching northward towards the Shah-i-Gulak Mountains, which forms the main divide separating this tableland from the Kasvin Plain. The lower mountain slopes behind Hamadan are well cultivated for some miles, and the monotonous colouring of the plain, so usual in Persia, is relieved by numerous villages and large areas of grain, maize, vineyards, fruit-trees, and poplars, which follow almost without interruption for forty miles the perennial stream which drains the lower levels. Two miles behind the town the Kuh-i-Alvand range rises abruptly, and is formed largely of igneous rocks with precipitous peaks, and the slopes are strewn with boulders of gneiss and granite.

Near the head of one of the valleys about six miles from Hamadan, known as the Ganj Namah, or Valley of the Tablets, on a huge granite boulder, is the well-known Darius cuneiform inscription. It is remarkably clear, as though it were cut but a hundred years ago. The period is 521 to 466 B.C. Jackson gives the following translation in his "Persia, Past and Present": "A great God is Auramazda, who created

this earth, who created yonder Heaven, who created man, who made Peace for man, who made Darius King, the King of many, the one ruler of many, I am Darius, the great King, the King of Kings, King of the countries which have many peoples, King of the great earth even to afar, the son of Hystaspes, the Archæmenian." An inscription to Xerxes, in identical terms, is by the side, and both are in three languages in parallel columns as at Bisitun. Hamadan, or the classical "Ecbatana," the summer capital of "the Medes and Persians," has another association with Xerxes, or the Ahazuerus of Scripture, in the reputed tombs of Queen Esther and Mordecai in the centre of the town. The tombs are side by side and covered with carved woodwork not very ancient in appearance. The interior of the domed building which contains the tomb is dark and damp. There are some Hebrew inscriptions on the walls, and this interesting relic of the Jewish captivity, whether the site is genuine or not, is carefully guarded by the Hebrew community.

Time will not allow me to describe the route from Hamadan to Kasvin. The barrier formed by the Shah-i-Gulak Mountains would not permit the construction of a railway within economical limits, though, with this exception, it would pass over practically level country, which is the case, also, between Kasvin and Tehran. While it was not possible to carry the survey, or any systematic reconnaissance, north of Kasvin owing to the Bolshevik advance and political situation at the time, a cursory inspection by one of our engineers as far as Mandjil confirms that the gorge of the Yuzbashi Chai and the Shah Rud leading from the high plateau through the Elburz Range to Resht and Enzeli and the low levels of the Caspian presents a most difficult engineering problem, which could apparently only be overcome by a rack section if at any time it were desirable to connect Kasvin and Tehran by railway with a Caspian port.

The proposed alignment of the railway from Hamadan to Tehran takes an almost direct route, and rounds the Shah-i-Gulak Mountains via Zarreh, Noberan, and Asiabeg. No engineering difficulties exist on this route. The country is similar to that already described, and there is a fair amount of cultivation, especially in a group of villages near Noberan and round Asiabeg, and at the latter place a good deal of cotton is grown. This should be stimulated by the approach of a railway, and the establishment of cotton yarn and other factories at a point on the line where water power is available should offer good prospects.

At Chamaroun, near Noberan, the Seif-el-Mamalek, a Persian landowner with the rank of General in the Persian Army, received us most hospitably. He lives in a house having the appearance of a castle of the feudal times though built of mud brick, surrounded by the smaller village houses of the peasantry.

The system of land-tenure in Persia is similar, too, to feudal times in Europe. Very large tracts of country are owned by families of ancient lineage, and usually the villages with water rights are owned as well. The landowner receives roughly one-third of the produce and the cultivator takes two-thirds, the proportion varying according to conditions of water supply, village accommodation, and so forth. It follows that the landowner has a hold on the peasant labour, though it was at no time represented to me that by unfair means were the people deprived of their freedom.

One seldom sees a school in these country districts, but the condition of the people generally seems a contented one. No doubt changes for their betterment must occur, but there seems no reason why this should not be gradually effected, and without disturbance to trade, if agitators are kept out of the way. The Persian Moslem of the Shiah Sect is not a fanatic, and all classes possess a cheerful temperament and a disposition to make the best of things.

The population of the strip of country described, say, forty miles wide, is, including Tehran and all urban population, about thirty-three per square mile, or a total of 650,000 people. The average for the whole of Persia is about sixteen per square mile.

With the exception of a low divide between Zarreh and Noberan, which is not correctly shown on existing maps, and one or two spurs which trend towards the Great Salt Lake, there is a gradual fall to Tehran. The lowest point—3,500 feet above sea-level—is at the crossing of the Rud-i-Shur near Robat Kerim. This river drains the whole of the Kasvin Plain and the northern slopes of the Shah-i-Gulak Mountains, also a part of the southern slopes of the Elburz Range. It lies in a deep depression and flows into the Great Salt Lake. In the dry weather it is a mere stream and intensely salt, but would require a flood opening of at least 600 feet. From this point there is a gradual ascent over nearly level country at Tehran, which is 3,800 feet above sea-level.

Tehran lies on practically level land from which there is a gradual slope to the foot of the Elburz Mountains six miles away. It covers about four square miles and is surrounded by a moat and earthen ramparts. Several gates ornamented with coloured tiles and minarets give access to the city. The main thoroughfares are broad, and there are avenues of trees and large and shady gardens. Its principal streets are in a transition stage between east and west, but there are now many well-built three or four storied houses of a continental type. It possesses six or eight miles of horse tram-line, and a metre-gauge railway. This little line, the only railway wholly operating in Persia, runs out to the town of Shah Abul Azim five and a half miles away, and conveys devout Moslems and "trippers" to a celebrated mosque. The population of Tehran is probably between 250,000 and 300,000.

At the time of my visit practically the whole of its imports came by way of Bushire, Shiraz, and Yezd or Ispahan, an overland journey of say 680 miles. I was told that goods ordered in England or Europe took on an average nine months to deliver in Tehran from the date of despatch, sometimes more and very seldom less. The actual land journey by camel or mule should not be more than eight weeks, but delays occur in transshipment at Bombay, at the custom houses, and various halting centres inland. All merchants and European residents complained of the great delay in getting delivery and the great cost of transport of any goods, no matter what special means were employed or interests were brought to bear on the problem.

In pre-war days Tehran and Kasvin were almost wholly supplied from Enzeli with Russian or continental goods and to a large extent Hamadan and even Kermanshah, exports passing out of the country in the same way. Russian oil from Baku commanded the market to the exclusion of all other brands. In the event of the Russian railways again offering a means of access and egress for merchandise, and competing with the proposed railway from Khaniqin to Tehran, the overland journey by pack animal or cart from Enzeli to Tehran would be 220 miles, to Kasvin 120 miles, to Hamadan 270 miles, and to Kermanshah 380 miles.

The distance by the alignment of the railway from Khaniqin to Tehran is 532½ miles.

Between Tehran and the Caspian Sea the Elburz Range forms an immense barrier, and it is among these mountains after crossing the watershed that the principal bituminous coal-field which supplies Tehran is located, about forty-two miles away. A good many surface mines have been closed in recent years in the Lar River valley and towards the village of Demavend. Those now working are at the head waters of the Lar River. The elevation of the valley is, at its head waters, 9,000 feet above sea-level, and some of the mines are nearly 10,000 feet, so that the working season is confined to four summer months, and all food has to be packed in for the miners, and the coal packed out by mule or camel in sacks, over a quite severe pass of nearly 11,000 feet. Considerable quantities of produce from the Caspian littoral, such as rice, comes into Tehran by the same route.

The principal mines in this area are Gelli Gatel, Gamrot, Bargarh, and Safidab.

One can approach quite close to the mines without being aware of their presence. The seams are thin—between 1 foot 6 inches to 3 feet—and tilted to an acute angle, the dip in some cases being almost vertical. Methods of coal-cutting are, of course, very primitive, and no tools seem to be used other than a windlass and rope and a pick and basket. The seam is gradually worked out in shafts and stalls from the surface to a depth rarely exceeding 100 feet. When water

interferes, the miners turn on to some other place. The coal is good, but rather soft. Its calorific value averages 13,150 B.T.U., and it is about equal to good Indian coal.

Another coal area now supplying Tehran is at Yangi Iman Kishlak, about eight miles to the north of a point on the Tehran-Kasvin road, fifty-one miles north-west of Tehran, and on the southern slopes of the Elburz Range and fronting the plains, and therefore at a much lower elevation than that just described. Although the Askenan mine—one of the group—is owned and worked by a French company, "The Syndicat Franco-Iranien," and, better methods of coal-getting are employed, either owing to the thinness of the seams or the extra distance of haulage, which is probably the governing factor, the output of the whole field does not equal the quantity sent in from the Lar Valley. The price of coal in Tehran in sterling equivalent is now about £7 10s. per ton. The quantity used does not appear to exceed 8,000 tons annually, the bulk being consumed by the little railway, a small electric light station, and the mint. The price, which has doubled in recent years, probably restricts the demand. The subject is of economic interest, especially as geologists agree that coal, in level seams, should be found below the plain near Tehran at a depth of about 2,000 feet.

The time at my disposal necessitates hurrying up from Hamadan to Ispahan, if I am to reserve a few minutes to describe the route followed through the Bakhtiari country.

The journey from Hamadan to Sultanabad can be accomplished by motor car in the dry weather in a day, though there is no properly formed road. I made the journey by pack train in the early part of April, and the floods caused by the melting of unusually heavy winter snow had carried away some bridges, so that the ordinary route could not conveniently be followed for the whole distance. The village people were hard at work ploughing, in order to make the most of the spring rains, and in a part of the Du-ab Valley I counted thirty ploughs busily engaged in one narrow strip. There are some villages in this valley whose inhabitants are Christians of Armenian origin. They are bilingual and seem quite contented.

Sultanabad, a clean town with a good bazaar, has a population of about 25,000 people. It is only slightly lower in elevation than Hamadan, and stands within sight of the Tuzlu-Gol, a shallow salt lake of some twenty square miles. It is an important centre of the gendarmerie, and, like Hamadan, has a carpet factory owned by Messrs. Zeigler's, the old-established Swiss-British firm of merchants.

The usual route taken by cross-country transport between Sultanabad and Ispahan is via Kum and Kashan, although this is some eighty to one hundred miles longer than the more direct road via Khumain, Gulpaigan, and Deh-hak. The reason that the shorter route—which is

quite easy and direct, and might be made into a first-class road, at small cost—is not used, is because of the risk of attack by robbers, who come through the mountainous regions behind Khunsar towards Luristan. Strong gendarmerie posts are established at Khumain, Gulpaigan, and Khunsar, and throughout this journey myself and Mr. C. E. Matthews, who accompanied me, were provided with a guard of twelve sowars and an officer. A little excitement occurred one afternoon when the party split up into two sections, and emerged from the hills by different routes about three miles apart. Each suspected the other of being robbers, and made a great show of galloping across the plains to a strategic point, and then blazing away at a range of two miles or so until the mistake was discovered.

The country passed through between Gulpaigan and Chah-i-Siah, near Ispahan, is flanked by high mountains to the south-west, and is in the nature of a ridge or saddle-back. For 100 miles the average height of the plain is 6,500 feet above sea-level, and the highest point on the trail is 7,240 feet. For the greater part the country is arid, though the Gulpaigan and Khumain plains are fertile tracts of country. Elsewhere the rivers are not perennial, and the widely scattered villages are dependent wholly or partly on "kanats," or underground water channels. A large amount of ingenuity is shown by Persians in the construction and maintenance of these channels, on which the means of subsistence of many thousands of people depends. This system of conducting water is widely applied throughout all the more arid portions of Persia. It consists in boring a number of wells of small diameter, roughly lined with stone, and at a distance apart of about 60 feet, more or less. The bottoms of the wells are joined by a small channel, or tunnel, with a slight gradient, and this is also generally lined with hand-packed stone.

The line of wells stretches sometimes for miles across the country, and usually conducts water not from a defined spring but from saturated strata and at a depth of, say, 25 feet from the surface. The accumulation of water which weeps into the wells and channel from the wet strata is supplied originally by the mantle of snow and the spring rains filtrating through very absorbent soil or rock debris, and attains, in the course of a mile or so, a flow of 2 or 3 cubic feet per second—amply sufficient to support the life of a large village. As a rule the "kanat" approaches, across an arid and sloping plain, the lower portions of a range of mountains, and the supply of water is probably partly derived from fissures below the exposed rocks.

Many Persian landowners are very interested in the possibilities of procuring water by artesian well borings, but up to the present experiments do not seem to have been made. The prospects of successful results, however, are good, and it may well be that herein lies the solution of the water difficulty in many parts of Persia.

Ispahan lies at the edge of a vast plain trending north and westwards, which is 5,250 feet above sea-level. It is well watered by the Zindeh Rud, which surrounds the city to the south, and is bridged by three fine-looking brick structures. Many miles of intense cultivation surround the city and follow the windings of the river and its tributaries. The head waters of the Zindeh Rud offer great possibilities of water-conservation which would enable much greater areas to be cultivated. At present all flood water of this considerable river—which is over 500 feet wide, with a depth of 3 or 4 feet at flood times—runs to waste in a salt marsh seventy miles from Ispahan.

The population of Ispahan is about 100,000, and it retains its old-world appearance little altered by modern improvements. As a centre of trade it has great importance and occupies a commanding position, and could be easily connected by rail with Hamadan by the route described.

At the time of my visit the headquarters of the South Persian Rifles had been moved from Shiraz to Ispahan, and a small gymkhana and race meeting was held on the outskirts of the town through the enterprise of the British and Persian officers, encouraged by the principal residents both Persian and European. Competition was keen, and, although apart from the gendarmerie, entries by Persians were not very numerous, there was quite a good and friendly gathering. The Governor of Ispahan, Sirdar Mohtasham, a brother of Sirdar Jang, was present and other leading Bakhtiari, and a number of Persian ladies were also on the course in specially reserved tents. It is to be regretted from the point of view of both British and Persian interests that the South Persian Rifles, as then organized and officered, has been recently disbanded.

In passing south from Ispahan travellers who are able to arrange motor-car transport take the road by Shiraz to Bushire, though a part of the distance—that over the mountains near the coast—is impassable by car. The track to Ahwaz, through the Bakhtiari Mountains and the Karun Gorges, offers an alternative, but this journey is extremely arduous for transport animals. I passed over portions of this track between Kaleh Madrassah and Qavarukh and also between the Pul-i-Shalu (the Iron Bridge) and Malamir, and the bad condition of these—the easier portions at either end—shows clearly enough why transport rates are so high between Ahwaz and Ispahan.

The route I followed was first explored by Major—then Captain—Noel and Mr. Sotham of the Mesopotamia-Persia Corporation in 1917. Their object was to discover an alternative route to the existing track and such as would avoid the tremendous gorges of the Karun crossed in succession and might be adopted for a properly constructed motor road, it being readily admitted by those who know the track well that it is impossible of substantial improvement within reasonable economic

limits. It is interesting to note that this track was made where it is, taking the higher spurs and deeper gorges almost on the square, in order to keep as far as possible from the Lurs on one side and the Kuhgelus and Qashgais on the other, professional robbers and raiders with whom it is impossible to come to terms. Toll is collected at barriers erected on the track from the Charvadars in charge of the pack trains, being based on so much for each pack animal. The bridges are maintained by the corporation mentioned in arrangement with the Bakhtiari Government, but very little, if anything, seems to be spent on the track.

It must be conceded that the new route proposed via Urujan, Ganduman, Bichgird, Sini, Lurdagan, Bidela and Bars was well selected and is probably the most practicable route through this country to Ahwaz and the coast, but it is unlikely that the economic conditions and needs of Persia would justify the construction of a railway, owing to costly engineering works which would be necessary. Further exploration is, however, needed east and west before it can be definitely stated that no practicable outlet to the coast exists.

The Ispahan Plain is flanked to the south by a high range of mountains which forms the main watershed dividing the sources of the Karun River from the streams flowing eastwards to the salt marshes of the plateau, and it is here, therefore, that the great fall begins in that river which lower down cuts with great bends through very mountainous country until it finally emerges to the almost level plains near Shushter, and then flows as a sluggish river to Ahwaz and until it joins the Shatt-el-Arab at Mohammerah.

The approach to the watershed, or divide, from Ispahan is over country similar to that described, and follows generally the valley of the Zindeh Rud. There are alternative passes over the dividing range: that most frequently used, and followed by the so-called "Lynch" track, is the Gardan-i-Rukh, which attains an elevation of 7,900 feet, and the other is the Tang-i-Dusdan, of about the same height, leading to Urujan almost due south of Ispahan. Over the divide between these two passes, in an inner valley, is Surkh, the ancestral home of Sirdar Jang, one of the Bakhtiari Khans, and well known to those conversant with Persia as a very capable administrator and Government official. He received us very hospitably, and was most interested in the possibilities of railway development. Through his courtesy in placing two of his personal guards at our disposal, and in sending messengers to the leading Khans on the route proposed to be followed, no difficulties were experienced, and in three weeks the journey was safely and successfully accomplished to Maidan-i-Naftun, the oil-fields of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. I was also fortunate in meeting Major Noel at Surkh, as he had just been visiting some little-known parts of the Bakhtiari country and was on his way to Tehran.

The village of Surkh has an elevation of 6,700 feet, and a gradual ascent of 700 feet is made to the head of the valley between Urujan and Ganduman, from which point a stream flows southwards to join the Karun. A feature of the route followed was to avoid, as far as possible, the sudden fall of the larger tributaries of the Karun and especially to minimize the length, which would closely follow a winding river pent up in a gorge-like valley which is so characteristic of this country.

From Bichgird the track takes a short cut, thus avoiding a circuitous river route, and with a comparatively easy ascent over a spur known as the Gushingli Pass then drops down a short valley to the Ab-i-Ganjam. This river was first crossed on the edge of the plateau at Bichgird. The stream which drains the valley from the Gushingli Spur breaks through a small cañon and joins the larger river, now a mountain torrent—in partial flood when I crossed it by the Pul-i-Carrabast in May, 1920. Up and down this river great mountains overshadow the valley, which lower down is shut in by precipitous slopes, and although it swings into the Karun after some twelve miles of gorge, neither road nor railway could advisably pass by this wild and inhospitable route. The track climbs 600 feet to the Sini Plain above the left bank of the Ab-i-Ganjam and finds a gradual descent by the Ab-i-Lurdagan, past the village of that name, and then to Munj and Bidela, and as the Karun River gorge is approached, the valley is shut in by high mountains until finally the track, which is only a mountain path, passes over a succession of spurs to the Kirsan River, which joins the Karun at Bars.

All this country is covered with scrub oak, and there is an abundance of vegetation and excellent grass. Agriculturally it possesses great possibilities. There is plenty of good timber, a rich and virgin soil and immense grazing areas, perennial streams, and a rainfall of probably 18 to 20 inches per annum, but unfortunately very few inhabitants. The scarcity of population seems to be due to the continual inter-tribal warfare. At least half the adult males spend their time in riding up and down the mountains waving rifles in the air and letting off at everything which takes their fancy. Those who work seem very poor, and are largely semi-nomadic in habit. In the summer they leave their villages and crops practically unguarded and camp on the higher hills with their flocks, and live on very unnutritious bread made from acorns.

Should a road or railway ever be constructed it would follow generally the route described, but it would swing into the Karun Gorge near Bidela and from there follow the left bank of that river, crossing the Kirsan River at or near its junction, and then continue down the main gorge to the iron bridge, where it would rise over the ridges which flank the valley towards Malamir.

Crossing the Kirsan River was an interesting experience. It was in half flood, and a great volume of milky-looking water roared along at a pace, in mid-stream, of 25 or 30 feet per second. Much to our surprise all camp equipment and transport animals were got across without accident or losses. The natives are accustomed to swim the river either supported by a single goat skin inflated with air or a small raft is made with several skins on a light frame. Each time the crossing is made the single skin or the raft is carried up the edge of the river for the length of the drift, which is usually 400 or 500 yards, so that it takes many hours' hard work to put a large party with their belongings across. The animals are usually guided by two men on single skins, one on each side, who hit the beast on the head to force it to swim straight; but even so three or four attempts are frequently necessary before success is attained.

At the Kirsan crossing the large mounted guard of Bakhtiaris provided at Lurdagan returned, and thereafter a rather nondescript following was put up by the Bars men through country said to be infested by robbers.

Some excitement was provided one afternoon when we were supposed to be fired at from a neighbouring hill, and the Bakhtiari clansmen let off their musty old rifles in all directions, each man being armed with a weapon of different calibre; but it looked very much as though our friends had thoughtfully arranged the affair so as to obtain a little extra money at the end of the journey.

There is fine, wild scenery down the Karun to the iron bridge. Between Bars and Sadat there were splendid crops of barley and bearded wheat; both the ears and the straw were the best I have seen in Persia. Some of the villages, notably Behars, are romantically situated on spurs of the mountains overshadowed by a sheer rise of nearly vertical cliff. The track takes a heart-breaking route over ridges and foothills, it being impossible to closely follow the river.

From the iron bridge, which is 2,550 feet above sea-level, is a climb of 1,500 feet over the dividing ridge of limestone which separates the Karun Gorge from the Malamir Plain.

There are alternative routes to Ahwaz from Malamir. The country, which now reassumes its arid colouring, is rapidly descending to the desert level, though it is much broken by ridges and isolated mountains. The route followed was by Mortafie, Kaleh Madrasseh, and the Ab-i-Tambih direct to the oil-fields, and thereafter by motor-car to Ahwaz and Mohammerah over the desert. This sketch of my journeys would be incomplete were I to make no reference to mineral prospects in Persia. I have already referred to the important coal-measures near Tehran. Coal is reported to be in the vicinity of Kermanshah and of Hamadan, but it seems to be a lignite of rather inferior quality. The portions of Persia I have described are not apparently well

mineralized, though no systematic prospecting seems to have been done. The best fields for investigation are doubtless in the district where igneous rocks occur, notably in the Elburz Range and probably also in the Kuh-i-Alvand, south of Hamadan. Silver lead ore and copper in various forms are known to be widely found, and I procured some samples from the Shah-i-Gulak Mountains near Chamaroun on the Noberan route between Hamadan and Tehran. The same ores are reported in the vicinity of Kum, Kashan, and Ispahan.

Only a brief sojourn in Persia is needed to appreciate how greatly cheap transport is needed, and how, until that is obtained, there can be no substantial progress.

The economic importance of a connection by rail is apparent, and a further development would be the construction of feeder roads and the extended use of motor-cars and lorries, which form of transport, it may be remarked incidentally, has not yet proved a serious competitor in Persia to animal transport, though this will doubtless change when petrol becomes cheaper and more efficient workshops are established. In considering the economic value of the scheme both to Persia and Irak, and of its possible developments, one must take into account the large deposits of mineral oil which are at present so valuable an asset both to Persia and to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company near Ahwaz, and to the probable further extension of operations near Khaniqin and south of Mosul.

The gauge question opens up a wide field for debate, and I do not propose to say more than that Persia, both economically and physiographically, requires a metre-gauge railway system.

In conclusion I must acknowledge my indebtedness to Messrs. Bishop, Allen, and Morgan for the use of negatives, in addition to those borrowed from Mr. Matthews, which, supplementary to my own, have enabled me to give a fairly well-connected series of views this evening.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—If there are any members of this Society, or visitors, who are well acquainted with this subject, and would now open a discussion, we should be very much obliged. Is General Lubbock here?

Brigadier-General LUBBOCK, C.M.G.: As I was in charge of all the railways in Irak, I naturally took great interest in their extension into Persia. I took a great deal of interest in the survey, and I would have liked very much to hear this evening some sort of forecast of the possible results of the survey, whether anything was going to happen. But that the lecturer did not venture to prophesy.

The HON. SECRETARY (Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate): Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—It occurs to me to mention that the question of railways in Persia is by no means a new thing. I am sure there must be many in this room who remember how, in 1911, the question of the

Trans-Persian Railway was very seriously taken up by the British, Russian, and French Governments. At that time I was not on the Council of the Central Asian Society, but a member of that Council came to me and said that the Society wanted a lecture. The Trans-Persian Railway was just coming to the fore, and, as I had known Persia for about thirty years, I said, "Well, that shall be my subject." You know, some of you at least, that the scheme was to bring a railway down from the Trans-Caucasian line, skirting round the south-west angle of the Caspian Sea, to Tehran, and thence probably to Yezd and Kirman. After that the route was uncertain. The goal was the Indian frontier, but whether via Nushki to the Quetta line or across Makrān to the North-Western Railway near Karachi was not decided. It is curious, now, to think that, when the scheme had advanced as far as it had, it should have collapsed, and that we should now be beginning to consider railways in Persia from an entirely different starting-point—namely, based upon Mesopotamia. As we see things at this moment, we can but wait and see what the issue brings forth. The fact that one great and strongly supported project has simply come to naught gives us the warning so familiar on our motor roads: "Drive slowly." In the winter of 1911-12 I went over to Paris with one or two influential Englishmen who were working in the interests of the Trans-Persian Railway. I was not an influential man myself, but I knew Persia. I attended a meeting in Paris of Russian promoters and French financiers. I was particularly struck on that occasion by the very perfect knowledge which a Russian engineer who was present showed of railway possibilities in Persia and the intimate acquaintance that he possessed with possible railway routes. What Russia had come down to Paris for at that moment was to interest France financially in the scheme, but France at that moment was not in the humour. The Russian representatives did not convince the French financiers that the subject was at that moment ripe for consideration. The great house of Baring took the affair in hand later, but before matters were duly settled the Great War broke out. I have not the slightest doubt that French financiers to-day, who see so very little chance of recovering any of their investments from Russia, are thankful that France did not support the Trans-Persian Railway. (Applause.)

When an entirely new railway scheme for Persia is promulgated before this Society, which for twenty years has been dealing with them, it is as well that the younger school of members, as well as the outside public, should have an outline of what the Society has done. I give below the lectures that have been delivered :

1904. "Railways in Western Asia."—Lieut.-Colonel H. Picot.

1905. "Russian Railways towards India."—Colonel C. E. de la P. Beresford.

1908. "The Future of British Relations with Persia."—Mr. H. F. B. Lynch.

1909. "A Railway from the Mediterranean to India."—Mr. C. E. D. Black.
 1911. "The Proposed Trans-Persian Railway."—Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate.
 1911. "Railways in the Middle East."—Mr. H. F. B. Lynch.
 1911. "The Baghdad Railway."—M. Chéradame.
 1919. "The Nushki-Sistan Railway."—Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Webb-Ware.

To these eight lectures should be added articles by Sir Hugh Barnes, Sir Louis Dane, and Mr. A. L. P. Tucker. Many members of the Central Asian Society, notably Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Sir George Lloyd (now Governor of Bombay), and Sir Hugh Barnes, dealt with the subject in letters and articles contributed to *The Near East*. These facts will make it clear that railway enterprise in Persia is a subject that the Central Asian Society has long made its own, and that nothing pleased it more than to invite the Persia Society to join the audience which has listened so keenly to Mr. Frank Grove's lecture and so thoroughly enjoyed his pictures.

The CHAIRMAN: If there is anyone else who wishes to speak we shall be very glad.

Mr. D. MELLOR: May I ask the lecturer about the railway running from Baghdad on the way to Kermanshah? I believe at present it ends at Quraitu. He mentioned that a portion of the line was to be dropped. Am I right in understanding that about twenty miles of the line are to be dropped altogether, or are they taking it twenty miles further on up into the mountains?

The LECTURER: In reply to the point raised as to the diversion of a portion of the existing railway from Baghdad to Quraitu, in order to get an easier gradient, it is generally understood that the joint station and commencement of the proposed railway into Persia would be at Khaniqin Village, and thus about twenty-three miles from Khaniqin Road Station to Quraitu would be diverted.

In reply to other points raised, I may say that the paper accentuated the fact—and it was evident on the map—of the central position of the line. As an extension of the Mesopotamian railways, at any rate, as far as Hamadan, it would be a beginning of a railway system in the centre of Persia, a development, of course, from the Irak railways. Such a railway, it was also evident on the map, would be capable of extension east and west. Further than that I am not prepared at the moment to make any statements. Those who know Persia know perfectly well that the barrier of mountains which surrounds the Persian Gulf forms a very serious obstacle to a line due south. With regard to the point raised by General Lubbock, I may say that the prospects of traffic, both passenger and goods, on the railway that is proposed are quite good. The amount of merchandise

handled by difficult, slow, and expensive transport is very considerable. Everybody must know that a town such as Hamadan or Kermanshah, of fifty or sixty thousand people, receives a very large amount of imported goods, and exports very considerably. The pilgrim traffic is very great; and then there are the prospects of development which I have referred to.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—Before asking you to give a vote of thanks to a lecturer for his lecture, it is usual for the Chairman to sum up the discussion, but as we have had no discussion, I am afraid I shall find some difficulty in summing it up. I can only say that I regret that I have not even read up the subject sufficiently to make any illuminating remarks. I think it is distinctly unfortunate that we should not have had a discussion on this matter, because the whole question of railway development in the Middle East is a most extremely interesting one, from the point of view not only of strategy but also of commerce; and Persia forms, as it were, the hub connecting the Caucasus, Turkestan, Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, and Irak. As the lecturer has told us, the line that probably has the best commercial prospects is that leading up from Irak to Kermanshah and Hamadan, and so on to Tehran and Ispahan, which would be the eventual objectives of that line. But the real difficulty with Persia is this, that Persia is a country without a stable government, and without a stable government and without a reasonably dense population there can be no great development of any railway system in Persia for a great many years. We must await peace and order in the country before railway development can really have any good prospects. I regret that neither time nor my knowledge of the subject would in any way make it advantageous for me to prolong my remarks, and I therefore now end by asking you for a vote of thanks to the lecturer for describing that portion of the country with which he has been specially engaged, and which is of course the most important portion as regards railway development; though I regret that the part which most of us—at all events those who are connected with the East—know best does not come within the sphere of his lecture—I mean, of course, the Indian frontier line from Nushki with its present terminus at Duzdap in Persia. We, and when I say “we” I mean the Indian Government and the Indian commercial community, are more intimately interested with the eastern provinces of Persia than with the western; but that unfortunately does not come within the lecturer’s purview. I will now ask you to record your vote of thanks to the lecturer for the interesting account he has given us. (Applause.)

The vote of thanks was heartily given, and the meeting closed.

THE QANUN AL ARADHI

IN accordance with the note following Mr. Howell's lecture on page 39 of the last number of the JOURNAL, Sir Michael O'Dwyer's speech at that lecture is given here. It is much regretted that it was not received in time for publication with the lecture.

SIR MICHAEL O'DWYER: Colonel Howell was good enough to suggest that I should open the discussion on his paper, and I do so with the more pleasure as he is an old pupil of mine and one of whom I am very proud. The tables are now turned and we are all sitting at his feet here. We have all learned a great deal from the very lucid, humorous, and graphic account he has given us of the state of affairs in Iraq. His account is of great value not only to those who are concerned with the discharge of our responsibilities there, but to all interested in land revenue and settlement, and in fact to everyone interested in the administration of Eastern countries. For as Colonel Howell pointed out, in all the ancient empires the system of land-tenure and the system of land assessment were the two main factors of good government; they are the two tests which are invariably applied. Hence we find that so many of the great administrators of antiquity and of the Middle Ages owe their fame to the fact that they identified themselves with the reform of the system of land-tenure and land revenue assessment. The Gracchi brothers in ancient Rome, and Julius Cæsar and his nephew Augustus in Imperial Rome, were great land reformers. Later on we find Naushirwan in pre-Moslem Persia. I wonder Colonel Howell did not make a reference to him, for in the East his name is a household word; it is symbolical of justice. He was the first to fix the standard of measurement based on that of Cæsar which was to be applied in valuing land, and also the State share of the produce which was to be exacted from the holder of this land. These two measures protected the people from the exactions of dishonest officials. Passing on from him, we find the great Khalif Omar, who also identified himself in a remarkable degree with land reform by carrying on the principles of Naushirwan; and later on Akbar the Great owed his name and his fame in India very largely to the just and far-reaching land reforms which he inaugurated there. Coming to our own day, I suppose that Napoleon's reputation as an administrator rests to no small extent on his handling of the agrarian system in France and the establishment of a peasant proprietary.

On the other hand, I think we are all justified in accepting Colonel Howell's conclusion that where the empires of antiquity have failed, it is due mainly to the fact that they have not properly handled the two great problems of the system of land-tenure and land assessment. We have only to look to recent events to find that the French Revolution was brought about largely by a bad agrarian system, and the Russian Revolution we know was largely due to the fact that the Russian soldier at the Front was informed—rumours were brought to the effect—that the lands of the nobles and the Church were being divided, and the soldiers, being mainly peasants, bolted from the Front to go back to their villages and get their share of whatever land was going. There we have examples of two great revolutions of modern days largely precipitated by this agrarian question.

It is particularly interesting to find that in 'Iraq the system of land-tenure was hardly at all influenced by the Islamic religious law. In all Mohammedan countries we are accustomed to find Islamic religious law dominating everything; in 'Iraq it was calmly pushed aside and the matter left to local custom or the civil law. Exactly the same thing has happened in India, whether among Mohammedans or Hindoos. You will find those who live in the towns following with the greatest closeness the Hindoo or Mohammedan religious law. But the same people, directly they become associated with the land, throw the religious law aside and adopt the law or custom of the country. You ask a Syed what custom is followed as to the inheritance of land—whether that of the Sheriat which gives a share to women, or that of the country, which denies all share to women—he will say at once that he follows the custom of the country. In other words, though he won't say so, he disregards the Sheriat. It would be very interesting to have seen what system of rights in land would have been evolved by the nomadic tribes of Mesopotamia if they had been allowed to develop on their own lines. That development was retarded by the instability—economic, social, and political—which prevailed in Mesopotamia. But had they been given a chance it is not improbable that they would have evolved a system suited to local needs, a system somewhat similar to that of the nomadic tribes in North-Western India. Unfortunately one of those well-meaning doctrinaires who have done so much mischief in the world intervened with laws based not on what the people wanted, but what it was thought they should want, and Midhat Pasha thrust from above on the unfortunate 'Iraq the system of *tapoo*. A more unsuitable and unworkable system it would be hard to imagine. It was devised apparently in the interest of the bureaucracy of Constantinople or elsewhere, and imposed from above absolutely regardless of the wishes and traditions of the local people. Compare that with what we did in India. In India we have made many mistakes, but in this particular

matter I think we can comfort ourselves with the reflection that we have gone on the right lines. In all our system of land revenue assessment and tenures we have accepted and improved on the system we found in existence; we have worked not from above down but from below upwards. Our land records are based on enquiries made locally. The maps and records are prepared locally, in the village, by the expert local agency, and in the presence of and after enquiry from the people whose rights are in question; they are tested, also on the spot, by higher officials, and in the end are a miracle of accuracy. Colonel Howell has suggested that perhaps they are not a complete evidence of title. They are the recognized records of rights in land, and the courts are by law bound to assume, and do assume, that they are completely accurate until their inaccuracy is proved. The result is that they are usually accepted, and rightly accepted, as conclusive evidence of the title of the persons whose names are entered in those books as landlords and tenants, and of their liabilities to one another and to the State. Therefore to Colonel Howell, or anyone accustomed to the cheap and accurate system of land-records in India, it must have been heart-breaking to deal with this appalling *tapoo* system of 'Iraq. I daresay Colonel Howell often said what Lord Fisher said, that the best thing to do would be to scrap the lot and start all over again.

I will only say a few words about the land-revenue system, the Turkish system as described by him. The Turkish method of collection involves practically every form that we are accustomed to in India; and it is very curious to see how exactly those forms reproduce themselves in different countries. We get the form of division of the crop (*batai*), the State taking one-fifth more or less. We get the form of the appraisement of the crop (*kankut*, or tip) where it is valued standing. Then we get the money value of the crop on the ground, after it has been cut and thrashed; and then we go a stage further, and, instead of assessing the money value of the crop every year, we make a fixed cash assessment for a term of years. That is what we term in India a settlement. All these things prevail in 'Iraq as in India, but it is significant to find that the share taken by the actual cultivator in 'Iraq—a half—is almost always the same as in India, although the conditions are so different. It seems to be traditional that the man who cultivates the land shall receive half the crop at least. It is most rare to find him in India receiving less than half; often he receives a good deal more. Another interesting point is this: Colonel Howell has told us that after the cultivator's five-tenths and the headman's one-tenth have been separated off, the landlord takes two-tenths and the State two-tenths. That practically works out as in India, where in theory the landlord keeps one-half of the net assets for himself and pays one-half to the State.

Colonel Howell referred to the fact that our system in India is

largely based on the reforms introduced by Akbar, and he regretted the fact that Turkey, although it may have had a Sulieman the Magnificent, never had an Akbar the Great. I will read a few lines from the "Ain-i-Akbar," showing the lines on which Akbar carried out his reforms; you will be astonished at the breadth of vision and the interesting historical analogies they display. They also throw light on the history of the land question in other Mohammedan countries. These are taken from the Commentaries of Abu-l-Fazl. The first point is that Akbar, knowing the value of old authority in support of what he was doing, took Naushirwan as his model. He adopted the *bigha* standard of measurement, practically the same as the Roman Jugum: the square of a chain in lengths 60 "Cæsar's" yards of 33 inches—i.e., 55 English yards. He took one-third of the produce as the State's share laid down by Naushirwan and followed by Omar. Abu-l-Fazl, in his treatise on taxes, tells us: "In former times the monarchs of Hindustan exacted the sixth of the produce of the lands; in the Turkish Empire the husbandman paid a fifth; in Turan the sixth; and in Iran the tenth. But at the same time there was levied a general poll tax which was called 'khorij.' Naushirwan instituted a land measure of 60 square 'kaisari gaz,' and computing the produce of such a quantity of land to be a 'kifeez' valued at 3 *dirhams*, he determined that a third part should be the proportion of revenue.

"When the Khalifat descended to Omar he approved of the wisdom of Naushirwan, but introduced a few innovations. Latterly in Iran and Turan, Government has taken a tenth part of the produce of the soil, but at the same time the husbandman is loaded with a number of other taxes, which altogether exceed half the produce. In every kingdom, besides the land tax, Government exacts something from the property of every individual (a long list of these extra levies follows). But this mode of collection is destructive to the country and vexatious to the people. His Majesty therefore abolished all arbitrary taxes. He fixed the *gaz* (yard measure) and the *tenal* (measuring chain) and the *bigha* ($\frac{1}{4}$ of an acre). After which he ascertained the value of the (produce of the) lands and fixed the revenue accordingly. . . . One-third part of the average produce of a *bigha* of each sort of land—good, middling, bad—is the State revenue fixed by His Majesty. What was exacted by Sher Khan (Akbar's Afghan predecessor) exceeded the present produce of the land."

Akbar took three kinds of land, as in Rome, took an average of what each would produce, and took one-third of that as the value of the produce. But he found it very difficult to assess on those lines from year to year, owing to the fact that the amount of the crop and the cash value were fluctuating. Therefore, after ten years' experience of collecting each year according to crop and prices, he fixed a regular

assessment. Taking the average assessment of ten years as his basis, he fixed that as the amount that each village should pay. That in practice is the origin of the system of land revenue administration which we are following in India to-day. Akbar's equitable system died away after him as the country fell into anarchy; but the roots were there; the tradition survived. It was not difficult to revive it. The system we derive from Akbar was derived by him from Omar, who derived it from Naushirwan, and has much in common with, even if not directly based on, the old Roman assessment and survey. For it is quite possible that the Persians and Arabs copied the Roman system.

The two things which have done most to justify our rule in India up to date are, firstly, we have made just distribution of the rights in the land, and have prepared an extremely accurate record of those rights. In the next place, we have placed on the land an assessment which is just and equitable, and the pitch of which in my experience has yearly been getting lower and lower. Akbar, the great reformer, took one-third of the produce and prided himself on his moderation; roughly we take one-eighth or one-tenth. The Native States of India take about double what the British Government takes. We hope that 'Iraq, under the Government which has now been established there, will be able to obtain and enjoy those two main elements of prosperity—that is, an equitable distribution of rights in the land with a good record of such rights and moderate assessments. For such work knowledge, experience, and sympathy are essential. If the new Government of 'Iraq are in a position to obtain the services of officers like Colonel Howell for work of that kind, they will be very well repaid by the increased prosperity and contentment of the people. (Applause.)

THE ASSYRIAN ADVENTURE OF 1920

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL F. CUNLIFFE-OWEN, C.M.G.,

Late Director of Repatriation in the Civil Government of Mesopotamia.

THE event forming the title of this paper was inaugurated from the Refugee Camp, Baqubah, Mesopotamia, of which I was in charge from June, 1919.

Prior to going to Baqubah, I had had a lengthy association with the Near and Middle East in various capacities—in fact, since 1912. I had only in the previous year (1918) completed a mission to Central Arabia, involving many months spent with Ibn Saoud, the ruler of Nejd, and to turn from this especial centre of Moslemism (the purest and most strict in every sense of the word) to dealing with Eastern Christians, of which the Baqubah Camp was composed, was indeed a remarkable change.

At Baqubah, twenty-seven miles east of Baghdad, there were assembled some 45,000 refugees of three categories. There were two categories of Assyrians and one of Armenians. The first two categories were mountaineer Assyrians, mostly Nestorian Christians from the mountains north of Mosul, and plainsmen from the neighbourhood of Lake Urmia in Persian territory. The story of how these Assyrians came to Mesopotamia has been related before now.*

The mountaineers having decided to throw in their lot against the Turks, took up arms some time after the war began, and fought the Turks with some success. As time went on, however, these mountaineers went short of arms and ammunition, and as the Russian pressure on the Turks declined, the Assyrians were forced away from their country. They managed, however, to effect a junction with their Urmian brethren, who had actually joined the Russians and had taken up arms with them. After the second Russian retirement from Turco-Persian localities, the united Assyrians were left in the lurch. They defended Urmia with great resolution, but, being assailed on all sides by Kurds, Turks, and even Persians, they had to evacuate Urmia, and made their way, with all their families and belongings, to a district

* Full historical and other details connected with the Baqubah refugees and their movements will be found in the printed reports of the Colonial Office (formerly India Office), under No. 36,170 of December 4, 1919, and October, 1921, compiled by Lieut.-Colonel F. Cunliffe-Owen and Mr. H. L. Charge.

where they hoped to get in touch with the British. On their way they were joined by a large number of Armenians from the Van and Caucasian localities. This combined mass of people eventually got into touch with the British near Sian-Kaleh, and were sheltered behind our lines of communication.

During their retreat numbers of people of both sexes were killed or died, but, as I have said, some 45,000 got through, and, as these people could not be maintained or supplied in the forward area, they were gradually shepherded down to Baqubah. Here they were on a line of railway by which they could be fed, and a vast camp was set up for them on the Diyala River.

This camp was installed on the most approved lines of military management. Water-supply was laid on, ample rations issued, and large supervising medical and administrative staffs established. In the early months these refugees naturally required some rest and recuperation, but when I joined the camp they were in the most healthy and vigorous condition, and the time had arrived when efforts had to be made to reduce the cost of this vast undertaking. Concurrently with my arrival, the supervising staff was reduced to a great extent, and shortly after my arrival I got rid of almost all the expensive European and Indian personnel, and replaced them by refugees themselves. However, this was not enough, and some means had to be devised of either repatriating these people or making them to a certain extent self-supporting. The difficulty about repatriation lay in the fact that the conditions in the country from which they came were still very disturbed. Operations were in progress against various Kurdish recalcitrant elements to the north of Mosul, while in the Urmian Persian localities the conditions were still worse. As for the Armenians, no one would receive them overseas at any spot where they could reach their former homes.

As regards the other problem, that of making the refugees self-supporting, any project on these lines involved a large outlay, and such was not worth while except for permanent habitation. Only a very small proportion was skilled in any form of work other than agricultural. There were, too, comparatively large numbers of women and children and old persons. Generally speaking, the men showed strong disinclination for settled work; any parties that were sent out to work compulsorily with Government Departments were unsatisfactory. However, by the institution of camp industries in a small way, gardens and forage farms, a certain return was being got in by the end of 1919, and the cost of the camp, originally about 18 lakhs per month, was reduced to about 9 lakhs per month. At the beginning of 1920 the position in the Mosul area had improved, and it was felt that some determined attempt must be made for repatriation.

The difficulty about the Assyrians was that they had no reliable

leaders, and no unanimity among the various elements to effect repatriation as a whole. It was possible to place them in a zone of country north of and quite close to our administrative line of the Mosul vilayet, but when this was put to the people no willing acquiescence was obtained. Some of the mountaineers would listen to no plan other than going back to their own particular regions under British protection. Others would not leave the present line of British occupation, and nothing would satisfy the Urmians but to go back to Urmia. None of them could understand why the British were not prepared to send an armed force to install them in their old territories and occupy the country.

The nominal, or rather theoretical, headship of the mountaineer Assyrians had been vested in the Nestorian Patriarchate of the House of Mar Shimmun. This Patriarchate was an offshoot of the old-time See of Antioch, but had diverted from it to follow the tenets of Nestorius. With the Turks, it was customary to deal with the subject races through the spiritual heads, and hence the Patriarchal family came to be regarded as the representatives of the Assyrian communities within the Turkish dominions. The Mar Shimmun, however, who was in office in 1915 was murdered under circumstances of great treachery by Simko, one of the Kurdish chieftains against whom the Assyrians were engaged in the operations around Urmia during the retreat. The successor was not of the same stamp, and was, moreover, an invalid, and incapable of exercising much leadership. This fact, coupled with the wanderings of the Assyrians and their prolonged absence from their old homes, caused the Patriarchal influence to wane. Also, the Urmian groups, being Persian subjects, acknowledged the Patriarchal influence in but a slight degree.

The Patriarch's sister, Surma Khanum, in somewhat less disturbed times, might well have been looked to in a directing sense. Her name is well known to many in England, as she came to this country in the autumn of 1919 to plead the cause of the Assyrian nation. She was received in all the influential circles and remained at home until the autumn of 1920. An educated and exceedingly intelligent lady, she would, no doubt, have achieved great things for her nation had the times been more propitious. As it turned out, however, her prolonged absence rather augmented the disunion of the people, and, after all, what they really needed was a determined and single-eyed male leader, capable of welding all the diverse elements together.

Under these circumstances one Agha Petros came forward. He was by origin a mountaineer from the Baz country, who had latterly travelled a good deal, and finished up by owning property in Urmia. Rather a mysterious personage, he had attained some eminence before the war, and during the war had done some good work in conducting the Assyrian retreat. He was, though, of a different religious per-

suasion to the Nestorians, and was strongly hostile to any temporal power being accorded to the Patriarchate, but as certain sections of people were strongly attached to him he came forward with a project to reconcile the various conflicting wishes by compromise. He proposed that the mountaineers and Urmians should combine to regain part of their former territory and form a combined Assyrian nation from the refugees at Baqubah, who would be afterwards joined by the large numbers who were still in the Caucasus, near Tabreez, and in America. He recognized that it would be impossible to return to their full former mountain habitat, but that it would be possible for the Assyrians, if suitably provided with arms as a precautionary measure, to regain the mountain country from near Gawar eastwards, where they would actually join up with the Urmians who would return to Urmia. It was recognized that this project was feasible of execution providing the Assyrians were united, and if they arrived in these localities they could claim to return to their own homes without necessarily fighting. As for the Persian Urmian subjects, they only asked of the Persian Government to return to their former properties peaceably, and would engage to hand in all arms if the other inhabitants did likewise. Agha Petros stipulated for certain armaments and initial supplies, after which he would be responsible for the movement under the benevolent encouragement of the British. He secured the adherence of the whole of the Urmian community and of about two-thirds of the mountaineers, and under these auspices, and with a hope of obtaining the establishment of an Assyrian nation, the proposal was agreed to.

If some such project were not entertained, it was probable that all hope for a future Assyrian nation would disappear, and, as events transpired, this forecast was correct.

It was decided to give Agha Petros an equivalent of rifles to that which was originally in the possession of the Assyrians when they were disarmed at Baqubah, to fit them out with certain material and transport, and to transfer them as a preliminary measure to a camp north of Mosul.

With the small staff available this was a large undertaking, but such were the assistance and support accorded to me by Sir Arnold Wilson, the then Civil Commissioner, that the first section of the people with their families left Baqubah at the end of April, 1920, and were conveyed by rail and march to a camp at Mindan, on the Ghasir Su River, about twenty-seven miles north-east of Mosul. It was anticipated that all the sections, each one consisting of about 1,200 persons, would arrive at Mindan by about the end of June, and this would give ample time for the men to proceed forward and to prepare a way for the women and children to follow later. Events proceeded according to plan up to the middle of May (when I myself left for Mosul), and

we had then about five sections of people collected. I made arrangements for an advance camp near Akra for the armed men, where, too, a supply dump could be formed for the forward movement. The men were also organized in proper parties, and comprehensive arrangements made for food-supplies and issue of material.

It was at the end of May, however, that a serious hitch occurred owing to the Arab attacks on the Mosul-Baghdad railway line. I managed to return to Baqubah to ascertain the position and returned again to Mosul at the end of June, but it was not until the middle of July that movements were resumed.

After a small respite the attacks on the line commenced afresh, and again matters were held up; however, additional preparations were still made in the forward area. Early in August I again went to Baqubah, and with great difficulty initiated further resumption of movements with all due and necessary precautions, only to be again confronted with further and still more serious difficulties. After a few days at Baqubah, and when the movement was again in full swing, I found a column of troops arriving near our camp, Arab disturbances having apparently occurred beyond the river. It took all our energies at Baqubah to help this column with transport, working parties, and detrainment.

After two days this column, after engaging in some not altogether successful operations on the far bank of the river, suddenly commenced to withdraw to Baghdad. Concurrently with this the political authorities came into my camp and informed me that the rebels were entering Baqubah town, there being merely a small detachment of native infantry left behind to guard the Baqubah railway bridge. No word came from Baghdad as to how I was to defend the camp, nor with what means. The camp perimeter was some seven miles in extent, and a large part of it was under close rifle range from the opposite bank of the river.

By chance a small proportion of the rifles allotted for the repatriation movement had been retained temporarily by me at Baqubah, but the majority of our rifles were discarded Winchester weapons of 1866, with defective ammunition, and of ammunition for the few modern rifles there were only ten rounds per rifle. Soon we came under a continuous and sustained fire from across the river, involving many casualties in the hospital and the transport lines, which for the sake of a convenient water-supply were close to the river. I organized the defence in sections as far as possible, but the difficulty was that at that time of the year parties of Arabs could cross the river both above and below the camp. Parties did so cross, and day and night we had to watch these and drive them off. Added to this, with so few British personnel, it was difficult to prevent the refugees firing away all their ammunition. Telegrams were despatched to Baghdad, in the interval of the line being cut, to get more arms and ammunition. After three

days a consignment was despatched, only to be derailed five miles from the camp station. I took a mounted party of refugees, who succeeded in dispersing the Arabs and rescuing the consignment, which was brought in by hand. From this point offensive measures were undertaken, and the Arabs within a radius of about eight miles learned a wholesome lesson from the refugees; villages were burnt and arms and prisoners were captured. After this the situation was relieved by the arrival of a regiment, only to be again rendered grave by the reports of large fresh assemblages of Arabs arriving, released by the fall of Shah Roban. The defence, however, was successfully maintained, though the supply of rations was becoming a difficulty, and the whole camp was on half scale.

It was now decided, largely on account of the food difficulty, that the camp should be evacuated. The remainder of the Assyrians were consequently sent on up to Mosul, and the Armenians were despatched to near Basrah, where they could await shipment overseas at some future date. With the fighting still in progress, this movement required considerable adjustment, together with the dismantling of the camp and the salvaging of all the stores. Day and night these movements were carried on, with the result that the camp was practically evacuated by the beginning of September.*

Meanwhile, at Mosul, the delay in keeping the refugees at Mindan with large numbers of arms in their hands caused some trouble with local authorities, added to which the interim camp near Akra was attacked by the Surchi Kurds. The Assyrians themselves dealt with these most successfully and chased them back to their villages, capturing large quantities of stock. The Assyrian parties moving up to the line were also attacked at intervals.

After a rapid rush down to Basrah to see the Armenians installed, I lost no time in then hastening back to Mosul, where, notwithstanding the difficulties, I pushed Agha Petros on to complete his arrangements. I found him extremely dilatory, but by my personal efforts, and with those of my assistants, we got some sort of organization into the parties, and fixed a date for the forward movement. Some of the most important material had, however, still been hung up in Baghdad, and I had once again to return to see about this. On my arrival at Baghdad I was informed that, owing to the departure of the Civil Commissioner (whose help and advice had never failed me in all these movements), and the arrival of the new High Commissioner, instructions had been given to suspend the repatriation movement until the actual orders of the latter had been taken.

The season was getting very advanced, and there was no time to

* The above operations and defence of Baqubah Camp were dismissed in the military despatch of the G.O.C. in the following words: "As for the refugees at Baqubah, they were well armed [!] and could look after themselves [!]"

lose if the project was to be carried through. I accordingly went down the river to meet Sir Percy Cox, and put the matter before him. He was most sympathetic, and gave sanction to carry on the policy of his predecessor, and with this sanction I returned to Mosul. I found Agha Petros had again done little in my absence, but I urged him on to such effect that, by October 19, we managed to get all the armed men assembled with transport and with reserve food for three months in the forward camp near Akra. This assembly made really a very good appearance, there being some 6,000 armed men grouped according to their tribes, under their respective banners of red crosses on a white ground, and something like 2,500 pack-mules.

In co-operation and agreement with the local Kurdish chiefs of the immediate neighbourhood we moved forward through Akra and ascended the Akra-Dagh. From there, according to plan, at the limits of our occupied territory, I left the expedition entirely in the hands of Agha Petros; two British officers, however, remained with it to watch events, and report to me as to progress, according to the lines agreed upon.

The country immediately across the Akra-Dagh was nominally in our administrative sphere, but in reality it was occupied (up to across the Zab) by the Surchi and Zibari Kurds, who were hostile to us, and upon whose leader a price had been set by the British Government for the murder of the late Mr. Bill.

These particular Kurds, as anticipated, opposed the Assyrian advance, but were easily brushed aside, and the expedition moved into the Barzan country successfully. Here was reached the limit of our administrative sphere, and Agha Petros, according to plan, should have moved, negotiating as he went, towards Neri, and thence north-east and east.

Unfortunately, as it turned out, a large body of his mountaineer people got out of hand. The temptation to branch off westwards towards their actual former country was too strong for them, and, in addition, their old habits of pillaging and looting asserted themselves. Agha Petros, in consequence, lost control of this his best category of fighting men, and his weaker Urmian category were left in the lurch. What Agha Petros had in effect actually promised these mountaineers is even now not altogether clear, but it is probable that he had promised one thing to them and another thing to the Urmians. However, the upshot was that, after some weeks, Agha Petros and those who had followed him doubled back to Mindan Camp, and the recalcitrant contingent, after securing various booty among our friendly Kurds, circled round and, unable to make their way to their own Tiari country, percolated back into the Mosul vilayet by way of Amadia.

Thus unfortunately ended this enterprise, upon which so much care and trouble had been expended. We had endeavoured to give the Assyrians a chance of national unity in a suitable zone of their own,

and it was worth making the attempt, as otherwise there would always have been the reproach against us of lack of sympathetic treatment to this small nation, which had, to a large extent, been sacrificed in the war. The result, however, only showed what had all along been seen as the danger, that, as in the case of so many of the Eastern nationalities striving for liberation, there is no cohesion and no unity of aim among the component parts.

Having regard alone to British interests, the establishment of a strong and united element on the borders of our occupied territory must have been a safeguard to us. Their interests are our interests, and there would be an absence of that potential hostility which cannot help being inherent in certain of our Moslem neighbours. This is, of course, not to say that our policy should have been to turn out such of the Moslems as were installed there.

Furthermore, had this Assyrian movement succeeded, the Armenian Christians from Baqubah could have been passed through to unite with the large numbers in the Caucasus, and give added strength and extent to the then existing Armenian Erivan State.

After the return of the Agha Petros expedition, the season was too advanced to do much in the way of alternative repatriation measures, but it was found possible—not, however, without some grumbling—to settle some 1,200 families on the land just north of Mosul. These families consisted of those who were all along averse to Agha Petros' scheme, but it required some moving to get them away from the comforts of the refugee camp. As spring approached preparations were commenced to get the above amplified and so finally dispose of the refugee camp. As was customary each group of persons asked for different settlement. Nothing would induce the Urmians to settle on the land, while, as regards the mountaineers, some only were agreed to follow the above-mentioned families; Agha Petros' following remained obdurate, and would listen to nothing except again to make their way by force of arms to their old homes. On account of the misdeeds of these people in the late expedition it was not possible to let them embark again upon such an adventure.

By the end of May that contingent which was willing to settle down peaceably commenced joining those who had previously gone in the neighbourhood of Dohuk and Akra, and the first-named settlements were extended, by arrangement with the existing Kurdish elements, into country a good way to the north of Dohuk and to our nominal administrative border. The other mountaineer families were cleared out of camp on fixed dates, and given equal allotment of stock and subsistence grant to the "willing" families. After some continued stubbornness these people realized that they must accept the reasonable measures taken for them, and they eventually joined up more or less in the neighbourhood of the others.

As for the Urmians, they would hear of nothing but return to

Urmia. They were accordingly given a grant in money equivalent to what the mountaineers had received, and were left to make the best of their way into Persia via Hamadan. The Persians at first turned these people back, although they were their own subjects, but now they are managing to filter through with a certain proportion remaining in Mesopotamia, where they found suitable work, and others joining relatives in America.

The upshot of the above is that instead of a united Assyrian nation of some 100,000 persons, which the first scheme contemplated, the Assyrians are now split up separately—some 15,000 are congregated in the settlements north of Mosul, where, notwithstanding their former continued protestations, they are living in amity with the Kurds under our ægis, and have provided a substantial contingent for the frontier levies.

As the Middle East resumes more peaceable conditions and the different nationalities see that, notwithstanding their religious differences, it is yet possible to live side by side with one another, these settlements of the Assyrians may yet form the nucleus to which the nation as a whole might attach itself.

As for the Armenian category, so often mentioned in the foregoing, they are at last in transit to Batum, but it is unfortunately the case that they contain at least one-third among their number of incapable persons who must be a permanent charge on some authority or other.

Inasmuch as the upkeep and repatriation measures of the Assyrian and Armenian refugees in Mesopotamia have cost the British Government 500 lakhs of rupees, it is hoped the benevolence of this very considerable outlay is fully appreciated and realized.

THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSION TO TURKISTAN, 1918-20

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at 74, Grosvenor Street, London, W. 1, on Tuesday, January 24, 1922, the Right Hon. Lord CARNOCK, P.C., G.C.M.G., in the chair, when a lecture was given by Major-General Sir Wilfrid Malleeson, K.C.I.E., C.B., on "The British Mission to Turkistan, 1918-20."

The CHAIRMAN : I will now call on Colonel Yate to read the names of those who have been elected as Members of the Society.

The HON. SECRETARY (Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate): I have to announce we have to-day elected thirteen new Members: The Right Hon. the Earl of Lytton, Major-General Sir Webb Gillman, K.C.M.G., C.B., Lieut.-General Sir Richard Wapshare, K.C.B., C.S.I., Sir William Sheppard, K.C.I.E., Major Francis Humphrys, C.I.E., H.B.M. Minister at Kabul, Major L. C. Thuillier, I.A., Dr. H. R. Hall, F.S.A., of the British Museum, Major H. M. Wightwick, Bombay Political Department, Captain F. C. de L. Kirk, K.A.R., Captain A. H. Roberts, Mr. Brasher, Mr. A. C. Sampson, M.C.

The CHAIRMAN : It is now my pleasing duty to introduce to you Major-General Sir Wilfrid Malleeson, who was head of the British Mission in Turkistan from 1918 to 1920. I do not think, as far as I am aware, that much information ever reached the press or public in regard to this Mission; and, therefore, I am sure that it will be with great interest and curiosity that we shall listen to General Sir Wilfrid Malleeson on the matter.

THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSION TO TURKISTAN, 1918-20

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR WILFRID MALLESON (*January 24, 1922*).

IT will obviously be impossible, in the short space of one hour, to describe the crowded events of two eventful years, on hardly one day of which period there did not happen something both interesting and important. In what follows, therefore, it will only be possible to give you the barest *précis* of the work of the Mission.

In June, 1918, I was summoned to Simla, and informed that I had been appointed head of a Mission to Turkistan, and was to proceed immediately to Meshed, where the Mission was in process of formation. The object of the Mission was to check as far as possible the Turkish and German designs to penetrate, via Baku and Krasnovodsk, with the active assistance or tacit consent of the Bolsheviks then in control of Turkistan, to the Afghan frontier, where their object was to bring pressure to bear on Afghans and tribesmen alike to embark on a religious war against the British in India. The times were critical. In France the German armies had penetrated far beyond the lines held by us in 1917. There was as yet no sign of any counter-offensive by the Allies. Nothing was happening on the Salonika front; Allenby had not yet started on his wonderful campaign in Palestine; whilst the Turk was pushing fast towards Baku, and German troops, with a corps headquarters in Tiflis, had disembarked in the Caucasus as a stiffening to that "Army of Islam" which, hordes of enemy agents had for months been proclaiming through the bazaars of Central Asia, was about to undertake the liberation of the East from the clutches of the brutal English Imperialists. Enemy missions—German, Turkish, and Austrian—were in Kabul and Herat. Great pressure was being put on the Amir Habibullah to declare a holy war. In fact, the opinion of those in high places at Simla was that it needed the appearance of but a detachment of German or Turkish troops on the Northern frontiers of Afghanistan to precipitate a *jihād* against us which, in view of India's commitments in Mesopotamia and elsewhere, would have been extremely awkward. In short, the Government of India could hardly sleep at nights owing to these various possibilities, and the Mission which I was about to join was only one of the steps taken with a view to mitigating the obvious perils of the situation.

Having with some difficulty obtained the assistance of one officer, I started on the long journey to Meshed. At that time the Nushki line had been extended to Mirjava, close to the Persian frontier. Thence to Meshed the route was difficult, as the magnificent road made by

Colonel Dickson did not come till much later. The heat was intense, as much as 128° in the shade, and there was a great scarcity of potable, or even of any water, along the first part of the route. We travelled in Ford lorries, starting at daybreak, carrying food and water with us, and pushing ahead until it was too dark to go further. Thus to Turbat-i-Haidari, some eighty miles south of Meshed, beyond which it was stated cars could not go. Eventually we reached Meshed in what was stated to be the then record time from India. At any rate, the journey called forth a special telegram of congratulation from the Commander-in-Chief in India, which I particularly desire to mention here, inasmuch as it was the only word of commendation that the Mission received from anyone in authority during the whole of the two years I was with it!

My orders were, roughly, to take all possible steps to obviate the dangers already alluded to. I was to get into touch with any elements likely to be of use to us. I was to give all possible assistance to such elements. My financial powers were unlimited, according to my orders, but actually a very acute lack of cash, both in India and Persia, made them extremely small.

From the moment of my arrival in Meshed events began to move fast. We were already in touch with some Social Revolutionary Russian elements in Transcaspia who were hostile to the designs cherished by the Germans and their Bolshevik allies. But, before these negotiations could proceed very far, the railway workmen of Transcaspia had already taken matters into their own hands and made a clean sweep of all the Bolshevik officials for the whole distance between the Caspian and the Oxus. They had been driven into this action by the bloodthirsty methods of the Bolshevik *commissars*, who, moreover, neglected to pay them any wages. Had this movement, which was unorganized and quite precipitate, been better co-ordinated, it might have altered the subsequent history of Central Asia to a considerable extent. But, as all the anti-Bolshevik elements beyond the Oxus were unprepared for the *coup*, and the Bolsheviks were the only party actually in possession of an armed force, the revolting railwaymen, after crossing the Oxus, soon found themselves on the defensive. At this juncture they appealed to me for military assistance. We had at this time a few troops on the Perso-Russian frontier, and a few more in Meshed, a mere handful all told. Moreover, they were not under the Mission, but belonged to the East Persian cordon, whose headquarters were at Birjand. However, these were now placed at my disposal. They were seriously deficient in important articles of equipment, and had nothing like their proper complement of ammunition, but the troops, the 28th Light Cavalry and 19th Punjabis, were magnificent material and led by exceptionally able and gallant officers. It now became a matter for serious and immediate consideration whether

this little detachment should be launched over the Russian frontier with a view to supporting the workmen of Transcaspia against the avenging Bolshevik hordes. The Simla reply to my references on the subject was that I was on the spot and had a free hand. Now, a free hand from the Government of India as then constituted was in the nature of a gift from the Greeks. If all went well some gentlemen in easy-chairs on a hill-top 2,000 miles away would appropriate the credit. If, on the other hand, the throw miscarried, or if the venture were subsequently adversely criticized in Parliament or the press, then the unfortunate man on the spot might be quite certain that he would be spurned and repudiated and thrown remorselessly to the wolves. Moreover, although not in the least afraid of responsibility, and confident from reports received that our splendid troops would have no trouble in adequately dealing with the Bolshevik rabble, the Mission felt that the issue was too large to be decided by subordinate officers, inasmuch as our crossing the Russian frontier would constitute a definite act of war against the Bolsheviks, and we were not at all certain whether Simla realized this or whether such a course was in accordance with the policy of H.M. Government. However, it was so decided, and our troops crossed the border and were almost immediately engaged with the Bolshevik forces, which by this time had arrived at a spot almost due north of Meshed. I have no time, unfortunately, to describe the military operations. It must suffice to say that four times we were attacked, and each time repulsed the enemy with loss. Our allies were a mixture of railway workmen, a few regular Russian officers, and a motley gathering of Turkman. The latter could have put much larger numbers in the field, but the Russian elements were averse to arming numbers, as they were in doubt whether the Turkman might not subsequently turn on them.

Meanwhile events were moving fast on the Caspian side. The Turks were almost in the suburbs of Baku when General Dunsterville's troops took a hand in the defence of that place. They came too late, were in too small numbers, and generally were inadequately supported to hold the place. Baku fell, and at once the hordes of enemy agents announced the imminent coming of the Army of Islam which was to free Asia from the British yoke. But General Dunsterville's occupation of Baku, short though it was, had enabled him to obtain control of the Caspian fleet, which was decisive so far as enemy plans were concerned. Without the fleet there could be no transport of troops across the Caspian. Nevertheless the situation remained serious. The Turks advanced from the Tabriz direction, and the G.O.C. in Mesopotamia became concerned regarding his long line of communications between Bagdad and Enzeli on the Caspian coast. Just at this critical time, however, the war in more distant theatres took a dramatic turn in our favour. In France the Allies were carrying everything before

them. In Italy the Austrian *débâcle* had begun. From Salonika the Allies were advancing with great success. In Palestine General Allenby was defeating the Turks in a campaign reminiscent of that of Jena. There quickly followed the armistice with Turkey, and the danger from the Army of Islam ceased to exist. On our side of the Caspian, however, we had been not unprepared for the worst. You all probably know that the whole area from Krasnovodsk to the Oxus is a waterless desert tempered by small and widely separated oases. Invading troops, unprepared with the enormous amount of animal transport which would be necessary, would consequently have to depend on the railway. This, had the necessity arisen, we should have been able to deny them. In granting assistance to the Transcaspian people it was an essential part of the terms agreed upon that, in the event of a hostile descent on the eastern shores of the Caspian, the railway should be handed over to us. We were prepared to destroy the wharves, lighters, and other facilities at Krasnovodsk; to evacuate its inhabitants inland; to destroy the reserves of oil fuel maintained for locomotives; and to cut off the water supply, not only at Krasnovodsk, but for a long distance inland. We were to remove or destroy all rolling stock, blow up bridges and culverts, carry away the points, and even as much of the track itself as was possible in the time available. General Dunsterville was our first line of defence against the Turko-German plans; our Mission was the second. Had he failed to obtain control of the Caspian fleet we should have hoped that the measures taken by us would have made it quite impossible, at any rate for many months, for any hostile force to approach within 300 miles of the Afghan frontier.

Time does not allow of my describing in any detail the rest of our experiences in Turkistan. In October our troops inflicted a heavy defeat on the Bolsheviks at Dushakh, and the latter retired hurriedly for more than a hundred miles. We advanced to Merv. The Government of India became anxious that our presence in that area, which was not a bit nearer Afghanistan than Meshed itself—rather further off, in fact—might cause apprehension in Kabul. I was ordered to retire to the districts on the railway near the Persian frontier. I pointed out that winter was coming on; that the whole country between Askabad and Merv afforded no shelter for our troops, having been destroyed by the Bolsheviks; that already the temperature was very low; and that, moreover, any such retirement would have a disastrous moral effect, and would almost certainly lead to an immediate Bolshevik advance. The only reply I got from Simla was the reiteration of former orders and instructions to make the best arrangements for shelter I could. This in a desert of sand, without timber or stone or even water in many places, and without any adequate supply or hospital arrangements! However, the Home Government came to

my rescue, overruled the Government of India, pointed out that our staying in Merv was the best means of supporting Transcaspia, and, in fact, that we were to stay there. And so we passed the winter in Merv and Bairam Ali, where the Brigadier's headquarters were in the private palace of the Tsar.

In January, 1919, the Mission passed from the control of the Commander-in-Chief in India to that of General Milne at Constantinople. That officer shortly afterwards came to Transcaspia and inspected the position at the front and discussed local matters with the Mission. It was evident that we should not remain indefinitely in Turkistan. The British Army was being demobilized, the expenses were great, and it was abundantly clear that the local inhabitants were quite content that we should do the fighting for them whilst they took their ease. The Russians were always claiming that they numbered 250,000 in the province. General Milne countered by asking how it was that out of such a large Russian population there were less than 200 men at the front. In February I received orders that we were to evacuate the country "forthwith." I pointed out that to carry out these orders literally might lead to serious trouble. The Bolsheviks would seize the occasion to advance directly they learnt we were no longer opposing them; many of the Russians at the front would desert to them, the rest would probably bolt. The railway workmen would refuse to work the railway; and local Bolshevik elements, which had always been in our midst, would cause trouble, and we might have great difficulty in effecting a safe and orderly withdrawal. Moreover, I felt that we could not summarily leave in the lurch those who had for so long been relying on us and who, to a man, had interpreted the British declaration to the Russian peoples as being a definite pledge that we were going to support them. Accordingly I asked, firstly, that the orders be kept secret for the present until I had prepared a suitable atmosphere for their promulgation, and, secondly, stated that I anticipated being able to effect the withdrawal, if allowed to carry it out in my own way, by the end of March. General Milne supported me in these matters and the suggestions were approved.

There was much to be done. In the first instance I arranged with the Brigadier to withdraw unostentatiously all surplus baggage, to evacuate all sick and wounded, and to hand over stores too bulky to carry and no longer likely to be of use to us to the local troops. I sent the local War Minister with a portmanteau full of notes to Baku to raise troops—good ones, if possible, but, at any rate, something to send to the front and inspire confidence on our side and lead the Bolsheviks to believe that heavy reinforcements were arriving, and that an advance was imminent. Later, when I had divulged secretly to the local Government the fact of our impending withdrawal—a communication which caused great consternation and the resignation

of three ministers—I caused to be widely spread by the many agents we had in and behind the Bolshevik lines rumours that the British were up to some deep move, which would probably take the shape of an ostentatious departure from the Merv front, but that in reality they were contemplating a wide detour by a line of wells north of the railway, right round the Bolshevik flank, that they would cross the Oxus, then very low, below Charjui, and that, when thus right across the Bolshevik line of communications, the Russians and Turkman on the Merv front, largely reinforced from Denikin's armies in the Northern Caucasus, would advance on Charjui from the west whilst the British descended on it from the east. These stories, and many others which we put about almost daily, evidently made so great an impression on the Bolsheviks that they never attempted to advance when we did leave the front. Indeed, they had packed their baggage and sent it to the rear, whilst their main body at Charjui lived in a state of nervous apprehension for many weeks.

When the time at length came when I had to make public the news of our impending withdrawal, I was inundated every day by deputations from every class of the community, begging for delay, for reconsideration of the orders, and so on. I was not able to give these poor people, who already had suffered much from both classes of Russians, the old régimists and the Bolsheviks, very much in the way of comfort. The Turkman of every class, the Yamuts from the Caspian, the Tekke of the central oases, the Salors from the regions south of Merv, were pathetically insistent on their desire that we should remain. Indeed, a British protectorate was what they all reckoned as their probable greatest happiness. During the months the British had been in the country, despite the disturbed conditions, the high prices and general scarcity, they had enjoyed, they said, greater justice than they had experienced for forty years. Tsarists and Bolsheviks were equally obnoxious to them. They had always heard much of the benign aspects of British rule in the East; now they had experienced it they wished their country permanently to become part of the British Empire. If our troops, indeed, must go, in pursuance of orders from higher authority, surely I alone might stay in their country to see justice done. They would provide an escort; and much more to the same effect. No doubt much of what they said was due to the certain knowledge that our troops alone had saved them during many months from being overrun and devastated once more by the Bolsheviks. But this was not all. I am sure they had a real liking and respect for us. The gallant behaviour of our troops in the field, their good conduct at all times, the fact that we had been able to get altered or altogether cancelled many Russian restrictions which the Turkman found harmful or invidious, my insistence that two out of the five members of the local Government should be of

Turkman race, and many other little things in which we had been able to help them, had begotten a genuine liking both for British institutions and individuals. However sorely they may have felt regarding what they regarded as our abandonment of them and their cause, they bore us no ill feeling regarding it. We were merely carrying out orders. Not only did we part as friends, but I am confident that for many a year to come the prestige of British troops and the justice of British officers will be subjects of conversation in the *auls* of the Turkman deserts.

Our evacuation proceeded almost "according to plan." There was some slight delay in procuring the necessary rolling stock, and one or two palms had to be greased. On the evening of April 1, one day behind schedule, the last Indian troops marched out from Askabad towards the Persian frontier. Simultaneously the last British troops entrained at Askabad for Krasnovodsk. Our withdrawal was accomplished. It had been a difficult and delicate task, carrying the seeds of much trouble and complication. All these had been successfully surmounted. We left without friction, and with the front intact. We thought it might have been somebody's business to say that this difficult operation had been well done. But the move was evidently regarded as being one of no more moment than a change of cantonments in India during peace-time. No one in authority made any sign. It is this sort of thing which does so much harm in the Indian Army. The neglect of the higher authorities to bestow a word of praise to troops who have thoroughly deserved it makes those troops, in their turn, come to the conclusion that the praise of such authorities is not worth having. But Simla has a bad reputation in this respect. More than ever out of touch with the army, it is slow to praise, but quick to criticize and to blame. The difference between serving under Constantinople and Simla, for instance, was most marked. From the former we were always sure of a courteous and sympathetic hearing. Our needs were well attended to. Every branch of the Constantinople commander's staff, as well as General Milne himself, came to see us and do their utmost for us. No one from Simla throughout the whole period I am dealing with ever came as far as Meshed even. And no sooner were we back in that place than once more we became liable to receive the savage and ferocious official messages for which Simla is famous, and which, in the investigations of the Mesopotamian Committee of Enquiry during the war, caused so much surprise in Parliament and the Press.

The day after our evacuation I left Askabad for Meshed. Almost at once we got news of the risings in the Punjab and elsewhere. There followed speedily the Afghan War. Had the Afghans on our side displayed any vigour they might have made things unpleasant for us. With ten or twelve thousand Afghans in Herat threatening our

communications our position might have been serious. However, it is seldom realized in Simla that Western Afghanistan as a rule does not look upon things with the same eye as Kabul. Most of the people are Shiah, and, as the official Afghans of the East were tactless enough to engage on some serious massacres of Shiahs in Kandahar and elsewhere, we were able to make much capital of this. The Herat garrison was never a danger to us. In fact, I imagine that it was much more afraid of us than we were of it. Now began what was undoubtedly the most important and most interesting task of the Mission. Early in the day we were able to report to India the despatch of letters from the Amir and his Foreign Secretary to the Bolsheviks, announcing the independence of Afghanistan and their desire for friendly relations. The Bolsheviks were quick to seize upon so excellent an opportunity for harming the one country which, in their estimation, stands between them and their dream of universal anarchy. One Bravin, who had formerly posed as Bolshevik Minister to Persia, was selected to proceed on a special mission to Kabul. It became our task to do everything possible to prevent the consummation of Afghan and Bolshevik plans for an offensive and defensive alliance, and as a preliminary we laid ourselves out to "queer the pitch" of Bravin. In a series of communications, which, despite increasingly rigorous guards on the respective frontiers, almost invariably circulated freely amongst the people we desired they should reach, we pointed out to the Afghans that, in view of the notorious faithlessness of the Bolsheviks, they should, before admitting such dangerous people to the God-granted kingdom, extract from them suitable pledges. What more suitable than the restitution to Afghanistan of the Panjdeh district filched from them in 1885? And what more agreeable act of justice to the Bolsheviks than such restitution—the Bolsheviks, who never tired of denouncing the iniquitous, land-grabbing Imperialism of the former Tsarist Governments? The bait was swallowed. Bravin was asked what the Bolsheviks meant to do about it. He promised restitution. The Bolshevik Government, perhaps not going as far as this, at any rate held out strong hopes of such a concession to right, and talked about a frontier commission and a plebiscite of the people of the area. The Afghans, their appetite improving, demanded not only Panjdeh but the whole area almost to Merv, and asked, moreover, for a further realignment of the frontier from Sarakhs to the Oxus at Bosaga, together with further territorial concessions in Southern Bokhara. Moreover, determined there should be no doubt about the plebiscite when it took place, they sent important mullahs and numerous other agents to canvass the inhabitants, assuring them at the same time privily of their earnest desire to extirpate from Central Asia, at any rate, not only all infidels but especially the Bolsheviks. Having, through numerous agents in both

camp, a very fairly accurate notion of what was going on, and of how these two interesting parties were seeking how best to take each other in, we made it our business to keep each side unofficially informed of the perfidy of the other. The Afghans about this time, hearing that there was a serious and promising anti-Bolshevik rebellion throughout Ferghana, were *gauche* enough to send special emissaries there with letters and presents for the leaders of the insurgents. This information, too, we felt it our duty to bring to the notice of the Bolsheviks. Meanwhile an Afghan extraordinary mission had proceeded to Moscow, and had been greeted there with much enthusiasm by Lenin, Trotsky, and the rest. The definite word "alliance" was repeatedly used, large offers of military help, not only in arms and munitions of every sort, including aeroplanes, but of instructors and even troops, were made. The Afghan Mission departed confident of having achieved a great diplomatic success. They had a definite alliance, a restitution of territory, and huge promises of arms, munitions, and money. All this evidently induced Kabul, with typical Afghan impudence and aggression, to regard the Bolsheviks as sadly in need of Afghan help. Hence more Afghan arrogance and further demands. An Afghan armed force marched through Kushk without permission and proceeded towards Merv. Afghan consuls and agents appeared in every town in Turkistan. Afghan mullahs were everywhere active. As a result of our bringing these matters to Bolshevik notice there was considerable anxiety. Reinforcements were sent to Kushk. The head of the Turkistan Bolshevik Government went to Merv and Askabad to enquire into Afghan machinations. Afterwards he went to Kushk and was exceedingly annoyed at being insulted by an Afghan officer there. More Bolshevik reinforcements went to Kushk. We informed Herat, who hurriedly sent *their* reinforcements to the frontier. The Bolsheviks were warned of this, and so the game went on. The Bolsheviks became seriously perturbed about Afghan designs and ambitions. Their tone lacked its former affection. The promised help in money and arms was delayed, and finally actually countermanded altogether, because they had become at any rate partly convinced that the Afghans were fomenting a huge pan-Islamic rising throughout Central Asia against them.

Meanwhile we had fought our indecisive and unsatisfactory campaign against Afghanistan. More than 300,000 troops on the frontier had not done one-tenth as much as Lord Roberts with 5,000 men. This anti-climax was very damaging to our prestige in Central Asia, and we found it hard to explain to educated Persians and others why this huge force, with all the advantages of supreme direction from Simla, had achieved so little. In August came the so-called peace, which was no peace. It is true it pleased Simla so to regard it. But all my advices showed that the Afghans themselves re-

garded it as a temporary armistice only, a breathing space during which they hoped to get large support in arms from the Bolsheviks. During actual hostilities the Bolsheviks in Turkistan had been able to offer the Afghans nothing better than promises. They were cut off from European Russia by the left wing of Koltchak's army, and locally they were very short of arms and ammunition themselves. In September, 1919, Koltchak's armies disappeared like melting snow, and the road to Moscow was open. Open, but not working. Years of fighting on the Orenburg-Tashkent line had damaged it enormously. Bridges were blown up. Locomotives were worn out. There was no oil fuel for engines, no lubricants for the axles. Even special trains for high officials took weeks to get through. Troops had either to march or to stay where they were until railway conditions could be improved. All this was well known to Kabul, and it was realized that months must elapse before real help could reach them from their Bolshevik friends. Meanwhile they benefited by the nominal peace, intrigued in India, and agitated amongst the frontier tribes. In very numerous telegrams I reported to Simla my conviction, based on reports from numerous informants, that the Afghans were playing for time. In April, 1920, I reported that rumours were current of an imminent resumption of the war. This was scouted as absurd. A few days later Simla themselves wired me that the Afghans had invaded Chitral, that there were various disturbing signs along the whole length of the frontier, and, in short, the position was such as to make it probable that war would be immediately resumed. Troops in the interior of India were hurriedly sent to the frontier. Matters hung fire for some months, our troops standing on the frontier, and then things just fizzled out.

Why did they fizzle out? At the very time when everything pointed to a renewal of the war, the Afghans had definitely notified the Bolsheviks of their willingness to renew the war and to carry all the frontier tribes with them, provided the Bolsheviks would assist them with certain specified arms, ammunition, and money. But, partly because the raising of the maritime blockade against the Bolsheviks had impelled hopes of recognition by the Western Allies, and very largely because of my Mission's numerous *exposés* of Afghan designs had materially chilled the Bolsheviks' former enthusiasm for them, Moscow had decided not to strengthen the armaments of Afghanistan. Kabul was put off with excuses of various descriptions, until at last the chilling truth was realized that the Moscow "alliance" of October, 1919, had six months later evaporated into thin air. Without Bolshevik assistance Afghanistan was in no position to renew the war, and for this reason only, and not with any regard for the "peace" of Rawal Pindi, the war was not renewed. This Mission claims to have played a large, though an entirely unrecognized part, in averting the renewal of the war. That would certainly have cost millions, even though we

had advanced no further into Afghanistan than the half-dozen miles or so of the previous year. It might have cost many lives from battle, and more from disease. To have taken any part in averting such disasters is something of which the Mission may well be proud.

How were we able to do the work I have described? Well, I had some most excellent officers, speaking numerous languages. I had agents up to distances of a thousand miles or more, even in the Government Offices of the Bolsheviks. I had relays of men constantly coming and going in areas which I deemed important. There was hardly a train on the Central Asian Railway which had not one of our agents on board, and there was no important railway centre which had not two or three men on the spot. Travellers of every sort and description were cross-examined at scores of different places. Intelligence cannot well be improvised. It needs to be slowly built up. But we started with nothing beyond a few agents and ended with a great deal. The organization of this system was splendidly carried out by certain officers of my Mission. I do not think we ever made any grossly inaccurate reports, such as I often received from centres elsewhere. On the other hand, we sent in a stream of information from every part of the huge area for which we were responsible. It was a veritable *tour de force* for the officers I have in mind to have organized and to have brought to such a state of efficiency in so short a time so excellent an intelligence system.

What has been their reward? In May, 1920, when I left the Mission, I wrote strongly in their favour to Simla. No notice being taken of this letter, I wrote again some months later. I was then told to submit recommendations. These went in in October, 1920, for the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief. They lay for weeks in his office, and he gave up his command, apparently, without seeing them. In May, 1921, I ascertained my recommendations were still lying unnoticed in Simla. In June I wrote to the India Office, and was told a reminder had been sent to Simla on the subject. Later on I ascertained that a report had been received, but no recommendations. Then I was told that names had come through and were being considered. In November, 1921, the India Office informed me that the list of names had been sent to the Army Council for consideration. The Council is still, apparently, considering the matter, if it has not entirely rejected the proposals. At any rate, none of the rewards so richly deserved by the officers whose services I brought to notice have been gazetted. I can only surmise that neither the Commander-in-Chief in India, the India Office, nor the Army Council have the faintest conception of the important work carried out by this Mission, and to the success of which these officers of mine made so constant and so powerful a contribution.

The CHAIRMAN : I believe Colonel Redl is present at this meeting,

and I am sure we shall be very greatly obliged if he could supplement in any way the excellent remarks we have had.

Colonel REDL: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I am afraid that at very short notice I am really rushing in after General Malleson has given you a very realistic picture of what took place. I think that the only thing I can do—you are probably all anxious to sample the Arctic conditions of weather which await us outside—would be to give you a very short account of what occurred to us when we were unfortunate enough to lose General Malleson, and he returned to India. The position, roughly speaking, at that time was that the Afghan situation was by no means too stable. We did not know what was going to happen, and the Bolsheviks themselves were in a very much stronger position than they had been for some time before. Even before General Malleson left they had completely succeeded in driving our late allies across the sea—or into the sea into their graves—and, with the exception of Ferghana, they practically had the whole country under their thumb after taking Khiva, Bokhara, and the outlying parts. In Bokhara they seized the opportunity soon after to eat up the country, drive the Ameer out, and create as much chaos and trouble in Turkistan as they could—a task which, if we had been able to carry out our original Mission, they would probably have found difficult to complete; however, having their hands more or less free in the summer of 1920, they turned their attention to Persia. As they operate, if possible, by disintegrating a country, their idea was no doubt to stir up as much trouble as they could in Persia—in fact, to light a fire and then to come in as preservers and put it out. They tried various methods of getting at different elements of the Persians, and they thought that on the whole the Kurds who inhabit the mountain region between Meshed and the Russian frontiers might be the readiest material. Chiefly with the assistance of an ex-robber, named Khudu, of whom this Society heard at Major Blacker's lecture, using this man as an instrument they got these people to put up a rebellion, which completely "flummoxed"—as one might expect it would—the local Persian authorities. The Kurds came into conflict with a small detachment of our troops on the frontier, and not unnaturally were defeated; but the movement itself was not upset. Khudu occupied a very strong position in a mountain valley, which was almost impossible to get at; and the only people to go against him at first were some Persian gendarmerie, commanded by a Persian prince. He arrived, but immediately developed rheumatism, and did not get rid of it for some time—not until he returned to Meshed. While he was indulging in this rheumatism we found matters getting very dangerous indeed. We managed to get pressure put on the Governor-General to send out a further force, which he did. The rebellious Kurds were in a valley surrounded by heights and towers—a very interesting position indeed

to attack. The Persians attacked with some bravery, but did not succeed in getting in. They had good guns but no ammunition, and the guns for which they had ammunition would not shoot. Altogether matters were in a very bad way. A good deal of pressure was put on General Lesslie, who succeeded General Malleon, to place a British column we had at the time on the frontier at the disposal of the Persians to assist them. It was a very difficult demand to resist in a way, but compliance was exactly what the Bolsheviks wanted. These troops were guarding the main line from Askhabad, and of course it absolutely suited the Bolshevik book to move us off that on to a side issue. We regretfully had to decline, and say we could not move; they must find their own salvation. Eventually, through surrounding the Kurds, they were able to do it. They carried the position, and Khudu and his people fled. That left us fairly quiet for a bit. We had been told that the troops were to withdraw to India during the autumn. Just before the withdrawal of these the rebellion of the Kurds took place; there were various incidents of that sort. One day we got a message from the Governor-General that a large detachment of Bolsheviks had arrived, seized Khakistar, and imprisoned everyone. The only thing to do was to send off a flying column which ought to have been going to India instead of to the frontier. That gave us two columns out. In the end it appeared to be only an incursion of about 200 Turkmans, who were rebuked by their Bolshevik masters, and soon retired. But it indicated the ease with which the Bolsheviks could have come in and made things unpleasant. In the autumn of 1920 our troops went down by successive columns by the excellent line of communications made by General Dixon, and they got down to India without much trouble. We had left with us then a "large force," consisting of one and a half squadrons of cavalry and a certain amount of other oddments, twenty or thirty Ford vans and cars, and some thousands of local levies raised in Seistan and Khorasan, and Kurdish levies numbering about 300, whom we kept in Kuchan with half a squadron of cavalry. The way was easy for the Bolsheviks to come in, but they apparently thought that our troops had not really withdrawn, but were hidden behind mountain ranges, and would come out at the right moment. Possibly that had a certain amount to do with keeping them away. Of course, at the time the Persian Government was in negotiation with the British Government for results which did not come off. It is quite possible that the Bolsheviks might have come in if things had been going against their wishes; but as the English-Persian agreement did not eventuate they had no real reason to intervene. In November General Lesslie returned to India, and I remained in command of the Mission and remaining troops until the spring of this year. In the winter we got notice that we should be called upon to retire, and all the levies that we had we were told to

disband. So we gradually disbanded them and got ready to march. I was told to get off when I could find a favourable moment, which occurred at the end of March last. We were stopped by snow, but eventually got away. It was not a particularly easy task; we had to get rid of many tons of stores and material, including arms and much ammunition, and we had to march down by a line of communications from which all personnel had been withdrawn some months before. We had formed dumps of provisions before we started, and managed to keep these and the water supply safeguarded by the help of our Consular authorities in Khorasan and Sistan. The troops started away in very inclement weather. We just avoided frostbite at the one end and sunstroke at the other; so the troops passed through various extremes. I would add that throughout the whole of this period Khorasan was flooded with Bolshevik spies and propagandists. The general tenor of the propaganda was virulently anti-British, and particularly directed to fomenting disorder in India, for which purpose a special propaganda school was maintained at Tashkent. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: I do not know if Major Blacker is here. If so, we should be glad to hear him.

Captain BLACKER: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—We have heard of the excellence of the Bolshevik propaganda, but there was a time when the Bolshevik propaganda was not quite so good as it became in 1919. In 1918 I was unfortunate enough to be on the wrong side of the Bolshevik front, and the Bolsheviks used to put out a good deal of news about the war. The war was still going on. I remember standing behind a little group of workmen who were reading a Bolshevik *communiqué*—this was the time when strikes were taking place in England—making the most of them. But an ordinary Russian remarked that this was pure Bolshevik propaganda, because at that time, when the war was on, every cat and dog in England was mobilized. Again, when the fall of Baku took place the Bolsheviks announced it with glee, but people did not believe it because they thought it was also propaganda. The business of finance is a curious thing; it seems curious that the Bolsheviks, without any money at all, were able to command an army against us in a war where we could not afford to maintain troops at all. At that time in Tashkent we always knew when there was a financial crisis on, because the printing press was driven by electricity, and when a financial crisis took place its acuteness was measured by the dimness of the electric light. It is curious that the German emissaries who were opposed to us in a sense in 1918 in Turkistan were always well provided with actual gold coins for propaganda. I need scarcely say that a gold coin is of much more use to an emissary than paper money or promises. There is one aspect of the whole operations in Turkistan; that is, as I heard a very clever French officer say the other day, that war, like other activities of the

human race, is subject to evolution. First we had war between individuals, then between families, then between tribes, latterly between nations: now we are confronted with a war between races, which one sees sometimes in many distant corners of Asia and even Africa. Of course, he went on to say, this was only preliminary to war between sexes and planets, but I think that is a little too far to go at present.

The CHAIRMAN: I think at this late hour we should hardly like to prolong the discussion, interesting as it has been. General Malleson and the other speakers have been good enough to tell us of events previously unknown. It is most unfortunate that those events cannot be more widely known, because those who dealt with them deserve the very highest credit for courage and diplomatic skill. (Applause.) I am sure I am interpreting the wishes of all present when, in your name, I convey to Sir Wilfrid Malleson our most hearty thanks for his very interesting and most humorous recital of those very important events in which he took so active and successful a part.

This ended the meeting.

REVIEWS

DATES AND DATE CULTIVATION OF THE 'IRAQ.

Mr. V. H. W. Dowson, of the Mesopotamian Agricultural Department, on his election as a member of the Central Asian Society, has presented to the library copies of Parts I. and II. of his monograph on "Dates and Date Cultivation of the 'Iraq" (W. Heffer and Sons, Cambridge). Part III. is still in the press.

Mr. Dowson, who was employed in Lower Mesopotamia during the years 1917-20, and thus had an exceptional opportunity of studying the cultivation of the date, was placed on special duty for three months in 1919, during the date harvest, in order that he might make a close examination of the varying conditions under which the date is cultivated in Mesopotamia, especially in the great gardens on the banks of the Shatt-el-'Arab, with a view to the discovery of an equitable basis for the taxation of date gardens.

The monograph, which is lavishly furnished with admirable illustrations, gives proof of the method and care with which Mr. Dowson brought the attention of a trained mind to bear on his problem, and of the pains which he took to find a solution. It also shows that, owing to the great difference in yield and price of the chief varieties of date, among other factors, any attempt at systematic adjustment of the burden would involve such prolonged and scientific enquiry as the industry is unlikely to receive in the near future. Nevertheless, although the primary object may not have been attained, Mr. Dowson's monograph remains as a useful compilation of facts connected with the date industry in 'Iraq, reviewed and analyzed after diligent enquiry at first hand with commendable thoroughness and acumen. One impression which also imparted itself to Mr. Dowson strikes the lay mind on perusal of his work. It seems almost certain that if greater pains were taken with the handling and packing of the best varieties of date grown on the Shatt-el-'Arab, especially the Basrah "khadhrawi," the dates of 'Iraq might compete at least on equal terms with the produce of North Africa in the markets of Europe and North America, and better prices might be realized, to the benefit alike of the Mesopotamian cultivator, garden owner, and exporter.

The attractiveness of the monograph, and even its value, are diminished by methods of transliteration of Arabic names, which are quite unscientific and altogether unworthy of a writer as well acquainted with the spoken Arabic of Mesopotamia as Mr. Dowson. It is to be hoped that in the third part—that dealing with the varieties of date grown in the 'Iraq—this defect will be remedied.

E. B. H.

RIVER CONTROL IN MESOPOTAMIA. By E. B. Howell, C.S.I., C.I.E. *Quarterly Review* for January, 1922.

This very ably written article brings before the public a subject hitherto, I believe, untouched in the press. Mr. Howell speaks with an intimate knowledge of his subject, based upon study of it on the spot during the years of the war. Not only is the consideration of great water problems a fascinating pursuit in any country, in Iraq it is the consideration of the very existence of a spacious land. The story of the investigation by irrigation officers of the mysterious silting up of the rivers, and the curious phenomenon of their continually raising their own beds till they ran on causeways, is well told. The successful outcome of their careful studies, and the equally successful means taken to make the Tigris behave like a normal river by making it do once more for itself what man had hitherto made impossible, are fully and graphically described. It is easy to realize, moreover, that had the steps not been taken, the time was not far distant when the lower Tigris and Euphrates would have ceased to exist as rivers, and have become a number of shallow ditches, feeding enormous wastes of marshes, isolating Baghdad from the Persian Gulf. The article is one of the most interesting on Mesopotamian topics that has appeared for a long time.

E. B. S.

PIONEERS OF PROGRESS: EMPIRE BUILDERS: SIR ROBERT G. SANDEMAN. By A. L. P. Tucker, C.I.E. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. 1921. Price: 2s. 6d. net.

In this little study of Sir Robert Sandeman Mr. A. L. P. Tucker has achieved a remarkable feat of selection and compression. In the space of sixty small pages he has given a moving and essentially truthful picture of a character not without complexities in all its surface simplicity, and a career long, strenuous, and filled with controversy and achievement. The feat is the more remarkable since, in order to make his story interesting or even intelligible to a public unfamiliar with Indian frontier history and geography, he has been compelled to devote a full sixth of his scanty space to a setting of the scene and an exposition of the events leading up to his drama. This is excellently done in Chapter II. ("The Indian Frontier"), which, with the aid of the sketch-map,* should enable the least instructed of his readers to follow the story with sufficient understanding.

Mr. Tucker has been well inspired in basing his appreciation largely on the section of R. B. Hittu Ram's *Baluchistan Chronicles*, englished by General Sir Claud Jacob under the title of *Sandeman in Baluchistan*; for this gives us—what is often lacking to a just estimate of empire-builders whose work lies amongst uncivilized or semi-civilized peoples—a view of its subject's character and achievements as they appeared in the eyes of the people among and through whom the work was done. True, "the Chronicler," as Mr. Tucker calls him, was not himself a Baluch. But he was born and brought up amongst Baluch, though outside the hills; he knew the chiefs and tribes of Baluchistan and understood their feelings as few have done before or since, and, as Sandeman's trusted henchman and confidant, he had been for twenty-six years a close

* Regrettable omissions from this map are the town of Sibi, and the Bolan Railway, now the principal line of communication with Quetta.

eyewitness of all his dealings with the people. When all due allowance has been made for the tinge of hero-worship which renders the Chronicler's work so engaging, his picture of his hero may be accepted as, in all essentials, that which filled the minds of the tribes of Baluchistan.

What, then, was the secret of the power exercised by this man—a man, as Mr. Tucker quite justly says, not brilliantly clever, not highly educated or trained, not even endowed with the faculty of clearly expounding in words the faith that was in him? What was it that enabled him, in the face of very strong opposition from many of his superiors and fellow-workers, in the face of the frequently reluctant and distrustful attitude of the Government of India, to effect the peaceful conquest of a great province; to compose the inveterate feuds that had embroiled its tribes from time immemorial, and persuade or compel them to cease from preying on one another and on their neighbours; to establish a system of self-government which made this new conquest a source of real strength to the Empire in days of stress; and to leave, in the province he had created, a name that is still, almost literally, “a name to conjure with”? Mr. Tucker finds the most conspicuous of his great qualities to have been personal courage, deep sense of duty and inexhaustible tenacity and patience, and, above all, passionate “love for his fellow-creatures, especially the half-civilized peoples among whom his life was spent.” Personal courage, indeed, is the condition *sine qua non* of successful work on the Indian frontier, and no doubt Sandeman's conspicuous, though never harebrained or uncalculating, boldness did much to establish his fame and authority among the tribes. His tenacity or, as his opponents sometimes called it, his obstinacy, was a proverb both among his colleagues and superiors and among those over whom he ruled. “Sinneman Sahib is not the sort of Sahib that lets go,” a shrewd Indian, who had suffered somewhat from this characteristic in him, once said to the writer with immense emphasis and a sort of rueful admiration. And his love for his fellow-creatures, and especially for the people of Baluchistan, undoubtedly inspired and informed that passion for bringing order out of chaos that is writ large across his history. By inspiring him with sympathetic understanding, it gave him that insight into the minds of chiefs and tribesmen, and power of divining the motives which would appeal to them, which at times seemed almost uncanny, but which were in fact due to the vivid realization and unswerving application of a few simple principles.

First, and perhaps most important, Sandeman saw that tribes living on the verge of semi-starvation, and subsisting from of old largely on plunder, must be given bread, or the means of earning it, before any attempt could usefully be made to impose law and order upon them. It was this which inspired his doggerel couplet (an inversion of a similar effort by the Khan of Kalat), which Mr. Tucker paraphrases (p. 41):

“When *reasoning* fails,
Then twist their tails,”

but a more exact rendering of which, both in the letter and the spirit, would be: “When *feeding* fails, Then twist their tails”; for, though Sandeman believed in reasoning, he knew, as a Scotsman, that it is ill reasoning with an empty belly. It was this, with the knowledge that Satan finds mischief for idle hands to do, that led him to the large employment of tribal levies, so mistakenly denounced by some of his opponents as blackmail. (Doubtless there were

"periwigged lords of London" who cried, "Blackmail!" when Pitt raised the Highland regiments.)

Secondly, he held that most uncivilized or half-civilized tribes, being of highly aristocratic constitution, can only be successfully managed through their hereditary chiefs and natural leaders, and that these should be strengthened and supported by every legitimate means. This principle, it is true, was of full application only in the case of the Baluch and Brahui tribes; but he held, in the writer's opinion justly, that there is much exaggeration in the view which attributes an exclusively democratic spirit to Pathan tribes, and that, particularly among southern Pathans, much better results may be obtained by working through chiefs and headmen than in any other way.

Thirdly, he saw that men, and especially half-civilized men, greatly prefer self-government, however rude, in accordance with their own ancient laws and customs, to the application by strangers of foreign codes and rules, however civilized and excellent. He regarded it as one of the conditions on which the people had accepted our occupation of Baluchistan that they should continue to be governed, as far as possible, in accordance with their ancient customs. Hence his institution of *Jirgas*, which, with the levies as executive auxiliaries, provided the machinery for self-rule. Hence, too, his sleepless jealousy of the inevitable tendency to regularize, to introduce Indian laws and regulations.

In his realization of, and strenuous adherence to, principles such as these, he was helped, rather than hindered, by his lack of academic training. He had no temptation to that pedantry in administration which is a besetting vice of every highly-trained bureaucracy. To him a tribal custom, if not absolutely in conflict with elementary laws of humanity, was as good as any law of the most enlightened civilized State; indeed, in its own place, it was a great deal better. For him the clear light of faith in which he saw his goal was never interfered with by those side and cross lights of varied, more or less irrelevant, knowledge which often confuse the accomplished, many-sided administrator.

But these explanations, good so far as they go, do not, it seems to me, quite touch the heart of Sandeman's secret. They do not fully explain to us his almost unerring sagacity in matters, whether or not connected with his own province, in which human nature, and Oriental human nature in particular, was involved. They do not explain the fact that in almost every case in which Sandeman's views, however apparently ill-founded, were overruled by the Government of India, even on grounds apparently the most incontrovertible, time has proved him to have been right; or why trouble has resulted in every case in which, since his death, his system has been departed from in his own province. They do not altogether explain our feeling that, if something analogous to Sandeman's system had been applied in the early days of the Indian Empire, and if in the history of British India there had been more Sandemans and fewer—shall we say?—Macaulays, we might have been spared the sight of some of the strange and disquieting results that have arisen from our persistent pouring of Western wine into Eastern bottles.

We are finally driven back, as the *Chronicle* was evidently driven back, on an explanation which amounts to a confession of our inability to account fully for the phenomenon. "Sir R. Sandeman," the *Chronicle* says, "was created by God, it would appear, for putting in order the distracted country of Baluchistan." We should, perhaps, put much the same thought in a manner more in accord with Western ways of speech if we said that Sandeman was a man

with a strong vocation for rule, and with a touch in him of the divine fire of genius. But if the Chronicler and those for whom he spoke saw in the matter the hand of Providence, who are we that we should gainsay them?

C. A.

THE "INDIAN ANTIQUARY"

To celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of the *Indian Antiquary*, Lt.-Colonel Sir Richard Temple, who for thirty-seven years has been the Editor-proprietor, has written a short account of the history of the magazine, which has had among its contributors many great Indian and Oriental scholars in India itself as well as all over Europe and America. The object of the *Indian Antiquary* has been to provide a means of communication between the East and the West on subjects connected with Indian research, and a medium to which students and scholars, Indian and non-Indian, could combine to send notes and queries of a nature not usually finding a place in the pages of Asiatic societies. The main aim has been to promote and encourage research. The subjects with which the magazine has been principally concerned have been the Archaeology, Epigraphy, Ethnology, Geography, History, Folklore, Language, Literature, Numismatics, Philology, Philosophy, and Religion of the Indian Empire and, to a certain extent, of its surroundings. Notable contributions have been published on all these subjects, several of them having been preliminary studies of books subsequently well known to Indian and Oriental students and even to general fame.

OBITUARY

CAPTAIN H. C. DILLON FITZGIBBON, M.C., 13TH HUSSARS.

On the morning of January 13, 1922, a frontier affray took place near Gul-ambár (165 miles north-east of Baghdad) between Iraq Levies and a party of hostile Kurds. The Levies suffered twenty casualties, and Captain H. C. D. FitzGibbon was killed. Gul-ambár is in Southern Kurdistan, near the Persian frontier. Captain FitzGibbon was the youngest son of the late Mr. and Mrs. Louis Dillon FitzGibbon, and received his commission (temporary) on September 30, 1914. He had been awarded the Silver Medal for Military Valour (Italy). It is hoped a more detailed notice may appear in the next number of the Journal.

A. C. Y.

SIR FREDERIC W. R. FRYER, K.C.S.I.

The very recent presence of Sir Frederic Fryer at the Council meetings of the Society had but little prepared its members for the deeply to be regretted intelligence of his death on Monday, February 20, 1922. To most, if not to all, the members of that Council, that intelligence came

through the Press notices, which paid a justly appreciative tribute to an honourable and distinguished career and to a very charming personality. We are concerned with him here as a member of the Central Asian Society—a Society which he joined in 1906, three years or so after he vacated the Lieutenant-Governorship of Burma. The annexation of Upper Burma in 1885 had converted that great Province into a chief-commissionership, a post held successively by Sir Charles Bernard, Sir Charles Crosthwaite, Sir Alexander Mackenzie, and (from 1895-9) by Sir Frederic Fryer. From 1897 to 1903 Sir Frederic ruled that Province with the title of Lieutenant-Governor. In fact, with one brief interlude, he gave the last seventeen years of his active service to the administration of Burma, and in 1903 he was succeeded by Sir Hugh Barnes, who is also to-day a Vice-President of the Central Asian Society. When in 1907 Sir Frederic read before the Society a paper on "The Tribes on the Frontier of Burma," we knew well that the lecturer was dealing with a subject on which long experience had made him an expert. When Sir George Scott a few years later dealt with "The Red Karens," we listened to a second expert who had had very special experience of the tribes which dwell between Burma on the west and China and Siam on the east.

In 1911 Sir Frederic was invited to accept a seat on the Council of the Society, and that seat he held until, in 1919, he was elected a Vice-President. He was punctilious and regular in his attendance at Council meetings, and during a period of eleven years he rendered to the Society notable and faithful service, which will be remembered with gratitude. It is of such men, as of his friend Sir Henry Trotter, that the Society genuinely feels the loss.

A. C. YATE.

February 25, 1922.

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THE BRITISH MUSEUM ARCHÆOLOGICAL MISSION IN MESOPOTAMIA, 1919

By DR. H. R. HALL, M.B.E., D.LITT., F.S.A.

Deputy-Keeper of Egyptian and Assyrian Antiquities, British Museum

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Services Institution, Whitehall, on Thursday, February 9, the Right Hon. Lord Carnock in the chair. A lecture was given by Dr. H. R. Hall, Deputy Keeper of Egyptian and Assyrian Antiquities, British Museum, on "The British Museum Archæological Mission in Mesopotamia, 1919."

In opening the proceedings, the CHAIRMAN said: Ladies and gentlemen, I should like to announce that since our last meeting nine new members have been elected to the Society, and if any persons here feel disposed to become members, or put themselves up for election, Captain Stephenson, the Hon. Secretary, will be happy to give any information after this meeting about the Society. I am glad to say that we have the pleasure of the presence here of Dr. Hall of the British Museum, who proposes to read us a paper on the British Museum Archæological Mission in Mesopotamia. I think Dr. Hall is sufficiently well known to all who take the slightest interest in that subject to obviate any necessity that I should introduce him. I will therefore ask him if he will kindly deliver his lecture. (Applause.)

The capture of Baghdad in 1917 and the British occupation of the whole of Mesopotamia, with the exception of the Mosul district, that followed turned the attention of British archæologists towards the possibility of starting active excavation in the mounds of Babylonia again as soon as possible, under direct British auspices and while our forces were in occupation of the country. Accordingly, the Trustees of the British Museum, by arrangement with the War Office, entrusted Captain R. Campbell Thompson, M.A., formerly of the Department of Egyptian and Assyrian Antiquities in the British Museum, and one of the most eminent British Assyriologists, who was then actually on the spot in Mesopotamia as an intelligence officer, with the task of carrying out the proposed excavations. Captain Thompson was deputed from the Army for this purpose. He began work in the district of Nasriyah, and after a week spent on the site of the ancient city of Ur "of the Chaldees," the modern Tell el-Mukayyar, and examination of other sites in the neighbourhood of Sūk esh-Shuytkh and the Hammar Lake, such as Tell el-Lahm and Tell ej-Judeidah, he concentrated his efforts on what is in many respects the most interesting site in Babylonia, Tell Abu Shahrein, the old Eridu, which the Babylonians themselves

considered to be the most ancient city in their country. Ur and Shahrēin were sites of old interest to British, and especially British Museum archaeologists, as in 1854 they had both been investigated for the first time by Captain Taylor, whose digging results were already in the Museum. At Shahrēin Captain Thompson worked for a month, using the nomad Arabs who came up to that part of the world in the spring (a sept of the Dhiffir) as his workmen by arrangement with their sheikh, Hamūd, and, by his method of sinking pits all over the mound, and carefully recording the objects found at different depths, has given us first accurate knowledge of the beginning of culture at Eridu. He also collected a rich harvest of the implements of chert, flint, and obsidian, and the fragments of painted pottery that had been in the course of centuries washed by the winter rains out of the lower strata of the mounds on to the surrounding plain, where they now lie for the picking up. His discoveries have now been fully published in *Archæologia*, vol. lxx. (1920).

His season's work finished, he returned to England, and, in view of the promising results, the Trustees of the British Museum, at the recommendation of Sir F. G. Kenyon, K.C.B., the Director, decided to send me out as his successor, owing to the serious illness of my since deceased colleague and friend, Professor Leonard W. King, who otherwise would himself have proceeded to Mesopotamia to take charge of the work. I was at the same time to place my services as adviser in archaeological matters at the disposal of the Mesopotamian authorities so long as I was out. I was accordingly demobilized from the Intelligence branch of the Army and, on my arrival at Basrah under the auspices of the War Office, was attached to the Mesopotamian Political Service with my Army rank of Captain.

In this capacity I proceeded, at the direction of my temporary chief, Lieut.-Colonel A. T. (now Sir Arnold) Wilson, the Chief Civil Commissioner, to Baghdad, and, after a visit to Ctesiphon, inspected the ruins of Babylon and Birs Nimrūd. At the former place I carried out certain works of conservation that were necessary, especially in the "Hall of Belshazzar," with the help of sepoy of the Erinpura Battalion, kindly lent me by Brigadier-General E. W. Costello, V.C., then commanding at Hillah, who always showed great interest in the archaeological remains in his command. At the same time I made an inventory of the antiquities then in the German house at Kweirish, close by, which Professor Koldewey, the German excavator of Babylon, had been compelled to abandon in 1917. The house had been plundered by the Arabs before the arrival of our troops from Baghdad, but luckily the antiquities did not appear to have suffered much; the museum-room seemed more or less intact with its contents. But the others, the living-rooms of the house, had suffered a wild *Verwüstung*, as their owners would have called it. Furniture and household

utensils, boxes and books, were all scattered about, and a pile of rubbish in one room was pathetically crowned by the celluloid dog-collar and *Mantschetten*, or cuffs, of some Teuton (fancy wearing such things in Mesopotamia!), for which obviously the Arab had no use. Reverently these relics were reduced to order and the house tidied up; and when the work of making the inventory of antiquities and writing various reports and recommendations to be transmitted to the Government at Baghdad was completed, and a new roof built to protect the stacks of boxes of architectural fragments which lay in the courtyard, the house was again sealed up, to await the day when, as it is hoped, it may be again opened as a local museum for Babylon, and the living-rooms used as a hostel for architects and archæological students.

At Birs Nimrūd I had to report on the stability of the fragment of the *zikkurrat*, or temple tower, that still stands like a jagged tooth above masses of brickwork, vitrified by some great conflagration, that crown the mound. So fierce must the heat have been that consumed the tower that it may be suggested that crude oil or *mazūt* was used; piles of brushwood soaked in oil were probably heaped up against the tower, and then the torch applied. If, as is probable, the tower was burnt by Elamite conquerors, this seems quite possible.

At Nippur I recommended certain minor works of conservation of walls, etc. On account of the danger of rain and the resulting impassable mud, to get to Sūk el-Afej, near which Nippur lies, from Diwānīyah and back at the beginning of February, was rather a risky proceeding if, as was the case with me, one was hurried. And sure enough after we had got to Afej the rain came down, and I have a vivid recollection of what was probably one of the most sodden, mournful, and miserable days of my life, marooned in pouring rain and squelching mud at Sūk el-Afej, which, to say the least of it, does not look its best as a "county town" under such conditions. However, the next day was fine and delightful, and the journey in a *bellam*, with its awning and its picturesque carved prow, à la Cleopatra on the Cydnus, up the local canal, and the ensuing ride to Nippur, was an experience as pleasant and interesting as the previous day's had been wretched. But on the return to Diwānīyah on the following day the Fords stuck in the mud, and only the strenuous energy of Captain Daly, the local political officer, who accompanied us, extricated us from the slough of despond.

Then southwards again, with a Burmese chauffeur at the wheel, beguiling the way with conversation in excellent English about Rangoon and the Shwē Dagōn, *phungyis*, and *pwēs*, and *Nats*, and comparisons between Burma and Mesopotamia, by no means to the advantage of the latter. So to Rumeitha and Samāwa, afterwards notable as chief centres of the revolt on the Euphrates in 1920. A year previously, however, they were peaceful enough, and with their

palm groves and comparatively prosperous look (so different from the miserable Tigris towns on their treeless banks of arid mud, past which I had steamed for so many weary days on the way from Basrah to Baghdad), reminded me more of Egypt than any other part of Mesopotamia ever did.

From picturesque old Samāwa, embowered in its palms on both banks of the Euphrates, to ugly modern Naşriyah, looking rather like a new Greek town with its broad shadeless streets crossing at right angles, in a motor-boat, and the scene of excavation was reached. Out in the desert loomed the red bulk of Tell el-Muḳayyar, which was now to be my home for four months. I camped under the shadow of the *zikkurrat*, and got to work on February 14, 1919, with seventy Turkish prisoners of war, kindly lent by the military authorities, and the Arab *reises* whom I had brought from Babylon. The nett results of the excavations were (1) the uncovering of the foundations of E-kharsag ("The House of the Mountain"), a palace of the kings Ur-Nammu (or Ur-Engur) and Dungi, of the Third Dynasty of Ur (*circa* 2300 B.C.), and the discovery of E-makh ("The Noble House"), a temple of the goddess Ninsun; (2) the clearance of the south-east face of the *zikkurrat*; (3) the discovery of part of the *temenos* wall of the temple, with its cellars or casemates in the foundation; (4) the exploration of some streets of the ancient city, in which later inhabitants had buried their dead in earthenware coffins or *larnakes*. The burnt brick walls of (1) were well and carefully built, usually 5 feet thick, showing that the ancient inhabitants well knew the proper thickness to make a wall in Mesopotamia, to keep out both the heat of summer and the cold of winter. The same people, apparently, who buried their dead in the pottery coffins had re-occupied the site of E-kharsag at a later date, probably the Assyrian period (ninth to seventh centuries B.C.), and had built amidst its ruin their own feeble and careless brick constructions, largely utilizing the ancient material. Tablets of this later period, beautifully written in cuneiform, containing legal documents, were found in these later constructions. A deposit of these was unearthed at the moment of a visit from Sir John Hewett, G.C.S.I., late Lieut.-Governor of the United Provinces (then on a mission to Mesopotamia), and his staff; and I was, of course facetiously, accused of having "salted" the dig on his honour! Traces of the great fire, by which, in all probability, Ur was destroyed by the Elamites about 2285 B.C., were everywhere to be seen; and remains of stone statues, smashed to atoms probably by the same destroyers, were also found.

When the desert surface was sufficiently firm to bear the weight of a car, and there was no immediate danger of rain and mud, I went out to Shahrein, fourteen miles away, and eventually transferred my work there. From the top of the Ur *zikkurrat* one could see the drab top of Shahrein, with its base and ends cut off by mirage, looking like

an airship as it swam in the heat-haze. An hour or so's bumping and lurching over the heath and thorn-covered surface of the so-called desert (in reality a steppe) brought me to the base of the mounds of Eridu, isolated like an island in the centre of its surrounding depression, which was the site of the lake, the "sea" in the midst of which the ancient town of the "beloved abyss" (as the Sumerians called it), once stood. For geological reasons it is improbable that Eridu ever stood on the shore of the Persian Gulf, as used to be thought. The "sea" referred to in the cuneiform texts is this lake.

The top, or rather tip, of this *zikkurrat* rises at the north end of the mounds to the height of 80 feet. It is of crude brick, unburnt, and so keeps its drab hue, whereas Tell el-Muqayyar, the *zikkurrat* of Ur, is red from the savage fire of the Elamites that once consumed it, like Birs Nimrūd. The fierce rains of winter have worn it down into a curious peaked shape at the summit. All round are the mounds in which Captain Thompson had sunk his pits in the preceding year. I also had the help of his Dhiffir Beduins, with some of my Turks. My object was not to sink pits for stratigraphical evidence, as Captain Thompson had done, but to select some portion of the ancient city of Eridu itself and dig it out at one level, so as to obtain an idea of the buildings of the city. I accordingly excavated a series of houses and streets of the late Sumerian period, apparently of about the age of Gudea, or perhaps a century or two earlier. These houses were built of rectangular crude bricks faced with coarse lime-plaster, occasionally decorated with horizontal bands of red, white, and black painting. Little was found in them, but the harvest of the surrounding plain, with its stone implements and its painted pottery lying on the surface, was again immense. The stone walls and bastions of the town (an unusual feature in Babylonia) were also explored in part. They are built of a rough coral rag, found not far away to the south, in a ridge which effectively disposes of the view that Eridu once stood on the shores of the Persian Gulf.

The heat at Shahrēin, for it was now the beginning of May, was great, and it was with relief that I moved away over the desert again, with combined camel and motor-car transport, to the small mound of el-'Obeid, ten miles away to the north and near the railway-line between Ur and el-Khidhr, which was to be the scene of our best discoveries. I had already found this mound in the course of a reconnaissance from Ur, being attracted to it by the identity of the remains lying on the surface around it with those at Shahrēin, and had tentatively attacked it with men sent out by car from Ur. Now, having shifted camp to it, I set to work to dig out the remarkable "beasts" of copper, the *beḥaimīn* (monsters) of which we had already found the first traces.

Tell el-'Obeid is what the Arabs of the *rif* call it; the Beduin name is Tell el-Ma'ābed, "the mound of the place of worship," which is per-

haps the original and more correct form. It is the site of a little rectangular building, 110 feet long by 85 feet wide, apparently the platform of a small temple or the base of a small *zikkurat*, of the earliest Sumerian time, built of the characteristic plano-convex burnt bricks of the fourth millenium B.C., and with the recessed or panelled exterior characteristic of that time. It was apparently a shrine of the goddess Damkina, the consort of Enki, the god of Shahrein. At the south-east end of this construction, beneath a brick platform of the time of Dungi, in a confused heap, as if they had been thrown into a *favissa*, were found the *behaimin*.

The find resembles in nature and circumstances the famous deposit of gold, copper, and stone figures, *etc.*, of the Old Kingdom found at Kōm el-ahmar (Hierakōnpolis) in Upper Egypt by Mr. J. E. Quibell in 1897.

Four life-size heads of lions with rudimentary foreparts but little else in the way of bodies, one smaller lion's head, two heads of panthers or cats, and two small bulls about the size of greyhounds: these were the beasts. They were of copper, and their cast heads had been filled with bitumen and clay, while their hammered bodies, or what remained of them, had been rudely nailed over wooden cores, just like the Egyptian copper or bronze (?) statues of King Pepi and his son from Hierakōnpolis (Sixth Dynasty, *circa* 2700 B.C.). The fact of the heads being cast, which appears to be generally agreed upon by the sculptors and metal-workers who have examined them, is very surprising, and is important in the history of metallurgy. The bitumen and clay filling of the heads reminds one of the description of the image in "Bel and the Dragon," that was "brass without and clay within" (*cf.* Dan. ii. 34).

The lion heads had inlaid eyes of red jasper, white shell, and blue schist, teeth of shell, and tongues of red jasper. All were in very bad condition, the copper being oxidized through and through, so that hardly any metal remained; and it is lucky that the bitumen cores reproduce for us, as if they were casts, the appearance of the copper heads. They, too, have suffered, but can easily be put together, while the reconstitution of the copper heads themselves is not beyond the powers of the restorer's art, and, it is to be hoped, may be attempted in the near future. Dr. Alexander Scott, F.R.S., is now studying the proper method of treatment.

Of the bulls, one fell to green powder almost immediately after discovery, but not until after it had been photographed; its head alone remained intact. The other can eventually be restored. An isolated bull's head is one of the finest examples of early Sumerian art in this *genre* known. The gold horn of another bull was also found, of thick hammered and polished gold, stuffed with bitumen again to give it strength. Cheek by jowl with these remains were found a small seated statue of a man, about 2 feet high, made of trachyte, of the usual early Sumerian type, with shaven head, prominent nose, and

enormous eyes, and the torso of another, possibly of the same man, but made of white limestone, and inscribed with a dedication in the most archaic cuneiform characters for Kur-Lil, the doorkeeper of Erech, to the goddess Damkina. These figures date the whole find to the epoch of Ur-Ninā of Lagash, about 3200 B.C. or earlier—a date otherwise deducible from the style of the animal heads.

Finally, as a crown to the whole work, was found close by the remarkable copper slab, 8 feet long by 3 feet 6 inches high, on which in high relief are the crudely cast copper figures of two stags, with heads in the round, walking to left and right respectively, whose tails are grasped by the talons of a lion-headed eagle in full face, who occupies the centre of the relief, while his wings fill up the space above the stags. This antithetical group represents Imgig, the mythical bird of the god Ningirsu, seizing his victims. The relief is the largest example of the group yet known, and is a notable relic of early Sumerian art.

Its excavation and removal was a very ticklish job, on account of the terribly oxidized condition of the copper, already so bad when discovered that the figure of the eagle could only be discovered by the eye of knowledge, since where the stags were we knew the eagle must be, but, sure enough, his wings were evident to settle the matter.

However, by careful labour the work was done, and the whole relief transported *en bloc*, without cutting up, to England, where it awaits the needful treatment and restoration. As a beginning the head of one of the stags has been treated, and is now on view, with the other objects described, in the British Museum.

Other interesting objects were found here, such as pottery rosettes, with petals of red, white, and black stones, on long shanks for insertion in crude brick walls, and pillars, originally wooden, faced with mosaic designs of red sandstone, black bituminous limestone, and mother-of-pearl, fastened by copper wire into a bitumen backing. These are quite new to our knowledge.

And the immediately surrounding tract gave us the same prehistoric stone implements and painted pottery as at Shahrein. This pottery is in itself one of the most important results of the expedition. That of 'Obeid differs little from that of Shahrein, but is often finer and with more delicate designs. Both are of the same type as that of de Morgan's "second style," found at Susa, and are identical with that found by Pézard at Bushire. At 'Obeid I found a few bits of the "first style." It is not wheel-made, but belongs to the age immediately preceding the invention of the wheel, and may be dated not later than 3500 B.C., in the chalcolithic period of culture, before metal was exclusively used. It is often highly fired, almost vitreous. This ceramic seems to have been common to Mesopotamia, Elam, Northern Persia, and Turkistan at that period, and connects definitely with similar pot-fabrics of somewhat later date in Asia Minor, while further connections may be adumbrated for it, from Thessaly to Honan.

The Sumerian of the historic period, the full age of metal, used a plain drab ware, which persisted, with the sole addition of green or polychrome glaze, till the end of Babylonian culture. The old black-painted vitreous ware was never revived.

I found also at 'Obeid, as Thompson and I had at Shahrein, the same votive (?) sickles of hard pottery, the strange curved pottery nails, *etc.*, which had already been discovered by our predecessor, Taylor, at both sites in 1854.

It was now the end of May, and the heat unbearable: 116° F. in the shade. El-'Obeid could not be finished, but still awaits the completing spade, while of Ur, of course, but a sample or two had been taken. It was impossible to go on in that season, and I hoped to return before long. Financial and political considerations have, however, denied us the fulfilment of that hope. It is, nevertheless, still permissible to hope that the work thus begun may eventually be taken up again, and the excavation of this interesting group of ancient sites be carried a step further. Completion of the exploration of such an enormous site as Ur is, of course, a thing of the dim and distant future, and work at Shahrein entails peculiar difficulties, notably the want of water, which I had to have brought daily by car in tanks from the railway at Ur Junction, fifteen miles away.

I left Basrah at the end of May, and, after an archæological visit to Upper Egypt and to Jerusalem, reached England again in August, 1919. My work would not have been possible without the help, not only of the Chief Commissioner and his subordinates, but also of the Commander-in-Chief, Major-General Sir George MacMunn, whose interest in antiquities is well known, of Brigadier-General C. E. Sutton commanding lines of communication, and of the railway officers to whose ever ready and cordial assistance we owe so much.

I was alone during most of the work, having a British warrant officer, Sergeant-Major Stanley Webb, to look after the prisoner diggers and help on occasion; he, however, remained permanently at Ur. The Commander-in-Chief kindly lent me an R.E. officer, Lieutenant H. D. O'Sullivan, for a week at the end of the work in order to make proper plans of the buildings discovered. These, with photographs, were published in the preliminary account of the excavation which appeared in the Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries for December, 1919.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not think that at this late hour I can venture to invite anybody to make any observations, but I think we must all be deeply indebted to Dr. Hall for having allowed us to pass an hour so agreeably and so profitably among the memorials of an ancient past, which has been so beautifully illustrated by the plates he has shown us. I am quite sure that I shall have your entire concurrence in thanking Dr. Hall most warmly for having come here this evening, and entertained and instructed us during his lecture. (Applause.)

SOME NOTES ON AEROPLANES, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE AIR ROUTE FROM CAIRO TO BAGDAD

BY AIR-COMMODORE H. R. M. BROOKE-POPHAM, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., on Thursday, March 9, 1922, when a lecture was given by Air-Commodore Brooke-Popham, entitled, "Some Notes on Aeroplanes, with Special Reference to the Cross Desert Route from Cairo to Bagdad."

Sir Michael O'Dwyer presided.

The CHAIRMAN opened the proceedings by asking the Hon. Secretary (Colonel A. C. Yate) to read the names of the newly elected Members of the Society.

The HON. SECRETARY (Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate) : We have to-day elected as Members of the Society : Lady Carnock ; Major Hon. F. A. Nicolson, 15th Hussars ; Major-General Sir George Scott-Moncrieff, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.I.E., R.E. ; Colonel P. B. Bramley, C.I.E., O.B.E. ; Colonel M. R. W. Nightingale, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A. ; Mr. C. A. Walpole, O.B.E. ; Captain C. G. Snelling, I.A., Indian Political Department ; Mr. Robert Machray. I think I might mention with regard to Mr. Robert Machray that he is a very well-known writer on the Middle East, and that his latest article on the subject is in the *Fortnightly Review* for February, entitled, "The British in the Middle East." I mention it because I consider he is a great acquisition to the Society.

The CHAIRMAN : We have met to-day to hear a lecture which Air-Commodore Brooke-Popham is kindly giving us, "Some Notes on Aeroplanes, with Special Reference to the Cross Desert Route from Cairo to Bagdad." It is a subject which will interest everyone concerned in increasing our knowledge of Central Asia, and the lecturer whom we have been fortunate enough to secure is an expert who can tell us more about the subject than probably anybody else. I will not waste any more time, but will ask Air-Commodore Brooke-Popham to give us the benefit of his notes.

Air-Commodore BROOKE-POPHAM : 1. Last summer I paid a visit to Egypt and Iraq with the object of finding out the particular troubles that are experienced with aeroplanes and engines in tropical climates. My stay in those countries only lasted for a total of four and a half

weeks in July and August, and that, of course, is quite an insufficient time to get more than a superficial knowledge of the subject. In fact, I feel rather a fraud in presuming to give a lecture this afternoon.

2. First, with regard to wind. For people who move only on the surface of the sea and earth the wind is either abominable or invigorating, according to the state of one's health. On land it only becomes a nuisance when it blows the hat off one's head or a tile off one's roof, but the matter is very different for those who move in three dimensions instead of two. For them the wind is one of the most important factors in their daily life.

When we talk of the speed of an aeroplane, it always means speed through the air. The speed relatively to the ground depends entirely upon what the air is doing at the time. If, therefore, the aeroplane has a speed of 100 miles per hour and is moving east, and there is an east wind of 50 miles per hour, the aeroplane will be only moving at the rate of $(100 - 50) = 50$ miles per hour relatively to the ground, but if the aeroplane turns round so as to fly with the wind, then it will be moving over the ground at a speed of $(100 + 50) = 150$ miles per hour, though its speed through the air will be the same in each case.

If a man is out of sight of the ground he has no direct means of telling how he is moving relatively to the ground; any instruments that he has only tell him his speed through the air, and unless he knows the force and direction of the wind he cannot tell his speed with reference to the ground by any direct means.

The trouble about the wind is that it does not remain constant at different heights above the ground, but varies with altitude. It is practically always stronger at, say, 2,000 feet than it is near the ground, but frequently it changes in direction as well. The most common change is clockwise. A pilot who is flying entirely by compass above the clouds out of sight of the ground, must therefore allow for the variation of wind strength and direction in order to make an accurate course to his destination. I lay stress on the words "entirely by compass" because it is now practicable to navigate aeroplanes by sextant and observation of the sun or stars, as in the case of ships at sea, though this, of course, presupposes a trained observer.

Another point about the wind is that an aeroplane should always get off and alight facing directly into the wind, otherwise it will have a certain amount of sideways movement when it reaches the ground, and this means risk of damage to the undercarriage.

3. An aeroplane depends for its support upon the reaction of the air on its wings, and the amount of this reaction depends, amongst other factors, upon the density of the air. Further, the amount of power given out by an internal combustion engine also depends upon the density of the air amongst other factors. In tropical climates the air is less dense than it is in England, and the result is that the perform-

ance of aeroplanes is distinctly worse in Iraq or India than it is here. This means that aeroplanes take a longer run to get off, climb slower, have a lower ceiling, and land faster. Flying at ground level at Bagdad in the middle of a July day is roughly equivalent to flying at a height of 4,000 feet in England.

There is no difficulty now in flying by night so long as the pilot has a prepared aerodrome to land on.

Flying actually in clouds is very unpleasant, chiefly because a pilot quickly loses all sense of direction unless he has a reference point of some sort to guide him. And remember, in the case of an aeroplane, it is not merely a question of going round in a circle on the surface of the earth, like a man lost in a fog, but also of losing all sense of vertical and horizontal as well.

An expert pilot, however, can fly in clouds with the instruments now available and keep a reasonably accurate course.

With the standard wireless set using continuous waves, as used on aircraft in the Middle East, a range of 500 miles from air to ground and of 300 miles from ground to air can be obtained under normal conditions. Atmospherics are, however, very bad in the afternoon, especially during April and May, and wireless communication is usually impracticable at such times.

It may be noted that direction finding wireless can be used to enable aircraft to locate their position or to fly on to a transmitting station, and also to assist in locating aircraft if stranded in the desert.

It is also possible to communicate between aeroplanes and the ground by dropping messages or picking them up. In the latter case, the message is attached to the end of a string, which is supported on two sticks about 6 feet high, and the aeroplane picks up the string by a small grapnel carried at the end of a wire, and trailing out behind and below the aeroplane.

4. I did not do a great deal of flying in the Middle East, but so far as my experience went, the eddy currents, etc., in the middle of the day were in no way so violent as to make flying dangerous, or even difficult for an experienced pilot, and I have certainly had far worse bumps during bad rain storms, both in England and in France, than when flying in Iraq in the middle of the day. This, of course, presupposes that one does not fly into a dust storm. These must be horrible, and the trouble is that they go up to very great heights in Iraq, certainly over 12,000 feet at times.

Another thing that is disconcerting is the sudden changes of wind direction that one gets near the ground in the desert. On one occasion just after midday the wind, which was about ten miles per hour on the ground, kept changing 90 degrees in a few seconds—viz., from east to north and back again—and the smoke from a smoke-bomb, which was put out to give a guide to an unfortunate aeroplane trying to land,

covered a segment of approximately 90 degrees instead of blowing in a straight line. About two hours later the wind suddenly died down completely, and five minutes afterwards began to blow steadily from a point a little south of west. One also gets sudden gusts, I suppose due to a small eddy; these are also liable to cause landing troubles.

Above a height of about 1,000 feet above the ground there is a westerly wind, apparently permanent, between the Mediterranean and Iraq; the result of this is that an aeroplane will do the journey from Cairo to Bagdad quicker than in the inverse direction.

5. I might say that I had nothing whatever to do with the making of the route from Cairo to Bagdad, but have merely been over it like a sort of Cook's tourist. The total distance from Cairo to Bagdad as the machines fly is 833 miles, of which 467 is over the Arabian Desert. The main objects in starting it were, first, to have the means of supplying Iraq with aeroplanes by air from Egypt, instead of sending them round in cases via the Red Sea and Persian Gulf; secondly, to form the first stage of the air route from Cairo to India and Australia; and thirdly, to establish the means of quick communication between Iraq and Cairo, and so with England. Normally, a letter going from London to Bagdad travels via the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, Bombay, Karachi, the Persian Gulf, and Basra, and takes between five and six weeks, thus making Iraq, from the point of view of communication, one of the furthest outposts of the Empire. The air route is altering all this. I have seen in Bagdad a London paper only nine days old. A pilot has arrived in Bagdad eight and a half hours after leaving Cairo, and an officer has arrived in London six and a half days after leaving Bagdad. A regular fortnightly mail service is now running in each direction.

From very ancient days a caravan route existed between Damascus and the Euphrates, running practically due east of the former. There is water on this route, whereas to the south of it, where the desert air route now runs, there is practically none, except after the rains.

The question then arises—Why fly across the southern part of the desert instead of continuing to follow the caravan route, as has been done on several occasions? The reason for that lies in the fact that under the Peace Treaty the northern boundary of our zone of influence comes a long way south of Damascus, and cuts the old caravan route about half-way across. We cannot fly military aeroplanes over other people's zone of influence.

6. With regard to the nature of the country, the word "desert" is somewhat of a misnomer. It is not a sandy desert at all, but most of it rather a steppe, which would probably be very fertile if there were more water. The surface is quite hard, and in many places is covered, or partially covered, with a sort of scrub which is, of course, all dried up in the summer. It rains, I believe, for about one week in the year,

and after that there is a large amount of grazing for camels. The desert lies high, being nearly all over 2,000 feet above the sea, in some places well over 3,000.

The desert is uninhabited as we should understand it, although after the rains a good many nomad Arabs wander over it, grazing their camels. At first there is a considerable amount of surface water, though this soon dries up. However, the camel food that has grown remains succulent for some time, so that the camels do not want to drink. The attendants live on camel's milk. They drink water when they can, but this is reserved chiefly for their women and children. I believe that they sometimes go for as long as two or three months drinking nothing but camel's milk.

Even in the summer there will be an occasional raid across the desert. The object of these is to steal someone else's camels. The raids are generally carried out according to strict rules. For instance, it is very wrong for a raiding party to kill any individual of the tribe whom they are raiding, although the raided tribe may defend themselves. When a man is killed a blood feud is started, but can be cancelled by adequate compensation.

The current rate of exchange, when I was out there, was forty camels per man. Again, if the raiders get off with camels belonging to a widow, she can run after them, and, using the proper formula, say she is a widow, and demand her camels back. I am told that this is generally done. One of the political officers told me that he was talking to a sheik and told him that raids were forbidden by the British, and asked why did they still go on doing it, pointing out that Englishmen never raided each other. The sheik thought for a moment, and then said: "Yes; but you play football."

7. The first Air Force party to be sent across this desert was the car convoy. The object of this was partly to select possible landing-grounds, but chiefly to make a definite track across the desert which aeroplanes would follow. I have sometimes seen some criticisms of this track, and people say, why don't we fly straight across? Well, from the point of view of pure flying this would be the simplest thing to do, and if one did get a few degrees out of one's course one would simply go on until one met the Euphrates; but unfortunately in this year of grace 1922, one cannot guarantee against engine failure in some form or other.

If an aeroplane comes down in the middle of this vast desert it is exceedingly difficult to find, even with the aid of wireless, the result being that, if there were no form of track, we should be bound sooner or later to lose pilots. However, so long as one has got a track and the aeroplanes follow it, a machine having a forced landing would be bound to be picked up, because even if the wireless did break down, rescue parties would be sent out within twenty-four hours from each

end, and they would follow along the track until they saw the damaged machine. Then steps would be taken either to drop water or other supplies, to land in the vicinity, or help in some other manner.

Up to June 25 of last year no European, so far as is known, had ever crossed this part of the desert from east to west or vice versa. People have, of course, been along the caravan route to the north, and others, such as Miss Gertrude Bell, Mosil, and Colonel Leachman had wandered over a large part of the desert, but mainly in a direction of north to south. It was, therefore, somewhat of a bold conception to decide to send off a small party to cross this unknown desert. The fact that it was accomplished successfully, I think, reflects great credit on those responsible for its initiation and organization, as well as the actual performers. The car party had many difficulties to contend with, especially during the first part, where a passage through lava had to be found. Final success was due chiefly to effective co-operation between aeroplanes and the cars, the former reconnoitring the route and bringing out supplies from Amman. On the outward journey six Crossley light tenders and three Rolls Royce cars belonging to the Machine Gun Corps were taken. All bar one vehicle made the complete journey to Bagdad and back.

A great many experiments were carried out as to the best method of marking the route, but it was eventually found that the wheel tracks of the cars themselves were sufficient in most places, each vehicle following closely in the tracks of the preceding ones. Over certain portions of the route it was necessary to use a sort of wide, shallow plough, and this was also used to make arrows by the side of the track occasionally. I don't suppose a car track of this nature would be of much value in a sandy desert, but it is certainly most effective between Amman and the Euphrates, and there is no real difficulty in following it from the air. One has to use one's brains a little bit—i.e., sometimes one has to look two or three miles ahead, and sometimes one has to look almost vertically downwards. From the pilot's point of view there is a great advantage in having a continuous line of this nature to follow, instead of occasional marks such as bomb-craters, and it is rather fascinating to watch the little narrow line stretching away in the distance, the one thread linking you not only to civilization, but to food and water. Most of the track has recently been gone over again, and it will probably require re-doing once a year.

Before this car party started, the maps of that part of the world observed a discreet blankness, but now the route followed by the cars and some of the prominent points near it have been accurately fixed by surveyors. They made use of the stars for fixing their position at night accurately, and this method entails knowing the exact time. The chief surveyor took a small wireless set with him, and every night

about half-past ten used to set it up and listen in for the time signals from the Eiffel Tower, and thus checked his chronometer to a tenth of a second. There is something rather romantic about this, the operator in the centre of a great city working his sending key, and, all unknown to himself, enabling some stranger over 2,000 miles away to locate his position in a trackless desert.

8. Now as regards the journey itself. I won't say anything about the part from Cairo to Amman, because many people know that part of the world. The Dead Sea looks quite pretty from the air, and quite reminded me of the Italian Lakes; but the Jordan, at any rate in the summer, is disappointing, being a miserable, dirty little trickle; in fact, I quite sympathized with Naaman in not wishing to bathe in it.

Amman is a town with about 12,000 inhabitants, including a great many Circassians, who were originally sent there by the Turks to keep control over the Arabs. In olden days it used to be the headquarters of a Roman Legion. There are still remains of a Roman amphitheatre and of one or two temples, and when you go down to a bazaar in Amman you will probably find yourself on a stone which, when examined, is seen to be the capitol or base of a Roman pillar. Amman is at present the capital of Trans-Jordania, and Abdul, king of that part of the world, has his court in a big camp at Amman. The aerodrome here is very dusty, about 2,600 feet above the sea, and has higher ground around. It is an unpleasant aerodrome to get off from in a slow-climbing machine.

The first point out from Amman is Azrak, distance fifty miles. There is no village or anything there but water springs, which form a series of pools in the summer and a lake in the winter. The ground immediately round these pools is fertile, and the place forms rather a centre for nomads. The Romans had a fort here, the foundations of which are still to be seen, and the Persians built a castle, the ruins of which are still left. The water is beautifully clear and quite good to drink, so long as one takes it from near a spring. Where it has been evaporating in the pools it tastes very salt.

From Amman to Azrak the country is undulating and bare; in fact, one may say the desert begins a few miles east of Amman. At Azrak one begins to get into the first part of the lava country. There are masses of this lava about, but so far as is known there is no volcano. The lava appears to have welled up out of the earth through a sort of crevasse and merely flooded over the whole countryside. The Persian castle and the old Roman fort I referred to are built of lava.

9. From Azrak onwards one also comes across what are called mud flats. These are large areas of a sort of light yellow soil, which looks white and almost dazzling in the sun. They are perfectly level

and smooth, nothing grows on them, and some of them are several square miles in extent. In many ways they form an absolutely ideal aerodrome, the only drawback being that they are so smooth and level that it is very difficult to judge one's height; in fact, it is like alighting on a perfectly smooth sea. The surface is quite hard, and though it is cut into by tail skids, is but little affected by aeroplane wheels. These mud flats are probably formed of the matter which is carried down in suspension by streams during the rains—in fact, are the dry beds of shallow lakes. Some of them may, however, have a volcanic origin. They are covered with water during the rainy season; in fact, one or two were still wet in July, but the water is only about an inch deep, and the ground surface remains hard, so it is possible for aeroplanes to land without damage.

I spent a night on one of these mud flats owing to the fact that one of three machines in my flight had to land on account of engine trouble.

This formed another instance of the value of wireless in the desert. The machine that had engine trouble sent out a wireless message to say it would be forced to land. That was taken down in my machine and the message handed to me, and at the same time it was being received at Bagdad and Amman, and from the last transmitted to Cairo. So, in a few minutes, there was I, up in the middle of the air over the desert, Bagdad, and Cairo, all knowing that this particular machine was having to land, and why.

Several of these mud flats and other places have been marked as specially suitable for aeroplanes to land on, but no personnel, stores, or supplies are kept at any of the desert landing grounds.

After a bit of fairly open steppe country one then comes to the second lava outcrop about 110 miles from Amman. The lava here is much more continuous than it is close to Azrak, and it was here that the car convoy met with their greatest difficulties. It is a most depressing area of country to fly over, and it has quite a bad effect upon one's nerves—at any rate, some people's. I know I felt as if the end of the world had really come, and there was no one left alive except my pilot and myself, and that the sooner we joined the rest the better. The lava ends just before the landing-ground marked F on the wall map, and from there, practically, till one reaches the Euphrates, the country is open steppe. A peculiar thing about this lava country is that there are traces of some ancient civilization on it. There are several circles of lava blocks, which may very likely be the remains of houses, but, in addition, there are straight walls, which, from the air, look like the boundaries between fields; in fact, they are not unlike an open stone-wall country in England, such as that round Cirencester. I noticed these walls principally on the eastern edge of the lava.

The lava ends quite abruptly about 130 miles from Amman.

El Djid is a sort of half-way place between Amman and Bagdad,

and one constantly sees it referred to. It is marked on many maps; in fact, some people think that there is a large village, and even a town there. El Djid really consists simply of two wells, one of them about 160 feet deep, bored through solid limestone. Who made them I do not know. The water tastes very good.

There is another well at Rutba, some thirty miles N.E. of El Djid, otherwise there is no permanent water between Azrak and Ramadi.

10. On the occasion that I crossed the desert to Bagdad there was quite a gathering at El Djid, on July 20. There was the R.A.F. car convoy returning from the East, another car convoy which had been reconnoitring for a railway came down from the north, and my flight of three aeroplanes from the west—three independent parties all meeting at this poor little well in the midst of the vast uncharted desert. One couldn't help feeling that it was the beginning of its future conquest by the mechanical genius of the West. On this particular occasion the party that came down from the north told me that they had come across a sheik who had been wounded two days before in the course of a raid made on him, and suggested that, as this sheik had been friendly to the R.A.F. convoy at the time it was moving to Bagdad, it would be a good thing to fly him to Bagdad for hospital treatment. This was referred by wireless to Sir Percy Cox in Bagdad, who agreed, and so we decided to do it. A couple of Ford cars were sent off to pick up the sheik and take him to the landing-ground known as L.G. 4A. About four hours later I started off with three machines, and, just as we got over the L.G. 4A, we saw two little black dots hurrying along over the desert, these being the two Ford cars with the wounded sheik and a friend of his. We landed all right, put the sheik into one of our machines, the Vickers Vimy, and eventually got him to Bagdad in safety. What the sheik thought of it I do not know; poor man, he was not given much of a chance to object. Hustled first into a Ford car, then out of that into this strange-looking contraption of wood and canvas, borne for hundreds of miles through the air, lifted into an ambulance, and, before he knew what was actually occurring, he was lying on a bed in Bagdad hospital and being X-rayed. Somewhat alarming for a wild sort of child of Nature, who had probably never slept in a house in his life.

I was told at the time in Bagdad that this action would have a wonderful effect upon the desert tribes, as showing that the Air Force did not exist merely for destructive purposes, but also for helping and benefiting the population whenever possible, and further at any rate—in the case of that particular tribe they would be friends of the Air Force for ever.

There was a sequel a few days later which proved the truth of these remarks. One of our machines on landing at El Djid to fill up with petrol was damaged. A flight of six more machines was sent out

from Bagdad to take out spares and mechanics to repair it, and the whole party had to spend the night at El Djid. Just about sunset they saw five men on camels ride up and proceed to take up an outpost line round them. These five men remained thus on guard all through the night, and at dawn mounted their camels and rode silently away. It was found later that these were five men from our wounded sheik's tribe who, learning that the Air Force were in some trouble, had taken steps to ensure that they were not molested during the night.

I may add that the sheik has recovered and is now back with his tribe.

There appears to be a sort of natural fellow-feeling between the nomad Arab and the Air Force pilot, and I think flying rather appeals to the romantic side of the Arab's nature. Perhaps both feel that they are at times in conflict with the vast elemental forces of Nature, forces which could completely overwhelm them at any moment, were it not for the fact that Nature is on the whole tolerant to such puny little creatures as human beings. I came across a case of the same sort of friendly feeling occurring in the Sinai Desert and in Trans-Jordan.

11. About forty miles beyond El Djid there is a series of low flat-topped hills.

As one approaches the Euphrates, about twenty miles from Ramadi, one passes over a couple of bitumen pools, horrid, nasty-looking things.

The approved method of marking landing-grounds is for a man to stand on the landing-ground, holding one end of a rope 20 to 30 feet long. The driver of a car holds the other, and then with the first man as centre and the rope as radius proceeds to drive in a circle as fast as he can. He soon cuts through the top crust, and very soon a beautiful circle is made.

In the country between the Euphrates and the Tigris there are traces of the old civilization, chiefly in the way of canals, which are now dry. Nearly all the existing cultivation in that area lies close by the banks of the two rivers, and between them is practically a desert. So far as I can make out there is not much point in building canals at present in this part of the world, because if one did put more land under cultivation there is no labour to work it. One cannot import labour, partly because the climate is unsuitable and partly because the Arabs won't have it, so if one wants to make Iraq prosperous the only thing to do is to reduce the infantile mortality, which I believe at the present amounts to as much as 70 per cent.

Bagdad is a disappointing place—at any rate, approaching it from the air—being simply a glorified mud village and hardly distinguishable at evening from the desert.

The intense heat of the Iraq Plain in summer is very noticeable when descending in an aeroplane. At a height of about 2,750 feet one seems suddenly to enter an oven, and wonders for a few minutes how

one will be able to live in such conditions. The air blast on one's bare skin is quite painful.

12. As regards the equipment to be carried on aeroplanes crossing the desert there are certain things that are essential.

First, a supply of water and food for every individual. At present the military machines carry five gallons of water and ten days' rations per head. The rations by the way want to be suitable for the desert. Bully beef and army biscuit are not very appetizing; but things like dates, tinned fish, if it hasn't gone bad, and some form of thin biscuit are what is wanted, especially dates. A small medical companion is also desirable, and this should consist not merely of bandages, but contain a few of those medicines that one does want in the East—*e.g.*, permanganate of potash for water, phenacetin, and chlorodyne.

Then as regards the machines. Always take at least one spare wheel, some Very's lights, smoke flares for dropping from the machine to give wind direction on the ground, signalling strips for making signals to a rescue party in case one has trouble, picketting gear for the machine, propeller covers, a few small tools and weapons of some sort. Picketting gear is most important in the desert, because you never know when a sudden gust will not come up, and they are sometimes so violent as to upset a Handley-Page.

13. It is very important that a machine crossing this desert should be able to fly the whole way across, or at any rate between Ramadi and Amman, without having to fill up with petrol. At present, although a D.H.9A can fly from Amman to Bagdad, it cannot fly from Bagdad to Amman without refilling. This is, of course, on account of the permanent westerly wind. This means carrying petrol in tins usually slung on under the lower planes and then landing to fill the tank. Now a landing in the desert is apt to lead to trouble, largely on account of the vagaries of the wind. As a case in point, when Sir G. Salmond and I were flying back from Bagdad we landed at El Djid to fill up with petrol. The first of the three machines to land damaged its undercarriage, not badly, but it could not get off as it stood. We decided to leave it there and proceed with the other two.

Here again came in an instance of the value of wireless. We sent up one of the two remaining machines to despatch a message to Bagdad, 250 miles, giving orders with regard to salving the machine and personnel. The receipt of this order was acknowledged by wireless at once. Shortly after our arrival at Amman we heard also by wireless that the orders had been executed, and that six machines had been sent from Bagdad to take out a spare undercarriage, tools, trestle, etc. Unfortunately, one of these six also damaged itself; in fact, a good deal worse than the first machine. Well, if any attempt had been made to rescue that second machine, I suppose twelve aeroplanes would have had to come out, and then two of those twelve

would have crashed, and so one would have gone on in a sort of geometrical progression. However, the Officer Commanding, Iraq, wisely decided to cut his losses, and made no attempt to get back the second damaged machine, though, with the shadow of the super axe in sight, I might add that its engine and instruments were salvaged.

All this trouble was due to the necessity for landing to refill with petrol.

14. A journey across the desert is still somewhat in the nature of a military operation. There is always a good sporting chance of trouble with some body of Arab raiders, and the first thing one does if one has to spend the night in the desert is to get one's machine-gun ready. Small parties—i.e., two or three men—cannot be left out alone at present, but have to be reinforced or brought back.

15. As you know, it has been decided by the Cabinet that the responsibility for the military control of Iraq shall devolve upon the R.A.F.

Without entering into a lengthy discussion on this, I should like to indicate one or two of the special advantages of air power in this connection. The normal course of any form of small war in which this Empire engages is roughly as follows:

Some tribe raids another under our protection, refuses to pay taxes, or eats a missionary. After due preliminaries and failure to obtain any apology, an expensive expedition is organized, and, after a lapse of some months, either gains or fails to gain its objective. Even in the former case the tribe that committed the enormity has probably forgotten all about it, and so the effect is not so great as might have been anticipated. The main difficulties are—

First, the need for a line of communication, which has to be guarded.

Second, the delay in starting, due to large amount of transport and troops that have to be collected and organized, mainly for the L. of C.

Third, the slow movements, even after the expedition is ready to start.

Fourth, natural obstacles met with—e.g., deserts.

Now, provided the objective is within, say, 200 miles of their base, aeroplanes have none of these difficulties. They can act within a few days, in some cases within a few hours, of receipt of orders, and they want no L. of C. There must be a great saving not only in time, but in money and in life.

As a case in point, may I remind you of the Somaliland operations, January, 1920. The following is an extract from the despatch of the Governor of Somaliland, Second Supplement to *London Gazette*, October 29, 1920:

"Twenty-three days of active operations have sufficed to effect the final overthrow of the Dervish power. For this, credit is primarily due to the Royal Air Force. They exercised an immediate and tremendous moral effect over the Dervishes, demoralizing them in the first few days. Our casualties amongst troops were confined to three native ranks killed and eight wounded, and one of the Camel Corps was slightly wounded. Neither the R.A.F. nor the Royal Navy suffered casualties."

Then, again, the rapidity with which aircraft can act may be the means not only of preventing a disturbance increasing and becoming a really serious affair, but of nipping it in the bud.

An interesting case was that of Colonel Jacob's Mission, which was interned at Baji, near Aden, in November, 1919. The local authorities estimated that a whole mixed brigade would be required to rescue this Mission, and I believe this had been actually asked for. It was, however, decided to see what moral effect could be produced by aircraft, and, consequently, two single-seater machines, with a total of eight men, were sent on the deck of a steamer, and landed on an island, the distance from which to Baji was fifty-five miles. The succeeding events can now be best described in the form of a diary :

November 26.—One machine flew over the neighbourhood of Baji. Colonel Jacob reported no good effect, rather the reverse.

November 28.—One machine flew over Baji and dropped a few bombs in a previously selected spot for demonstration purposes. Colonel Jacob reported excellent results of aeroplane demonstration and a great advance towards settlement.

December 12.—Mission was released without any troops being sent.

The following is an extract from the report of the G.O.C., Aden, on the occurrence :

"The effect of two flights by a single aeroplane over a hostile tribal area was so great that men, women, and children were filled with alarm, and brought to bear immediately the full weight of their influence against continued hostility to the Government."

I like sometimes to think of the number of women and children that were saved from becoming widows and orphans by those two little aeroplanes and their eight men.

I have sometimes seen criticisms levelled against the use of aircraft for this sort of purpose on the grounds that they are merely an instrument of terrorism, that bombing is necessarily indiscriminate, and even that any action we take amounts chiefly to bombing women and children. I think this is a most unfair statement to make, and, in any case, I fail to see that killing women and children by means of aircraft bombs is more cruel or reprehensible than killing them by means of shells from a gun. However, apart from that, I do not believe that aircraft really are going to rely entirely upon terrorism in

Iraq, but that they will have a distinct effect in pacifying and civilizing a semideveloped country.

There are the opportunities afforded by rapid communication. This will not only enable political officers to visit distant parts of the country at very short notice, but will also afford a means of conveying tribal leaders to the headquarters of the Government, and thus afford the opportunity of personal interviews, with all the benefits that accrue therefrom.

Further, there are the opportunities for doing direct friendly action to individuals in isolated districts. An instance of this has already been referred to.

Time alone can prove the wisdom or otherwise of the decision to make the R.A.F. responsible for the control of Iraq, but all the experience so far available shows that the decision is correct, and that it will result not merely in crushing opposition, but in preventing it, thereby saving many lives—lives not only of Englishmen, but of natives, too—and this, I know, is the opinion of those best qualified to judge on the spot.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—Air-Commodore Brooke-Popham has given us a very lucid, interesting, and humorous account of his experiences, and he has shown that even in the desert there is a human side. The only fault I find with his lecture is his modesty with regard to his own achievements and the achievements of the Air Force. That is characteristic of all brave men. I have been particularly interested in his closing remarks as to the effect of the Air Force, both in preventing disturbances and repressing them. About three years ago in the Punjab (April, 1919), the province of which I was then in charge, we were confronted with a serious outbreak of rebellion all over the centre of the Punjab. We had but few troops, the bulk of the army being still overseas, but a few days before the rebellion broke out four aeroplanes, by a happy chance, arrived from Quetta. The presence of those was, to my mind, worth four British regiments. On April 10 an outbreak of rebellion took place in Amritsar, and all the Europeans whom the mob could lay hands on were murdered. On the 12th the mob at Kasur—thirty miles off—tore up the railway, attacked a train, and attempted to murder all the Europeans travelling by it. They murdered two and seriously wounded four more. We were dealing with these outbreaks on April 15 when suddenly there was a fresh report from Gujranwala, the headquarters of a district on the main railway-line, forty miles north of Lahore. All communications by road, rail, telegraph, and telephone were cut. Messages were got through from an adjoining station to the effect that the mob had broken out and had attacked and burned all civil buildings and post offices, had torn up railway-lines and attacked the gaol. The few European women and children in the place had been hurried into the

fortified Treasury buildings, which were being attacked by the mob that was burning and looting everything around them. The lives of the Europeans were in imminent peril. This came on top of half a dozen similar reports, and I telephoned at once asking for military aid, but the reply was that all communications were interrupted, and that there were no troops to spare, even if they could be got there in time. Could we get assistance from Rawal Pindi in the north? We were informed there that they had heard of the outbreak, but they, too, could not send timely assistance. The position seemed hopeless, but I remembered the aeroplanes, and telephoned to the General: "Have you any aeroplanes left?" He had one; the others had been sent out scouting in other directions to see what damage had been done, but he had one left. I asked him to send that out to Gujranwala, make a demonstration, attack and disperse the mob who were looting and burning, and rescue the Europeans. I was glad to see it leave about 2 o'clock. It arrived at 3 o'clock, and found the rebellious mob in possession of the civil station. They had already burned the railway goods sheds and destroyed property to the value of £50,000. They had burned the English church, the post office, and were attacking the gaol with the idea of letting loose the prisoners, and the fortified building in which the few Europeans were taking refuge, defended by two British police officers and a small body of Indian police. That was the situation when the single aeroplane arrived. Within half an hour the situation had been completely changed. The aeroplane dropped a few bombs on the rebellious crowd, killing four or five and wounding twenty or thirty more. In ten minutes they had all dispersed, taking refuge in the city. It hovered about the place. The news of what had happened in Gujranwala was bringing in people from the neighbouring villages to join in looting and plundering, but a few warning shells dropped from the aeroplane drove them home. The aeroplane came back to Lahore at 4.30, and at 5 o'clock I received a message that all was well at Gujranwala. No further attempt was made to start a disturbance in Gujranwala. We got troops in late that night, but if we had had to wait for the arrival of troops and the restoration of communications, the Treasury buildings would have been burnt, the half a dozen Europeans murdered, and the rebellion would have rapidly spread.

This rebellion was accompanied by a general railway strike. At one railway junction, Sama Sata, in the Native State of Bahawalpur, there were about fifty Europeans and Eurasians connected with the railway works. All trains had stopped running; they were beleaguered on all sides. It was impossible to send troops—the nearest military station was over a hundred miles away—and the only means of restoring communications and saving these people from probable attack was to send an aeroplane. The place was in the middle of a desert, but the

aeroplane arrived and hovered around, and its mere presence had the extraordinary moral effect that the strike came to an end, and trains pulled up in the station were allowed to move out, and the relieving train bringing troops was allowed to move in. As to the effect of the four aeroplanes in that troublous week—one of the worst I have ever had to go through—I think four battalions would not have done what the four aeroplanes did in the time. I mention this as an example of the extraordinary value of aeroplanes, not only for suppressing, but for preventing, outbreaks. I am sure the knowledge that Government had at its disposal those aeroplanes, probably magnified by popular rumour, into many more, prevented outbreaks throughout the length and breadth of the Province.

We have many gentlemen here well acquainted with the route described by Captain Brooke-Popham who have helped to make it, and I trust they will join in the discussion.

Major General Sir FREDERICK MAURICE: I am afraid I have had nothing to do with the route to Bagdad, but I wanted to say one word upon the last part of the lecture; that is, with reference to the extraordinarily interesting experiment now beginning of the control of Iraq and Palestine by the Air Force. It has been the subject of a great deal of controversy. There are many differences of opinion on the subject: there are those who are doubtful about its utility, and there are even those who maintain that it would be far better to abolish the Air Ministry altogether, and put the aeroplanes that the Army require under the War Office, and those the Navy require under the Admiralty. I differ from that view and for this reason. We are, as far as the fighting forces are concerned, in a period of evolution. There are doubts expressed as to the value of the battleship; there are doubts expressed as to whether infantry and cavalry will play in future wars the part they have played in the past. But amidst all these uncertainties one thing seems to me to be absolutely certain, that is, that no one can foretell what will be the power of the Air Service ten years hence. We must remember that the air traffic as we know it now is barely ten years old, and I am quite certain that it is vital to us with our scattered Empire to give this new service the freest possible development, and for that it seems to me a matter of the greatest importance that it should remain under the control of its own Ministry. (Hear, hear.) I am quite certain, and I say this with no disrespect to the War Office at all—I have been serving a good many years in the War Office—but I am quite certain if the War Office to-day had been in the control of the military part of the Air Service we should not have heard the romantic story of adventure that we have heard this afternoon from Air-Commodore Brooke-Popham. It is natural that in times of financial stringency men should stick to what they know and avoid experiments. I had that very much borne in upon me in regard

to the air in 1910. I had an opportunity of attending the first experiment in France of the employment of aircraft for military purposes. I had my first flight. I came back full of enthusiasm and made a report to the War Office stressing the enormous value of air reconnaissance for military purposes. A certain very highly placed official in the War Office sent for me and told me I was visionary; that aircraft were far too fragile to be used in war at all, that the airmen who were flying then had a peculiar bird-like sense, and that there would not be anything like sufficient of such people available for military purposes. That was in 1910, and we had to struggle against a great deal of doubt and conservatism to get what little Air Service we had at the beginning of the war. You probably know that the one aeroplane which actually discovered the German turning movement at Mons was shot down, and that that was the first indication to the Germans that the British troops were at Mons. If we had been in a position to send out six aeroplanes instead of one, our Expeditionary Force would have got away from Mons with comparatively little loss. This shows the vital importance of allowing the new service with all its technicalities to develop freely. Therefore I am very cordially in favour of this great experiment that is being tried. No one can foresee whether it will be completely successful, but it seems to me that the data are sufficiently good to warrant its trial, and I hope it will be allowed to develop under its own Ministry.

Captain ACLAND: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen—I really did not want to speak this afternoon at all because I see so many distinguished people here whose views on the subject would be far more interesting and instructive than anything contributed by myself. However, I am glad to avail myself of this opportunity to congratulate Air-Commodore Brooke-Popham on his most excellent lecture, and to thank him for demonstrating to us what wonderful work can be executed by the Air Force, and how simple were the means which have given such very definite results. The laying of this air line undoubtedly required resource, imagination, and not a little personal courage, but the organization required was really on a small scale when compared with other pioneer enterprises which have been carried out in the past in opening up new territory. The result attained in linking up Cairo to Bagdad and bringing Bagdad into close touch with civilization is to my mind a lesson which should be pondered on, not only by administrators, but also by the commercial community.

It seems to me that by courageous and intelligent use of the air the development of communications is accelerated to an extent which is almost unbelievable were it not the fact, and I feel that a start once having been made it should be an axiom with us all that in opening up a new territory air problems should receive prior consideration

and, if found possible, aerial lines should be laid down and allowed to develop to bring trade and eventually render clearer the policy to be followed in the ultimate laying of railroads, etc. Thus, as in the achievement which has formed the subject of our lecture this afternoon, there will be very considerable saving in time and treasure, and it is in this direction, with adequate support, that the Royal Air Force can be of untold value in peace, as well as a vital part of the defence forces of the Crown.

Brigadier-General W. B. CADDELL said: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—my remarks will be entirely personal. The lecturer is an old friend of mine, and I should like to congratulate him not only on his paper but on having escaped the fate of other great men like himself who crossed, or attempted to cross, the Nile, Jordan, Tigris, and Euphrates—those great rivers of history. You will doubtless remember Sennacherib, who travelled from Assyria to Egypt—he, unfortunately, met with and had the worst of an argument with the Angel of the Lord—and was smitten. Air-Commodore Brooke-Popham is to be congratulated on having avoided such a meeting. Then there was Alexander the Great, who actually crossed all those rivers, and though I am rather shaky as regards his history, I believe that he committed bigamy in Mesopotamia by taking a second wife while his first was alive; shortly afterwards he took a fever, and though warned to keep his bed, got up, drank two tankards of whatever the local drink was, ate two wild ducks, and—died.

The lecturer being a single man had the advantage over Alexander, in that it was a physical impossibility for him to commit bigamy. As regards the charges of over-drinking and over-eating, you have only to look at the lecturer to see how well he is.

Major BURTON: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I hope you will be very tolerant, because I only heard of this lecture last night, and, as it was only at the beginning of it that I was asked to speak to you, it is absolutely “unseen” to me. I hope you will tell me when you have had enough, because I understand that inexperienced speakers generally go on too long.

I was mixed up with this affair in a very small way, and it will be rather an anti-climax, after hearing about this extraordinarily pukka expedition, to be told about a very cut-throat business that took place during the early stages of the evolution of the Cairo-Bagdad Air Route.

In March, 1920, I was detailed to take a party about half-way across the Syrian Desert to the 40th degree of longitude, rather to the north of El Djid, to find out whether it were possible to select suitable landing-places for aeroplanes, and also to reconnoitre the desert for an oil-pipe line and a railway, besides making a route report—so it was rather a tall order for one technical man.

My small party consisted of Majors Yetts and Thomas, political

officers, and a matter of half a dozen Bedouin, on camels; we disguised ourselves, because it is wisest not to attract too much attention on the desert when you are a weak party travelling on camels. This disguise served except at very close quarters, and, when on the march, we could not have been distinguished as anything but Bedouin, for we were all three old hands at camel-riding.

All our precautions, however, availed us nothing, for, six days out, we were attacked by a raiding-party, which broke all the rules that the Air-Commodore has been telling us about. (Laughter.) He did not by any means exhaust them, for they are only supposed, for instance, to attack at dawn, whereas they attacked us at half-past ten at night. If you are provided with "safe-conducts," as we were, they are supposed to cease fire immediately he announces the fact, whereas ours, directly he stood up, was shot down and had his throat cut. Again, they are supposed to begin by firing over your heads, so that, if you have safe conducts, or do not resist, the matter is settled, either for or against you, in quite a gentlemanly way; these raiders, however, fired at our party direct, and in the first onslaught killed two and wounded two of the Bedouin. In a very short space of time they had collected all our belongings, and when they had loaded up and were driving off our camels, two of them returned and stabbed us, and I have no doubt they thought they had finished us off. Our position was, according to all human probabilities, desperate, but in a most extraordinary way, which it would take too long to describe this afternoon, we got away, and pushed on for two days to a friendly tribe, which had concentrated somewhat farther on. Before returning via the Euphrates, I was able to penetrate further, and got to Bir Molussa, which lies north of El Djid; this route had to be turned down, because it was too difficult for any kind of transport except camels, but I was able to report that there were indications that a better line was likely to be found further south. This line was taken up by Major Holt, and after he had explored part of it, this big caravan came over from Palestine and finished off the job.

Our party was, as a matter of fact, going down south after having finished this part of the reconnaissance, and was going to be transmogrified into a political expedition to visit Ibn Rachid in Arabia. With the object of propitiating him, we carried with us about two thousand pounds in gold and some valuable presents, and I often wonder whether information as to our assets leaked out in some way, and was the cause of the attack. The disappearance of all our camels and valuables prevented our going down there, and I heard afterwards that just about the time that we should have been arriving at his stronghold, he and all his family were blotted out by Ibn Saud, so we were very glad that the contretemps I have been describing prevented our going there.

As I said before, the story of how we got away is an extraordinary one—too long to tell you now—and I really scarcely understand myself how the chain of circumstances that got us out came to pass, only, like the authors of "450 Miles to Freedom," some of us prayed ourselves; and I heard afterwards that there were people who felt that our party was in great danger, and there was, consequently, a great deal of prayer going up in my family and amongst my friends. You may perhaps, some of you, disbelieve in the efficacy of prayer, but I may tell you that there is no other adequate explanation as to how we got away at all.

I have learned more about the Syrian Desert this afternoon than I knew before, and I am very pleased to have been present at this most interesting lecture.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—it is now my pleasant duty to propose a vote of thanks to the lecturer for the admirable lecture we have listened to. The lecturer has also had the advantage of bringing about the most interesting discussion which we have had the privilege of hearing. I am sure the very clear statement of policy General Sir Frederick Maurice has given us is one that would appeal to most of us as convincing, and as affording a complete refutation of the arguments which have been advanced for putting the Air Force under another department. That would be clipping its wings. We have had the pleasure of hearing from the last speaker another instance of the romance of the desert; indeed, this desert seems to be crowded with romance! The lecturer told us it was difficult to imagine there was anything left in the world but yourself and your pilot as you went across the desert; and the wonderful pictures of the desert he put before us were a reminder of the infernos described by Dante. But as long as we have men like the lecturer with stout hearts and high hopes, I do not think that we need be afraid that they will fail to overcome this or any other danger. I ask you to pass a hearty vote of thanks to the lecturer for all the trouble he has taken, and the very interesting lecture he has given us. (Applause.)

The vote of thanks was most heartily accorded.

THE CAPE TO CAIRO RAILWAY, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

BY MR. ROBERT WILLIAMS

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal Society's Rooms, Burlington House, W. 1, on Wednesday, April 5, 1922, to hear a lecture by Mr. Robert Williams on "The Cape to Cairo Railway, from the Point of View of African Development." Lord Carnock presided.

The CHAIRMAN first called on the Hon. Secretary to read the names of Members elected since the last meeting.

The HON. SECRETARY (Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate): The Council has to-day elected the following gentlemen as Members of the Society: The Right Hon. the Earl Winterton; Major-General Sir George Scott-Moncrieff, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.I.E., R.E.; Lieut.-General Sir George Barrow, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.; Lieut.-Colonel Hon. Cuthbert James, C.B.E., M.P.; Mr. L. F. Nalder, C.B.E., C.I.E.; Lieutenant Kenneth Strong, Royal Scots Fusiliers.

The CHAIRMAN: I will now ask Mr. Williams to read his paper. I do not need to remind you that there is no higher authority on the subject with which he deals than Mr. Williams himself. (Applause.)

Mr. ROBERT WILLIAMS: It is very encouraging to myself and my fellow-workers in and for Africa to feel that your Society takes so lively an interest in the opening-up of what has been termed the "Dark Continent" as to invite me to speak to you on the Cape to Cairo Railway, from the point of view of African development. It is also appropriate for your Society to be interested in Africa, for the first explorers of Africa were undoubtedly Asiatics, and to this day practically the whole of Northern Africa is peopled by races of Asiatic origin. Had the great Sahara and Libyan deserts (an impenetrable ocean of sand extending across the continent from east to west, and 1,000 miles in width) not blocked the way, the central and southern parts of Africa would, in all probability, not have remained centuries behind the rest of the world in civilization.

Long before Vasco da Gama, the famous Portuguese navigator, in 1498 visited the East Coast of Africa, Asiatic adventurers had established themselves on that coast, and were engaged in trade with the natives. Indeed, Da Gama found an Asiatic pilot at Mombasa who

took him to India, thereby rendering him the first European discoverer of the sea route to that country.

According to Marco Polo, Chinese ships visited Zanzibar and Madagascar; in all probability they also visited East African ports, and these visits may account for the yellow-skinned Hottentots, so different in character from the negro.

The ruins of Zimbabwe, in Rhodesia—which I visited in 1891—are believed by many to be Asiatic in origin. Be that as it may, there is ample evidence to show that Africa received its first civilizing influences from Asia centuries before Europeans knew anything about the greater portion of that vast continent.

I will not enlarge further upon a subject with which your Society must be more fully informed than myself. My whole desire is to point out that whereas Asia is the home of very ancient civilization, Africa—with the ever marvellous exception of Egypt—is a continent, for the most part, as yet, uncivilized, and even in those regions where civilizing influences have been for some time at work she is as yet only in the dawn of her development.

In 1881, when I first went to Africa, there were only 300 miles of the Cape to Cairo Railway constructed—viz., the line connecting Cape Town with Beaufort West. In 1885 it was extended to Kimberley, and here for several years its progress was arrested for political reasons into which I need not enter. But even at this early date the dream had been dreamed of continuing this iron road for thousands of miles northward, through the vast and unknown spaces of Africa.

Rhodes died in 1902, when his railway had advanced only as far as Bulawayo, 1,362 miles from Cape Town and 3,600 miles as the crow flies from Cairo.

Shortly before Rhodes died I promised him I would carry his line forward.

The expeditions I had sent up in 1899 and 1901 under the leadership of my splendid colleague, the late George Grey, brother of Viscount Grey, with the object of discovering a mineral area of sufficient importance to draw the line northwards, had already revealed the great copper wealth of Katanga, besides important gold, tin, and diamond deposits.

I will not weary you with the story of the slow advance of the line to the north. I have told it often elsewhere. Suffice to say that in 1909 it at length arrived at the Congo frontier, and that, thanks to the co-operation of King Leopold and of his great financier, Monsieur Jadot, thanks also to the consistent support of his present Majesty, King Albert, the railway has now reached Bukama, on the navigable Congo, with the result that to-day one may travel from Cape Town, by train and river steamers running in direct connection with the trains, to Stanleyville, on the north side of the Congo State—a distance of

3,600 miles, of which 3,000 miles is railway—and to the mouth of the Congo River.

Meanwhile another transcontinental railway, traversing Africa from west to east, has been simultaneously coming into being. I refer, of course, to the Benguella Railway, which, with the co-operation of King Leopold of Belgium and of the Portuguese Government, I initiated some twenty years ago, and which, but for the interruption caused by the war, would have already been connected with the Cape to Cairo Railway. In about four years from now these railways will be connected. It will then be possible to cross Africa from Lobito Bay on the west coast to Beira or Mombasa on the east, or, at its junction with the Cape to Cairo line, to run southward to the Cape or northward towards Cairo.

Of the Cape to Cairo line there remain one or two small links to complete it and one big one. The small ones are along the Congo River, where steamers at present fill the gaps. The big link is the one between Stanleyville and El Obeid. This link will run over part of the Darfur Plateau and along the Nile Congo Divide.

It had long been my desire to arrange for the systematic investigation of the Sudanese side of this Divide in the hope that possible mineral discoveries would attract the Sudanese Railway southwards to complete this big link between the Cape and Cairo, and thus at last realize Rhodes' dream. The opportunity at last presented itself, and during the past year an expedition under Major Christy has been at work exploring this least known of all the great African Divides. The expedition has now returned, bringing with it a vast amount of information, much of it of a most encouraging nature. There are plentiful indications of yet another heavily mineralized zone, and I am hopeful—I cannot say more at present—that the further investigations we are now undertaking may succeed in locating deposits sufficiently large and rich to justify the extension of the Sudanese Railway southwards to meet an extension of the Uganda Railway on the British side of the Divide and to link up with the northward extension now being made from Stanleyville to the Kilo Gold-Mines on the Belgian side, and thus finally complete the railway between the two extremities of the Continent.

Those of us, therefore, who are alive ten or twelve years hence will probably witness the completion of the great trunk railway line from north to south, popularly spoken of as the Cape to Cairo Railway; and the other trunk line from Lobito Bay and Benguella on the west to Beira on the east, often termed the Benguella to Beira Railway, which, as I said, will be completed within about four years.

Now what does this portend for Africa, and not for Africa only, but for Asia, Europe, and all the world? I venture to say the completion of these railways will be followed by political and economic

effects of a very far-reaching character. To begin with, on account of its extraordinary geographical situation, Africa is the pivot on which turn all our trade communications with the East and with Australasia, whether by land or sea or air. All these routes must pass along one or other of the coasts of Africa, or through Africa itself from north to south or west to east. The African Continent is, in fact, a world highway. Nature has made it so. Those are important facts, but they are small when compared with the political and economic influence upon the world of a civilized, educated, and industrialized Africa. And Africa is rapidly becoming civilized and industrialized. Less rapidly, but none the less certainly, Africa is being educated.

Livingstone said that African civilization would come through commerce and industry. This is proving to be the case. The African native is gradually being changed from a warrior to a worker. He no longer comes—as I remember he used to come—to seek work at the mines armed with assegais. He no longer has the fear of being attacked and of having to defend himself on his way to work.

My personal experience of the native of Africa has been, perhaps, as extensive as that of any man. I have had thousands of them in my employ in the various diamond, gold, and copper fields of southern and central Africa, and in the construction of the Cape to Cairo and Benguela to Beira railways. I have travelled long distances with them all over Africa, from Cairo to the Cape, and studied them at close quarters. I have discussed the future prospects of the natives with Rhodes and with some of the greatest administrators and missionaries in Africa, and have witnessed the splendid results achieved by those missionaries, especially in the teaching of useful trades, and I have been struck by the ability of the African native in acquiring those trades. One has only to study the remarkable work of the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, founded by the late Booker Washington, a liberated slave, to learn what a high level of industrial skill the negro is capable of attaining.

The following quotation from a speech by Booker Washington at the opening of the Atlanta Exposition is most applicable to Africa. Speaking of his race, he said—and this shows a mind of high and lofty order :

“In all things that are purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress. . . .

“Nearly sixteen millions of hands will aid you in pulling the load upward, or they will pull against you the load downward. We shall constitute one-third and more of the ignorance and crime of the South, or one-third its intelligence and progress: we shall contribute one-third to the business and industrial prosperity of the South, or we shall prove a veritable body of death stagnating, depressing, retarding every effort to advance the body politic. . . .

"The wisest among my race understand that the agitation of questions of social equality is the extreme folly, and that progress in the enjoyment of all the privileges that will come to us must be the result of severe and constant struggle rather than of artificial forcing. No race that has anything to contribute to the markets of the world is long in any degree ostracized."

These are the words of a liberated slave! Instead of the sixteen millions Booker Washington refers to as forming one-third of the Southern States of America, alter the words to 190 millions, and it will apply to Africa.

What then, I ask again, is to be the future of a civilized and industrialized Africa? Observe the progress already made. Sixty years ago Africa was practically an unknown Continent. Livingstone had just published the first of his journals, and was rousing the world to the horrors of the slave trade. Even in 1881, when I went to Africa as a young engineer, the slave trade was rampant in Central Africa, and cannibalism was rife up to very recently. The "red road to the West" as Livingstone called it, along which we are building the Benguela Railway, was littered from end to end with bleaching skulls and bones, less than twenty-five years ago. To-day the slave trade in Central Africa is extinct. The coming of the railways has blotted out this atrocious traffic. In its place have come the civilizing influences of commerce and industry. The African has already been taught in hundreds of thousands to work instead of to fight. Thousands of them have been trained to the trade of carpenters, bricklayers, blacksmiths; others drive locomotives, work the telegraph instruments, and perform other skilled jobs. Many are entering the colleges and passing out as surveyors, architects, and medical men. In short, the African is rapidly becoming civilized. He prints and edits his own newspapers. He is beginning to realize that he is somebody and the native of a very great land called Africa. A national self-consciousness is developing as the result of the railway and other industrial developments. And all this in a short sixty years!

What about the next sixty years? Africa contains the last but also the greatest reserve of raw material for the future requirements of the whole world. It also contains a vast reservoir of the most magnificent labour. Anyone who has had any experience with the native of Africa must admit that he is magnificent human material. He has many good points and many bad. We want to develop the good and eliminate the bad. The African negro is, I affirm, naturally peaceable, cheerful, almost always singing at his work, imitative, by no means devoid of ability, with the heart of a child, affectionate, with a keen sense of humour, and an unbounded respect for the white man of high character. The mere fact that for many years Livingstone went about scatheless, and that two of his servants voluntarily bore the body

of their beloved master hundreds of miles to the coast, at great risk to their lives, to deliver it up to the white man, gives a clue to the character of the native of Africa.

These natives are a gigantic force to reckon with for good or evil. The wise or unwise handling of the millions of natives who people this continent must inevitably have a far-reaching influence on the whole world. Take, for example, the thousands of instances where the black man is capable of doing skilled work. Instead of the white man dictating to the black man what he shall be allowed to earn, as is now being done on the Rand, I would urge the white man to allow the black man to earn the full amount which his abilities and training enable him to earn. All that is possible should be done to secure the black man's confidence in the white man's sense of fair play and fair dealing. I foresee real danger in any other policy.

The highest status to which the black man may aspire must be limited only by his education and ability. In our future relations with the African, our aim should be to refrain as far as possible from accentuating the colour bar, but emphasize the vital importance of showing him that harmonious working between all classes and colours is the true secret of success.

Speaking for myself, I believe that the black man in Africa will, for a long time yet to come, be unequal in efficiency to the white man as a skilled workman, or in any position where he will be called upon to manage his fellow-natives. I believe he will long need the guidance of the white man in both his industrial and political development. Nevertheless he has begun to feel his feet, and to think politically.

In a few years, when the two great trunk railway lines to which I have alluded shall cut the continent longitudinally and transversely from sea to sea, Africa will come well within the range of the globe-trotting tourist, and the black man will be brought into still closer contact with the white, and will beyond doubt develop still further those political aspirations which are manifesting themselves even to-day. Already there is heard a demand for voting powers and for self-determination. "Africa for the African!" is the cry. The catching phrase "Self-determination!" launched during the war and offered as a panacea for most political ills, has winged its way into the recesses of Africa. Whether self-determination will always succeed remains to be seen. Self-determination carried to its logical conclusion means anarchy—each unit doing what seems right in its own eyes. As a working political principle it is only practicable if the minority in any unit area is self-disciplined enough to subordinate itself to the will of the majority. And there seem to be races temperamentally unfit for so-called "self-determination" by reason of their inability to abide by the principle of majority rule. We need not travel as far as Africa to

witness this phenomenon. The demand for self-determination has, however, been created, has gone forth, and cannot be recalled.

What, then, should be our attitude to this coming claim for self-determination on the part of the African? I regard the position of the white man in Africa as that of a trustee for the welfare of the black. In fulfilment of this trust we must assist the African to work out his own salvation. This cannot be done rapidly, and it is doubtful whether it will follow Western democratic ideals. To be successful, democratic Government demands a high level of education, a high standard of political and municipal purity, and a greater degree of experience and self-discipline than the black man is likely to attain in many generations.

We must recognize, however, that self-government is the goal to which the more educated Africans aspire, and that it is no part of the white man's duty to repress that aspiration. That does not mean that we are to yield forthwith to any clamorous demands of a noisy minority of extremists, who are bent less on the welfare of their country than on obtaining an undesirable influence over the great uneducated masses of their countrymen, too ignorant to realize that they are merely dupes in the hands of ambitious, and often unscrupulous, agitators.

It is, unhappily, one of the defects of a democratic Government that it is so easily moved to hasty and ill-considered action by the clamorous demands of a handful of well-organized extremists. We have seen it over and over again in recent years in our own country and elsewhere. We may find the same thing occurring in Africa. Already Egypt, taught by ourselves what good government means, has now been granted the right to manage her own affairs. It remains to be seen whether this grant has been accorded as the result of a genuine demand by the whole Egyptian people, or as a concession to sectionary violence. The success or failure of this experiment will constitute a supremely valuable object-lesson in dealing with future claims for self-determination on the part of other, and perhaps less civilized, of the African peoples. We do not wish to see in Egypt any repetition of the dismal failures in self-government of Hayti, San Domingo, and Liberia. Hence the highest form of statesmanship at home will be demanded in dealing with the African during his growing political pains. We must prepare him for the difficult task of self-government by training him in the ways of law, order, and justice, of industry and commerce, gradually accustoming him to positions of responsibility, and creating in him a tradition of public service.

Our duty is to guide and not to hurry him along the road of self-development.

In the short space at my disposal I cannot do more than lay down these general principles. I feel greatly strengthened, however, in the views I have expressed by Sir Frederick Lugard's valuable treatise

entitled, "The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa," issued since you invited me to address you, and since I began to formulate my notes for that purpose. I would strongly urge everyone interested in Africa to study Sir Frederick Lugard's volume, in which, with ripe wisdom, and a wealth of knowledge gained by long experience as an administrator, the author works out in detail the problems, and indicates the lines on which the white man may co-operate with and assist the black in his upward path towards self-government.

I associate myself wholeheartedly with one piece of wise counsel given by Sir Frederick Lugard. "*Festina lente*," he says, "is a motto which the Colonial Office will do well to remember in its dealings with Africa . . . The danger of going too fast with native races is even more likely to lead to disappointment, if not to disaster, than the danger of not going fast enough. The pace can best be gauged by those who have intimate acquaintance alike with the strong points and the limitations of the native peoples and rulers with whom they have to deal."

I endorse every word of this, and hope that the Home Authorities will definitely resolve to be guided in every decision by the opinion of the responsible white men on the spot—by those, in short, who are face to face and in daily contact with the problems to be solved.

In my personal opinion, a step that we should promptly take is towards a Federation of British Africa from the Cape to the Nile, with railway connection all the way, so as to be able to co-ordinate as far as possible one policy towards the black races, and establish some leading principles to guide us in meeting any demand by those under our tutelage for self-determination. As General Smuts said the other day, "The white man in Africa is on his trial." From so eminent and sagacious a statesman these words cannot go unheeded. For this reason, as well as for many others, I would gladly see a movement towards the Federation I suggest.

The world has need of Africa, and *per contra* Africa has need of the world. She needs the world's markets; she also needs her own markets. The north will need the products of the south, and the south will need the products of the north.

To a steady development of her commerce and her industries we must look for the ultimate means by which she can, in Livingstone's words, "be introduced into the body corporate of nations." The great iron highways we are building are the arteries through which will pulse the new life to which Africa is rapidly awakening. They will be a great asset not only to Africa herself, but through the development of Africa to the whole world.

Sixty years ago the influence of Africa beyond her own borders was nil. What will her influence be at the end of the present century? It is conceivable that you may have a United States of Africa under

one flag or possibly groups of States under different flags, united in general commercial policy, and protected by a Monroe doctrine. This is no wild dream.

I ask you therefore to project your vision into the not-too-distant future and think out for yourselves the nature of the political influence in the councils of the world of an Africa composed of Federated States, an Africa seamed with railroads, an Africa in which vast industries have been established, and in which both white and black men are co-operatively interested, an Africa upon whose resources and whose labour the whole world in large measure depends.

I ask you to consider all these possibilities—I might even say *probabilities*—in view of the boundless natural wealth of the Continent, in view of Africa's geographical position athwart the highways to the Far East and to Australasia, and last, but not least, in view of her immense, prolific, and readily civilizable population. Having regard to all these elements of greatness, I ask you how otherwise are we to deal with the problems of African development than in the sense that I have indicated?

The CHAIRMAN: Sir Reginald Wingate, I am sorry to say, has been unable to be present to-day; but he had the advantage of seeing an advance copy of Mr. Williams' lecture, and he sent some notes to Colonel Yate, the Honorary Secretary, who will now read them.

Lieut.-Colonel A. C. YATE then read extracts from the following notes sent by General Sir Reginald Wingate, G.C.B.

I much regret that I am prevented from leaving Scotland in order to attend the lecture of Mr. Robert Williams, of which I have seen an advance copy—and take a personal part in the discussion. I shall be grateful, therefore, if you would read out any extracts from the enclosed notes you think desirable in the circumstances. I recognize with the lecturer that as Africa received its first civilizing influences from Asia, so will future developments in Africa tend to bring these two great continents still more closely in touch with one another, especially when the great deserts and vast unknown spaces come to be bridged over for thousands of miles by that great iron road which is the theme of the lecturer, and I am sure all will have listened with absorbing interest to what he has to say.

From the material facts which Mr. Williams has placed before us, and from the large and wide views to which he has given such lucid expression, he has furnished us with food for thought in a variety of directions; but to me two points especially emerge:

Firstly, the modesty of the lecturer, who is so largely responsible for the wonderful transformation in the African continent during the last forty years.

Secondly, the vital importance of bringing home to the British

public, through such a lecture, the immense possibilities of Africa in the scheme of world development which Mr. Williams has so concisely summarized in its concluding paragraph.

In dealing with my *first* point, may I not say with justice that, although the name of Robert Williams is known throughout the length and breadth of South Africa, it is not as well known to the British public at home as it ought to be. Why is this? I think, on his side, it is due to modesty in his own great achievements as an Empire-builder, but on the side of the British public I think it is largely due to that selfish absorption in its own domestic concerns to the exclusion of the greater and more important interests of the Empire.

What proportion, I would ask, of the educated public have read that intensely interesting paper entitled "The Milestones of African Civilization," which Mr. Williams read before the Royal Colonial Institute in May, 1917; or his lectures at the Overseas Club on the Benguella Railway and Germany's future in Central Africa; and his sketch of Dr. Jameson; or his address before the London Chamber of Commerce in June, 1918, on German penetration in Central Africa; and, finally, his address in April last year to the African Society on the Cape to Cairo Railway?

I venture to say, without fear of contradiction, that the story of African development and the prominent part taken in it by Mr. Williams places him in the very first rank as a pioneer of civilization and administrative development.

One has only to read the discussions following on some of the papers I have quoted, to see what a high value our Belgian and Portuguese friends place on Mr. Williams' unique services in furthering the development of the Belgian Congo and the Portuguese colonies in Africa, whilst an American journalist—Mr. Marcossou, who recently travelled in Central Africa—pays a tribute to Mr. Williams' work which I cannot refrain from quoting. In his third letter to *The Times*, entitled "Wonders of the Congo," he writes:

"*British Enterprise*.—I entered the Congo at Sakania, which is on the border of Northern Rhodesia. It is the outpost of the Katanga, the most prosperous province of the colony. The Katanga is one huge mine, principally copper. The pioneer of Katanga exploitation was an Englishman, Robert Williams, the moving spirit in the construction of the Benguella Railway from Lobito Bay (Portuguese Angola) to the Katanga. Late in the nineties he sent George Grey, brother of Sir Edward, now Viscount, Grey, to the Katanga region on a prospecting expedition. There he discovered large deposits of copper, and also tin, lead, iron, coal, platinum, and diamonds. Williams organized the Tanganyika Concessions, which became the instigator of Congo copper-mining. Subsequently, the Union Minière du Haut Congo was formed by leading Belgian colonial capitalists, and the Tanganyika Concessions acquired more than 40 per cent. of its capital. The Union Minière took over all the concessions and discoveries of the British corporation. Within ten years it has grown from a small

prospecting outfit in the wilderness, 250 miles from a railway, to an industry employing at the time of my visit more than 1,000 white men and 15,000 blacks, with four completely equipped mines which produced nearly 30,000 tons of copper in 1917, and a smelter with an annual capacity of 40,000 tons of copper. A concentrator capable of handling 4,000 tons of ore per day is nearing completion."

With regard to my *second* point, the importance of bringing home to our people the immense possibilities of Africa in the scheme of world development, it is no easy matter for me to add one word to the admirable record and the sound advice on this subject given by the lecturer, but what specially appeals to me—and I think it must appeal to all interested in empire development—is the immense future opened out by the completion of the Benguela Railway and the final linking up of the Congo railway system with that of the Sudan—thus forging the last link in the dream of that great empire-builder Cecil Rhodes and his able lieutenant Robert Williams, who has so faithfully carried out his promise to his dying chief to "carry his line forward." As he truly says, if we are still alive ten or twelve years hence, we should see the completion of this vast project and the progress in African development which it implies.

Although the period covered by our lecturer extends to forty years back, I would ask you to retrace with me the salient points of the last *twenty-five* years only—for they are curiously interesting. Mr. Williams points out that the Katanga discoveries at the close of the last century formed another of those "milestones" of mineral deposits whereby the Cape to Cairo Railway would be advanced. Situated on the watershed of the Zambesi and Congo, the Katanga province of the Southern Belgian Congo is the greatest mineralized copper-belt known to the world. Slowly but surely the great iron spine advanced from the south, and though it took ten years to reach the Congo border, it arrived, in spite of every sort of difficulty and obstacle, financial and other. Simultaneously with this northward advance the Katanga copper-mines also caused Mr. Williams to initiate that other great transcontinental railway scheme from west to east—from Lobito Bay in Portuguese Angola—to connect up with the Cape to Cairo line at Katanga. It was clear that trade must follow the shortest route to the sea.* The completion of the Benguela line will

* On this point Sir Frederick Lugard, in his last publication, "The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa," is insistent. At p. 464, footnote 1, he writes: "The Cape to Cairo Railway can only be justified in so far as each section has a definite objective which offers reasonable prospects of being remunerative. Railways in Africa must lead by the shortest route to the seaport, and not along its length." This statement must be modified by an opinion which I heard expressed by Sir Reginald Wingate a month before this lecture, and by Sir Edgar Bonham Carter at the lecture—viz., that if grave danger threatened the British Empire in Egypt, or the Sudan, or the Suez Canal, or anywhere in that quarter, the Cape to Cairo Railway was a channel by which the Overseas Dominions could move forces to the aid of the mother-country.—A. C. Y.

mean a saving of close on 3,000 miles of transport, and provided the financial difficulties, which are in a fair way of being solved, are finally overcome, it is expected the railway connection between the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean will be achieved within four years. This railway has been truly called the "master key" of Africa, and I think the term must have been coined by the Germans, for it will be remembered how keenly anxious they were to secure the concession, and how bitterly annoyed they were to find that Robert Williams had forestalled them.

I believe it is now generally admitted that when the main trunk line from *north* to *south* is completed, the feeders *east* and *west* will follow; but, as we have seen, many of these feeders are already made, or approaching completion. The great gap between the two terminals of the trunk line, Stanleyville and El Obeid, is something like 1,750 miles out of a total of 4,500 miles.

Mr. Williams has made a most important proposal as to how this gap is to be bridged, and I think he is probably right in urging that the prime need is now to extend the railway from the northern terminal further south, though, in all probability, once the route is finally decided upon, work from the south northwards will advance as well.

It is a curious coincidence that with the great activity in pushing the railway northwards, consequent on the Katanga discoveries, a similar activity, but arising from entirely different causes, resulted in pushing the railway southwards into the Sudan almost at the same moment. This is neither the time nor the occasion to describe the development of the Sudan railway system; suffice it to say that within the last twenty-five years the following railway construction has been completed:—

The Wadi-Halfa-Khartoum line, with bridges over the Atbara and Blue Nile (579 miles).

The Khartoum-El Obeid line, with a bridge over the White Nile (428 miles).

The Atbara Junction-Port Sudan line, with a branch to Suakin (305 miles).

The Abu-Hamed-Kareima branch (145 miles).

Thus El Obeid is in direct railway communication (just over 900 miles) with an excellent and up-to-date port on the Red Sea.

Clearly this situation has long been thoroughly grasped by Mr. Williams, and, true to his instinct, he has sought Nature's help to guide him in his selection of the various routes between El Obeid on the north and Stanleyville on the south, where best the gap can be bridged over, and the final link forged of the great north to south chain.

He has sought, and I think he must have found, that missing "milestone" in the Great Congo Nile Divide to which he refers. Is there not some connection between what he has told us regarding

Major Christy's expedition and the following telegram, which appeared in *The Times* of the 23rd instant, in a message dated Cairo, March 22?

"An extensive mineralized area has been discovered by prospectors of the Congo-Nile Syndicate, which belongs to the Tanganyika Concessions Group. The discovery is described as of alluvial gold, which is said to have been traced in several rivers. What is believed to be the source of the gold has also been discovered in the form of an auriferous belt of rocks extending several miles. An old working carrying copper and gold has also been discovered, with evidence of an ancient copper-smelting industry in the vicinity."

If this discovery prove to be the mineralized "milestone" which, magnet-like, is to draw the railway there, then it is clearly somewhere on the great Congo-Nile Divide, and it will imply that—as Mr. Williams says in his lecture—"the unfinished link lies between Stanleyville and El Obeid, and that the line will run over part of the Darfur Plateau and along the Nile-Congo Divide."

It is, of course, possible that subsidiary lines may connect Stanleyville with Rejaf, following the present motor-road connecting the important Belgian gold-mining area at Kilo with the Nile in that vicinity—thus turning the Rapids and Duflé, and providing a trade route along the navigable Nile waterway to Khartoum, or to the nearest point on the Sudan railway system at Kosti. But should the recent mineral discoveries prove sufficiently large and rich to justify the extension of the Sudan Railway southwards, there is little doubt that the route to be followed will be as Mr. Williams describes; and clearly, through his prescience and indomitable perseverance, the wonderful dream of his great chief, Cecil Rhodes, is far nearer completion than any of us had contemplated.

If a quarter of a century has seen such progress in the once savage Sudan—where in that short space of time the revenue has risen from eight thousand pounds in 1900 to five million pounds in 1920, and the trade to close on twelve million pounds—and if the British Government has such faith in its cotton-growing possibilities as to guarantee a loan of several million pounds for its development, shall we question the accuracy of Mr. Williams' forecast, that in the not remote future we may have an Africa composed of federated States, seamed with railroads, where vast industries have been established and upon whose resources and labour the whole world may in a large measure depend?

How is this great result being achieved? Surely it is in the main due to that great iron spine which is now nearing completion, with its many arteries and vertebrae already stretching east and west to the two oceans washing the shores of Africa. This marvellous achievement is represented by the Cape-Zambesi express, the Rhodesia-Katanga extension, the Congo-Nile steamer, rail, and motor routes, the Sudan

steamer and railway services, the connection of Stanleyville with El Obeid—in all, a distance of nearly 7,000 miles. Then, forming a sort of cross with the north and south routes, the great transcontinental east to west connection is extending from Lobito Bay to Beira, with eventual through connections via Tanganyika to Dar es Salaam and with the Uganda Railway to Mombasa.

All honour, then, to the great men who have spent their lives and their energies—some, alas! have not lived to participate in the success of their undertakings—and all honour especially to Robert Williams, who, practically single-handed, has built up an organization for the development and transportation to the markets of the world of the rich treasures his vivid imagination has discovered for us in those great mineralized “milestones” which mark the various stages in the progress of African railways.

The CHAIRMAN: I believe Sir Frederick Lugard is present this evening. We should be very grateful if he would favour us with any observations. (Applause.)

Right Hon. Sir FREDERICK LUGARD, P.C., G.C.M.G.: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I am glad to avail myself of the opportunity which your kindness has afforded me to add my tribute of appreciation of the great work which Mr. Williams has done in Africa during the past forty years. He stands almost, if not quite, alone, both in respect of the length of time during which he has been closely associated with Africa, and in the magnitude of the material developments of which he has been both the originator and the active agent in execution. By his great railways Mr. Williams has created an unrivalled record as the foremost pioneer in the development of Africa on the material side, and the paper to which we have just listened, so full of far-sighted suggestion and of sympathy with the people, shows that he is no less concerned with the civilizing and moral progress of Africa than with its material development.

We recognize to-day how important and essential a part railways play in the rapid material development of a country like Africa, whose exports consist solely of foodstuffs and raw materials, but perhaps their civilizing and educational value has hardly been equally appreciated. Mr. Williams has told us how at first the labourers employed in construction works come with their bows and arrows and spears, and how before long these are discarded. Wild, primitive savages learn to value the regular pay, which enables them to purchase in the camp market the little luxuries of cloth, tobacco, and meat. Volunteers come forward more eagerly, soon they learn to appreciate piecework, and gradually become more skilled. The railway workshop is the most potent institution in Africa for the spread of technical education, and the railway in its various departments offers hundreds, and even thousands, of openings to the youth of the Government and Mission

schools as clerks, signallers, telegraphists, guards, stationmasters, storekeepers and accountants, etc.

Though I cannot rival Mr. Williams' forty-one years of African work, my own experience of Africa is sufficiently long and varied to justify me in expressing a hearty concurrence in all that he has said regarding the character of the negro tribes and the incalculable importance of securing their confidence in the justice and fair play of Europeans. I endorse most heartily his view both of the ability of the African and of the limitations which for many a generation preclude the possibility of his being able to stand alone in industrial and political development. The striking quotation which Mr. Williams made from the writings of Booker Washington seems to echo and confirm the views I recently expressed concerning the Colour Question in the *Edinburgh*, and since the President of the United States did me the honour to quote them and to assert that they presented the true solution of the problem, I may ask your indulgence if I repeat them: "Here, then, is the true conception of the inter-relation of colour: complete uniformity in ideals, absolute equality in the paths of knowledge and culture, equal opportunity for those who strive, equal admiration for those who achieve; in matters social and racial a separate path, each pursuing his own inherited traditions, preserving his own race purity and race pride; equality in things spiritual, agreed divergence in the physical and material." This, too, as I gather from his lecture, is the view held by Mr. Williams. I would, however, like to alter one word in his description of the new spirit which is beginning to show itself among the natives of Africa. It is, I think, rather a *racial* than a *national* self-consciousness, and its exponents advocate the prerogatives of race rather than those of tribal affinities.

Mr. Williams has not told us quite as much as I, at any rate, should have liked to hear about the more recent progress and the programme for the immediate future of the Cape to Cairo and the Benguela-Beira railways. I must confess that the latter interests me more than the former, for its object is to open up a fertile plateau abounding in vegetable products, to tap the wonderful mineral deposits of the Katanga district, and to provide a means of conveying them to the nearest seaport by the shortest and cheapest means. Of this great railway Mr. Williams was the originator and constructor. The story of its inception and the difficulties encountered by international rivalries is one of extraordinary interest. In the far future, when Africa becomes civilized and industrialized, internal railways as in Europe will, no doubt, become important and remunerative means of transport, conveying the products and manufactures of one region to another. Or, again, if another Great War should break out (which God forbid), it is impossible to forecast the rôle which railways in Africa, especially those which cross the continent from west to east,

may play; but to-day the great need of Africa is for railways leading from the centre to the seaports, and she has little need of a longitudinal north to south railway. Mr. Williams forecasts an extension of the Sudanese railways southwards from El Obeid to connect with the line from Stanleyville. It is possible that from the same point a line may some day extend to the Nigerian system at Lake Chad, and, as the "Niger to the Nile," may add one more to the alliterations (Cape to Cairo and Benguela to Beira) which seem to exercise a fascination for the financier.

Turning to what Mr. Williams told us of the connection between Africa and Asia, may I remind you that not Egypt alone, but the whole of Northern Africa, is populated by races which owe much to Asiatic origins, and if we accept Gibbon's dictum that "the use of letters is the principal circumstance that distinguishes a civilized people from a herd of savages incapable of reflection or knowledge," then we must admit a partial civilization to the Moslem States of North Africa, where for the most part Arabic is the language of culture. Mr. Williams referred to the Chinese ships which at one time visited the East Coast of Africa. They are mentioned by Marmol as early as the sixteenth century, and no doubt carried on a considerable trade in tea. Sir John Kirk described the excavations made at Kilwa, where three cities were found superimposed on each other. In the lowest of the three many Chinese coins were found, and much of the pale green Chinese earthenware known as "Celadon."

I thank you, sir, for the privilege of listening to your most interesting paper, and I heartily wish you continued success in your great projects in Africa.

Sir EDGAR BONHAM-CARTER, K.C.M.G.: Mr. Chairman, I join with Sir Frederick Lugard in thanking Mr. Williams for his valuable and extremely interesting lecture. The lecture covered so much ground that I find a difficulty in selecting matters for discussion from the many topics he so ably elucidated, and I propose to confine myself to three or four points affecting Egypt or the Sudan, countries in which I have spent many years. As regards the suggestions made by Mr. Williams as to the political future of Africa, while I think that we all here must agree with the greater part of those suggestions, I venture to select two points on which I do not find myself in agreement. The first is that the political arrangements which are now being attempted in Egypt cannot, I would suggest, in any way be regarded as a precedent for what should be done in the future with regard to more southerly parts of Africa. For the political relations of Great Britain to Egypt are entirely different from those to any other part of Africa. Besides, the Egyptians, racially, can hardly be regarded as Africans. Whatever their origin—a matter, perhaps, more in dispute than almost any other racial question—at least we know they have been very largely affected

by Arabian blood. Also they are Mohammedans, and possess a civilization which is largely Arabic in character, whereas the Southern Africans are pagans and in a much lower state of civilization. Another matter with regard to which I do not find myself in agreement with Mr. Williams is his proposal or suggestion for a possible future federated Africa. With regard to this I should say, *festina lente*. Africa is such a huge country; it contains such different climates, such different geographical features, such different races, that I cannot see in it the basis of a future federation; though no doubt the necessity will soon arise for arrangement between the different parts, on such questions as railways, customs, and other matters. Further, I should say that our experiences in other parts of the world, and especially in India, should make us very slow in trying to deal with the huge continent of Africa as if it in any way constituted a single political unit. (Hear, hear.) Dealing with the question of the railway, I have only a few remarks to make. Of course, to those of us who have lived and worked in the Sudan, it is a matter of the very greatest interest. The first object of those who were responsible for railway policy in the Sudan was to provide railway communication between the interior and the Red Sea, this being the shortest and cheapest route for the export and import of goods. This was accomplished by the opening in 1905 of the railway connecting the Halfa-Khartoum Railway with Port Sudan and Suakin. Subsequently the extension of the railway from Khartoum southwards was begun, and, as Mr. Williams stated, in 1912 Lord Kitchener opened the Khartoum-El Obeid Railway. El Obeid is distant about 430 miles from Khartoum by railway, about 1,000 miles by railway from Wadi-Halfa, and about 2,000 miles by railway and river from Alexandria. I need hardly mention that there is not yet complete through railway communication between Egypt and the Sudan: for there is still a break in the railway of about 200 miles between Wadi-Halfa and Aswan, along which one has to travel by river-steamer.

It is not without interest that the White Nile is navigable by river-steamer for a thousand miles south of Khartoum as far as Gondokoro. At one time it seemed likely that, as a preliminary stage in the construction of the Cape to Cairo Railway, the railway would be carried from the south as far as Gondokoro, or to some other point on the upper White Nile, where it would for the time being stop, and transport between that point and Khartoum would be carried on by river steamer. It is interesting, therefore, to hear from Mr. Williams that it is now proposed that the Cape to Cairo Railway shall join the existing Sudan railway system at El Obeid, and that only about 1,700 miles remain to be completed. The amount remaining to be completed is, therefore, a small amount compared with what has already been built.

I will conclude my remarks with a few observations on the utility of the Cape to Cairo Railway, considered from the point of view of the

Sudan. In the first place, it is obvious that, strategically, the railway will be of the very greatest importance. In the case of any disturbance in, or foreign aggression to, any British territory through which it passes, it will enable troops to be brought rapidly and easily from South Africa and the other territories which it traverses to the point in danger. Secondly, the railway will be of the highest value in facilitating the internal administration of the Sudan. There are places in the southern parts of the Sudan to reach which from Khartoum at present necessitates a journey of from a month to six weeks. The railway will enable the same journey to places through which it passes to be completed in not many more hours than the number of days now required. Thirdly, as regards the commercial point of view, I believe that it will be found that there is no great physical difficulty in the making of the railway when it gets into Sudan territory. It will, therefore, be cheaply constructed, and experience in the Sudan has been that, where you can make a railway cheaply, it is extraordinary how soon it will pay its way, even though the population through which it passes may be uncivilized and scanty. In this connection, it is relevant to point out that hitherto the Sudan has been developed, one may say, in a topsy-turvy way. For the northern part of the Sudan, which, because it is closer to the means of communication, has been developed first, is the more desert part. While in the north the Sudan is almost rainless, and vegetation is, generally speaking, confined to a narrow strip along the Nile, the rain increases as one travels south, until on the southern border there is an average rainfall of 40 inches a year, and the whole country is under vegetation. The completion of the Cape to Cairo Railway through Sudan territory will enable the development of the southern portions of the Sudan, which, from a commercial point of view, have hitherto been neglected, to be gradually taken in hand. Mr. Chairman, I will conclude by again thanking Mr. Williams for his extremely interesting lecture. (Applause.)

Sir LEE STACK (Governor-General of the Sudan): Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have only landed from the Sudan in the last few days, and came here to listen, not to speak, but I would like to say how much I appreciate the opportunity of hearing Mr. Williams' lecture, in which he has developed his theory and practice of the route from the Cape to Cairo, and the transverse route from Benguela to Beira. It is interesting to me, because one of the big links, or the big link, is through the Sudan. The Sudan is as yet a poorish country, and we have not been able to develop our communications as fast as we would like to have done; but if the indications of mineral wealth which Mr. Williams has told you about in the Southern Sudan materialize, then the inducement for a railway south-westward from El Obeid is a very great one, and a further stage in bridging that

gap will no doubt be feasible. I also would like to associate myself with Mr. Williams' sentiment as regards the trusteeship the white man holds towards the black man in Africa. If we develop our possessions in the interests of the native, and not by exploiting him in the interests of ourselves, then I am sure our administration will be successful. You have heard a good deal about the Sudan from Sir Reginald Wingate and Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, so I will not say anything more about it; but I should like to thank Mr. Robert Williams for his lecture and express the great interest it has been to me.

MR. DONALD MELLOR, F.R.G.S.: Mr. Chairman,—I must say I thank Mr. Williams for the lecture. I know what a splendid help he was to the late Cecil Rhodes, and I only hope that the railway will be constructed directly as shown according to the map on the wall. If so, I think it will be a splendid monument to Mr. Williams' courage, determination, and tact. From what I have read, I know that he has had unforeseen difficulties to face, and that no man who had not got what I may call a bulldog determination to carry on the work that Cecil Rhodes inaugurated could possibly have achieved the work that he has done up to the present time. When Colonel Lugard spoke, he expressed the wish that Mr. Williams might have mentioned more about the railway line. I should have liked to hear more also, because I believe, as regards the Benguella Railway, there have been a great many difficulties. Respecting the pushing forward of this line to the border and its continuation, it all depends upon the Belgian extension from their border to the Katanga district through Lulua. The success of the Benguella line depends on that. If this extension is not made the rest of the railway is no good for the chief purpose for which it has been built. I understand that there are several other schemes that have been broached lately for a line in the Belgian Congo across country for about 900 kilometres, which apparently is an offset against the Benguella line. As regards the line from Stanleyville, as laid down on the map, there have been several schemes for lines from this place in the direction of Lake Albert. I understand that one (the southern route) has been practically dropped, and that another scheme taking a more northerly route, making connection with the Nile (north of Lake Albert), which one of the last speakers mentioned, will replace it. Mr. Williams did not say anything about this; I hope he will not mind my mentioning it. I have worked out an itinerary from Stanleyville to Capetown. It is possible to travel from Stanleyville in accordance with a properly printed timetable to Capetown in twenty-six days, and from Capetown to Stanleyville in about twenty days, because one saves time when going down the river. I greatly appreciate Mr. Williams' lecture, and I should like to thank him for it. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN : I think we are all greatly indebted to those gentlemen who have taken part in the very interesting discussion we have had, and I have only one comment to make on Mr. Williams' lecture—that is, that to my mind it was a little too short. (Hear, hear.) Otherwise—composed as it was in such an excellent literary style, and enunciating such broad and statesmanlike views—it was a great instruction and great profit to us all to listen to it. I therefore wish to convey, with your permission, our very heartiest thanks to Mr. Williams for his excellent paper. (Applause.)

The LECTURER : Lord Carnock, ladies and gentlemen,—allow me to thank you very much for your kind reception. (Renewed applause.)

CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY DINNER CLUB

THE inaugural dinner of the C.A.S. Dinner Club was held at the Imperial Restaurant on Thursday, May 4. In the absence of Lord Carnock the chair was taken by Sir Michael O'Dwyer.

Membership of the Club is limited to seventy-five ordinary members, and members of the Central Asian Society only are eligible for election. Candidates must be proposed and seconded by members of the Dinner Club, and balloted for by the Committee.

The subscription is five shillings annually, diners paying for their own dinners. No guests, except those invited by the Club, are permitted.

The meetings are held at the Imperial Restaurant, Regent Street, on the first Thursdays in November, December, February, March, April, and May.

The acting Committee consists of General Sir Edmund Barrow, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Sir Edward Penton, and Captain G. C. Stephenson. The Officers and Committee will be elected at the next General Meeting of the Club, which is to be held on Thursday, November 2.

Members of the Central Asian Society home from abroad on leave are eligible as temporary additional members of the Dinner Club.

CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY ACCOUNTS, 1921

RECEIPTS.				EXPENDITURE.			
		£	s. d.		£	s. d.	
Subscriptions—				By rent	£	s. d.	£ s. d.
To 404 at £1	...	404	0 0	" general rate	30	0 0	7 4 0
" 17 at 16s.	...	18	12 0	" water rate	1	1 0	1 1 0
" 28 at £1 in advance	...	28	0 0	" salary	50	0 0	88 5 0
" Journal subscriptions—5 at 12s. 6d. 8 at 10s. 5d.	...	3 2 6 1 11 8		Journal—			
Journal sales	...			By printing	228	5 5	241 19 11
Miscellaneous	...			" reporting	18	14 6	
Interest on deposit	...			" hire of lecture halls and tips	7	6 0	
				" lantern	9	18 0	16 19 0
Balance at bank, January 1, 1921	66	12	8	By office fittings			2 12 6
Balance in hand (petty cash), January 1, 1921	0	5	4	" stationery, printing, etc.			15 8 9
	66	18	0	" dinner expenses			5 0 8
				" returned subscriptions			4 4 4
				" unpaid cheque			1 0 0
				" stamps and postage			40 17 9
				" petty cash (teas, etc.)			15 2 5
				" bank charges			0 12 2
							482 2 6
				balance at bank, December 31, 1921	18	15 4	
				" deposit	70	0 0	
				" balance in hand (petty cash), December 31, 1921	8	12 2	92 7 6
							£524 10 0
					£524	10	0

Audited and found correct, May 11, 1922.

A. I. P. TUCKER.

C. B. STOKES, LAUREL-COLORED.

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
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- Avison, Major J. T., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
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- Stack, Major-General Sir Lee, K.B.E., C.M.G., Governor of the Sudan, United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
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- Thomas, Captain B. S., O.B.E., 22, Courtfield Gardens, S.W. 5.
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ETC.



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NOTICE

THE first Meeting of the Session 1923-24 will be held at the Royal Society's Lecture Room, Burlington House, W., on Tuesday, October 10, when Major Arthur Moore will lecture on "Britain and Islamic Asia."

A misapprehension, it is understood, exists as to the admission of ladies as guests at the Annual Dinner of the Society. The Council wishes it to be known that ladies are admitted as guests at that dinner.

A. C. Y.

PERSIA AND THE GREAT WAR

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR PERCY SYKES, K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G.

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., on Thursday, May 11, 1922, Lord Carnock presiding, when a lecture was given by Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G., on "Persia and the Great War."

The CHAIRMAN said: Before Colonel Yate reads out the names of the new members I should like to say that the Anniversary Meeting will be held in this hall on June 15 at a quarter-past four. I hope all members who can come will come if it is convenient for them, as we should like a full meeting. The Annual Dinner will be held on July 6, with Lord Peel, the Secretary of State for India, in the Chair; and Lord Ronaldshay, late Governor of Bengal, is to be the guest of the evening.

The SECRETARY (Colonel A. C. Yate): The Council has just elected the following twenty members: The Right Hon. Lord Inchcape of Strathnaver, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.; Lieut.-General Sir G. M. Kirkpatrick, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Major-General Sir Lee Stack, K.B.E., C.M.G., Governor of the Sudan; Major-General Sir Edmund Ironside, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.; Sir G. S. Barnes, K.C.B., K.C.S.I.; Lieut.-Colonel Sir T. Wolseley Haig, K.C.I.E., C.B.; Sir Henry Bax-Ironside, K.C.M.G.; Colonel Bernard Green, C.M.G., T.D.; Colonel A. M. Moens, C.M.G., D.S.O.; Colonel G. Wright, C.B.E., D.S.O., late R.A.; Lieut.-Commander J. B. de Pouguet, O.B.E., R.N.; Major J. T. Avison; Captain V. Holt; Mr. C. P. Skrine, I.C.S.; Mr. E. G. Peel, Indian Political Department; Captain B. S. Thomas, O.B.E.; Captain A. T. Blackett, Palestine Gendarmerie, Mr. N. Calder; Mr. J. Milne; Mr. R. P. S. Waley, Royal West Kents.

The CHAIRMAN: That makes twenty new members since our last meeting, bringing up, I think, the total membership to over six hundred, which I think most satisfactory. (Applause.) I think it is hardly necessary for me to introduce Sir Percy Sykes to the audience here present, as anyone who takes any interest in Persia or the Mid-East must be fully cognizant of the very active and distinguished part which Sir Percy took in events which have occurred in recent years in those regions. I think there are very few who have studied so deeply the past history of Persia. You who have read his work entitled "The History of Persia" can testify to this, and I

doubt if there are any who are better qualified to be considered one of our first authorities on Persian affairs generally, because of his personal experience derived from a lengthy residence in the country, and the close contact which he maintained with the population. I think we are particularly fortunate in getting him here this evening to give us a lecture upon Persia and the Great War. (Applause.)

THE LECTURE

To all except a few students it seemed unlikely that remote Persia would be directly affected by the outbreak of the Great War. If, however, the pages of history be studied, it will be seen that the master-mind of Napoleon, realizing that British power in the East was based on India, determined to invade that country across Persia. In 1800, in alliance with Paul of Russia, the scheme was matured, and in the following year the Cossacks of the Don received orders to invade India. They marched off without proper transport and totally unprovided with maps, but, fortunately for them, the death of the Tsar caused the scheme, which, at this period, was fantastic, to be countermanded.

In 1914, Germany determined to pursue the same policy through her instrument, the Turkish army. Operating like the spokes of a fan, with armies attacking the Caucasus in the north, Irak and Persia in the centre, and Egypt in the south, Turkey worked on interior lines, but, to some extent, British sea-power counterbalanced this advantage, troops being moved between Egypt and Irak as the situation required. Throughout the war Germany aimed at India, and had a single Turkish brigade reached Herat, the Amir of Afghanistan would, in all probability, have been forced to lead his subjects, reinforced by the warlike tribes of the North-West Frontier, to attack India. Such an attack would have constituted a deadly peril to the British.

The position of Persia at the outbreak of hostilities was unenviable. Powerless to protect her frontiers, she saw the troops of the belligerents in most of her provinces, and was unable to do more than protest. The ruling class, which was not troubled with any patriotic feelings, took advantage of the situation to make money from one side or, if possible, from both. Persia, indeed, suffered in her western and north-western provinces from the operations of Russian and Turkish armies, but she made much money out of the British, who behaved throughout as if they were operating in a friendly country.

Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, Russian troops marched across the north-west corner of Azerbaijan into Turkish territory, and drove the enemy back on Van. After a temporary withdrawal, they returned and held a strong position to the west of Lake Urmia until

the collapse of the army in 1917. We must now turn our attention to South-West Persia. Upon Turkey entering the war, a British brigade speedily arrived in the Shatt-al-Arab, and prevented the enemy from wrecking the valuable oil-refineries of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, situated on the island of Abadan, a few miles below the port of Mohammerah. After the capture of Basra and the arrival of reinforcements, a brigade was despatched to Ahwaz to guard the wells and pipe-line. The Turks made strenuous efforts against these objectives, but were repulsed and driven out of Persian soil by a British division in the spring of 1915. The main effort of the enemy in Persia was inaugurated by the despatch of missions into Central Persia. These missions were composed of a few officers with experience of the country, who enlisted local robbers and drove out the unprotected British and Russian colonies. They murdered various officials and looted branches of the Imperial Bank of Persia. Established in the chief towns, they served as bases for other missions that were sent to Afghanistan and Baluchistan, and by the end of 1915 the British had been driven out and forced to seek refuge at the coast. In no case did the Persian authorities make any attempt to protect the Entente colonies. On the contrary, the Persian Gendarmerie, that had been raised by Swedish officers, was won over to the German side through them, and materially strengthened the enemy. In the north the position was satisfactory. As the enemy Ministers had made their legations into standing camps, Russian troops were brought into Persia. The representatives of the Central Powers attempted to induce the young Shah to throw in his lot with them, alleging that the Russians would storm Tehran and make His Majesty a prisoner. Ultimately this scheme failed, and the disappointed Ministers left Tehran accompanied by some deputies and grandees whom they had bought over. The Russian troops experienced little difficulty in dispersing the enemy parties, and by the end of the year North Persia was safe for the subjects of the Entente Powers.

The year 1916 opened with the advance of a Turkish force from Baghdad, to the neighbourhood of Hamadan, the plan undoubtedly being to support the German missions. The Russians were, however, at first able to drive the Turks back to their frontier. But the fall of Kut, in April, released large Turkish forces for the invasion of Persia, and a column 18,000 strong marched into the heart of the country, driving the Russians before it. At one time it seemed that Tehran would be captured, and a further advance made towards Herat, but the Russians took up a strong position to the north of Hamadan, and, as they received some reinforcements, the Turks were finally reduced to immobility. The importance of these operations was fully realized by the late General Sir Stanley Maude, whose despatch of April 4, 1917, ran: "The enemy's plan appeared to be to contain our main

forces on the Tigris, while a vigorous campaign, which would directly threaten India, was being developed in Persia."

To remedy the unsatisfactory position in South Persia, it was decided to despatch a mission, with the object of restoring order by means of a Persian force. I was appointed to undertake this task, and reached Bandar Abbas in March, 1916. My instructions were to raise the force, that was finally termed the South Persia Rifles, and as soon as we had landed we started recruiting. At first the difficulties we experienced were many, but, mainly thanks to a very fine young officer, Captain Ruck, a useful force was finally formed, which protected Bandar Abbas and the caravan route to the interior. Germans excel in the gentle art of making enemies, and before I had been long at Bandar Abbas I received letters from the leading notables of the Kerman province begging me to free them from their tyranny. This satisfactory state of affairs was reported to the authorities, with the result that a small force of 700 Indian troops was despatched to join me, and I was instructed to march to Kerman. Everywhere we were welcomed by all classes, and the Germans, who fled towards Shiraz, were, through my influence, arrested by the Chief of the Arab tribe and handed over to me upon my arrival in the winter.

At Kerman the British colony, which had returned with the column, settled down afresh, and recruiting was started for a brigade of the South Persia Rifles. From Kerman we marched to Yezd, where we were welcomed by the British colony that had recently returned. We here received the serious news of the Turkish advance referred to above, and marched to Isfahan, in accordance with the urgent appeal of the Russian Commandant, who reported that a Turkish column was marching on that city. It appears that the size of my force was exaggerated into a brigade, and that this fact caused the Turks to halt at a village some 70 miles from Isfahan, and, finally, to retire to Hamadan. After remaining some weeks at Isfahan, we marched south to Shiraz, which was to be our headquarters, thus completing a march of 1,000 miles through Persia.

The despatch of German missions to Afghanistan could not be a matter of indifference for us, and it was decided to form a cordon along the west frontier of Afghanistan, the Russians furnishing the necessary troops in the northern section and the British in the south. The question of communications was one of extreme difficulty, as from Nushki to the Persian frontier is about 500 miles, and northwards to Kain, where the Russian section began, was about 300 miles. At that time only camel transport was available, the railway-line not having been constructed, and it was the reverse of easy to supply even a small force at such a distance from its base. The Germans opened up relations with the raiding tribes of the district of Sarhad, and encouraged them to attack the caravans. So successful

were they that there was a risk of the Eastern Persia Cordon collapsing, at the time when Brigadier-General R. E. Dyer was sent to put things right. He attacked the Sarhaddis with a handful of men, giving out that they were the advance-guard of an irresistible army. When this bluff was seen through he was in a difficult position, but the opportune arrival of reinforcements changed the entire situation, and he was able to defeat, and then to make friends with, the truculent tribesmen. His book, "The Raiding Tribes of the Sarhad," reads like a story of adventure, and we hope that one day this Society may hear an account of these wonderful operations.

In March, 1917, the collapse of the Russian army commenced, and by the end of the year it had become a mob. The British Government was faced by the fact that the northern line of approach to India was now open. In other words, if the Germans could join hands with the thousands of their men who were in the prison camps of Central Asia, they would be able to form them into an army fit to undertake the invasion of India. The situation was desperate, and desperate steps were taken to meet the emergency. In the first place, a mission was despatched across North-West Persia with the Caucasus as its objective, the idea being to rally the Georgians and Armenians to resist the Turkish advance. Major-General L. C. Dunsterville, the leader of this mission, has given the Central Asian Society an account of the thrilling exploits of his force. Here it suffices to say that it filled the gap at a critical moment by denying the oilfields and port of Baku to the enemy for a period of six weeks. The feats of "Dunsterforce" must never be forgotten.

A second mission under Major-General Sir Wilfrid Malleon was also sent across Eastern Persia to Central Asia, to prevent the Bolsheviks from reaching the Caspian Sea from the east. This, too, if the remoteness of the war area be considered, was a remarkable piece of work, and here again the Society has heard a lecture from the leader of the mission. But we have not yet heard an account of how a few British naval officers and other ratings, under Commodore D. T. Norris, were able to hoist the white ensign on some merchantmen, and defeat the Bolshevik fleet. They did even more, for they dominated the Caspian. These three "sideshows" represent splendid achievements, and it has given me much pleasure to narrate them in the second edition of my "History of Persia." Indeed, they ran some risk of being forgotten.

To return to South Persia, during 1917 distinct progress had been made, owing to the arrival of a capable staff under Colonel F. E. Orton, and some reinforcements, while the capture of Baghdad reacted favourably on the situation. The position was, however, difficult. To begin with, the question of the Swedish Gendarmerie, who had arrested the British colony at Shiraz in the

previous year, had to be dealt with at once. It was in a derelict condition, and unless taken in hand would have broken up and gone off with arms and ammunition. While fully realizing the risk, I determined to take over the entire body, and, although the behaviour of the force was not satisfactory for some time, it was undoubtedly the best thing to have done; it finally behaved well, and did good work after the Armistice. Of greater importance was the hostile attitude of the powerful Kashgai tribe. For generations it had been accustomed to raid far and wide, and during the last two decades the Governor-General had been powerless to oppose its *Ilkhani*, who levied revenue, but kept it for his own use. The Arab tribes were weaker, but also addicted to raiding. We, on the other hand, stood for the restoration of order, and thus challenged the "right to rob" of these warlike tribesmen.

In March, 1918, the British retreat in France convinced the Persian Government that Germany was the winner of the World War. Consequently, the South Persia Rifles were denounced as "a foreign force and a threat to Persian independence and integrity." The Kashgais and other tribes were, at the same time, instigated to attack the British, with the result that there were serious mutinies in the South Persia Rifles, and, in May, the force of 2,000 Indian troops was invested in Shiraz. The Kashgais, who, with their allies, numbered perhaps 8,000 fighting men on an average, were attacked and defeated, but returned in greater numbers, and the position looked black, until the enemy fortunately cut the telegraph-lines. Free to act as the situation demanded, I was able to induce the Persian Governor-General to appoint the brother of the Kashgai Chief head of the tribe, with the result that, after an interesting display of Oriental diplomacy, part of the Kashgais broke away and joined the new *Ilkhani*. The Arabs also climbed off the fence and came down on our side. When the situation had thus improved, the column again attacked the Kashgais, who fled, pursued by their own tribesmen under the new *Ilkhani*. This ended the six weeks' investment of Shiraz, which proved the splendid fighting qualities of the Indian troops under British officers. It also proved how the British are everywhere true to type, for the Telegraph and Bank officials and their wives also rendered valuable services, which it is a pleasure to place on record.

While Shiraz was invested, a base was organized at Bushire by Major-General J. A. Douglas, and, in the autumn, road-making was started along the difficult route to Shiraz. There was practically no opposition, as, apart from the fact that the Kashgai Chief was a refugee, the whole country had suffered from the scourge of influenza. Consequently, progress was steady, and, in January, 1919, Kazerun was occupied, with the co-operation of a detachment from Shiraz.

Before the troops were withdrawn in the spring, a well-graded track had been constructed to Shiraz across one of the most difficult sections of country in Asia.

In conclusion, what would the results have been had these missions failed? There is the strong probability that the Germans would have been able to reorganize the thousands of their veterans who were in the prison camps of Central Asia into a powerful army. The existence of such a force on the northern frontier of Afghanistan would, undoubtedly, have induced the Afghans to join in an invasion of India, which we could not have met with success, unless large numbers of troops were withdrawn from other war areas. Furthermore, had the British force at Shiraz been overwhelmed, apart from the unfavourable effect in Persia, it is probable that a wave of fanaticism would have swept across Persia to India, and that the Panjab would have risen even before the Afghans appeared on the scene. Actually Persia benefited considerably from British operations. Communications were improved, order and security were re-established to some extent, and large sums of money were spent on the purchase of supplies, the hire of transport, and on wages. The Persian Government is unlikely to express its gratitude, but the thanks of the landowners, the muleteers, and, above all, of the peasants which we did receive, are of far greater value.

Lord LAMINGTON: Lord Carnock, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I imagine that most of us up to this afternoon, unless we have had the opportunity of previously hearing General Sir Percy Sykes, had a rather hazy and disconnected idea as to what took place in Persia during the war. Thanks to Sir Percy Sykes' lecture, I think we have now a clear and more collected thought as to events that occurred in that country. Of course, he has run over such a wide area, and over such a long period, that I dare say some of us would have liked to ask questions so as to supplement some of his remarks. For instance, how did those two German missions ever get down to Southern Persia if we had our force up by Ahwaz at that time, and the Russians were farther north?

The LECTURER: They got into Baghdad along the main road from Kermanshah, and came down to Isfahan.

Lord LAMINGTON: It was a most marvellous series of events, and we in this country ought to be proud of its having been achieved by our countrymen in Persia, not least of all by Sir Percy Sykes himself. (Applause.) As an old friend of Persia, a historian, and one with a sound knowledge of its people, he must have considerable satisfaction in thinking that he was able to conduct such a very wonderful campaign under such circumstances. For the circumstances were extremely difficult, and one can only think that there is

probably a benefit sometimes when you don't have too elaborate an organization. When you have no clerk at all, and are given a free hand, a man of the strength of character of Sir Percy Sykes is then able to do the great deeds he succeeded in doing. Not only Sir Percy Sykes; he very generously mentioned those others who played such an important part in the different missions that were sent to Persia, up to Baku in the north-west, and to Tashkend in the north-east. All those events are but seldom heard of by people in this country. What I imagine must be a sad thought to Sir Percy Sykes is that what he succeeded in doing in the political or military direction is the fact that it has been now wrecked. The very efficient body of the South Persia Rifles that he organized has had to be disbanded. We could not find the money, the Indian Government would not find the money, and, of course, the Persian Government could not find the money. Therefore that very efficient force has now ceased to exist. A sad thing it was to think what might have happened to those who had been so faithful to this country in trying to save their own country. Their enemies may be wreaking vengeance on them. It is deplorable that we have not been able to maintain that force, and by so doing secure permanent friends for ourselves in a country in which we are vitally interested. The constructive works, too, such as fine roads, will undoubtedly be neglected and fall into disrepair if order is not restored. I will not detain you longer, but everyone will agree with me that we are deeply indebted to Sir Percy Sykes for his brilliant achievements during the war; and we are very grateful to him for having come here this afternoon and delivered this lecture, which has been most informing, and which ought to give us a clear, connected idea of the campaign—of the several campaigns—that took place in Persia. (Applause.)

Sir HUGH BARNES: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I feel great reluctance in intervening in this discussion, because I am sure this audience must be rather looking forward to hearing the comments and personal experiences of some of those present who were active participants in the stirring events which Sir Percy Sykes has referred to. I, unfortunately, can only speak from the point of view of an onlooker. However, I may be able to supplement to some extent what Sir Percy Sykes has told you from the point of view of the Imperial Bank of Persia, with which I was connected during the war. I can certainly confirm entirely what Sir Percy has said as to the extraordinary intrigues and propaganda that were started by the Germans almost immediately after the war commenced. So immediate, so universal, and so well-concerted were the measures taken, that it is difficult to resist the conclusion that everything had been very carefully prepared before the war. No sooner had the Turks joined in than every German Consulate in the country became a

focus, not only for intrigue and propaganda, but for organized attacks upon every British interest; and the Imperial Bank of Persia, naturally, was one of the first and principal interests to suffer. Our headquarters in Persia, of course, are at Tehran, but the Bank has seventeen branches throughout Persia, and at one time no less than nine of these were in the possession of the enemy. The first to be attacked was Tabriz, nearest the Turkish frontier. Fortunately, that was very speedily succoured by the advance of the Russians. The next was Ahwaz down in the south, but in that case, also, our staff was very speedily able to return, owing to the despatch of a couple of regiments from the Basrah Field Force. Then the Turks attacked on the main trade route at Kermanshah, and gradually, during the first half of 1915, from Kermanshah, Hamadan, Sultanabad, and Isfahan—from all these places—the Bank staffs were driven, and with them our Consuls and the rest of the British residents. In November, 1915, occurred the occupation of Shiraz, under the superintendence of the German Consul, Herr Wassmuss, who succeeded in persuading the local gendarmerie and other insurgents to arrest the whole of the British colony, including Colonel O'Connor, our manager Mr. Ferguson, and his wife, and the rest of the staff and officers at Shiraz. The Germans then advanced to Yezd and Kerman, and seized our branches at both places. That was in June, 1916, but that was the high-water mark of the German effort. Kerman, as you have seen from the map, is not so very far from the Baluchistan border; and the—at that time—somewhat slow-going Government of India was at last moved to take action, and was persuaded to despatch Sir Percy Sykes to Bandar Abbas to raise a force of levies and to drive the Germans out. The enemy were not very numerous. They consisted of German Consuls, of some escaped Austrian and German prisoners, and a number of "catch-'em-alive-ohs" whom they had raised. You have heard Sir Percy Sykes' very modest account of what he accomplished, how he advanced from Kerman to Yezd, Isfahan, and Shiraz, and how all our Bank people gradually came back. But, as he has told you, there was a good deal of advance and retreat on the Russian line between Hamadan and the Mesopotamian frontier, and it was not until Baghdad was occupied in the middle of May or June, 1917, that we succeeded in regaining possession of all our branches. Nor was that the end; after the Russian revolution, when the Russian troops began to go back, the Turks again occupied Tabriz, and turned out our Consul and the Bank staff; and the Bolsheviks, assisted by a gentleman called Kuchik Khan, who had started a little revolution on the shores of the Caspian, attacked Resht and imprisoned our Consul and the Bank manager there. These were released by the advance of General Dunsterville and his admirable force, and I remember hearing with great satisfaction that our Bank funds had

been saved, thanks to the gallant conduct of a little company of Ghurkas, who inflicted very severe losses on Kuchik Khan's so-called army. Those being the facts, I dare say you will be able to imagine the dangers and the discomforts and privations which were suffered by the members of the British colonies in all these different places, when they were driven out helter-skelter by the violent action of the Germans and their friends. For example, as you have heard, the whole of the Shiraz party were arrested and taken down to Borasjun and imprisoned there by the Tangistani tribesmen. The ladies were separated from the men and sent on to Bushire, where they stayed for eight months in acute anxiety as to what was happening to their husbands, who did not succeed in obtaining release until the following August. Mr. Ferguson lost all his property, so did Colonel O'Connor and the other members of our staff. The Kerman Consul and Bank staff had to find their way down in December to Bandar Abbas, in a very cold season of the year, through very difficult country, as Sir Percy's slides have shown you. The Yezd staff managed to find their way to Tehran. From Isfahan the whole of the ladies and children and officers, with very inadequate supplies and very inferior transport, had to march 200 miles through the Bakhtiari Hills until they found refuge with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's people at Ahwaz. I was naturally in very close touch with our people during that period. I never heard one single word of complaint from any of them, and it was marvellous the cheerful courage and fortitude with which all their privations were borne by our fellow-countrymen and countrywomen during that time. (Applause.) When I look back on the years of the war, it seems to me there were four notable things achieved in Persia during the war-time. First of all, there was Sir Percy Sykes' great achievement of recovering the south of Persia, driving out German influence, and establishing the South Persia Rifles. Then there was General Dunsterville's romantic adventure—of which we had an interesting account from General Dunsterville himself; then, General Malleon's expedition on the extreme east and the Turcoman border; and, fourthly, there was the construction at long last of that desert railway from Nushki to the neighbourhood of Seistan on the Persian frontier. Now, General Dunsterville's force and General Ironside's force, which succeeded it, have gone; so also has General Malleon's gallant party—which is only natural, considering peace has returned. Up to this time last year we were still in hopes that the South Persia Rifles might be saved; but, as Lord Lamington has pointed out, the urgent demand for economy has led to the British and Indian Governments refusing to continue their contributions. So, much to everybody's regret, the South Persia Rifles have been disbanded. Whether that will prove to be a penny wise and pound foolish policy it is too early to say; but if South Persia does fall into a state of chaos and disturbance, that will mean great

injury to British interests and British-Indian trade, and it is just possible we may have again to intervene, at probably much greater cost than we should have incurred by maintaining the admirable force which had been raised by British officers. At any rate, the South Persia Rifles furnish another remarkable instance of the extraordinary capacity of the young British military officer, not only to create efficient soldiers out of the most unpromising material, but at the same time to gain, not only their confidence, but their affection. (Applause.) The one achievement which still remains is the railway from Quetta into Persia. But the other day I was dismayed by reading a report from India which said that the Government were thinking of pulling up the rails and dismantling that line. I hope most sincerely that such a short-sighted and retrograde measure will not be adopted. For whatever happens to Persia, that railway is bound to be of great value in the future. If Persia obtains a period of peace and orderly government, trade will increase, and this line is the only effective land route by which Persia and India can trade together. Secondly, even if Persia falls into anarchy, and we have to intervene, this railway gives us at once the opportunity and the power of putting pressure on the Persian Government by the occupation of Seistan. Thirdly, if the Bolshevik or any other Russian Government ever again becomes aggressive, and we have to give our material support, either to Afghanistan or Persia, Seistan again is the strategical point to which we can send troops to support one or other. Fourthly, if you think of it, there is only a gap of some 400 miles which separates the head of this railway from the nearest point on the Russian Transcaspian line, and if that gap is ever completed, there will be practically railway communication between India and Europe. If we are to have, as we all hope, an era of universal peace for a long time to come, it is almost inevitable that that gap will be filled up. When I look back it seems difficult to believe that thirty years have elapsed since Sir Robert Sandeman died; but it is as long ago as that since he and I, when we were together at Quetta, used to plan for and dream of the time when Quetta would be the most popular place in India, because it would be the "jumping-off" place from which our countrymen would start on their leave home—if they preferred to travel overland by rail all the way to Calais. The only other thing I have to say is that at the time of the Armistice British prestige in Persia never stood higher. Not only had we financed the Persian Government, financed our own troops, and financed the Russian troops, but we had driven out German and Turkish influence, occupied Mesopotamia, and, in short, had won the war. Our prestige, therefore, stood very high indeed. I am sorry to say that at the present moment I cannot say that this is any longer the case. From all we hear—if we are to judge by the action of the Persian Government and the tone of the Press at Tehran—England and the British are most

unpopular. This has arisen mainly, no doubt, through active Bolshevik propaganda and expenditure, but also, perhaps, through mistakes of policy, which are now beginning to be recognized. There are some slight signs of a change, and I hope that before long we shall again see Britain and Persia as closely united in friendship as they have been in former years. (Applause.)

Sir EDMUND BARROW: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have no claim to talk on Persia as I have never been there; but I have been connected behind the scenes with Persia's affairs for a long time past; and as my old friend Sir Percy Sykes, whom I have long regarded as my mentor on Persian subjects, has forwarded to me his notes for the lecture to which we have had the pleasure of listening to-day, and has asked me to make a few remarks on the influence of Persia on the Great War, I have felt constrained to do so. Moreover, it is always rather a pleasure to make remarks and criticisms on what one's preceptor or mentor has told one, so I have jotted down a few remarks which I wish to make. In the first place, Sir Percy has referred a good deal to the influence of the Russians on the campaign in the early days of the war; and it is quite true that that influence had a certain effect. But, at the same time, I think that it is more probable that it was our position in Mesopotamia that most affected the course of events in Persia. In the early days of 1916 it was not so much the Russians, I think, who put a term to the German machinations in Persia, but the presence of the British in Mesopotamia. We were there in a position from which we could tread on the tail of any advance or movement through Hamadan and Kermanshah; and I am inclined to think that it was the otherwise unfortunate advance of General Townshend to Ctesiphon which caused the failure of the Turco-German movement in Persia. On that subject I must be careful as to what I say; but I think that what really stopped the Turks, and, indeed, caused their hurried retirement a few months later from Persia, was not the Russians, but the advance of the British from Kut towards Baghdad. In this connection I should like to draw your attention to the marked influence which Mesopotamia and Persia reciprocally exercised on the strategy of the Great War; I have no hesitation in saying that it was the fear of Pan-Islamic influences on the Indian frontier, exercised through Persia and Afghanistan, which was the *ignis fatuus* that lured us on from Kut to Ctesiphon. The Press and the public attributed that ill-fated advance to an attempt to compensate for our failure at the Dardanelles, but I can assure you that the supreme consideration of the moment was the situation in Persia, and the menace to India which that situation involved at a period of dangerous military weakness in India itself. The lecturer has also told us how, later on in 1917, the Russian débâcle laid Persia open to renewed Turkish penetration by way of Tabriz on the north-west and in the north-east, movements

which led to the Dunsterville and Malleson missions. I need say nothing regarding the former, as Sir Percy Sykes has commented on it so fully; but, as regards the latter, I would point out that, though it is true our enemies hoped to utilize against us the war prisoners who had been interned in Turkistan by the Russians, that hope proved fallacious. The prisoners were almost entirely Austrian subjects, and, for the most part, Poles, Magyars, Czechs, and other races who had little or no sympathy with either German or Turkish aspirations, and who, consequently, were a broken reed in Bolshevik hands. The ease with which a few hundred Indian soldiers of the 26th Cavalry and the 19th Punjabis defeated the Bolsheviks in front of Merv a little later proves this. Nevertheless, I should like to say that the exploit of the Indians on that occasion merits far more credit and applause than it has ever got; it was a notable feat which added greatly to English prestige throughout Persia and Central Asia. (Applause.) Sir Percy has told us of the evil influence on Persia of the great German offensive of March, 1918, against our Fifth Army in France—how the Persian Government thought we were beaten, and how readily the Persians turned against us. This episode illustrates the importance of prestige in Oriental affairs. Our prestige had been shaken by a military disaster in distant Europe, and the East was once more gathering to join our enemies. Our hold on Shiraz, Meshed, and Bushire at that critical moment saved the situation; without those centres of resistance an acute crisis might have arisen at Kabul. Once again we were saved, for a time at least, by the influence of a sideshow; the threatened conflagration was damped down. Sir Percy Sykes concluded his lecture with an expression of sympathy for Persia. I am sure we are all sorry for the condition of things in Persia, and we must all condole with the unfortunate position which has now arisen. But in the East the unforeseen nearly always occurs, and I feel confident that Persia will be saved, as it has been before now, by some strong man. We have the example in old days of Nadir Khan, a Border cateran, who rose to power by his own strong hand, and who eventually raised Persia again to a position of great strength and influence in Asia, and, as you all know, the armies of Nadir Shah even reached Delhi; so I have some hope that a strong man may emerge out of that sea of corruption which Persia now is. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: I think at this late hour, after the very interesting discussion which we have had, and the very valuable remarks which have been made by Sir Hugh Barnes, Sir Edmund Barrow, and Lord Lamington, I can do no more than ask you to join with me in tendering a vote of very hearty thanks to Sir Percy Sykes for the very lucid and graphic narrative he has given us to-day of the really marvellous events in which he, with his associates, participated. (Applause.)

ANNIVERSARY MEETING AND ANNUAL REPORT

THE Anniversary Meeting of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., on Thursday, June 15, 1922, the Rt. Hon. the Lord Carnock presiding.

The Hon. SECRETARY (Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate) read the Annual Report of the session 1921-22.

It not unnaturally occurred to me, before making my Report for the year which is just now drawing to a close, to reread my Report for the year which preceded it; and, as I did so, it struck me as a curious coincidence that the two final lectures of each Session, that of 1920-1921, and that of 1921-1922, should deal with the very remarkable Mohamedan movement which has been one of the most vital issues of the war. Last year Sir Michael O'Dwyer ably handled this theme from the point of view of the Indian Moslem and of India's Mohamedan neighbours. For this afternoon Sir Valentine Chirol has adopted a title still more comprehensive—viz., "Storm-waves in the Mohamedan World." The other great storm-wave of the moment is the Bolshevik, and I would fain detect a subtle force somewhere which might break the one upon the other. That solution of the problems twain we may perhaps leave to time, if not to our statesmen.

A triumvirate of Secretaries of State is an honour of which this Society may justly be proud, and still prouder if that triumvirate could move Islam to crush Bolshevism, or at least to checkmate it. Over and over again we have been assured that Bolshevism is at war with every Moslem instinct and prejudice, and yet the Turk dallies with them still, and may at any moment end the dalliance in a warm embrace.

The Allied Powers of the West of Europe, victorious in the Great War as they can claim to be, are now threatened by this joint storm-wave.

I think we must all realize from our study during the past few years of events in Asia Minor, the Caucasus, Mesopotamia, Persia, and Egypt, that the position of Great Britain in the Middle East is a difficult and even a precarious one. Lord Curzon of Kedleston, speaking from the Chair, on October 20, 1920, spoke solemnly and earnestly to this Society on the importance of its responsibilities and

the possible wide scope of its work in this sphere of action. There can be no doubt about the presence in our ranks of the "galaxy of talent." The point that has not yet been worked out is the best method of applying that talent in the interest of the Empire.

At the end of last Session we were indifferently housed; but since then, thanks to the obliging attitude of the Royal Asiatic and the Persia Societies, we have acquired a more spacious office in which Miss Kennedy can find elbow-room, and our recently elected Honorary Librarian, Mr. Roland Michell, can find space for our books and journals. I think that this is just the psychological moment to remind you all that the Society wants books, journals, reviews, photographs, prints—in fact, everything that concerns its sphere of work. My experience during the past year, so encouraging in many respects, is tantalizing in this, that I know that the books of two very distinguished members of long standing were allowed to slip through our fingers—to slip through, so to speak, by just a few inches. One, I found, had just sold his surplus books, and the other had just given away a complete set of his copies of our Journal. I had to comfort myself with their assurance that "had they only known," etc., and the assurance was quite sincere, but "too late."

You will readily excuse me if I enter into no details regarding our lectures and lecturers. If you took the latter and passed their united careers in review, you would realize what a handful—you can count them on your ten fingers—of Britons can achieve. As for the lectures, the Journal is in your hands. The Journal, moreover, contains a good deal of interesting matter in addition to the lectures. The hall of the Royal Society and the theatre of the Royal United Service Institution have, during this Session, furnished us with admirable lecture-rooms.

We have increased the membership of the Society this year by 171, and among them are many men of high achievement and distinction. I mention no individual names. I am only going to say a few words of one member, of whom Lord Curzon specially spoke in October, 1920, as "brought up in the spirit and inspiration of the Society"—I mean Lord Ronaldshay, who for six years before he was Governor of Bengal was Chairman of the Council of this Society, or rather its President; for it was not till 1918 that Lord Curzon was invited to be Honorary President, and it was then that the title "Chairman of Council" was introduced. Lord Ronaldshay has recently returned to this country, and has been greeted by His Majesty the King in a manner which reflects the very high opinion entertained both by the Government of this Realm and by the Nation of his Lordship's success as an administrator at a time of exceptional difficulty.

When Lord Curzon spoke twenty months ago, the Central Asian

Society numbered over 400. It now numbers 600, most of them men in the spring or summer of life, many of whom may hope in their good time to rival, or even outrival, Lord Ronaldshay. The Council has invited Lord Ronaldshay to be a Vice-President, and to be the Society's guest at the Annual Dinner, at which Lord Peel will take the Chair. Four of the members of the British Legation at Kabul have just joined this Society, as well as some members of the recent Mission under Sir Henry Dobbs. We are thus well in touch with Kabul; and to Kabul to-day may, perhaps, be applied the term forty years ago, applied, however erroneously, to Herat—viz., "the key of India." I hope that the members of the Afghan Legation in London will understand that they will be welcome at our lectures.

I am not quite sure that this Society yet fully realizes the channels of progress and preferment that are open to it through our close connection with three great Departments of the Government, the Foreign, the Colonial, and the India Office. The Colonial Office suggests to me that we ought to be in closer touch with the institutions of His Majesty's Overseas Dominions. The "Anzac" destiny is bound in with ours. I have written to the Indian soldier whose name is indissolubly connected with the Australasians and New Zealanders who fought in the war, and have invited him, firstly, to join the Society, and, secondly, to indicate the channel by which we may get into touch with the "intelligenzia" of the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand.* The Cape, too, will not be forgotten, and no one can bring us into touch with that better than Mr. Robert Williams, to whom the Society is already indebted for more than one act of kindness and generosity.

Early this year the Council decided that the Society should be given an opportunity, if it so willed, of forming a Dinner Club. A Subcommittee composed of General Sir Edmund Barrow, Sir Edward Penton, and Captain G. C. Stephenson, with Sir Michael O'Dwyer as Chairman, was delegated for the purpose of bringing this project to maturity. The first meeting of this Club was held on May 4. At least fifty members attended. The unanimous opinion of all present was that the Dinner was a complete success, and it was felt that the Subcommittee had arranged everything admirably. It is proposed to continue these dinners during the coming Session, as announced in Part III. of the Journal of 1922.

* General Sir William Birdwood's reply reached me a few days after this Report was read. He wrote: (1) "I shall be glad to join the C.A.S."; and (2) "I think the best thing I can do is to send your letter to Lieut.-General Sir H. Chauvel, who commanded not only all the Australian and New Zealand troops in Palestine, but also the whole of Allenby's mounted division. I am sure that he personally will take much interest in such matters, and may be able to get others to do so."—A. C. Y.

Since my last Report we have lost fourteen members, three by death and eleven by resignation. Sir Frederic Fryer leaves behind him a deeply respected memory. The presence at his Memorial Service of Sir Charles Yate, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, and Captain Stephenson, who represented the Society, was a mark of high esteem and sympathy which his family cordially appreciated.

Finally, we can look back upon this year as a year of good sound progress. Some geographers found their feelings seriously upset by the intelligence that "The Cape to Cairo Railway" figured on the Society's lecture list, and their protests against the association of Africa with the Middle East were strenuous. Students of the past, however, and up-to-date practical administrators of Egypt, of the Sudan, Uganda, and of North-East Africa, showed conclusively that Asia to the north and east and Africa to the south and west of the Suez Canal, that thoroughfare so vital to the unity of the British Empire, cannot possibly be dissociated. If the British power ever trembles in the balance on that Canal, the Anzacs and the Cape Colonists will flock to our support by that very railway, and by the subsidiary branches connecting it with the Indian Ocean at Mom-basa, Dar-es-Salam, and Port Sudan.

The Chairman of our Council proposes to submit to you the following names for election:

As Vice-Presidents:

The Right Hon. the Earl of Ronaldshay, P.C., G.C.S.I.,
G.C.I.E.

General Sir Charles Monro, Bart., G.C.B., etc.

As Members of Council:

The Right Hon. Sir Arthur H. Hardinge, G.C.M.G. K.C.B.

Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, K.C.M.G., C.I.E.

Lieut.-Colonel F. E. Fremantle, M.P.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—The report which Colonel Yate has just read us shows us that the Central Asian Society is now established on a thoroughly firm basis. I am sure that we, its members, can look forward to a prosperous future, and I trust to an ever-extending field for its activities. The report has one or two omissions, omissions which naturally Colonel Yate himself was unable to fill. I allude to the great services which Colonel Yate as our joint Secretary has rendered to the Society, and to his constant and unremitting efforts to further our interest, both by procuring for us a large number of new members and also by arranging a series of most instructive and interesting lectures. (Applause.) The Members of Council have had ample opportunities of appreciating the value of Colonel Yate's services, and I am sure you will agree with me that we

owe him a great debt of gratitude. He has been most ably seconded in his work by his coadjutor, Captain Stephenson, who has also been very active in procuring for us a number of new members. I cannot too highly praise the untiring devotion which Miss Kennedy, our Assistant Secretary, has given to her varied and exacting duties. (Applause.) The financial situation of the Society, I am glad to say, is on a good basis; and this fortunate position is owing to the very careful and prudent administration of our funds by our Hon. Treasurer, Sir Edward Penton. (Applause.) We also owe our thanks to Mr. Mitchell, who has kindly undertaken the post of Honorary Librarian, and I hope that the collection of books, to which we have just received a very generous contribution from Lady Trotter, will multiply and expand under his guidance. I have now to submit for your sanction and confirmation certain appointments, or elections rather, as regards the Vice-Presidents and the Members of Council. We had, of course, the lamented death of Sir Frederic Fryer, which made a vacancy in the Vice-Presidents, and Sir Evan James has expressed his wish to retire from the post. We therefore in their places propose Lord Ronaldshay, late Governor of Bengal, and General Sir Charles Monro, late Commander-in-Chief in India. Of course, the Vice-Presidents are ex officio Members of the Council, and I hope the two gentlemen that I have named will also favour us with their attendance whenever they are able to do so. I presume I may take it that you confirm the election of Lord Ronaldshay and Sir Charles Monro. Then we have to elect four new Members of the Council to replace those who retire by rotation. Captain Ormsby-Gore retires, Mr. Tucker also retires, and Mr. Moon retires; but the Council would be grateful if you would sanction his re-election. As new members we propose Sir Arthur Hardinge, who was once Minister in Persia, also our late Ambassador in Madrid, Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter—whose services in the Soudan and Egypt are well known to you all—and Colonel Freemantle, M.P. Is the meeting agreed?

The resolution was carried unanimously.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure you will re-elect as our Honorary Treasurer Sir Edward Penton.

This was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: We co-opted as a Member of the Council since our last Anniversary Meeting Colonel Stokes, whose services in Persia have made him a very first-class authority on all Persian matters, and he is really a great addition to our Society. The Council did me the honour to ask me to continue as Chairman for another year. It was with diffidence I met their request, and I therefore solicit your suffrages in conforming with it. In about ten minutes Sir Valentine Chirol will give us his lecture. Meantime, I think that closes the business.

After a short interval the meeting was resumed, the business before it being to hear and discuss an address by Sir Valentine Chirol on "Storm Waves in the Mohamedan World."

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—The lecture which Sir Valentine Chirol has kindly consented to read to us to-day closes the session until we resume our autumn meeting. I do not think that we can terminate the present session in a more auspicious manner than in welcoming among us so distinguished and expert an authority on all Eastern questions—as regards the Far East, the Mid-East, or the Near East—as Sir Valentine Chirol. The subject that he is going to deal with this afternoon is one of the utmost importance to our Empire; and I know, as we all know, that Sir Valentine Chirol has devoted to it a profound and prolonged study. We will therefore listen with intense interest to what he has to say to us on so important a subject. (Applause.)

STORM WAVES IN THE MOHAMEDAN WORLD

BY SIR VALENTINE CHIROL.

The world is nowhere yet really at peace, but of the powers that fought us in the Great War, Turkey is the only one which has not yet bowed to the consequences of defeat. She asked for an armistice and obtained it, but peace negotiations hung fire. The situation was complicated by the landing of Greek forces in Asia Minor, originally sanctioned and desired by the Allies, and a stubborn resistance is still being put up, not by the Sultan's Government at Constantinople, but by a rival Turkish Government with its headquarters at Angora, which disposes of considerable military forces under the command of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, one of the ablest Turkish Generals, and has behind it a large measure of support from a population stirred up to an unprecedented degree of racial and religious passion by ten years of nearly continuous warfare. The Angora Government, composed largely of the same elements, formerly known as the Committee of Union and Progress, which plunged Turkey into the Great War in alliance with Germany, appeals both to the Mohamedan and national pride of the ruling race, and relies also on a more or less formal alliance with Soviet Russia, of which the mainspring is a common hostility, though on widely different grounds, to Western civilization. The most singular result of this renewal of Turkish resistance is the wild outburst of passion amongst a large section of the Mohamedans of India, who have not shrunk from the most lawless forms of agita-

tion in order to compel the British Government to reverse its policy towards Turkey as laid down in the Treaty of Sèvres, signed nearly two years ago, but still inoperative. There are about 66 million Mohamedans in India, a very important if relatively small minority in a total population of 320 millions, with great historical traditions, and forming the largest Mohamedan block in the world. Their sudden change of front in support of Turkey imports a fresh element of disturbance, not merely into a difficult political situation in India, but into the whole relations between East and West, already in a state of dangerous flux.

I thought, therefore, it might be interesting to place before you this afternoon a survey, however brief, of the history of those relations, with special reference to the part which Turkey has played in the Islamic world, and to the influence which our possession of India has exerted upon British policy towards Turkey.

Our minds are apt to be still dominated by Mr. Rudyard Kipling's saying that

"East is East and West is West,
And never the twain shall meet,"

as if the West were a planet set for ever on its own superior course and the East its satellite, ordained equally for ever to move on inferior lines that could not conceivably converge or clash. This may have seemed true in India at a particular time when Western ascendancy appeared to be widely acknowledged and deeply rooted there. But it was, I think, a somewhat narrow generalization, which has certainly ceased to be true, and over the long range of history has never been fundamentally true.

Our Western civilization, as far back as we can trace its origins, was hammered out from its very inception in constant contact, if often in violent conflict, with the East—*i.e.*, with so much of the Eastern world as the Western world then knew. West and East exchanged, not only heavy blows, but vital ideas. In peace and in war they acted and reacted upon each other socially and politically, morally and materially; and if we take a broad survey of the results, we must admit that on the whole the honours were fairly well divided. Greece and Rome, having withstood respectively the violent assaults of the Persian and Carthaginian East, gave birth to Western art and literature, to Western conceptions of public law and private rights. The Roman Empire, even more than the Greek colonies of Asia Minor, projected Western influence into the East, but from the East it received Christianity, which, though often obscured and perverted to unworthy uses, henceforth provided the ethical basis of Western civilization. It was Christianity, the gift of the East, that enabled the West to absorb, without irreparable injury to its better self, all the flotsam and jetsam—much of it essentially Eastern—with which

Europe was strewn after the invasions of the barbarians. There is scarcely one European nation in whose blood there is not some Eastern strain dating back to the welter of those ages. The ex-Emperor William himself, on one memorable occasion, exhorted his troops to remember their Hunnish ancestors, and Russia has never ceased to betray her Asiatic origins.

The sixth century, however, introduced an entirely new factor into the relations between East and West with the first emergence from the deserts of Arabia of the one great religion of the world which armed itself from its birth with a sword. So sharp was the sword of Islam wielded by the Arab followers of the Prophet that it carried them in the course of a century westward along the southern shores of the Mediterranean to the Pyrenees, and once even into the heart of France, and eastward through the outlying provinces of the old Byzantine Empire into Persia and the adjoining regions of Central Asia. The Arab conquerors never dropped the sword altogether, and there was almost constant warfare on the expanding borderlands of their vast dominions. But as they were brought into contact with the Western culture that had permeated many of the countries subdued by them, the receptive genius of their Semitic race yielded to its influence, and a *modus vivendi* grew up and took shape in a new Saracenic civilization, which under the Mohamedan Caliphs of Damascus and Baghdad, of Cairo and Cordova, kept the torch of ancient learning alight, when it was almost extinguished during the dark ages in Europe, until the Italian Renaissance kindled it afresh and with increased splendour in Europe.

Where during the four or five centuries which shed such imperishable lustre on Islamic history was Turkey? She was yet unborn. The Ottoman Empire only came into being in the thirteenth century with a new race of Eastern conquerors who picked up the Koran on their way from their heathen homelands in Central Asia to the No Man's Land, into which the slow disintegration of the Byzantine Empire and the more rapid decay of the Arab states successively carved out of it were converting a large part of Western Asia and South-Eastern Europe. With the growth of Turkish power, Islam fell under its blighting influence. For the leadership of Islam passed from a Semitic race intellectually highly gifted and with an innate capacity for progress to a Turanian race—virile indeed, but dull-witted, narrow, and rigid, to whom the Mohamedan creed appealed mainly as an instrument of domination based upon the sword.

The first Turkish wave of conquest, out of which the Seljuk Empire arose, never reached Europe. It destroyed Arab civilization in Mesopotamia and Syria, and the horrors which marked the capture of Jerusalem in 1076, in striking contrast to the reverence and generosity displayed by the Caliph Omar when the Arab followers of

Mohamed first entered the Holy City, stirred Europe to the fierce reprisals of the Crusades, which once more deepened the gulf between Christendom and Islam. It was only with the second wave of Turkish conquest that the Ottoman Turks, so called from their famous leader, Othman, who established himself as Sultan at Brussa within a few miles of the Sea of Marmora, first came to the front as a horde of mercenaries, upon whom their religion at first sat so light, that they were ready to hire themselves out to the highest bidders, whether Mohamedans or Christians. They served in turn the Mohamedan Seljuks and the Christian Emperors of Byzantium, and the Bulgars and Serbs who were already disputing its inheritance. One of the earliest Ottoman Sultans married the daughter of a Byzantine Emperor, and allowed her to retain her own religion, but had no scruple in breaking the alliance of which she had been the price. The Ottoman Turks crossed the Bosphorus as hirelings. They remained as masters. They made Adrianople their first European capital until they were firmly enough established in Thrace to lay hands upon Constantinople itself in 1453. Then, with a fresh momentum, the tide of Ottoman conquest rolled irresistibly forward towards Central Europe, and was only stemmed at last under the very walls of Vienna.

Not until the Ottoman Empire had been thus built up on the ruins, it should be remembered, of earlier Mohamedan states in Asia, no less than on those of Christian states in Europe, did the relations between the West and the East assume a character of irreconcilable antagonism, which the precarious continuance of commercial and even of political intercourse hardly mitigated until Turkey ceased to be a menace to European civilization and began to offer a tempting field to the ambitions of her European neighbours. It was not merely that the Turkish lust of conquest seemed insatiable, nor that with the incorporation of Egypt into his dominions in 1516 the parricide Selim I. added to the title of Sultan that of Caliph, which he wrung from a descendant of the Abbaside Caliphs who had found an obscure refuge in Cairo. This first attempt to convert the Turkish scimitar into the divinely appointed sword of Islam bore little visible fruit until our own times. The Turk was ready enough even to ally himself more or less openly with this or that Christian power against a common enemy—witness, for instance, the frequent co-operation of the "most Christian Kings" of France with the Ottoman Sultans against Austria. Nor did the Turk refuse to concede to infidels limited rights of trade and residence within his territory under the name of capitulations or under special charters such as that of the English Levant Company. But he remained a barbarian. He copied the splendour of Byzantium and excelled its profligacy. He borrowed freely from Arabic and Persian to build up a Court language less

primitive than his rude Central Asian tongue, but he contributed little to literature, nothing to science, and, plagiarizing the nobler arts of Persian and Arab civilization, he steadily debased them.

The first Ottoman Sultans were great soldiers and leaders of men and not devoid of rough, rudimentary statesmanship. It is claimed for them that they even displayed a fine tolerance in their treatment of the conquered Christian peoples, leaving them free to practise their own forms of religion under their own ecclesiastical authorities. There is, however, another side to that policy. The ruling race enjoyed *quâ* Mohamedans under the Sacred Law many privileges, and above all immunities from taxation, which would have lost their value had all the conquered peoples been compelled to become Mohamedans. It would have killed the goose that laid the golden eggs. The material interests of the ruling Turk were best served by tolerating large Christian populations to remain *taillables et corvéables à merci* for his benefit, and, as his power waned, his hand pressed more and more heavily upon the subject races whom he had originally despised, but now began to fear. He reverted more and more to Central Asian type under the thinnest veneer of borrowed culture. The cleavage between the West and the East, of which Turkey was for a long time the one fearful embodiment in the eyes of Europe, deepened as never before in history, until the barrier which she opposed to all beneficent intercourse between East and West was turned by the marvellous enterprise of Western navigators who opened up new ocean highways to another Eastern world hitherto almost unknown to Europe.

Nothing that the Turks ever did in the heyday of their power was to have such momentous consequences for our own race as their conquest of Egypt. For their possession of Egypt and their piratical sea-power all through the Mediterranean closed the last avenue through which Europe had kept up, mainly from Genoa and Venice, a precarious but lucrative trade with the mysterious countries of the distant Orient. The seafaring nations of Western Europe were driven to seek a way round over the hitherto untravelled ocean. The Portuguese were the first to turn the Cape of Good Hope, and they established the first European settlements on the south-western shores of India at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Spaniards and Dutch, French and English, joined in turn in the great adventure, and fought on land and on sea for the new markets of the Indies; but we outstayed all our competitors, and the East India Company laid, in pursuit of the trade denied by the Turkish belt, the foundations of a British Eastern Empire far greater than any over which even the most magnificent of Ottoman Sultans ever reigned.

The opening of new ocean routes to India and the Far East not merely outflanked the Turkish obstruction to intercourse with the

East, but it brought the West for the first time into contact with another East, alien indeed also, but entirely different from the East which Greeks and Romans had known or which had confronted Europe either in the dark ages when Islam had first sprung out of Arabia or in later times when the flood of Turkish invasion was rolling up the Danube. In India the West found itself in presence of a Hindu civilization more ancient and far more rigid than its own. Later on it was to force its way into contact with other Eastern civilizations, the Chinese civilization and the Japanese—widely different again, but not less ancient and peculiar; but, with the rapid development of British dominion, it was India that became the centre of stability of our own Empire in the East, and even of Western influence throughout the Eastern world.

It would be interesting to try to trace the impression which India made on the minds of the first adventurous Englishmen who settled on her far-flung shores. But they had come there solely to trade, and they stuck to their last. The Moghul Empire still held the greater part of India under Mohamedan domination, but it was already on the downward grade, and differed in many respects from the type of Mohamedan domination which Europe had come to associate with Ottoman rule. Islam had first reached India direct from Arabia in the seventh century, but only in the remote north-west corner, now known as Sind, and it was from the great reservoir of hungry humanity which supplied the Turkish conquerors of Western Asia and South-Eastern Europe that successive floods of Mohamedan invasion began to pour forth out of Central Asia, through the northern gates of India, in the eleventh century, and ultimately submerged the whole of India except the extreme south.

At first the Mohamedan conquerors had been like the Turks, mere barbarous raiders, to whom India, split up into a multitude of rival states and principalities, fell a facile prey. But in the course of time they yielded in some measure to a more highly civilized environment, and just when Queen Elizabeth was granting to her London "Merchant-venturers" the charter out of which the East India Company grew up, the latest Mohamedan dynasty to set up its domination on the ruins of its many predecessors was represented by a ruler of real constructive genius such as the Turks never produced. The great Moghul Emperor Akbar realized that, though the sword could achieve the political unification of India, Imperial unity could never be permanently achieved except on a national basis, and unless, therefore, the rigidity of Islam relaxed sufficiently to admit of a religious and social fusion with the enduring forces of Hinduism which still moulded the beliefs and customs of the vast majority of his subjects. With that object in view, he evolved a new creed compounded of Hindu as well as Mohamedan elements, in which,

like our Henry VIII., he would have combined the headship of a national Church with that of an All-Indian state. It is a singular coincidence that, whilst the Ottoman Sultan had picked up in Cairo the empty shell of the old Arab Caliphate, something of the spirit of fearless inquiry and freedom of thought which had quickened Islam under the Abbaside Caliphs at Baghdad, long before the Turks came and levelled the great city and its Arab civilization to the ground, should have been revived, if only for a brief spell, in the splendid Hall of Disputations at Fathehpur-Sikri, where Akbar conversed on ethics and religion with Christians and with Jews, with Hindu pundits and Mohamedan divines. But no other Mohamedan ruler of non-Semitic descent ever had the boldness to question the finality of divine revelation as contained in the Koran, and he was far ahead of his time and of his people, whether Mohamedans or Hindus. His creed did not survive him, though something of his broad tolerance survived under the Emperors Jehanghir and Shahjehan.

Under Aurangzeb, Indian Mohamedanism bore once more, like Turkish Mohamedanism, the deadening imprint of Central Asia. It was wrapped up more and more as its political ascendancy declined in outward forms and observances, in arrogance, intolerance and ignorance, whilst the masses, then, as now, only a minority, converted to the Mohamedan conquerors' creed, still clung to many of the superstitions and even to the caste prejudices which they were supposed to have abjured with Hindu polytheism. The Moghul court and the great majority of Indian Mohamedans professed the orthodox doctrines of Sunnism, as both Turks and Arabs do, but an influential minority were then, as they are now, Shiachs who regard the Sunnis as heretics. The culture of which their greatest rulers have left splendid monuments behind them was chiefly derived from Persia, whose language and literature and art were held in high honour by the Mohamedan ruling classes. Not until the second half of the last century was there any intercourse between the Mohamedans of India and of Turkey, beyond such as occurred during the pilgrimage to the Holy Places, and in occasional missions of courtesy exchanged between Delhi and Stamboul. In its first onslaught Islam destroyed the last remnants of Buddhism, and it swept away one Hindu kingdom after another, even to the great Vijayanagar kingdom in the south, which only fell in the middle of the sixteenth century. But it never seriously shook the ancient social and religious fabric of Hinduism, and when Aurangzeb's gloomy fanaticism reverted to the older methods of oppression, the Mahratta Shivaji was already raising the standard of Hindu revolt against the decaying Moghul Empire, torn by internal dissensions and reduced to seeking aid from the new forces which for the first time in the

annals of India had reached her inviolate shores from Europe across the vast expanse of the ocean.

For more than a century trade had remained the only purpose and the sole interest of the Englishmen in India, who had gone there neither as conquerors nor as missionaries, but as traders. Even when they could no longer remain altogether indifferent to the reaction upon their trade of internal conditions which threatened to plunge the whole of India into chaos, the East India Company at home set its face sternly against any sort of interference in Indian quarrels which might compromise it with one or other of the warring factions, and above all against military intervention, which would swallow up the large profits of its one legitimate business—viz., trade. It was not till India became one of the chief theatres of conflict between Great Britain and France during their long struggle throughout the eighteenth century for the mastery of the seas, and the genius of Dupleix threatened the East India Company with destruction as the first step towards the creation of a French Empire in India, that the British people as well as the Company awoke to the fact that Great Britain would have to take up the inheritance of the moribund Moghul Empire or see it pass into the possession of her great European rival. The choice was quickly and effectively made. I need not dwell upon the expulsion of the French or the rapid expansion of British dominion in India, or on the steady transformation of the East India Company from a trading corporation into a great agency of Government subjected to the increasingly close control of the British Parliament and the British Crown. Within less than a hundred years from the battles of Plassey and Buxar, British dominion was firmly established over the whole continent from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin, either under direct British administration or in virtue of treaties by which a large number of native princes and rulers gave their allegiance to the British Paramount Power in return for the maintenance of their local autonomy and dynastic rights.

It was whilst British rule was moulding India into a new shape that Great Britain lost her dominant position in another continent through the successful revolt of the Colonies that became the United States of America. No longer the foremost power in America, she became a great Asiatic power, and the axis of her foreign policy had to be shifted from West to East. For as soon as we awoke to the value of India, our rivals in the world also awoke to the fact that there might perhaps be found the most vulnerable point in our armour. Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, his overtures to Tippu Sahib, the last Mohamedan potentate to defy British paramountcy in India, the schemes which he from time to time dangled before Russia for the invasion of India by combined

Russian and French armies, all came to naught. But the safety of India was henceforth a constant preoccupation of British statesmanship; and though British sea-power could be relied on to guard her shores against all attack, Russian expansion in the East pointed at least to the possibility of overland invasion across Persia and Afghanistan.

In the general scheme of international values, Turkey had in the meantime undergone a complete change. It was no longer her strength but her weakness that threatened to disturb the balance of European power. The decline of the Ottoman Empire had been as rapid as its rise. Not only had its European frontiers steadily receded after a succession of disastrous wars, but its subject races, whose sense of nationhood had never been entirely destroyed, were growing dangerously restive under the lash of the ruling race, more and more ruthlessly applied as corruption increased at Constantinople under effete and profligate Sultans and Sultanates, and anarchy spread throughout the provinces. The French Revolution and the convulsions through which Europe passed during the Napoleonic wars stimulated the spirit of revolt which Catherine the Great had been the first to encourage deliberately from outside. The Serbs rose in the first decade of the nineteenth century, and the Greeks, in the second, with greater success, since their War of Independence ended by the establishment of a sovereign state, small indeed and feeble, but the first one to be entirely detached from the Ottoman Empire. The Rumanians, whose fetters had always been looser, enlarged their autonomy. The dissolution of Turkey for the benefit of her subject races had begun.

British statesmanship, whose liberal traditions inclined it to favour these movements, was held in restraint by the growing dread of Russia, whose ambitions, embracing Asia as well as Europe, filled the British rulers of India with increasing alarm. England had the choice between two policies. The one was to wash her hands of Turkey, encourage the building up of independent states in South-Eastern Europe, and come to a definite understanding with Russia in regard to Asia. The other was to protect Turkey from dismemberment as a bulwark against Russian aggression on condition that the Turkish system of government should be completely reformed, and made tolerable for the Christian as well as Mohamedan subjects of the Sultan. Successive British Governments hesitated between the two policies. The Tsar Nicholas I. made important overtures to Lord Aberdeen for the liberation of European Turkey, on the understanding that neither power was to take permanent possession of Constantinople, and he offered Egypt and Cyprus to Great Britain in fulfilment of assurances already frequently given that Russia entertained no designs upon the British position in India.

But a masterful British Ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, profoundly distrustful of Russia, persuaded British Ministers that Turkey had really begun to tread the path of reform and progress. The Tsar's overtures were rejected, and we drifted into the Crimean War. The Ottoman Empire was given a new lease of life, and admitted by the Treaty of Paris of 1856 into the comity of European nations. But the internal situation in Turkey soon drifted from bad to worse, and whilst spasmodic risings continued to take place amongst the subject races, the much-talked-of reforms resolved themselves into an orgy of foreign loans which landed the Ottoman Government in bankruptcy. By the middle of the seventies, European Turkey seethed with revolt, and two Sultans were deposed in quick succession by Palace revolutions on the approved Turkish model. A conference of the Great Powers at Constantinople in 1877 was rendered abortive mainly by the mutual distrust of England and Russia, against which Lord Salisbury, who was the British representative, vainly struggled for a time. Russia, whose expansion in Asia the Crimean War had rather stimulated than checked, once more took the law into her own hands, and the Russian armies finally reached San Stefano, close under the walls of Constantinople. Once more Great Britain intervened and saved Turkey at the imminent risk of another war with Russia. The treaty imposed by Russia on Turkey at San Stefano was revised at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, whence Lord Beaconsfield claimed to have brought back "peace with honour" as well as a defensive alliance with Turkey safeguarding her Asiatic dominions and handing over Cyprus to Great Britain as a military base in the Eastern Mediterranean.

During all those first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, when Great Britain had almost continuously befriended Turkey and twice at great cost to herself saved her, what had been the attitude of the Mohamedans of India? In 1832, one of them, Jaffur Shereef, wrote his well-known work *Kanoon-i-Islam*, or "The Customs of the Mussulmans of India, comprising a Full and Exact Account of their Various Rites and Ceremonies," which from cover to cover makes no single reference to the Turks or to the Caliphate of Constantinople. This is fairly strong evidence that they still knew nothing and cared nothing about Turkey. How indifferent they were to her fate and to British policy towards her was shown still more clearly when, little more than a year after the end of the Crimean War, waged to save Turkey, Mohamedan fanaticism joined hands with the reactionary forces of Hinduism in the great Mutiny of 1857. Not a thought had the Indian Mohamedans, who then raised the old cry "Din Din" ("Our Faith, Our Faith"), for the Ottoman Sultan and Caliph in far Stamboul, but only for the restoration of Mohamedan

rule in India itself, of which the old King of Delhi, a descendant of the Moghul Emperors, still perpetuated the tradition.

Not till more than twenty years later, when we were again on the brink of war with Russia in support of the Ottoman Empire, did anything happen to bring Turkey within the immediate range of Indian experience, and it is one of the curious ironies of history that Lord Beaconsfield, who had just made Queen Victoria Empress of India, should himself have unwittingly prepared the soil which the Caliphate agitation has recently sown with a rank crop of disloyalty, when in 1878 he despatched an Indian force for the first time into European waters in anticipation of an Anglo-Russian conflict. That spectacular demonstration was perhaps primarily meant to magnify the position of India in the Empire, but it was also meant to magnify Turkey in the eyes of India, and to arouse Indian Mohamedans in particular to a sense of brotherhood with the Mohamedan people in whose defence England was prepared to go to war for the second time with Russia. We did not, after all, go to war with her, and the Indian troops were recalled from Malta to take part in a protracted war with Afghanistan, which was to teach that other Mohamedan country, by other and very different methods, that we and not Russia were its appointed friends. Long before it was over, the pendulum of British policy swung again violently with the downfall of Lord Beaconsfield's Administration in 1880 and Mr. Gladstone's return to power. The great Liberal Minister, whilst in opposition, had passionately denounced Turkish misrule, for which the only remedy, he declared, was to turn the "unspeakable" Turk, "bag and baggage" out of Europe. In office he had to content himself with far less drastic methods of keeping, or trying to keep, the Turk under restraint. But the Disraelian policy as well as Disraeli, was dead when Lord Salisbury succeeded Mr. Gladstone in 1885 and frankly admitted that in backing Turkey we had backed the wrong horse.

Europe, on the other hand, had now to reckon with a Sultan of undeniable capacity. Physically a coward and living in perpetual dread of conspiracies such as he had himself owed the throne to, Abdul Hamid II. was an astute and masterful ruler, who, having abolished the sham Constitution by which he had tried to throw dust in the eyes of Europe before the disastrous war with Russia, proceeded first of all to restore the autocracy of the Sultanate, which had been overshadowed under his feeble predecessors by a powerful bureaucracy. During his reign the Sublime Porte became a mere appendage of the Palace. But his heart was soon set on bigger things. When he was a child a pious *jakir* greeted him once, it is said, as *Ameer el Muminin* (Prince of the Faithful), who would one day not only reign as Sultan, but also resuscitate as Caliph the

ancient power and glory of Islam. The prophecy may well have sunk deep into his superstitious mind. The Caliphate had been with most of his predecessors little more than an empty title. Abdul Hamid resolved to make it a living reality. In the revival of the semi-spiritual authority vested in the Caliph and its extension as far as possible to the world of Islam beyond as well as within his own dominions, he saw vast possibilities of compensation for the woeful loss of temporal power which the Ottoman Sultanate had suffered. That was the fundamental idea of Pan-Islamism as Abdul Hamid conceived it, and he carried it out with immense perseverance and resourcefulness.

Circumstances favoured him. True, the Ottoman Caliphate had never secured recognition from all Mohamedans. The Sherifian Sultans of Morocco regarded themselves as Caliphs within their own dominions. The Shah of Persia was a Shiah for whom the Sunni Turks were abominable heretics. The Ameer of Afghanistan styled himself King of Islam. The only religious movements which had stirred the dormant waters of Islam earlier in the nineteenth century had both been Puritan movements, and the Wahabees in Arabia, as well as the Senussis in North-Eastern Africa, had loudly denounced the corruption and licentious despotism of Constantinople. It was in the Sultan's name that Mohamed Ali, the great Pasha of Egypt, had driven the Wahabees out of Mecca, but he himself had not hesitated shortly afterwards to turn his arms against the Sultan, and his victorious armies had been stayed only by foreign intervention within ten days' march of the Bosphorus. Much more recently, the first Nationalist Movement in Egypt under Arabi had been anti-Turkish before it became anti-European. The Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire had, to say the least, no love for the Turks, and even in the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina, of which the Guardianship constituted one of the Sultan's chief titles to the Caliphate, Turkish authority was precarious and detested. Nevertheless, the psychological moment was not ill-chosen for Abdul Hamid's great enterprise. The world of Islam had been slowly aroused from its long torpor, not only by the intellectual and economic impact of the West, but by increasing fear of complete political absorption. It saw the independence of one Mohamedan state after the other shrink or disappear entirely. France was strengthening her hold over a large part of North Africa. Great Britain had occupied Egypt. Russia was spreading all over Central Asia. Persia was being squeezed between the Russian and the British millstone. Turkey was the one Mohamedan power left to hold up its head, even though a diminished head, against the inrush of the West. Was it not a sign of predestined salvation that a Sultan should have arisen who was prepared to give comfort and shelter to the whole Mohamedan

world in its dire distress under the broad mantle of the Ottoman Caliphate?

How broad that mantle was Abdul Hamid was at pains to show by collecting Mohamedans from all parts of the world around him at Yildiz Kiosk (the Palace of the Star). His confidential advisers and secretaries and spies were mostly Arabs and Kurds and Albanians, Mohamedans all, whether holy men or rascally adventurers, whom he found more receptive to the new gospel of Pan-Islamism under the ægis of the Ottoman Caliphate than his own Turks with their dull and narrow pride of race. Even the Prætorian Guard that garrisoned Constantinople and kept watch over his sacred person was chiefly drawn from the non-Turkish Mohamedan races of his Empire. He once appointed a Tunisian to be Grand Vizier, and after that warning to the Stamboul Pashas they were quick to understand that if they wanted ministerial loaves and fishes they could only get them as the humble instruments of their master's will, which, after he had once made a terrible example of Midhat Pasha, held every provincial governor equally in its grip. Under such a régime there could be no question of internal reforms such as the Berlin Treaty had prescribed, and least of all for the benefit of the Christian subject races. As far as European Turkey was concerned, he could exploit not only the jealousies of the Great Powers, but the bitter feuds of the rival nationalities, Greek, Bulgar, and Serb, who cut each other's throats in Macedonia as cheerfully as any Turk's. But when the Armenians in Asiatic Turkey invoked the Berlin Treaty against intensive Turkish misrule, he proceeded to adopt a yet more drastic policy—the sinister policy of systematic massacre, which his successors were to carry to still more ruthless lengths, and are still carrying on at the present moment—and he knew he could adopt it without much risk of chastisement. Germany had stepped into our shoes at Constantinople after the days of Lord Beaconsfield as the special friend and protector of the Ottoman Empire, and under William II. Germany had no scruples. The ex-Kaiser had made up his mind at the beginning of his reign that Turkey was a necessary "bridgehead" towards German world-dominion, and having practically no Mohamedan subjects of his own in the Greater Germany which he was building up beyond the seas, he could afford to look upon Pan-Islamism with complete equanimity, and even with favour, as a potential menace to those of Germany's rivals who had large numbers of Mohamedan subjects, and most of all, therefore, to Great Britain. So he sent out German officers to reorganize the Turkish armies, and German engineers to build the Hejaz Railway, which was to make the Turkish overland line of communication with the Holy Places safe against British sea-power, and served also as a splendid advertisement for the Caliph, whose agents collected subscriptions for its con-

struction from Mohamedans in all parts of the world. Whenever, too, the unseemly question of Turkish reforms was raised, German diplomacy could always be relied upon to throw the so-called "European Concert" at Constantinople hopelessly out of tune. To so understanding a friend Abdul Hamid could refuse nothing, and in return for the Baghdad Railway Concession the Kaiser not only paid a second state visit to Constantinople in 1898 and clasped the "Red Sultan's" hand, still dripping with Armenian blood, but proceeded from Jerusalem, where he masqueraded for a few days as a Crusader, to Damascus, and at Saladin's tomb paid homage to his friend and ally, the Sultan Abdul Hamid, whom 300,000,000 Mohamedans revered as their sacred Caliph. This public recognition of the Ottoman Caliphate, the only recognition bestowed upon it by any European power before the Great War, was the high-water mark of Hamidian Pan-Islamism.

It was just then that its influence made itself, for the first time, felt on our Indian borderland. India, with its 60 million Mohamedans, had not escaped Abdul Hamid's attention as a suitable field for Pan-Islamic propaganda, and as far back as 1884 a newspaper called the *Pek-i-Islam*, edited by a Punjabee Mohamedan dismissed from the Indian public service, was issued from the Sultan's printing press at Yildiz for secret circulation in India. But Abdul Hamid's emissaries made no substantial headway until in 1897 the folly of the Greeks gave him an opportunity of punishing a Christian nation single-handed, for the first time in the last two centuries of Turkish history, and the victories of his armies in Thessaly reverberated along the whispering galleries of the East to the greater glory of the Ottoman Sultan and Caliph. Then it was that Abdul Hamid's name came to be invoked in the Friday service in an increasing number of Upper India mosques, and fanatical *mollahs*, extolling the renewed splendour of the Caliphate, helped to stir up the North-West Frontier tribes to the great rising which cost us the protracted Tirah campaign. Still, though Indian Mohamedans began to take a pride in Abdul Hamid as a great potentate in the Mohamedan world, their loyalty to the British *Raj* remained unmoved. They had hitherto held aloof from the political movements which were already agitating the Western educated classes of the Hindu population—for one reason, because they had been much slower than the Hindus to avail themselves of the opportunities of Western education which British rule had opened up to Indians of all races and creeds. One of the few Indian Mohamedans of light and leading to recognize its value for his co-religionists, if they were not to lag hopelessly behind the Hindus, Seyyid Ahmed Khan, had founded with great difficulty and in the teeth of bitter orthodox opposition a remarkable Mohamedan college at Aligarh, in which he sought to reconcile the

doctrines of Islam with Western knowledge, and to train up young Mohamedans to be true to their faith and at the same time useful citizens, loyal to the British *Raj*. He died in 1899, when Indian Nationalism was still in its infancy, and some Indians were beginning to respond, however faintly, to Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propaganda. One of the last things he did was to publish a reasoned refutation of the Ottoman Sultan's claim to the Caliphate, which, like many other Mohamedans, he denied on grounds of purely Islamic doctrine. His influence had been constantly exerted to dissuade his co-religionists from joining the Indian National Congress, in which he suspected a scheme to establish the political ascendancy of the Hindu majority over the Mohamedan minority, under the guise of representative institutions and self-government. His views prevailed for some years after his death, and even at the time of Lord Morley's Indian reforms in 1909 the All India Moslem League, founded as a counterblast to the Indian National Congress, pleaded hard and not unsuccessfully for special safeguards for the Mohamedan community against Hindu supremacy in the enlarged Councils as the well-earned reward of its unwavering loyalty to the *Raj*.

The Turkish revolution of 1908 had, however, by that time swept Abdul Hamid from the throne and driven Pan-Islamism temporarily into the background. Even in Turkey there had grown up a small school of intellectuals whom Abdul Hamid vainly persecuted and drove into exile, and the concessions in Macedonia which, in spite of German support, were ultimately wrung from him under pressure from Russia and Austria, and most of all from Great Britain, estranged from him the army, which he had always distrusted, and especially the purely Turkish elements in the army. From the beginning it was an essentially military revolution, though the Union of Committee and Progress which ruled in the name of Sultan Murad V., whom thirty years' detention as a State prisoner during Abdul Hamid's reign had reduced almost to imbecility, at first deluded Europe and the subject races of Turkey themselves into the belief that a new era of liberty and fraternity had dawned in the Ottoman Empire. Disillusionment quickly followed when the Nationalism of Union and Progress hardened into a policy of intensive "Ottomanization," which was only a euphemism for tightening the grip of the ruling Turk on all the non-Turkish races of the Empire, Mohamedan as well as Christian. For it did not spare the Albanian and Syrian Mohamedans, and against the Armenians it soon resorted to the old Hamidian methods of massacre, pure and simple.

Upon Indian Mohamedans the Turkish revolution had a twofold effect. The deposition of Abdul Hamid alarmed the more conservative elements. But a new school of advanced Mohamedans had grown up who, though many of them came from Seyyid Ahmed's

old college at Aligarh, had entirely forgotten his teaching, and were drifting towards the extreme wing of Hindu Nationalism, already in thinly disguised revolt against the British *Raj*. These Young Indian Mohamedans recognized kindred spirits in the Young Turks, and soon sought and found contact with them. Their opportunity came when the Italian conquest of Tripoli, the one province left to the Ottoman Empire in Africa, was followed by the Balkan wars, which ended in the partition of almost the whole of European Turkey. More rapid communications, more frequent intercourse, and above all the luxuriant growth of the vernacular press, had brought India much closer to everything that happened in Europe, and Turkey now occupied in the minds of many Mohamedans a place undreamt of even ten years before. The resounding blows dealt to her in such quick succession would not perhaps even then have produced such a deep impression had not Indian Mohamedan sentiment been just at the same period deeply wounded by an event much nearer home. Lord Curzon's partition of Bengal in 1905 had been welcomed by the Mohamedans because it created a new province of Eastern Bengal in which their political ascendancy seemed to be definitely assured. But the partition had been undone at the King-Emperor's Durbar of 1911, and the transfer of the capital to Delhi had not made up to the Mohamedans for the disestablishment of the recently created province.

It was easy for anti-British agitators to represent this as another blow dealt to Islam in India itself by the same British power that oppressed Mohamedan Egypt, was selling Mohamedan Persia to the Muscovite, and had instigated the Balkan conspiracy against the very life of Mohamedan Turkey.

The leaders of this group, amongst whom a young Mohamedan, Mohamed Ali, who had studied at Oxford and returned, like many other Indians, embittered by failure, soon came to play a very prominent part, started collecting funds from their co-religionists for the Turkish sick and wounded, and proceeded to Constantinople with ambulance parties which Government freely allowed them to raise. There they were, of course, warmly welcomed by the Young Turk, and returned to India well primed by the Envers and Talaats and their German allies. But in spite of a pro-Turkish propaganda of which the anti-British tendency was only thinly veiled during the first weeks of the Great War under lamentations over the folly of England in challenging the irresistible might of Germany, the enthusiasm with which the vast majority of Mohamedans, like the rest of their fellow-countrymen of all creeds and races and classes, responded to the call of the Empire in August, 1914, was not chilled even when Turkey threw herself into the war as the willing ally of Germany. During the four years' war Indian Mohamedan troops

fought shoulder to shoulder with the British, and not less resolutely against the Turks in Mesopotamia and in Palestine than against the Germans on the Western front where the Indian army filled, in the critical winter of 1914-1915, a gap which the Kitchener armies and the Colonial armies were not yet equipped and trained to fill. In India itself, where Germany had reckoned upon wholesale mutinies and risings, there were only a few local disturbances, promptly and firmly quelled, and in the most serious ones, in the Punjab, it was returned Sikhs from Canada and not Mohamedans who played the leading part. Mohamed Ali and his brother Shaukat were interned, as they refused to give any assurances that they would desist from aiding and abetting the King's enemies. Others who were less openly disaffected were left free to join hands with the Hindu extremists, and it was during the war that the All India Moslem League, which had now passed under their control, combined for the first time with the Hindu extremists of the Indian National Congress in a vehement agitation for full and immediate Home Rule. But most of them professed to be at one with Government in the vigorous prosecution of the war, and they never stopped for a moment the steady flow of Indian recruitment, least of all amongst the Mohamedan fighting races.

Not till after the war was over and Turkey had to pay the penalty of defeat in common with her European allies were there any signs of a revulsion of feeling—somewhat hesitating and shamefaced at first. Turkish war-guilt was too recent and flagrant. The Indian war prisoners from Kut had suffered like the British war prisoners at the hands of their Turkish captors. Enlightened Mohamedans felt that the appalling massacres of Armenians and the ruthless persecutions of other Christian races, and even of Mohamedan as well as Christian Arabs suspected of sympathy with the Arab revolt against Turkey, had blackened the face of Islam. They knew quite well that Turkey had been waging no Holy War, and had not been the sword of Islam, but of Germany.

The one incident in the war which had perturbed the Indian Mohamedans had been the revolt of the Sherif of Mecca against the Sultan. Some of them professed to regard it as a menace to the religious interests of Islam. Very astutely, therefore, the agitation in favour of Turkey was at once placed on a religious rather than a political basis. It was the Sultan's independence as Caliph that had to be saved, for the sake not so much of Turkey as of the whole world of Islam, and how, it was argued, could it be saved if he was not to recover his dominions, since any curtailment of the Sultan's temporal power would impair the spiritual authority vested in the office of Caliph? These champions of the Caliphate were not all men of undoubted Mohamedan orthodoxy or of unblemished character,

and many of them detested the British *Raj* even more than they loved Turkey. But they knew what they were about when they labelled the movement they were engineering the Caliphate movement.

The Allies' long delay in imposing definite peace terms, the renewal of Turkish resistance, the interposition of the Greeks, the stories of the excesses which some of their troops committed, played into the hands of the Mohamedan extremists, whilst the cosmic wave of post-war unrest was beginning to sweep over India too, until the Punjab outbreak, with its terrible tale of anti-European outrages and the tragic episode of Amritsar, provoked amongst Mohamedans and Hindus alike an unprecedented outburst of racial feeling. Religion, still a vital force in the East, is easily harnessed to racial hatred. It was to the religious traditions of primitive Hinduism that Gandhi, with his mystic fervour and saintly asceticism, appealed when he started his strange gospel of *Swaraj* which was to restore India to the simple life of the Vedic scriptures, and it was because he allowed himself to be convinced that in the Caliphate movement the Mohamedans of India were giving a splendid demonstration of their religious faith that he threw over it the Hindu mantle of Non-Co-operation against a Satanic Government and the whole Satanic civilization of the West. The Hindu-Moslem fraternization which he preached, and for a time with some measure of success, assumed no more singular shape than his own close personal association with Mohamed and Shaukat Ali, who, unaccountably released from prison, had become the recognized leaders of the Caliphate movement. I have seen Gandhi and Shaukat Ali together, and in the course of a long conversation with them nothing impressed me more forcibly than the contrast between the frail and gentle Hindu, clad in simple home-spun, consumed, his worshippers said, with spiritual fire, and the great hulking Mohamedan in his ample robes, embroidered with the Turkish crescent, who seemed to sweat "the flesh and the devil" at every pore.

One can understand up to a certain point the sympathy of India's Mohamedans for their Turkish co-religionists, about whom they knew very little except that they were their brothers in the faith, and their concern for the Ottoman Sultan, whom they had at last come to regard as the legitimate head of Islam. They were quite entitled to fasten on to the pledges given by the British Prime Minister in Parliament with regard to the Turkish homelands, and to press for their fulfilment without regard to any earlier pledges of freedom and protection given by the Allies during the war to the subject races of the Ottoman Empire. The Government of India itself would have been quite justified in seeking to impress upon the Imperial Government the danger of estranging Mohamedan religious sentiment, if the

movement had been guided and restrained by responsible and reputable Mohamedans. But it assumed a very different complexion under the leadership of such men as the Ali brothers. What manner of men they were, Sir William Vincent, the Home Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, has himself admitted, rather late in the day. "When I think," said Sir William Vincent only a few weeks ago, in the Delhi Legislative Assembly, "of the treasonable practices of those two men during the Great War; when I think of the secret support and encouragement given by them to the King's enemies, and when hundreds of thousands of British and Indian soldiers were daily risking and sacrificing their lives; when I think of the poor *Muhajirin* (Mohamedans whom the Ali brothers persuaded to emigrate in thousands out of an infidel-ruled India into a Mohamedan Afghanistan) whose bones lie about the Khyber and on the road to Kabul because they listened to these two men, who themselves never did a *Hijrat* (or holy pilgrimage) farther than Paris and London; when I think of the money extorted from the poor Mohamedans of this country and squandered in Europe and elsewhere, of which no recorded accounts have been published to this day; when I think, lastly, of the unfortunate Hindus dishonoured and killed in Malabar, and the Moplahs themselves, innocent in a way because misled, driven to death and ruin at the instigation of Mohamed Ali, Shaukat Ali, and those who think with them, I marvel at the gross ignorance and folly of the Moslem population that recognized such men as leaders."

But may not one marvel equally at the supineness, to say the least, of a Government which so long tolerated the Ali brothers as the recognized spokesmen of Mohamedan India? They were interned during the war for notorious disloyalty, arrested again for treasonable correspondence with the enemy during the short Afghan war, and released once more without any guarantee that they would mend their ways. Yet Mohamed Ali was not only received by the Viceroy, then Lord Chelmsford, as the head of an All India Caliphate deputation, but was allowed to proceed in the same capacity to England, and plead the cause of Turkey before British Ministers in Downing Street. He got, it is true, a crushing reply from Mr. Lloyd George, but he returned to India with undiminished prestige to resume with his brother a lawless propaganda which constantly led to rioting and bloodshed; and when threatened with prosecution in the United Provinces, these two firebrands secured a further lease of impunity by inducing the present Viceroy, Lord Reading, then new to India, to accept, at Gandhi's instance, futile and obviously fallacious assurances as to the honesty of their intentions, until the formidable outbreak of Mohamedan fanaticism amongst the Moplahs of the Malabar coast and their own attempts to tamper with the

loyalty of Mohamedan troops at last brought their criminal activities to a term. Even then—such are the mysteries of the penal code—they escaped with a much lighter sentence, two years' imprisonment, than did Gandhi some months later, who was at least an honest fanatic, and, however paradoxically, always professed to abhor violence.

From whatever point of view one looks at the Caliphate movement, it is hard to understand the countenance lent to it by the Government of India, or for that matter by Mr. Montagu, as Secretary of State, to his own ultimate undoing, or to hold them free from blame for having helped to aggravate by their handling of it from the very beginning the difficulties with which they were confronted in the initial stage of the great constitutional changes in India, as well as the complicated problems of international policy with which the long-deferred Turkish settlement has confronted the Imperial Government. Gandhi's imprisonment has scotched the Swaraj or Hindu wing of Non-Co-operation. The imprisonment of the Ali brothers has hardly affected the Caliphate or Mohamedan wing, which has seen a substantial part of its programme publicly endorsed by the Government of India. The proposals made at the Paris Conference for the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres have failed so far to arrest the Caliphate agitation. The Paris Conference, you know, proposed an armistice in Asia Minor as a preliminary to the withdrawal of Greece from the whole of Asia Minor and the retrocession to Turkey of a portion of Thrace sufficient to lend some strategical security to the Sultan's position in Constantinople, but it left untouched the actual *status quo* in the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. It is not, the Indian Caliphate organs declare, by any such proposals, which are merely a fresh insult to Islam, that the real independence of Turkey will be secured, but rather by the Turco-Soviet Treaties between the free peoples of Turkey and Russia who will stand and fall together; and Mohamedans will never be appeased until all trace of Western authority, civil and military, has disappeared from the Arab lands which were the cradle of Islam, to make room once more for the supreme overlordship of the Ottoman Caliph and Sultan. According to a telegram in yesterday's papers, the All India Caliphate Committee has once more declared in favour of "civil disobedience."

The Indian Mohamedans go, in fact, further in their demands for the restoration of the Sultan's authority in the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire than the Kemalists at Angora. The latter base their resistance mainly on Nationalist grounds, and Pan-Islamism is merely a second string to their bow, just as it was for the men who ruled Turkey during the war, when Pan-Turanianism came to the front with its wild dream of an immense Ottoman Empire

that was to embrace all Asiatic peoples and countries with which the Turks could claim, in the past or in the present, the slightest racial or historical connection, including India on the strength of a common Turanian ancestry with the Moghuls and other Mohamedan conquerors who had once ruled over India. The Turkish Nationalists welcome, of course, the support of their Mohamedan co-religionists wherever it is forthcoming. But even when they themselves revert, as the rulers of Constantinople reverted during the war on a grand scale, to the Hamidian policy of massacre in order to exterminate Christian minorities, they are careful to explain that these have got to be eliminated, not on religious grounds, but because their existence threatens the safety of the ruling Turkish race.

Can the alliance between Turkish Nationalism and the Indian Mohamedans who have sought to identify the cause of Islam with it endure? The Caliphate movement is no doubt largely controlled by the same revolutionary and destructive forces which the extremist wing of Indian Nationalism represents amongst the Hindus. But for the bulk of Indian Mohamedans, conservative and law-abiding, who have been carried away by it, it doubtless stands for a great religious cause. It may be regarded as a form of religious revivalism. It may also be inspired, as some Hindus are beginning to realize, by a distant hope of restoring Mohamedan domination some day in India, when it shall have joined hands across Asia with a Pan-Turanian Turkey. But it lacks the essential characteristics of a Nationalist movement. It does not derive in any way from the sense of common nationhood which the Nationalists in Egypt or in Arabia claim to have imbibed from the West, and which is already beginning to stir more faintly the Arabs of Tunis and Algeria and Morocco. Wherever the people are Mohamedans, religious antagonism stimulates their impatience of alien political domination; but the one peculiar link that seems to connect Turkish Nationalism with Indian Mohamedanism, besides the temporary conjunction of a spirit of revolt against the British *Raj* amongst Indian Mohamedan extremists and Kemalist bitterness against England as the only one of the Allies who cannot apparently be bought off with economic concessions, is a certain affinity of temperament due to the common Central Asian origin of the ruling race in Turkey and of the conquerors who brought Islam into India.

I have already trespassed too long on your indulgence, and I have hardly or not at all touched upon many other noteworthy movements in the Mohamedan world. No one has, I think, made of them a more careful and exhaustive study than that which a distinguished American writer, Mr. Lothrop Stoddard, has recently published under the title of "The New World of Islam." The conclusion at which he arrives is that, take them all in all, these movements are

destined to regenerate Islam and to endow it with a vitality with which the West will have very seriously to reckon when it once more puts forth its united strength as a "new world of Islam." With all due deference to so competent an authority, I venture to think that neither history nor the conflicting character of many of these movements supports such a conclusion. I do not underrate the potency of the underlying sense of religious brotherhood amongst Mohamedans of different races and sects and schools of thought, nor the old militant spirit, seldom more than dormant beneath a surface of passive fatalism. But the brotherhood of Islam has never been translated into united action since the followers of the Prophet founded kingdoms and empires altogether transcending the modest limits of the primitive tribal state from which they emerged. Even when Islam still bore the impress of its Arab origin, successive Caliphates rose and fell in strife and confusion. The Ottoman Empire was largely built up on their ruins, and surcharged Islam with the Central Asian stamp under which we have chiefly known it for the last six or seven hundred years. The outward observances of Islam have never effaced the difference between the Semitic mind, with its rich intellectual endowment and its potential capacity for progress, so brilliantly illustrated during the great period of Saracenic civilization, and the Turanian or Turkish mind, with its stolid obduracy to all the cultural influences which make up a vital civilization, and its inveterate tendency to relapse into Central Asian savagery.

One cannot view without some apprehension the muster of retrograde forces under cover of Turkish Nationalism at Angora and of the Caliphate movement in India, but it is essential to discriminate between them and the more progressive forces which over a much wider area, extending from Northern Africa to the Asiatic shores of the Pacific, are working, one must hope, towards a synthesis which shall bring East and West together in the interests of racial and religious peace, despite the profound differences that still divide them.

Sir MICHAEL O'DWYER: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—We have listened with rapt attention to the brilliant historical sketch of Sir Valentine Chirol, who with his great knowledge and great ability has described the rise of Turkey to the hegemony of Islam, and also the later development of Pan-Islamism and its connection with Islam in India. I think most of you generally agree with the fidelity of his historical retrospect. If I may say so, there is just one point in which I think he has not done justice to the work of Islam in India. Islam came in undoubtedly as the religion of the conquerors, attracted by the wealth of India. But the Moghul

Emperors—at least, at the time of Akbar and his successors—did a great deal in India to establish the foundations of a regular administration, the foundations which we ourselves built upon and maintained. Also, the progress of Islam in India did a wonderful work for the lower and depressed classes in India by helping to raise their status. The fact that Islam in theory looks upon all Mohamedans as equal before God had a powerful effect as a solvent to the exclusiveness and rigidity of the Hindu caste system in India; and in these two ways, socially and administratively, Islam under the Moghul Emperors did a great work in India—a work which we carried on. I will say a few words about the development of the Pan-Islamic movement. It is curious to observe how the growth of the Pan-Islamic movement was fostered in her own interest by Germany as a means of causing embarrassment in the future to the British Empire; and it is curious to see history repeating itself, because at the present time Pan-Islamism, in so far as it is associated with the Angora Turks, is, if not encouraged, at least not discouraged by some of our recent Allies for perhaps exactly similar reasons—i.e., as a means of bringing pressure to bear upon Great Britain and making her accept peace terms which would fall in more with the views of those Allies. As regards the Pan-Islamic movement in India, I agree with Sir Valentine Chirol's description of its origin by that astute diplomatist and politician, Abdul Hamid. He encouraged and developed it to prop up a shaking throne, and he found people ready to his hand in India to carry on this propaganda. But the movement in India—and I have seen it from the beginning—is really a fictitious one, which has spread, especially in recent years, because we did not adopt a firm or reasonable policy in dealing with it. We allowed free play to open rebels like the Ali brothers, and men like Dr. Kichlu, who returned from Germany to India in 1915, probably to act as a link between Germany and the Pan-Islamic movement—we allowed free play to these people to propagate their views and preach rebellion. In the circumstances it is surprising that among a credulous and ignorant people a movement which was represented as a religious movement, did not attain even greater success. To show how fictitious the movement was, I will quote the words of one of the leaders of the Pan-Islamic movement in India, Mr. Fazl Ul Hak, a member of the Bengal Legislative Council. Speaking at Dacca in December, 1920, of some of his brother-leaders, he said: "There are some of the leaders of this Caliphate movement who frankly confess to me that they do not care a brass farthing for the Caliphate, but that their whole object is to bring back the days of anarchist outrages and thereby pave the way for revolution in India." That momentous admission was made about eight months before the outbreak of the Moplah rebellion, and in a way it is prophetic. It

shows the object of these people is not to benefit Islam, still less to benefit Turkey; but to subvert British government in India. But the traditional loyalty of the average Mohamedan in India and his knowledge of the benefits of British rule enabled him to withstand the insidious propaganda which for years had been preached; and a wonderful example of Mohamedan staunchness and loyalty is the fact that during the war the Mohamedans, though only one-fifth of the population of India, supplied one-third of the combatant recruits who went to fight their battles against their Mohamedan foes. Another very significant fact is this. The Mohamedans of the Punjab contain some of the best fighting races; they form only one-sixth of the total Mohamedan population of India, about 11 millions; but they supplied 180,000 combatant recruits—that is, three-fourths of the total Mohamedan recruits raised in India. No people hold their religion more sacred, or are more careful in its observance. Hundreds to whom I spoke on their return from Mesopotamia and Palestine expressed their disgust for the Turks because of their laxness in religious matters. They rallied to our call, though we told them they would have to fight against the Turks in Palestine and Mesopotamia, and they were proof against the attempts made on their loyalty. Later on, the Gandhi movement developed; and Gandhi for his own purposes associated himself with the Caliphate propaganda, and thereby gave it a very powerful impulse; but these same Mohamedans remained true to their salt. I think it is very important in dealing with movements of this kind to remember the old line of poetry, "The shallows murmur, but the deeps are dumb." We hear a lot of the Ali brothers and other fanatical and seditious "leaders," and see the whole Mohamedan press stirred up on behalf of Turkey; but really, below the surface, we find the masses very largely untouched by this propaganda, and still retaining their old feeling of loyalty and respect to the Government which has respected and protected their religion. If we handle them in the proper way and save them from these covert and overt attempts to sap their loyalty and subvert British rule in India, there need be no doubt as to their attitude to us. One remark I would like to make about the alliance between Gandhi and the Caliphate leaders, because that alliance has enormously increased our difficulties. Gandhi has given his benediction to the Caliphate movement, and the Caliphate movement has supplied the element of physical force which supplements the "soul force" on which Gandhi professes to rely. Sir Valentine Chirol has the advantage of having seen Mr. Gandhi—an advantage which Mr. Gandhi offered to me, but which I declined. I told him in April, 1919, when he wished to enter the Punjab, that if he did not go back to Bombay he would be arrested. He went back to Bombay, and for

three years remained unmolested, doing all the mischief he could. Sir Valentine Chirol thinks he is an honest fanatic. Many people think so; but, after many inquiries from people in very close touch with him, both British and Indian, I believe him to be a most astute hypocrite. My last authority is an old friend, a very advanced Irish Nationalist. I met him in India two years ago; he had come to India for a particular object, and to carry out that object he had to get into close touch with Gandhi and the extremists. He came to see me, and I said: "Tell me your honest opinion of Gandhi." "Well," he said, "I came to India with the highest idea of Gandhi, looking on him as a man of the loftiest ideals seeking to secure the regeneration of his country. I have been in close contact with him for a fortnight; I have seen him with the mask on—and it is generally on—but I have seen him also with the mask off. Now, if you would like to have my final view, that man is the most consummate hypocrite that has ever deluded a credulous people or fooled a cowardly Government." (Applause.) Personally, I prefer to this canting hypocrisy the open hostility of the Ali brothers, which is a thing you can deal with. You can meet it by the law, or, if necessary, by resort to force; and I prefer that to the covert treachery of a man like Gandhi, who has peace on his lips, but who has been responsible for the loss of thousands of lives. I think the audience showed its entire accord with the remarks of Sir Valentine as to the manner in which this very dangerous movement had been allowed to develop and to cause bloodshed and so much injury and loss of life and property in India. Nothing could be a more complete exposure of the methods of the Ali brothers, of the Caliphate people, than the speech of Sir William Vincent from which Sir Valentine quoted. I have never heard a more eloquent description of their misdeeds; but, like Sir Valentine, I marvel that these misdeeds have been so long allowed to go on unchecked. Probably those who have been in India more recently than I can tell us there is another side to the case, and that there was some reason for allowing rebellion to be preached openly and leading thousands of people to ruin and death.

We ought to try and derive from the very instructive lecture we have heard this evening some lesson for the future. There is no doubt we have got on the wrong side of a large part of the Mohamedan world—not so much the masses, but the political and vocal Mohamedans. We have to put ourselves right. I think we have pursued a wrong policy in the past. We have made in times of crisis promises such as we ought never to have made, and have held out hopes which we are now quite unable to fulfil. Now a large portion of the Mohamedans are thoroughly suspicious of us, and even the further concessions given to Turkey at

the various recent conferences do not seem to allay their suspicions, because there is a section of those Mohamedans which does not want a settlement, but is intent on bringing about rebellion and revolution. But the point I want to bring out is the view of the average Indian and loyal Mohamedan. At the end of the war, when the Paris Conference began, I was asked to ascertain the voice of the reasonable Mohamedans. I had kept in close touch with them during the war, looked to them to maintain peace and order and furnish recruits, and had my best friends among them. When I was asked to report on their attitude as regards the peace terms to Turkey, I wrote: "The view of reasonable Mohamedans is this: the Central Powers have brought ruin on themselves and their peoples by an unjust war. Germany and Austria have been broken up, their dynasties are gone, their armies and navies are shattered. Bulgaria will be shorn for the benefit of Serbia, Greece, and Roumania. Turkey, who threw in her lot with our defeated enemies, must be prepared for a similar fate. Indian Mohamedans, while having a sentimental sympathy with the fallen Mohamedan Empire, yet feel that she has brought this on herself, but that the shadow at least of the Turkish Empire should be retained to save the face of Islam. Indian Mohamedans are prepared for a British Protectorate in Egypt and Mesopotamia, and for autonomy in Europe, Palestine, and Armenia. What they want to retain is Turkish sovereignty for Constantinople—at least nominally—as the seat of the Turkish Empire, and over the Turkish provinces and Asia Minor. They would even accept conditions and limitations being imposed on that sovereignty in the interests of good government. But to eject the Turks from Constantinople and the small surrounding areas in Europe would arouse resentment and might lead to fanatical and anti-Christian feeling."

I think that is a fairly accurate summary of the views expressed to me by the Punjabi Mohamedans three years ago; it is practically what now, after three years' delay, has been proposed in the recent conferences. Had these terms been proposed when the question was first raised three years ago, they would have been accepted by all Mohamedans; but now suspicions have been aroused, charges of bad faith have been brought forward, and we have to try and re-establish confidence. That can only be done by openly stating that those terms are what we consider best in the interests of the Allies and of Turkey after we have taken into consideration all the services of Indian Mohamedans during the war. In making these concessions, we should state that they represent concessions to the feelings of reasonable Mohamedans, especially those who helped us in the war, and who have the best right to be heard; but that we are not going to allow the Mohamedans of India or anyone else to dictate to us what the terms of settlement shall be. (Applause.)

Sir GRAHAM BOWER: My Lord,—I have the misfortune to differ from Sir Valentine Chirol in his opinions of both Islam and the Turks, but I readily associate myself with the feeling of gratitude which I am sure animates you all towards him for his eloquent, cultured, and able exposition of the case against Islam and the Turks. To me personally his address gives great gratification because I feel now that I know the case against the Turks, which has been stated with a culture, a knowledge, and an eloquence that cannot be surpassed. It is impossible for me in the few words that I can address to you to rival that eloquence or to compete with him by presenting an equally able, intelligible, and cultured exposition of the case for Islam and the Turks. But I may at once say that I differ from him both in the aims and in the history that he sets forth. First, then, as to aims. He regretted that the Sèvres Treaty was the one treaty which had not enforced the penalties of the war. Here we come to the root of the matter. I hold that the aim of a war is not to enforce penalties, but to secure peace; and I have behind me every authority on war from St. Augustine to the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Foch, who all declared the aim of war to be to secure peace, and if this is not the aim, war is not worth fighting. We were told during the war, "Never again"; we were fighting to secure peace. That was our aim during the war, and it should be our aim now. The test to be applied to every treaty made at Paris or elsewhere is, Does it or does it not secure peace? The next point I make is that the Turks have been indicted as conquerors in the past. True; but is there any other nation such an indictment could not be framed against? Have not the English done something in the way of conquest in their past history? Can you point to a single nation in Europe that has not at some time or other in its past history been a conqueror? What about England? What about France? What about Spain? What about Portugal? What about Germany? What about any country—Russia or any other? Have not all nations at one time or other been conquerors? If conquest is a crime, I am afraid England must stand in the dock. But there is another charge made against them; Islam and the Turks are accused of arrogance and intolerance. I deny that; I deny their arrogance and their intolerance. There is a book—I am at some little difficulty in addressing you, for although I am addressing the Central Asian Society, I am not sure that you know your Koran as you do your Bibles, and so you must pardon me if I make some reference to the Koran and quote chapter and verse. I will not assume that you know the Koran by heart. Now, the first point is the attitude of Islam towards Christianity, and on that point Mahomet himself is very clear. First as to the position as to Christ Himself; this is taken from the chapter entitled "The Table" from Sale's translation of the Koran: "And in the footsteps of the Prophet caused we Jesus the son of Mary to follow, confirming the law which

was before him: and we gave him the evangel with its guidance and light, confirmatory of the preceding law, a guidance and warning to those who fear God." Next we find in the chapter called "The Cow": "Verily those who believe, Moslems and they who follow the Jewish religion and the Christians and the Sabeites" (the Sabeit religion, I am told, was something like the Persian religion; they were something like the Parsees of to-day: they worshipped the stars and other heavenly bodies)—"whoever of these believe in God in the last day and doeth that which is right, shall have their reward with their Lord. Fear shall not come upon them, neither shall they be grieved." I do not know any other religion in the world which has such a tolerant attitude towards other and rival religions. And this is not merely an extract from a sacred book; you must remember that this book, the Koran, is not merely the sacred book of Moslems—it is the law, and Moslems observe the law—observe the law better and more faithfully than many Christians. Now, Mahomet may be said in his later years to have departed from this attitude towards Christianity. Well, at Medina, after the flight from Mecca to Medina, he found a Mohamedan thrashing a Jew; he stopped him, and he said: "Whoever ill-treats a Jew or a Christian will find me his accuser at the Day of Judgment"; and the sayings of Mahomet are almost as sacred as the word of the Koran. Now let us go a step farther. Mahomet died on the 8th of June, 632; Constantinople was taken on the 29th of May, 1453. Mohamed II., in taking Constantinople, recognized the Greek Patriarch as ruler of his own people in all matters relating to marriage, inheritance, and divorce. He practically set up an *imperium in imperio*; he gave the Greeks full freedom of religion, and he did the same with others, and the Turks have done the same to every ecclesiastical authority—to the Bulgarian Exarch, to the Armenian Catholicos—to everybody, in fact, at the head of a religion in Turkey. Philip Marshall, Professor of the University at Princeton, says the Patriarchs became even, in this sense, political authorities acting in place of the Ottoman authority, and to this extent may be considered as chiefs of their respective nations. The Turk granted an autonomy to each of the races of the people. Now, it is said that these nations have been oppressed. Who have been the prosperous people in Turkey? Who have made fortunes in Turkey? The Greeks, the Armenians, the Jews, the Christians; the Turk has not made much of a fortune. It is true that he fails alike as a merchant, as a financier, and as a politician; and anybody acquainted with Eastern finance would not be disposed to blame the Turk very much if he fails to compete in Eastern finance or Eastern politics with the various practitioners of those pursuits. He is a soldier and an agriculturist. As a soldier he is a clean fighter; as an agriculturist he is an industrious and honest man. But it has been said that there is this feeling; what does it come to? He was

a conqueror long ago; he is no longer a conqueror. The Turkish question may be summed up in two lines:

"Cet animal est très méchant
Quand on l'attaque il se défend."

For years past the Turk has been on his defence—on his defence against Russia, against Austria, against Germany, against all the Powers trying to stir up trouble in the Balkans, in European Turkey and Asia Minor; and they are at it now. We know something of the difficulties made by foreign agitation in a neighbouring country. I fancy Sir Michael O'Dwyer is a full-blooded Irishman—I cannot claim that honour, I am only half Irish, but I was born in Ireland, and in my native country I know something of what foreign agitators can do. I know something of what American money can do in Ireland; and if you have not one but five nations stirring up agitation in your country, how are you going to carry on the Government? Then, by way of settling it, we have let loose the Greeks! Now, I may say this—I have been two years in Greece, and I say that if there is one race that is detested above all others by the Turks it is the Greeks. The Greeks are hated by the Bulgarians; they are hated even by the Serbians who are their allies now. It is as if you set an Orangeman to govern the South of Ireland; Sir Michael O'Dwyer can tell us what the result would be! If you gave the Orangemen leave to conquer Ireland, what would happen? What has happened in Turkey? I have got here—I will not trouble to read it, but I have got here the report of the Carnegie Commission on the Balkan wars. An impartial inquiry was held by an International Commission as to the conduct of the various races in the Balkan wars. There are extracts from the report of that inquiry which I dare not read to a mixed audience—I dare not. But the horrors were such that they left bitter memories behind them, and when the Greeks landed at Smyrna the Turks knew what to expect. What did they get? The report of the Inter-Allied Commission at Smyrna has been suppressed; the report of Commission after Commission has been suppressed. News has come to England which has not been published, but we get sometimes a little news from other sources. This is the report of the Red Cross Commissioner in the Peninsula of Ismid; it is not a Moslem document. The Red Cross is not a Mohamedan society, it is a Christian society; and what does this Christian Red Cross commissioner say? He writes, in French: "La mission est arrivée à la conclusion que des éléments de l'armée grecque d'occupation pour suivaient depuis deux mois l'extermination de la presqu'île. Les constatations faites—incendies de villages massacres, terreur des habitants coïncidences de lieux et de dates—ne laissent place à aucun doute à cet égard. Les atrocités que nous avons vu ou dont nous avons vu les traces étaient le fait de bandes irrégulières

de civils armés (tcheti) et d'unités encadrées de l'armée régulière. Nous n'avons pas eu connaissance de cas où ces méfaits aient été empêchés ou punis par le commandement militaire. Les bandes au lieu d'être désarmées et dissipées étaient secondées dans leur action et collaborent la main dans la main avec les unités régulières encadrées."

We have it on the authority of Mr. Toynbee that a large number of villages have been destroyed in Asia Minor. In Thrace 80,000 people have gone, and are refugees in Constantinople. Is it any wonder that the unfortunate Moslems are defending themselves with desperation against their enemies? Surely this is not the road to peace, to justice, to humanity; and if our war was not waged to secure peace, justice, and humanity, then the men who have died all over the world have died in vain. (Applause.)

Sir WOLSELEY HAIG: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I will not trouble you very long. We have been favoured with a quotation from the Koran which is beside the point. I never understood the lecturer to say that Islam was intolerant: he said the Turk was intolerant. We know the history of the Arabs in Spain. They were tolerant, but the Turks are not. We have been told the Greeks are evil people. I did not understand Sir Valentine Chirol to say they were better than the Turks, but the Greeks did not massacre the Armenians, and the Turks did.

Major MELAS: My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen,—It is indeed a great audacity on my part to attempt to talk to you, knowing English as little as I do. Being unknown to you, I must present myself as the ex-secretary of King Constantine, which post I resigned when His Majesty refused to fulfil his obligations towards our Allies the Serbs. I then went to the front, in Macedonia, to fight on your side.

As a Greek soldier I feel I must protest highly against what has just been said about the Greeks by Sir Graham Bower. I am sorry I did not know what would be said here, and therefore I am not prepared to answer, and there would be much to be said.

Concerning what Sir Graham said on the alleged and long in advance planned massacre by the Greeks at the landing of the Greek army at Smyrna, which allegation is absolutely false, I could have produced a letter written in 1919 by M. Vénisélou to M. Clémenceau about that event. It has since been proved quite clearly that, on the contrary, it was a regular ambush of the Young Turks, encouraged by the intrigues of a certain Great Power who did not wish to see the Greeks occupy Smyrna. The Allies have proofs of it in their hands.

Received with rifle-shots fired from the barracks, the Governor's palace, and the adjoining Turkish houses, the Greek troops had to reply in the midst of a numerous crowd of people: 163 casualties were reported, 63 of which were fatal cases. Of the total number 78 were Turks, 62 Greeks, and the rest belonging to different nationalities.

All survivors were indemnified at once, and some Greek culprits severely punished, three of them even by death.

I ask you, can such incidents be compared with the known organized Turkish atrocities in cold blood, with massacres and deportations *en masse*, whose victims amount to hundreds of thousands during only these last five or six months? Can there be any comparison?

I have nothing here with which to answer the other allegations of Sir Graham Bower; I shall only say that he quoted from the Koran only one quotation which suited his views, whilst it is known that the Koran preaches the doctrine of war as a duty against all other religions.

About the Red Cross's report I do not know much; but as for the Carnegie one, I do know by whom and for what purpose it has been written.

I wonder how people can still be so mistaken, and how anyone can yet speak, at the very moment when such unheard-of crimes are committed by the Kemalists, in defence of those very Turks.

I only wished, my Lord, as a Greek soldier, to protest emphatically, and I shall always do so, against any comparison between Greeks and Turks.

The CHAIRMAN: I think at this late hour I will do no more than ask Sir Valentine Chirol to reply.

The LECTURER: I will say two words only. First of all, I entirely agree with my friend Sir Michael O'Dwyer as to the great part that the Moghul Emperors played in developing the administration of the country. I could touch only on one aspect of Akbar's constructive statesmanship, but I am quite aware that we owe a great deal to him in our system of revenue administration.

With regard to Sir Graham Bower's remarks, they were mostly, I fear, beside the point. I have never attacked Islam; what I deeply deplore is that the cause of Islam should be associated with the cause of Turkey. I think no greater mistake has been made by my Indian Mohamedan friends than to identify themselves, as they have done, with the Turks, who have acted as a blight upon Islam, and as a blight upon every country that has come under their rule.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure we are greatly indebted to the gentlemen who have taken part in the discussion. In a complex question like this there must be very divergent views, and we have had the various points of view very ably expressed. I do not know how we can sufficiently thank Sir Valentine Chirol for the most admirable, lucid, and eloquent address that he has given us. I think we have all been under the spell of his eloquence, and have highly appreciated the most informing review that he has given us of the whole of the problems in the Mohamedan world. (Applause.) Our most hearty thanks are due to him for his having been good enough to come here this afternoon.

THE ANNUAL DINNER

THE Right Hon. the Earl of Ronaldshay was the guest of honour at the annual dinner of the Society held at the Imperial Restaurant on July 6, 1922. The Right Hon. Viscount Peel, Secretary of State for India, presided.

Viscount PEEL, in proposing the toast of the guest of the evening, said he desired first to express both on his own behalf and on theirs great satisfaction that the President of the Society, Lord Curzon, was almost restored to health and would soon return to his duties at the Foreign Office. (Cheers.) He spoke as having been a humble member of the Central Asian Society for some years, and the name had always struck him as apt and showing admirable forethought. For the Society existed to attract attention to and study the great subjects of discussion the central parts of Asia provided. In the past few years those regions had provided abundant material for this purpose, and the Society had served the fare admirably. He was not quite certain what, in the view of the Society, Central Asia meant. He saw around him many distinguished Anglo-Indian soldiers and officials, and he did not think that when they embarked upon their duties and signed their covenants that they were under the impression that they were taking a plunge into Central Asia. But in the past few years the Society had discussed problems relating to India, China, Japan, Arabia, and Palestine, and at least on one occasion had gone outside the Continent of Asia altogether. Their guest had told him that though his original intention was to speak of some of the Himalayan gateways into Central Asia, he had been asked to go down into the plains of India. This being so he would say little himself in regard to India. But he would like to say that in regard to the problems of India he had been reading two notable volumes in the last few weeks. The first was the first volume of a history of Indian civilization by Mr. Chandra Das Gupta, a most competent man, whose second volume would compare the results of that philosophy with those that had been arrived at by thinkers in the West. The second work he had been reading was the vast history of India planned on a truly Cambridge scale in six gigantic volumes, the first of which he had been perusing. He had been told that it was difficult to collect the materials for this period because the Brahmins of old days were chiefly absorbed in things of the spirit, and were

detached from such external matters as wars, politics, or business. History had become a more and more extensive subject, and he thought a rather dangerous subject. He was not quite sure it ought to be taught in the schools at all—(laughter)—because people with political designs always were able to call ancient history in aid of their particular policy and ideas. He knew many cases in which the most destructive claims were founded on particular readings of historical discoveries and research, but he had never known any single national claim or policy which had been renounced because history in the past had pronounced most definitely against it. Their Chairman of Council, Lord Carnock, was a very distinguished representative of the old diplomacy. (Cheers.) He had confided to him just now that he was not an intense admirer of the new diplomacy. (Laughter.) In his day we used a great deal the phrase "spheres of influence," which Lord Carnock told him was a most useful diplomatic phrase for anybody or nation, and one that would cover almost any claim. For this reputable phrase we had substituted to-day the term "mandate," which nobody understood, though we had the great assistance of the League of Nations for the purposes of definition. In regard to another current phrase, it would be an interesting speculation to show the relation of "national homes" to the nations in which those homes were planted. (Laughter.) The subject would lend itself to much speculation and very learned analysis.

With their guest of this evening, just retired from a successful five years' Governorship of Bengal—(cheers)—he had three points of contact, and almost a fourth. He lived in London almost opposite to him; they were together for many years in the House of Commons; and in Scotland they each had for years an adjoining forest. Before going out to Bengal Lord Ronaldshay had travelled widely, observed carefully, and written voluminously. In the India Office Library there was a whole shelf which groaned under these gigantic works of their guest. He could assure him that they were perpetually consulted in the India Office, and that they formed the daily and ordinary reading of members of the India Council. (Laughter.) It would be interesting to hear what he had to say about India, but he was not sure it would not be even more interesting to hear what Lord Ronaldshay had to say of the changes he found at home after five years' absence. He found them much poorer than when he left England, with very heavy taxation and with their ranks thinned by the war; but he would also have found that we supported our difficulties by sustaining cheerfulness, and he found us in many ways little altered. The old thirst for honours seemed to be almost as strong as when he left five years ago. (Laughter and cheers.) He found us still talking with the same energy and enthusiasm as we

did twenty years ago about the reform of the House of Lords, and he found also the newspapers describing the House of Commons, in pre-war language, as a servile body. His Governorship had been passed in a time of extraordinary and exceptional interest in the history of India. It was one of his duties to introduce and establish the constitutional reforms in Bengal, those reforms of which many there to-night, including, he thought, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, had such a very high opinion. (Laughter.) He was the one man who could tell them exactly what diarchy meant, how it worked, and how convenient it was to have in your Cabinet some men responsible to yourself and others responsible to the elected Legislature. He had brought back with him a great reputation as a Governor, and he hoped many other activities in public life still stood before him. Recently he (Lord Peel) received a letter from a friend in India regarding a Governorship, and wrote: "Send us a Ronaldshay and then all will be well." For an individual in his own lifetime to be converted into a species was one of the most remarkable tributes that could be given to any man. (Cheers.)

LORD RONALDSHAY, who was enthusiastically greeted, said that it was quite true that when he received their kind invitation he had some doubts as to whether India came within the scope of the activities of the Society, and it seemed to him that it would be appropriate if he spoke of the Chumbi Valley and Sikkim and Bhutan, little known States which might claim to be gateways into Central Asia, and which ran along the Northern frontiers of Bengal. But when he mentioned his intention to a member of the Society it was received with such obvious disapproval that he asked what was expected of him. The answer was that he would be expected to talk about India.

They had heard a great deal in recent times of unrest in India, and he would be the last to deny that the relations between Government and the governed had not infrequently been the cause of considerable anxiety. During his five years in Bengal he was faced with two distinct movements, the object of which was the destruction of British rule in India. The first was the anarchical movement which worked secretly underground and which was consequently extremely difficult to deal with. The second was the more openly seditious attempt to overthrow the existing Government in India, which was known by its author as the Satyagraha movement, but which became more generally known to the public under the term of non-violent non-co-operation. This title unhappily it too often belied, for the non-violence was frequently conspicuous by its absence, and its activities were prone to break out in open violence. The first of these two movements had been in progress for some years when he went to Bengal. It had resulted in the assassination of a large number of

officials, mainly police officers, and also of non-officials, such as loyal headmasters of Indian schools and persons who had gone into the witness box and given evidence in anarchical cases. Attempts had been made upon the lives of the highest officials in the land, from that of a Lieutenant-Governor to those of a district magistrate and a district judge.

He claimed to be a man of peace, but no one responsible for the maintenance of law and order could very well sit with folded hands when faced with occurrences of that kind. It became obvious to him as soon as he reached Bengal that the paramount duty which awaited him was to stamp out, if possible, the anarchical movement. Their great difficulty was that they could not bring cases against these persons into court, for the simple reason that they exercised so great a power of terrorization that members of the general public were unwilling to come forward as witnesses and give evidence against them. Fortunately the war had produced in India something equivalent to the measure which in this country was euphemistically known as "Dora." The Defence of India Act, as it was called, enabled them under certain safeguards to proceed against and lock up persons with anarchical designs without first going through the form of procedure of a trial in the ordinary courts. During the earlier years of his time in Bengal it was his unfortunate duty to have so to intern rather more than 1,000 persons, mostly young men of the student class.

Of course the Bengal Government were violently and vehemently attacked both from the platform and in the press. They were told that they were a tyrannous Government cutting off in their youthful prime the lives of the flower of Bengal. No one was more conscious than he was himself that the action they were compelled to take was of a very drastic and unusual character which must inevitably excite criticism. But he and his advisers knew that they were proceeding upon evidence which was unassailable, and they expressed their willingness to submit every case of the young men interned under the provisions of the Act to an impartial tribunal. Such a tribunal was set up and consisted of Sir Narayan Chandavarkar, late Judge of the Bombay High Court, and Mr. Justice Beechcroft, of the Calcutta High Court. These learned and distinguished judges spent two and a half months investigating every case of internment, and this was what they reported: "The total number of cases examined by us is 806. In six of the total number . . . we have advised Government that there are not sufficient grounds in our opinion for believing that the parties have acted in a manner prejudicial to the public safety. In the rest we have advised that the parties have, in our opinion, so acted." The police of India were accustomed daily to abuse and vituperation of every kind from the Indian Press, but

he ventured to say that no police in the world under similar circumstances would have passed through such an ordeal with greater credit than the Bengal police did. (Cheers.) Some two years after the adoption of these measures anarchical crime in Bengal ceased.

Later, however, came the cult of so-called non-violent non-co-operation. Mr. Gandhi's object was precisely the same as that of the Bengal anarchist—namely, the destruction of British rule; but the movement was much more widespread, because Mr. Gandhi was shrewd enough to fasten on the many discontents which inevitably arose out of the aftermath of the great war. For instance, there was the Mohamedan grievance over the terms of peace with Turkey. More formidable still, there was the economic stress which the people in India, in common with every other people in the world, found themselves subjected to also as a result of the war. Mr. Gandhi and his followers were extremely shrewd in the efforts they made, with no little success, to capture the imagination and the sympathies of the uneducated masses. Therein indeed lay the great danger of the Gandhi movement. Many other political movements had risen and fallen in India in the past, but it was not often that a great political leader in India had succeeded to the extent Mr. Gandhi had in capturing the ignorant masses. The first of the cards played by his supporters for this purpose was the superstition of the average Indian peasant. Stories were circulated of the miraculous powers of Mr. Gandhi, until vast numbers of people actually believed that he was an incarnation of God. By way of example he would relate a story typical of the tales which were not only widely circulated but as widely believed. A villager in Bihar was invited by one of Mr. Gandhi's lieutenants to make a contribution to the non-co-operation war chest. He not only refused to part with his money, but he was unwise enough to say some sarcastic things about Mr. Gandhi and his programme. Later on, hearing of the supernatural powers which Mr. Gandhi was supposed to exercise, he became apprehensive, and in order to put himself right with the powers of the unseen world he invited a large number of Brahmans to a feast—a very ordinary way of purchasing immunity against divine wrath in India. The Brahmans came in large numbers, and the dishes were brought in. When the covers were removed, instead of the succulent delicacies which had been provided, the food was found to have been turned into blood. That story was told to a very large gathering of people in one of the open spaces in Calcutta, by a man who claimed that he was himself an inhabitant of the village in which this miracle occurred. That was one of many examples he could give of the stories that were told with the design of capturing the imagination of the masses.

Another card played was the economic card. Mr. Gandhi's followers preached through the length and breadth of the land the

imminence of a golden age when Mr. Gandhi would be king, when the British would be driven into the sea, and when neither rent nor taxes would any longer have to be paid. It was small wonder that he received reports from his officers in every part of the Presidency stating that this item in the non-co-operation programme was proving to be a singularly attractive one, and that there was a widespread tendency on the part of the cultivators to anticipate the date of the arrival of so glorious a golden age. His hearers might find it hard to believe that people could be so easily deluded, yet the fact remained that one of the most difficult problems with which he had to deal last winter was in persuading the peasant villager that he had still to pay his rent and his taxes; for it was firmly rooted in his mind that if only he could hold on a few days longer without paying them he would be tided over to this glorious era when rents and taxes would be no more. Another serious development of the past twelve or eighteen months was the formation of national volunteer corps to carry out the work of the non-co-operation party.

The non-co-operators did a great many foolish things. For instance, they were responsible for the Moplah rebellion, which, if it did nothing else, at least gave the Hindus furiously to think. But they reached the height of their folly when they decided to boycott the visit of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales. He used the term "folly" advisedly, because, although it was true that by so doing they added enormously to the anxieties and work of Government at a time when these were sufficiently great, he could not imagine anything that was better calculated to consolidate opinion in this country against them than the decision to boycott the Royal visit. (Cheers.) They began with sanguinary outbreaks in Bombay city on the day of the arrival of His Royal Highness, and there were threats of similar riots in other parts of India to mark the Royal progress. The volunteer corps were enlisted by Mr. Gandhi and his friends in order to ensure the carrying out of this cheerful programme. Hence it was that he and his colleagues in Bengal were confronted with a situation in which there was no option but to act, to strike and strike quickly, and at the same time as hard as they could at the volunteer corps. Accordingly the Bengal Government proclaimed these corps to be unlawful associations. Many of the corps defied the proclamation, and Government had no option but to proceed against them. During the few weeks which elapsed between the arrival of the Prince in Bombay and his anticipated visit to Calcutta, it was his (Lord Ronaldshay's) most unhappy lot to have to cast into prison in Calcutta alone some 3,000 or 4,000 members of these volunteer corps. He did not deny that that put him into some difficulty. In the first place his jails very soon overflowed, and he was confronted with the problem as to where the overflow was to be housed. He was fortunate in securing

large warehouse accommodation in the growing docks of Calcutta, and in housing about 1,000 persons there. Still the arrested persons came, and he found himself compelled to embark on the construction of a prison camp capable of holding at least 5,000 people. When the Government once decided to take drastic action of that kind they knew that they had to see the matter through. (Cheers.) The mistake the non-co-operators made was in supposing that Government had not foreseen the difficulties which would probably arise out of the policy which had to be adopted. It had to be shown to the non-co-operators that they had made a mistake, and he was thankful to say that by the time he left India the non-co-operation movement had undergone a very remarkable slump. (Cheers.) So far as the Royal visit to Calcutta was concerned, he had no hesitation in saying that the real feeling of the people of Bengal found adequate expression. There was some little hesitation on the part of the rather timid Bengali to come into the streets on the first day of the visit, but they found that nothing terrible happened to them when they did come out. So the crowds grew, and they came in their thousands and hundreds of thousands. He was told by those who had seen the great pageant on the maidan in Calcutta which had been organized for the previous Royal visit at the time of the Durbar, that there was not one whit less of a crowd on the maidan to welcome the Prince of Wales than that which assembled to greet his father ten years earlier. (Cheers.) He did not wish to indulge in odious comparisons, but he might at least claim for the credit of Calcutta that in Calcutta alone of the three Presidency cities the entertainments organized for the reception of His Royal Highness were not added to by the unrehearsed *tamashas* which greeted him both in Bombay and Madras.

We should be guilty of poor statesmanship, however, if we were satisfied merely with quelling disturbances as they arose, and took no trouble to try to understand the underlying causes of such disturbances. Indian unrest was a very complex thing, which derived its power from many sources. One was the Mohamedan discontent, and it was very notable that while the Mohamedans were entirely absent from the earlier anarchical movement in Bengal, they became one of the most formidable elements in the troubles of the last two years. To the economic stress of those years he had alluded already. There was another cause which required close attention. It seemed to him that a fundamental cause behind the anarchical and the non-co-operation movements was the revulsion amongst educated Indians against the civilization of the West. It was difficult to explain adequately in a few words what was the cause of this curious revulsion, but it undoubtedly existed. He thought the real cause of it was that the Indian outlook upon life was different from that of the Western world. The Indian was a contemplative, thoughtful,

idealistic person—they might say a spiritual person; and he was desperately afraid that his own distinctive outlook upon the universe was going to be crushed out of existence by the successful, the aggressive, and, as the Indian would describe it, the materialistic civilization which came from the West. That undoubtedly was a root cause of the present Indian discontent. He would try to illustrate the difference between East and West by an illustration taken not from the field of politics, but from the neutral field of art. The Indian artist was essentially an idealist, and when he gave expression in his art to the idea of divine omniscience painted or made a figure with a thousand eyes; if he wished to give expression to divine power, he created a figure with four or more arms. The Western critic who missed the inner meaning of these things was apt to describe such productions as monstrosities. For instance, John Ruskin wrote that Indian art "wilfully and resolutely opposed itself to all the facts and forms of Nature, and that if it attempted to represent any living creature it did so under some distorted and monstrous form." Ruskin did not grasp the fact that what were to him "the facts and forms of Nature" were to the Indian mere appearances and therefore illusory, and that the Indian was not attempting to make a photographic reproduction of what he actually saw in Nature: he was striving all the time to grasp and give expression to the reality which he believed to lie behind the appearance. This illustration from the field of art gave some idea of the difference of outlook between the Indian and the European. It was the perpetual clash of these different outlooks upon life, exacerbated by lack of understanding on the one side or the other, which was going on in every field of human activity in India that was producing so much heat at the present time. Therefore it was a matter of great importance that the Indian and the European should try more than had been the case in the past to understand one another's point of view. So long as we were charged with the duty of governing India we must unflinchingly compel respect for law and order, but in so doing we could at least endeavour to make it clear that our whole object was the preservation of peace, and that we did not desire to impose upon the Indian people an outlook upon life which they themselves rejected, that we did not desire to convert the vast Indian population, with a great and far-stretching civilization of their own behind them, into nothing but imitation Europeans, (Cheers.) If we could succeed in convincing them that this was not our object we should go very far to remove the bitterness of feeling which undoubtedly had existed of late between the two races in the country. He was compelled by circumstances to take drastic action on frequent occasions against Indian extremists—action which might naturally appear to them to mark him down as one who was not sympathetic toward their legitimate

aspirations. But side by side with action of that kind, he never lost an opportunity to make it clear to them that that was not the case, and that he had a most profound sympathy with the Indian point of view and with the aspirations which her people very properly and very naturally cherished. He felt that he had not been without his reward, for some of those Indians who had regarded his appointment to the province with dislike and misgiving had now heartily associated themselves in movements to commemorate in some permanent form his tenure of office. (Cheers.)

He was most grateful to Lord Peel for his kind expressions, and was delighted to see him in the Chair at the Central Asian Society dinner, having himself been one of the original members of the Society, and having been its Chairman for several years. He hoped the Central Asian Society might long continue to enlist into its ranks eminent statesmen such as the Secretary of State for India, even if India did not strictly come within the geographical limits described by the term of Central Asia. He was glad to have been instrumental in assisting to some extent the recent remarkable expansion which had taken place in the ranks of the Society, for he was successful in securing as members a not inconsiderable number of highly educated Bengali gentlemen. He had no doubt that the Society would always be glad to welcome to its ranks men of all races and varied creeds, provided they showed a genuine interest in the problems which it was the duty of the Society to help to solve. (Loud cheers.)

Lord CARNOCK, in proposing "The Health of the Chairman," said that he was confident the Society was well advised not to restrict its vision to the region which could be strictly defined as within the limits of Central Asia. Were they to do so they would be but a small and dull Society, and would miss the opportunity of hearing such interesting addresses on India and cognate subjects as those with which they had been favoured that evening.

The CHAIRMAN, in returning thanks, said that it was in no spirit of criticism, but rather one of respect and admiration, that he had alluded to the extent to which the Central Asian Society had developed its range and outlook. In fact it was with a feeling of great satisfaction that he saw that they had burst the narrow bonds that seemed at first to confine them and had flown over the whole of Asia. (Cheers.) Lord Peel humorously added that according to the newspapers that evening he was not likely to have any further opportunity of visiting them as Secretary of State for India, for they reported very grave dissensions in the Cabinet, and that its end was near, whether or not members of the Government kept gloves on or took them off. (Laughter and cheers.)

THE EARLY DAYS OF THE ARAB GOVERNMENT IN IRAQ

FROM A CORRESPONDENT IN BAGHDAD

To understand fully the more recent developments in Iraq it is necessary to go back to the disturbances of 1920 and to trace briefly the changes which have taken place since that time. The events which led up to those disturbances and the history of the months from June to November, 1920, have been dealt with often enough, both in official documents and in non-official writings, to enable them to be passed over here, and the threads may conveniently be gathered up at the time when Sir Percy Cox arrived in the country as High Commissioner.

His first act was to take steps to lay the foundation of an Arab Government, and to that end he appointed a council to act as a provisional government until such time as the pacification of the country should be completed and it should be possible to hold elections to a national assembly. The Naqib of Baghdad was persuaded to become Prime Minister, and his prestige and the great respect in which he is universally held by both Sunnis and Shi'ahs did much to alleviate the council's immediate difficulties. Still, the road was by no means easy. Parts of the country were still in the hands of the military, and punitive columns were extracting rifle fines from recalcitrant tribes. In such districts British political officers still retained their executive powers, and the appointment of Arab executive officials was out of the question, while other parts of the country were almost completely out of hand. The Kurds on the north and north-east made no secret of the fact that they viewed with extreme disapproval any attempt to place them under an Arab Government, and the attitude of the Turks on the north-west frontier was not reassuring. In spite of these difficulties, however, a start was made, and Arab mutasarrifs and qaimmaqams were appointed to divisions and districts which were not in the hands of the military and where peace and order obtained. Later, as the military columns completed their work it was possible to appoint Arabs in all divisions and districts. In Mosul, however, it was not found possible to make the change for some months. A mutasarrif had been appointed to that division in the early days, but had been murdered on the day

of his arrival there, and though it is believed that there was no political motive behind this murder, yet the fact of its having occurred, combined with the attitude of the Kurds who form a very large part of the population of the Mosul division, and the activities of the Turks over the frontier and in the neighbourhood of Rawanduz, made it advisable to defer the appointment of another mutasarrif until the situation was clearer. In Hillah Division, too, though qaimmaqams were appointed to districts in May, 1921, it was the end of the year before it was found possible to find a person at the same time capable of performing the duties of mutasarrif of that troublesome division and willing to do so.

Meanwhile the home government's delay in forming a definite policy towards Iraq had led to unfortunate results. It was known that the existing government was only provisional, but it was not known whether the form of government to be set up finally was to be a monarchy or a republic, or even whether it was intended to have an Arab head of the state at all. There were some who considered it possible that there would be a national assembly and a Cabinet, but that the British High Commissioner would act as President of the Republic, so to speak. As a result neither the Arabs nor the British officers knew where they stood or what policy was to be advocated, and this it was which was largely responsible for the fall of Saiyid Talib Pasha, the Minister of the Interior, who had stood loyally by the government throughout the disturbances of 1920, though it must be admitted that there were few in the country who did not heave a sigh of relief when he went.

The Cairo conference did not do much to clear up the situation, and without instructions from home the High Commissioner was unable to give any indication of what was likely to happen. The first indication of any policy on the part of the British Government was the announcement that the Amir Faisal had sailed for Iraq, and Mr. Churchill's speech at home in which it was announced that the people of Iraq were to be allowed a free choice of king, but that the Amir Faisal appeared to the British Government to be a suitable candidate. The result was, of course, a foregone conclusion. Faisal was the British nominee, and Faisal was accordingly elected, as any other British nominee would have been. In order fully to understand subsequent events it must be realized here that Faisal did not come into Iraq on a wave of national enthusiasm, with the Iraqis clamouring for a king and for Faisal as the only suitable person to be king. It is as certain as anything can be that had Faisal not been the British nominee he would not have been elected. The justification for the action of the British Government lies, however, in the fact that there was no other candidate who could have commanded anything like universal support, and that the country was undoubtedly

looking to the British to give them an indication as to who was regarded as suitable. The Naqib of Baghdad was a very old man, not able to leave his home and possessing but little influence outside Baghdad, and it was not desirable to have as king a person whose span of life was almost run, and whose election made it certain that a change of king, with all the dislocation it entails, would have to occur in a year or two. The question of succession had to be considered also, and the Naqib's sons are not of the stuff that kings are made of and would not have carried the necessary weight. Saiyid Talib Pasha was known to be a candidate, but his past history was too notorious to make him acceptable to more than a very small section of the population, while the Sheikh of Mohammerah, though he might have gained the support of most of the Shiahs, would have carried no weight with the Sunnis, who form by far the majority of the population north of Baghdad and from whom almost all the officials in the country are drawn. He was further disqualified by the fact that he is actually a Persian subject. There was a possibility that the prestige of the Sherifian house might make Faisal acceptable to both Sunnis and Shiahs, and so help to drown feelings of religious antagonism in a sense of national unity.

Unfortunately Faisal, after his accession, did not act in such a way as to gain the confidence of the people as a whole and so consolidate his position. The blame, however, should not be laid on him alone. He brought with him from the Hedjaz three of the ringleaders of the disturbances of 1920, and a personal staff composed largely of the very persons who had let him down so badly in Syria and are now doing their best to repeat their success in Iraq. For some time after his accession it was obvious from his actions that he regarded himself as beholden to those who had risen in 1920, and under an obligation to reward them by such means as were in his power, while at the same time it was noticeable that this view of his received warm support from certain British officers with whom he was particularly intimate, stoutly though they denied doing so. This very naturally gave offence to the very considerable body of tribal opinion which had stood by government during the disturbances, and laid the foundation of the deep sense of distrust of Faisal as a king which now animates the tribes as a whole, though many of the sheikhs speak very well of him as an individual.

This same feeling was noticeable in the appointments made after Faisal's accession. Many of those qaimmaqams who had been appointed in the first place had been appointed either for political reasons or as experiments, and it was realized that a certain number of them would have to go as things grew more settled and as the work thrown upon the executive officials increased. Those appointed by Faisal's government were almost to a man extremists

and almost universally sublimely ignorant of the state of affairs in Iraq, and completely out of touch with the country and the people. Most of them, it was true, were Iraqis in that they came of Iraq families or had been born in Iraq, but they had been so long away from the country that they had forgotten almost all they ever knew about it, and had learned to view things from a Turkish or Syrian rather than from an Iraq point of view. Further, these men were all townsmen and ignorant of tribal customs and completely out of sympathy with tribal ideas and aspirations. These extremist effendis embarked on a policy of persecuting in every possible way the sheikhs who had stood by government, dubbing them "Ingliz" and not "Arab," and making things as uncomfortable for them as possible. The result of this is that the tribal leaders have been forced to unite against the townsman effendis and against the government which they represent, and the breach between townsman and tribesman is rapidly growing wider. It will now be clear, therefore, how Faisal has failed to consolidate his position among the tribes. Has he done any better in the towns? To reply to that question, it is necessary to consider Basrah, Baghdad, and Mosul separately. The other towns in Iraq are composed largely of tribal elements, and their views are controlled very largely by the tribes around them, while the holy cities of Kerbela and Najaf are guided largely by religious fanaticism and by the politics of Persia. Basrah is essentially a commercial city, and the Basrawi's politics entertain no thoughts of appointments to the offices of state or the favour of the court, but look simply and solely to the security of the communications of the country and the extension of trade connections. They realize that their ideals will most easily be obtained if there is in the country a strong government able to maintain order, and an army of occupation which will create a demand for imported produce. That being so, the Basrawi is strongly in favour of the retention of as great a British control as possible, while his natural jealousy of Baghdad serves to convert that desire into a thorough dislike of any Arab Government in Baghdad. Mosul was regarded for some time as the stronghold of the pro-Turk party, and there were many who thought, and not a few who hoped, that Faisal would gain no support at all in the northern town. Such thoughts and hopes received a rude shock, however, when the King paid a visit to Mosul in October, 1921. On this occasion he really made a favourable impression, and as a result the undoubted pro-Turk sentiments of many of the people of Mosul have been kept in check and Faisal has gained as a result. Baghdad exists for politics, and politics is almost the sole topic of conversation among Arabs who can read and write. As in other Eastern countries, education is regarded merely as a passport to an official appointment, and as a result the city is full of semi-educated persons clamouring

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for appointments. These effendis at first welcomed Faisal with open arms. Promises were lavishly made by the new government that all foreign clerks would be dismissed and replaced by Iraqis, and there was opened up to the Baghdad effendi a vision of countless appointments waiting to be filled by Baghdadis, for it must be realized that where appointments are concerned the effendi regards Iraqi as meaning Baghdadi. All went well for a time. Gradually Indians were replaced by Iraqis in the government offices and the surplus effendis were being absorbed, when suddenly Faisal committed an act of folly which has destroyed for the time being whatever confidence the Baghdadis may have had in him. Whatever else the Baghdadi may be, he is certainly a constitutionalist and has very definite ideas regarding the prerogatives of ministers and their position vis-à-vis the King. When, therefore, five of the ministers resigned in April, 1922, as a protest against Faisal's continual interference in the affairs of the cabinet and his attempts to force his own views on them, their action was almost universally applauded and Faisal's action as universally condemned. It is likely to be a very long time before the King recovers to any appreciable extent the confidence which he has thus lost.

It will be seen then that during the past eight months the politics of Iraq have been largely centred around the person of the King, and it cannot be said that he emerges any too favourably from an examination of recent events. Signs are not wanting, however, that he now realizes this to some extent, and it is noticeable that he has recently been inclined to take a much stronger line with the extremist party and to work in closer co-operation with the High Commissioner. The burning question of the moment is the treaty which is being prepared between Great Britain and Iraq, and in Baghdad interest in the treaty is confined almost entirely to the question of the removal or retention of the mandate. The extremist party is making the most strenuous efforts to rouse popular opinion into demanding the removal of the mandate, whereas it is believed that the draft treaty contains no clause abrogating the mandate. The King appeared at first rather inclined to side with the extremists, but his attitude towards them has hardened very considerably of late. It is thought that any difficulties created by the question of the mandate will be got round by the adoption of some translation other than the word "intidab," which is now in use, and whose meaning is not sufficiently definite to be properly understood by the people of this country.

There are difficulties ahead, notably in connection with the Budget. A "Geddes Super-Axe" Committee has been appointed to inquire into the budgets of each ministry and try to reduce expenditure down to the amount of the anticipated revenue. The task will not be easy, but it has to be done as the home government has

declared that it will not give any grant in aid to make up any deficit in the accounts of the Iraq state for this year.

Reading this note must give the idea that Iraq is in almost desperate straits, and it is not to be denied that the past few months have been extremely critical. At the moment, however, there is justification for sounding a note of hope. The corner appears to have been turned, the situation seems to be more stable, and the fact that Ramadhan and the Id passed without any untoward occurrences gives some colour to the view held by many that the extremists have shot their bolt. The electoral law has now been published, and much depends on the result of the elections to the national assembly. Faisal has certainly been the central figure in the politics of the last eight months, but it seems likely that during the next eight months he will be considerably less prominent, and that events will centre more closely around the national assembly and the cabinet. If this is so, it will be all to Faisal's advantage, and he will have a much better opportunity of allowing his attractive personality to help him to worm his way into the affections of those with whom he comes into contact.

SOME REMARKS ON HELLENISM

WITH REFERENCE TO DR. G. N. BANERJEE'S "HELLENISM IN
ANCIENT INDIA"*

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR R. C. TEMPLE, BART., C.B., C.I.E.

FOR the understanding of ancient Indian and Western Asian history the subject of Hellenism is of the first importance, and it says much for Dr. G. N. Banerjee's handling of it that his book has gone to a second edition in the year succeeding the appearance of the first. The subject is wide to a bewildering extent, and demands a matured knowledge of many of those studies that make up the "humanities." Dr. Banerjee has shown himself to be not afraid of tackling any part of it.

Taking Hellenism to be the spread of Greek culture, and the Hellenes to be the peoples who accepted the Greek mode of life, such culture could not be extended to India without contact, and contact between the Near East, as we know it, and the Greeks was early indeed.

The actual commencement of the ancient Persian Empire took place in the mid-sixth century B.C., at the time when India had not long emerged from the period without dates, and was the result of the defeat of the Median ruler of Ecbatana (Hamadan) by Cyrus the Great. The immediate consequence of this event was a coalition against Cyrus, consisting of Nabonidus of Babylon, Amasis of Egypt, Croesus of Lydia, and the Spartans of Greece proper, which, that master of affairs, military and civil, defeated in detail. The whole situation implies close contact between Greek and Asiatic, both Aryan and Semite, and African, which was even then no new thing, for the Median Empire had extended westwards to the Halys in Asia Minor. Then in the same century we have Cambyses with his conquest of Egypt and his adoption of Egyptian manners, and Darius with his conquest of the Ægean Islands towards the end of it. Thereafter there was a continuous struggle between Persian and Greek for the next two centuries till the arrival of Alexander the Great in the late fourth century B.C.

* "Hellenism in Ancient India," by Dr. G. N. Banerjee, Lecturer on Egyptology and Oriental History, Calcutta University. Second edition. Butterworth and Co. : Calcutta and London.

The nature of the Oriental armies and their commanders thus in contact with the West is material to the present argument. The Persian armies, led by the Achæmenids of the dynasty founded by Cyrus, was raised out of a manly, hardy, patriotic, and enthusiastic peasantry, thoroughly believing in itself and its leaders. After a time the inevitable decay in these moral qualities set in, and the Persian armies became manifestly inferior to the Greek, paving the way for Alexander's victories. On the initiation of Cyrus the earlier Achæmenid rulers thought and acted imperially. That is to say, their tendency was to behave humanely towards the conquered and to spread civilization. Darius was a born organizer, a believer in the destiny of his race, to which the great God, Ahuramazda, had given dominion "over this earth afar, over many peoples and tongues," whom he was pledged to govern aright and civilize. Indeed, at times he went too far in his concessions to local aspirations. Darius's system was to govern by satrapies, which were viceroysalties, each with its subordinate governments, and in the West there were city-states as well. Within the satrapies the subject races had much freedom of self-government, which created an immense variety of provincial administration, suited to local civilization, and indicated by every system of finance between the use of minted money and trade by pure barter.

The political effect of the Achæmenid Empire was to civilize, to improve communications, agriculture, finance, and trade, to foster industrial art, and to affect enormously the religion of the ancient world. The Achæmenids, like the Medes before them, were enthusiastic Zoroastrians, and their widely spread empire gave an opportunity for propaganda on an immense scale. The Zoroastrians, like the Brahmans, were natural missionaries, and in effective eclectic methods for diffusing their respective creeds, through priestly castes, there is not much to choose between them. Neither opposed the foreign gods, but both absorbed them: the Indian as emanations of his own Vishnu or Shiva, the Persian as servants of the Supreme Ahuramazda. But the Indian dealt with the peoples of a compact country, and so was able to dominate while absorbing; whereas the Persian dealt with a world-empire, and so was ultimately himself dominated through his absorption of the more gorgeous cults of the civilizations he encountered.

Now, it was Darius that first established direct contact with India, still in the sixth century B.C.—in the last two decades of it—not by way of conquest of set purpose, but by way of the natural expansion of a great empire in order to preserve the peace in its outlying provinces. In the same way, to the west he spread his dominions to Thrace and Macedonia and along the southern littoral of the Mediterranean to the territories of Karta (Carthage). Such

armies, raised out of such a people, under such rulers, could not but seriously affect those with whom they came in contact, and Northern India must to some extent, from the earliest historic times, have become aware of Western Asiatics and their ideas and ways. The spirit in which Darius or his representatives worked in India is shown by the coasting voyage of exploration undertaken by Skylax of Karyanda from the Indus to Suez in 509 B.C., under his ægis.

In spite of his achievements, Darius received a severe check at Marathon in 490 B.C., and his successor Xerxes still severer defeats on the sea at Salamis in 480 and on land at Platea in 479. But at this last battle Indian archers were present, and whatever may be the exact sense that we should attach to the term "Indian" here, this fact does argue more than a superficial contact between India and the West, even at that early date. From the time of Xerxes and his two crucial defeats the Greeks waxed stronger and the Persian power waned steadily, despite temporary spectacular successes, such as those of Artaxerxes III. (Ochus) in the mid-fourth century B.C., just before the final conflict with a united Greece under Philip of Macedon. But these were purely superficial victories, as they were won by Hellenic armies, under Hellenic generals (Mentor and Memnon of Rhodes), fighting for an Asiatic suzerain, to whom they were uncontestedly superior. So when the youthful Alexander succeeded to the aspirations of Philip—the founding of a Greek state out of the Persian (still Achæmenid) Emperor's Greek dominions—he found himself confronted by an empire, the helplessness of which before a Greek invasion had been abundantly shown, and throughout which Greek influence was no new experience.

Alexander was a Greek of the Greeks, saturated with Greek culture, a conscious world-conqueror for Greek civilization from the beginning, capable of carrying out his ideas, and only prevented from doing so to the full by being cut off at thirty-three, practically at the commencement of his astonishing career. So far as the Persian Empire was concerned, his influence was immense during his short life there, owing *inter alia* to his assumption of the dress and ceremonial of the Achæmenids, his establishment of autonomous Greek municipalities along his line of march, and the marrying of all his officers and some ten thousand Macedonians besides to Persian wives. He was Greek enough to follow the old Greek philosophic advice to be "himself the law," and to be officially proclaimed a god ruling by divine right, and eclectic enough to aim at the amalgamation of all his subjects rather than treat the Asiatics as servants of the Greeks.

At his death there were set up by his generals (*diadochoi*) the satrap or viceregal dynasties usual on such occasions in Oriental history, but within a decade of it one of them came to the front in the person of Seleukos Nikator, the only one of Alexander's generals

who had retained his Persian wife after his master's disappearance from the scene. He created and ruled successively from Babylon, Seleukia near by, and Antioch in Syria, an empire extending from Syria to the Indian borders, where he was checked by the great Indian pupil of Alexander, Chandragupta Maurya (Sandrakottos). But just before his death he extended his rule westwards to all Asia Minor and Thrace. Seleukos Nikator was a Hellenizer on a large scale, following Alexander's plan of founding Greek autonomous cities with country districts attached thereto under the suzerainty of the empire—a policy that diffused the Greek language, commerce, and civilization everywhere, as far east at least as the Indus, and created large and flourishing communities which attracted wealthy settlers, especially Jews, from foreign lands. His son and successor, Antiochos Soter, another great man, continued his father's work, and he it was who gave the Oriental Hellenistic civilization its form, as we know it, in the second century B.C.

But the Seleukid Empire had an inherent defect in the centrifugal tendencies of its numerous autonomous municipal centres, and these, combined with the attacks of outside enemies, made the lives of the later Seleukids one long battle for existence. Revolts, more or less successful, were rampant everywhere, leading up to the wholly or partially Hellenized Indo-Baktrian and Parthian kingdoms on the Indian frontiers, which played so prominent a part in ancient Indian history. Eventually the Seleukid, Antiochos the Great, came into conflict with the Romans in the beginning of the century before Christ, and from that time the empire was doomed, soon afterwards falling before the rising power of the whilom nomadic Central Asian Parthians, by that time a settled people of a high civilization and thoroughly Persianized.

Nominally Imperial, the Parthians held the country from the Euphrates to the Indus, but in reality they never created an empire, and ruled through vassal states of varying conditions of independence. They were also at continuous feud with Rome, and often proved a formidable enemy. Gradually their rule degenerated into a condition externally always on the defensive, while internally there was ceaseless civil war and strife. Local states within such an empire could not have been much interfered with. Politically and administratively the earlier Parthian rulers were thoroughly Hellenized in institutions, currency, and commerce, though in religion they were stalwart Zoroastrians. Some of them spoke good Greek, and on the whole their great service to civilization was that they acted as a buffer between Hellenism and the barbarism of the Central and Northern Aryan hordes for something like half a millennium—until well into the third century A.D. Nevertheless, the effect of their suzerainty was in the end to create a reaction against Hellenism, because Greek

culture and the Greek mode of life were inherently unsuited to a rough Oriental people of the Parthian and Central Asian type. So Hellenism gradually declined, until the destruction of Seleukia by the Romans sealed its fate. Then the Greek language gave way before the Aramaic of the Syrian Christians, and thenceforward Greek culture and literature were available to Persia only in an Aramaic dress. Hellenic influence fell away and finally passed out of ken under the great Sasanid successors of the Parthians. In the days of the Sasanids, who were Persians *par excellence*, were waged two exhausting struggles—Persia *versus* Rome, and Zoroastrianism *versus* Christianity—for four long centuries, until the advent of the Arab Caliphate of Baghdad produced the absolute ascendancy of the Mohamedan faith in Persia in the seventh century A.D.

Contemplating such a story as this, as I read it in outline with reference to Hellenism, of the lands between Greece and India, and of the lands within their respective borders in ancient times, one cannot but say that *primâ facie* the reciprocal influence must have been very great. How far that influence can be said to have been actually felt as regards India is the riddle that Dr. Banerjee has set himself to solve, so far as a solution is possible. He has not shirked his task, and considers it from all points of view—architecture, sculpture, painting, coinage, astronomy, mathematics, medicine, writing, literature, drama, religion, philosophy, mythology, fables, and folklore. The view is comprehensive enough in all conscience, and its study is history in *excelsis*. Such a width of view involves an enormous amount of varied reading, and, what is more, an unusual capacity for absorption and assimilation of what is read. Dr. Banerjee has grasped his nettles with an unflinching hand, and has honestly attempted to crush out of them all that they have to give him. He has his opinions, but he states his grounds fairly, and though experts may find what appear to them to be flaws in apprehension and deduction, yet he is so transparently honest and fair that his views and efforts cannot but command respect. He is not afraid of cross-examination, and gives his authorities in a series of admirable bibliographies attached to each section of his work. These are not always as complete as they might be, but at any rate one does know exactly on what he bases the faith that is in him. In this way he has produced a work that is a credit to himself and his University.

Dr. Banerjee would be the last person to hold his present edition to be a final say on his subject. No doubt further editions will succeed it, and perhaps he will therefore take the following suggestions into consideration. The relations and mutual influence of nationalities in contact, but situated so far apart as were the ancient Greeks and Indians, are subject to that general law of evolution, whereby an individuality progresses mainly on a line of its own.

subject to the influence of every other line with which it may come in contact. Therefore, in effect, in this case, Indian institutions and thought would eat into those of the Greeks, and *vice versa*, and what one has really to look for is, firstly, the extent and nature of the contact, and, secondly, on what points each has in actual fact definitely affected the other. It is in this way that universal fashions in thought and practice have from all time been set up from age to age. Looking through the ages historically, it will be found that among nations in contact common fashions in thought, practice, and industrial art rise up, prevail, and die out from one age to another, and that this is the result of contact, which has acted either directly or indirectly through an intervening body. Much that is common to them all in India, Persia, Greece, and Rome, in what we call ancient days, is due to fashions prevailing among nations of "Aryan" civilization from time to time. This, it seems to me, is a point that searchers into the effect and scope of Hellenism should take into serious consideration.

Again, what manner of antagonists were they that carried on the age-long struggles outlined at the commencement of these remarks—these Greeks and Romans on the one hand, and these Persians and Persianized Parthians on the other; these Hellenes of Persia and Afghanistan and these "Aryans" of India proper? In the dim past, as afterwards right up to modern times, the great overboiling caldron of Europeo-Asiatic humanity was situated in Central Asia. Thence issued horde after horde in age after age to the west, south, and east, and their great characteristic throughout was their power of dominating absorption. They adapted themselves with remarkable rapidity to any civilization with which they happened to come in contact, and to such an extent that they often themselves soon became its chief exponents. Thus they overran from time to time, under different names, the East, West, and South, but always with the same effect, wherever they were not quickly ejected. They overran, became absorbed, and leavened their absorbers with their own thoughts, practices, and arts. In the East they met the Chinese and their already established civilization. In the West they met at first what we may call the Babylonian, Semitic, and Hamitic civilizations, and then the Greek and Roman. In the South they met what again one may call the Dravidian civilization. And it must be remembered that none of these were even then anything but a complex of various still older civilizations, which we can at present only call aboriginal.

The very ancient irruption into the West and South from Central Asia we are just now concerned with was that of the "Aryans." Without going too much into detail, in Persia these immigrants met an existing Babylonian-Semitic culture and absorbed it into their own. This they carried across westwards to Greece and Rome, coming into contact in the process with Hamitic, Egyptian, Mediter-

ranean, and Germanic types of mankind, and eastwards to India, where they met a culture of Dravidian and Sinitic, and—shall we say also?—of a Kolarian type. Everywhere the dominating factor was Aryanism deeply imbued with the local leaven. So that when the titanic struggles between Greek and Persian and between Persian and Indian arose, we find the same dominating temperament on both sides, affected by almost every kind of national idiosyncrasy in Europe and Asia. There was, indeed, very much in common between Greek and Persian, Persian and Indian, and Indian and Greek, as well as much that was antagonistic. What, therefore, appears now to be the result of mutual influence may well have been but a common inheritance. This is the direction in which it seems to me that further research will lead us.

In view of the above remarks, the following conclusions drawn from his research by Dr. Banerjee in his Introduction (p. 26) will show how far he has been guided by similar ideas, and how far he may be inclined to develop them in future. Says Dr. Banerjee: "Greece has played a part, but by no means a predominant part, in the civilization of ancient India. The evolution of Philosophy, Religion, and Mythology has gone along parallel but independent paths. India owes to Greece an improvement in Coinage and Astronomy, but it had begun both; and in Lyric and Epic poetry, in Grammar, the Art of Writing, the Drama and Mathematics, it had no need to wait for the intervention and the initiative of Hellenism. Notably, perhaps, in the plastic arts and especially in the details of some of the architectural forms, classical culture has acted as a ferment to revive the native qualities of the Indian artists, without robbing them of their originality and subtlety. But in any case, the fascinating story of the Greeks in India is not only full of suggestion, but is also a most interesting chapter in the history of the development of ideas. The question is not of interest solely to the Indianists and the Hellenists, but likewise to all those who occupy themselves in tracing the evolution of general history, and to those who above all love to follow, even in their more remote expansion, the antecedents of our modern culture and civilization, the different phases of our national development and progress."

One is tempted to quote again and again from Dr. Banerjee's suggestive pages, but I will content myself with one extract from his description of Indian in connection with Greek medicine. He says (pp. 202-203): "Even in modern days, European surgery has borrowed the operation of rhinoplasty, or the formation of artificial noses, from India, where Englishmen became acquainted with the art in the last century. The Indian rhinoplasty has attained some reputation, because of its early introduction and because of its influence upon the plastic operations of European surgeons, such as Carpue,

Gräfe, Dieffenbach, perhaps even Branca and Tagliacozza. Although the skin of the forehead was used as a substitute for the nose in the operations performed in the eighteenth century by the Indian doctors, still the connection with the old method, where the skin of the cheek was used, could not be doubted. Dr. Haas declared Susruta's description of rhinoplasty [about the time of Christ] as an insipid modification of a similar description in Celsus (7, 9), and referred to a remark in Chakradatta's commentary on Susruta, according to which the whole of the description in Susruta is said to have been *anarsa*—i.e., not genuine. But the references in Celsus have only a faint resemblance to Susruta, and Dallana, Jaiyyata, Gayadāsa, and others—i.e., the oldest commentators—have recognized that portion of Susruta as genuine."

Dr. Banerjee is here possibly on debatable ground, but his remarks will, nevertheless, be of special interest to many, who, like the present writer, were *ex officio* interested during the late European war in the maxillo-facial hospitals, that did so much to make the future life of many an unhappy sufferer from the various fronts more bearable than it would otherwise have been.

REVIEW

ON SECRET PATROL IN HIGH ASIA. By Captain L. V. S. Blacker, Queen Victoria's Own Corps of Guides. John Murray, London. 18s net.

This is a tale of strange post-war happenings on the far frontiers of Persia and Turkestan which for high adventure and hairbreadth episodes would have delighted the heart of Charles Lever—whilst retaining all the advantage of historical accuracy. Told in the language of the modern British officer, which, if not classical, is at least picturesque and sometimes most expressive, it deals with the progress of a detachment of Guides projected into that amazing theatre of confused military and political action, after the Armistice, which we know as Central Asia. It would have added much to our enlightenment if the author had been able freely and frankly to explain the meaning and object of the various "missions" which were despatched, like his own, to that remote region, and their relation to each other. But he warns us in the Preface that the time "is not yet ripe for a full and complete description of the events of June, July, August, and September, 1918, in Turkistan," which doubtless led up to the subsequent military alarms and excursions in which he played so distinguished a part. This is unfortunate. How many people have heard of the battle of Dushakh, for instance, where the 19th Punjab Infantry lost half their effective strength and all their British officers, whilst they and the 28th Cavalry swept 10,000 of the Red army off the field? Sir George Young-husband, in his Introduction, does not help us at all. He confines himself to a characteristic eulogy of his own beloved Corps of Guides. It is, however, not difficult to trace the threads of our vacillating policy towards Russia in Central Asia, and to detect the influence of the British Communist in assisting the spread of Bolshevism, until finally the whole energy of these missions was absorbed in the intricate business of preventing Bolshevik propagandists (including Afghans as well as representatives of nearly every Asiatic nationality outside India) from crossing the borderland into the Punjab. This, at any rate, was Captain Blacker's mission, and right well he and his detachment seem to have carried it out. The pursuit and capture of a band of Afghan propagandists, which involved much strenuous mountaineering and tough adventure in the roughest of

the Kuen Lun offshoots, is a thrilling tale, which, unfortunately, is badly illustrated by the War Office map at the end of the book. This part of the Kuen Lun has, in fact, never been satisfactorily explored or mapped. It leaves us to conjecture where those Afghans came from and what was their real objective. There is an easy pass from the eastern point of the Afghan province of Wakhan leading to the Taghdumbash Pamir and Tashkurghan, called the Beyik (? Payik), at the foot of which is a Chinese post (which consisted of a single kibitka and the keeper of a few bedraggled fowls in the days of the boundary demarcation), so that clearly the Afghan band was not so very far from its own boundaries when Captain Blacker dropped on to its trail. There was no room for propaganda so far—no, indeed, was there any opportunity for mischief in the Kuen Lun. The propagandists were finally most gallantly run in at Yarkand, and there ended their abortive career. Not less entertaining and instructive were Captain Blacker's experiences subsequently on the northern Persian frontier. Indeed, the whole book is full of good yarns. One most satisfactory sign of the times is the thirst for geographical knowledge evidenced by the author and his Guides. All the map knowledge of Asia which we possess from Mesopotamia to the Chinese frontier, south of Russia and apart from India, is the result of the work of native surveyors of the Indian Survey Department working on the basis of triangulation carried out by their own officers or by such geographical experts as Deasy, Sir Percy Sykes, and (notably) by Sir Aurel Stein. Many of these native topographers have been army men, and many have earned distinctions for their courage and success, but I do not remember the names of any Guides amongst them. As much of this great extent of geographical reconnaissance has been gradually amassed under haphazard conditions, when such opportunities as campaigns, boundary commissions, etc., offered the chance, there is naturally many a wide gap still unfilled, chiefly in the regions of the Elburz mountains (Northern Persia), Badakshan (East of Balkh), Central Afghanistan (the Hazara country), and the Kuen Lun, although there is doubtless useful material not yet published which is still in the making. The Guides possess almost unique opportunities for exploration and reconnaissance, and from Captain Blacker's story they know how to use them to the best effect, working on such methods as modern geography requires. Both the topographers and their officers appear to be scientifically trained. This is a matter of lasting importance. Captain Blacker is much to be congratulated on obtaining permanently useful geographical results from his strenuous and most adventurous mission.

T. H. HOLDICH.

OBITUARY

SIR ALEXANDER M'ROBERT*

SIR ALEXANDER M'ROBERT, Chairman of the British India Corporation, Cawnpore, died on June 22, at Downside, Aberdeenshire, aged sixty-eight.

Before going to Cawnpore in 1884 he held the appointment of Neil Arnott Lecturer in experimental physics at the Mechanics' Institution, Aberdeen, and was Lecturer in Chemistry in Robert Gordon's College, Aberdeen. He was invested with the Order of Honour of Afghanistan in 1918. He was President of the Upper India Chamber of Commerce for nine years, and represented that body in the Legislative Council of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh for five successive terms. He represented the Chamber at the Congress of Chambers of Commerce of the Empire at Montreal in 1903, London 1906 and 1912, Sydney 1909, and Toronto 1920. He was pioneer of the movement for providing sanitary dwellings for factory workers in India, and had travelled extensively all over the world. Sir Alexander was an LL.D. of Aberdeen University and a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society. He received a Knighthood in 1910 and the K.B.E. in 1919.

CAPTAIN ROBERT KEITH MAKANT, M.C.

Captain Robert Keith Makant, M.C., was educated at Harrow, where he represented the school both at cricket and football. The outbreak of war prevented his going up to Cambridge, and he joined the 1/5 North Lincs in October, 1914. After serving two years in France, where he won the Military Cross and a bar, he was wounded in 1917. In the early part of 1918 he was sent to Mesopotamia as A.D.C. to the G.O.C. 1st Indian Army Corps M.E.F. In April, 1919, he joined the Arab levies, acting in the capacity of adjutant at headquarters. The autumn of that year saw him nominated to the Kurdish levy at Sulaimani, South Kurdistan, and the work of organizing and training the force as second in command became the only immediate aim of his life. Handicapped by a natural inability to learn easily

* By kind permission of the *Morning Post*.

Oriental languages, he nevertheless took no advantage of interpreters, rightly judging that the surest way to gain the attachment of his men lay through direct intercourse with them. He lived in the strictest simplicity, and won the liking of both Kurdish officers and men by identifying himself with them in a manner which with another personality might have led to a loss of respect, but which with him had the reverse effect. He knew the south Kurdish country as well as any officer living, for it was his habit to spend days away hunting in the mountains with but a single orderly, living in the Kurdish villages and with their inhabitants, for whom he had a great affection.

The trend of political affairs in 1921 had almost resolved him to resignation, but his loyalty to his commanding officer, the late Captain FitzGibbon, M.C., and to the levy, induced him to return. On the death of Captain FitzGibbon he was for a time in command.

He was murdered on June 18 of this year by one of the most truculent leaders of a bad and treacherous tribe—for reasons which were probably purely political, and devoid of any personal consideration.

The Administration has lost in him one of its most loyal and efficient officers, and those who knew him and worked with him, one of their sincerest and staunchest friends.

E. B. S.

LIST OF MEMBERS ELECTED, JUNE AND JULY, 1922.

- Acworth, Captain J. P., 28th Cavalry F.F., Leicester House, Portland Road, Hove, Sussex.
- Bampton, Major J. A. H., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
- Bampton, R. E. Fitzsymons, Mohammerah, Persian Gulf.
- Birdwood, General Sir W. R., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., A.D.C.Gen., Cavalry Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
- Bois, Captain H. E., Iraq Levies, East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
- Borrie, David, E.I.U.S. Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
- Bower, Sir Graham, K.C.M.G., Studwell Lodge, Droxford, Hants.
- Cadogan, Lieut.-Commander F., R.N. (ret.), Hatherop Castle, Fairford, Glos.
- Channer, Captain G. O. De R., 7th Gurkha Rifles, Quetta, Baluchistan.
- Dew, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Armine, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
- Ditchburn, Major A. H., O.B.E., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
- Fagan, Sir Patrick, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., I.C.S., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
- Farrell, Captain W. J., M.C., Brookside, Newland Park, Hull.
- Fraser, Major W. A. K., D.S.O., M.C., Military Attaché, British Legation, Kabul, Afghanistan.
- French, J. C., I.C.S., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
- Gilkes, Captain G., R.F.A., G.H.Q. Allied Forces, Constantinople.
- Greatwood, H. E., 123rd Outram's Rifles, c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., Bombay.
- Hallinan, Captain T. J., R.A.M.C., 77, Southside, Clapham Common, S.W.
- Harrison, Captain C., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
- McCleverty, Major P. H., 20th Infantry, I.A., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
- Macdonald, Lieut.-Colonel F., I.A. (ret.), East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
- Maconochie, R. R., I.C.S., British Legation, Kabul, Afghanistan.
- Mann, Alexander, 64, Lancaster Gate, W. 2.
- Milnes-Gaskell, the Lady Constance, 47, Pont Street, S.W.
- Moore, Major Arthur, 9, Chester Terrace, Eaton Square, S.W.

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Morland, Major W. E. T., D.S.O., M.C., Army and Navy Club,
Pall Mall, S.W.

Norris, Captain David, C.B., C.M.G., R.N., Admiralty, Whitehall,
S.W.

Oatway, Captain S. H., 93rd Burma Infantry.

Oddie, Philip, M.C., East India United Service Club, 16, St.
James's Square, S.W.

Richards, Captain E. I. G., Army Educational Corps, School of
Education, Wellington, S. India.

Ridge-Jones, J., M.C., Civil Surgeon, Sulaimani, S. Kurdistan.


Scott, Lieut.-Colonel N., C.I.E., I.M.S. (ret.), Eastcott, Hatfield,
Herts.


Trotter, Miss Angela, 18, Eaton Place, S.W. 1.

Trotter, Miss J., 18, Eaton Place, S.W. 1.

Vickery, Lieut.-Colonel C. E., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.F.A., United
Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.

Wickham, Captain E. T. R., British Legation, Kabul, Afghanistan.





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NOTICES

MEMBERS are asked to notify any change of address to the Assistant-Secretary, 74, Grosvenor Street, W. 1.

Journals have been returned by the G.P.O. as "gone away" from Captain E. Castells, 6th Gurkha Rifles, Mr. Bassett Digby, Mr. C. Empson, Major Garland, Major R. B. L. Garbett, Miss Nina Mylne, Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Parker, Sir Wilfred Peek, Mr. P. B. Vanderbyl. The Assistant Secretary would be glad if these members would kindly send a new address, when their Journals and lecture cards will be forwarded.

The following lectures will be given in the Spring Session :

January 18.—"Central Asia : its Rise as a Political and Economic Factor," by Lieut.-Colonel P. T. Etherton. (Lantern Illustrations.)

February 8.—"The South Persian Littoral during the War," by Major-General J. A. Douglas, C.M.G.

March 8.—"China and the Powers," by the Right Hon. Sir John Jordan, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.

March 22.—Major-General Sir Edmund Ironside, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. (Particulars to be announced later.)

The lectures will be given at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall.

The telephone number of the Society has been omitted from the present directory through an error on the part of the telephone office. It is, Mayfair 4025.

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BRITAIN AND ISLAMIC ASIA.

THE Central Asian Society met at the Royal Society's Lecture Room, Burlington House, Piccadilly, on Tuesday, October 10, 1922, the Right Hon. Lord Carnock presiding, to hear and discuss a lecture by Major Arthur Moore, entitled "Britain and Islamic Asia."

The CHAIRMAN opened the proceedings by calling on the Honorary Secretary (Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate) to read the names of members who had been elected since the last meeting, and to announce gifts made to the Library.

The HONORARY SECRETARY: Since the last meeting the total number of members elected is thirty-four. I will not trouble you with all the names. I will simply mention that among them are included General Sir William Birdwood, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Armine Dew, Sir Patrick Fagan, Mr. D. G. Hogarth, Lady Constance Milnes-Gaskell, and Major Arthur Moore, our lecturer of to-day. I also wish to mention that we have since July received some valuable gifts for the Library: from Sir Percy and Miss Ella Sykes several of their own books; from Miss Tanner a very valuable gift of books, including Lord Curzon's "Persia" and Sir Percy Sykes's "History of Persia" in both editions; and, lastly, from Mr. E. R. P. Moon a number of books on China and a complete set of the *Journals* of the Central Asian Society. The latter is most valuable because up to the present we have had only one set in the possession of the Society.

The LECTURER: Lord Carnock, Colonel Yate, Ladies and Gentlemen,—When Colonel Yate wrote to me, and was good enough to ask me to address the Society, I begged to be allowed to choose the larger subject of "Britain and Islam" or "Britain and Islamic Asia" rather than a particular country like Afghanistan or Persia, and that I did because I was so deeply impressed with the importance of the question. That was in the month of May, and I certainly could not then realize that when the day came round, instead of being merely a question which experts might remember that this Society was alive to, it would be a question which had forced itself upon the attention of everyone in the crude form of an issue of peace or war. That must add to the sense of responsibility that we all feel at a time like this in discussing such a question. And first of all I would like to appeal to the more senior, more expert members of this Society, to realize

that the mere fact that they have very often served the Crown in very distinguished positions in the East in the past, or travelled extensively outside the Empire in the East, may blind them to the extraordinary change that has taken place in the East—since they left it—because, let us make no mistake at all about it, the East has changed out of knowledge. The Russo-Japanese War, although it was outside the limits of Islam, was a signpost, and all those various movements like the constitutional movement in Turkey, the constitutional movement in Persia, and the Chinese Revolution—the political developments that took place between the Russo-Japanese War and the 'Great War' were further signposts. But the change that has come over the East in the second half of the war, and since the war, should be a very thunderclap of warning in our ears. It is merely to delude ourselves to suppose that the East is really very much the same, and that we have only got to deal with the work of agitators. The East is now quite definitely awake, and one may say crudely that it is awake against the West. The Western business brain, Western capital, Western push, and, above all—and this is the vital point—the Western underlying assumption that the Asiatic is an inferior being, Western patronage, in short, have definitely produced a phenomenon in the East with which we have got to take account. Now, can that hatred of the West have any result? you may ask. Is the East strong enough to challenge the West? Well, that would be a larger question, and I certainly do not propose to go into an issue that would take us outside Islam, and drag in the very vital question of the Far East. But what is certain is that if a clash or crash is to be avoided the British Empire is in the very centre of the picture. The interests that we have got you can represent shortly in two words, India and Islam. India stands for some 400,000,000 of people; and it stands for the deep abiding permanence of Hinduism, which is a real force, and for Islam, which in India represents a powerful and warlike minority who have been loyal to us in the past and a prop of our power. Outside India Islam stands for a great common cord of sympathy that stretches from the heart of Central Asia, from China and Chinese Turkestan, through Bokhara and Samarcand, right across to the Atlantic Ocean at the Straits of Gibraltar in North Africa, and to the Danube in Europe. Now, unless we, the British Empire, the British Commonwealth of Nations, can in some way act as mediators, and in some way provide a common platform for East and West, I cannot see how that clash is ever to be avoided. Islam was for long a harmonious colour in the mosaic that made what we call the British Empire overseas—made by a combination of commerce, arms, and destiny. Islam was with us because we British were strong, and carried with us respect for religion and respect for custom. Also, in foreign policy we were very fortunate

throughout the nineteenth century. On two occasions, as you know, it was we who came forward as the champions of the Sultan, and in the eyes of India, or the greater part of India, in the nineteenth century, even if we allow that the Khilafat movement has now greater strength than then, the Sultan was certainly recognized as Khalif in the mosques of India. There is no doubt that all Indian Mussulmans looked upon Turkey as a thing to be proud of, because it was still an independent Moslem empire. It was we who came forward and took arms as against Russia to champion Islam. Islam accepted British rule; and when the war came that loyalty held, despite the fact that Turkey came into the war against us. That was regretted, but the fact that we were at war with the Kaiser was good enough for the Indian Mussulman soldier, who was a loyal subject of the King, and the Indian Moslem soldier saw the world. He went to France, to Salonika, to Palestine, to Mesopotamia, to Africa, and he wrote home letters. Those letters went home to the villages in the Indian plains, and in the folds of the valleys; and he saw a great deal that he did not put into his letters, but which he talked about when he got home. Then came the period of the Armistice. We had reached it, and still the bond held. It had been strained, and it had been proved. Since then we have had four years pass, and at the end of it all we find ourselves universally hated and universally distrusted. It is the plain fact throughout Islam that we are regarded as people whose word is not their bond, as a restless and greedy Asiatic power, and if we do not recognize that we are blinding ourselves to the truth. Since the Armistice, as it has happened, I have had opportunities of visiting Constantinople, Cairo, Jerusalem, Damascus, Aleppo, Baghdad, Tehran, Tiflis, Kabul, and Delhi and other Indian cities, and wherever you go throughout the world of Islam you find a universal feeling. They are firmly convinced that since the Armistice France has shown herself a friend, and Italy has shown herself a friend, and that we have not. I am not at the moment arguing the rights or wrong of it; but if we do not recognize that that is the real opinion of Islam, I am perfectly certain it is because we have not informed ourselves of what they are saying. The reason for that, it seems to me, the basic fact for all this complete *volte face*, is the disappearance of Imperial Russia. The Eastern question, broadly, for about 150 years has painted itself to Islam as the balance of forces between England in the South and Russia in the North. Islam was perfectly well aware that it was a decaying military power. After the Turks were turned back at the gates of Vienna there was a steady withdrawal towards the Maritza in Europe, and the signs of decay were perfectly evident to themselves amongst the Turks, the Persians, and the Afghans. They knew, however much they might not admit the knowledge—they

knew that they could not deal with Russia singlehanded, or with England singlehanded. Always it had to be a balance, and they had to maintain their existence by walking between the two and playing one off against the other. There was never any serious competitor for long. Napoleon was sick of Europe, but he did not figure much in Asia. The Kaiser became a factor—he became a very serious factor, of course, at the time of the War—but then he disappeared. Suddenly there was no one but Russia and England, and the extraordinary thing was that there was not Russia. There was only England. Well, I propose later on to return to a consideration of how that impressed the Oriental, and how during the Armistice period we utterly failed to realize the way in which he was soliloquizing. But first of all I want to apply to this question of the balance between Russia and Britain the consideration of modern Turkish history. I read this morning in the paper one statement by the Prime Minister to a Labour deputation about Turkey, and he has also recently used the word treachery in reference to Turkey's coming into the war against us. This morning he said that Turkey closed the Straits against us in 1914 because two or three Turkish Ministers were in German pay. Now, that is how it appears to the British Cabinet, but I submit that that is an utterly superficial and misleading reading of modern Turkish history. I think it is very deplorable that at the present moment we should appear before the world as if we are still in the period of war propaganda and war talk. The statement that two or three Turkish Ministers were in German pay and closed the Straits against us was all very well during the war, when we all flung about any statement like that that would help us. But to continue those statements in peace-time is not going to help us, any more than it helps Mustapha Kemal, with whom we are negotiating, to state publicly in an interview that the real trouble was that nobody trusted Mr. Lloyd George. If both sides are making that kind of statement about each other it does not seem to me that we can get very far with negotiations about Islam, and we have got to realize the things that Islam writes about us, and the things they believe about us. The Prime Minister makes a statement like that about Turkish Ministers. I do not know what his evidence is, and personally I do not believe it, and I propose presently to submit what I believe are the real reasons why the Straits were closed. But is he aware that this country is practically the only country that is not aware of an allegation—where the Press has never said what all the Constantinople papers have said—that the British offered a large sum of money to the Turkish Commander to buy off the British garrison at Kut? That has been published with the most circumstantial details in the Constantinople papers, and is universally believed in Turkey. The sum is mentioned; I have forgotten it now,

but it is over a million sterling. It was said to be offered to the Turkish Commander, and the Turkish Commander turned it down. It may be a mistake to suppose that in dealing with Turks you are dealing with bribable people. You can bribe Orientals as you can bribe people all over the world, but you cannot bribe nations, and to assume that we as a Western Christian nation can pose in a superior moral attitude is to make ourselves ridiculous in the eyes of Islam. We know that we flung money right and left during the war, and were willing to buy up support wherever we could find it. All those things are perfectly well known, but they are not published in our papers. Our people do not know it, but Islam does. The point, it seems to me, as regards Turkey coming into the war, goes much deeper. It was not a question of buying two or three Turkish Ministers; it was simply a question of Russia. For the first time Russia and England were acting together, and for Turkey that fact was vital. It dominated the whole situation, and it is perfectly idle to talk of Turkish treachery because Turkey went in against Russia and England. Never in her history had she been faced with the two of them together, and when she saw the possibility of bringing in a third party as a counterpoise to the united power of Russia and England, naturally and inevitably she came to the conclusion that that was the thing for her to do. If we look to the events that led up to that decision of Turkey in 1914 we shall see the whole question, I think, quite clearly. It seems to me that the safest rule of all in considering our relations with Islam is not to set out with accusations against Islamic people or their conduct to us. Their conduct, doubtless, is frequently full of mistakes, and frequently it is not what we consider either just or honourable to us, or with a full recognition of our merits, or of what we do for them. But I am perfectly certain that we shall never get back to a basis of friendship with Islam till we start looking for our own mistakes, and if we get far enough back we shall very often find that we have originally caused subsequent decisions which distressed us very much when they came, and which we then dubbed with hard names. Turkey at the beginning of the century was universally recognized as a decaying power. Then came in 1908 the Young Turkish movement at Salonika and Monastir, and it aroused a great deal of sympathy in the West to see that attempt at reform. That was the first feeling. Then the Young Turks immediately got into difficulties. Their effort at reform had, in fact, come too late, and had aroused the exasperation of all the candidates for portions of the decaying Turkish Empire which we had all been watching at that time. Consequently they immediately got into trouble with Austria and with Bulgaria. Austria embarrassed the Young Turks by declaring that Bosnia and Herzegovina were no longer under the suzerainty of the Sultan, but were part of the

Austrian Empire. Bulgaria, by arrangement with Austria, did the same thing. That was in October, 1908, the revolution having taken place at the end of the previous July. That was the first blow struck; then came the Italians in 1911: they declared war on the Turks in Tripoli; and next year came the Balkan Federation. They attacked the Turks with the results that we know. The Turks lost practically all their land in Europe, and that was the state of affairs when we got to the eve of the Great War. The Young Turks in six years had done practically nothing. They had all the time been engaged in a struggle with foreign enemies, and the era of great reforms that they had promised had never been introduced. The Parliamentary régime had not brought popular freedom, nor was there any great freedom of the Press. Nevertheless, it is true that at that time throughout Islam there was the very greatest sympathy felt for the struggle of the Young Turks against Abdul Hamid first, and secondly against these blows of fortune that rained upon them. I well remember when the first Balkan War was declared in the autumn of 1912, and news reached me on my way down to the Persian Gulf at a village near Persepolis. There was an old Persian there who was a Shiah, and one might not have expected great sympathy for Turkey from him, but I remember him sitting in my tent, and when I told him that Greece, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Serbia, had all got together for the first time, and had attacked Turkey, his distress was the most unexpected and genuine thing I had seen for a long time. "Oh, God," he said, "they have all hurled themselves on Turkey." I went to Aligarh, the Mussulman University in India, a month later, and there I found a most real feeling amongst all the students, and they were running a fund for the Red Crescent, a fund of which we have heard a good deal since owing to the allegations made as to the way in which the money was diverted. But that fund was being run by Mohammed Ali under the patronage and with the approval of the Viceroy, and that period, I think, that pre-war period, does definitely mark a crystallizing of sympathy in the East for Turkey in a series of misfortunes. Then the war came, and the Turks, although they had had all this series of misfortunes, and were almost, apparently, beaten to the ground, nevertheless made what was superficially the very astonishing choice of plunging into a new struggle, and plunging in against us. It puzzled us very much, and made many of us indignant, but it is worth while to consider what was the reason. The reason briefly is in that word Russia. In a sense you may put all your other reasons, such as the buying of Ministers, into the waste-paper basket. Through our rapprochement with Russia we had for the previous five years been alienating Turkey from France and ourselves, and I hope it will be understood that I am not in the least criticizing our entente with Russia, or the alliance of France

with Russia. I am not for a moment suggesting that it was open for Sir Edward Grey to seek insurance against Germany in the form of Turkey rather than Russia; what I am trying to do is merely to trace cause and affect, and to state facts. I am not at all suggesting that the policy of Sir Edward Grey in cultivating an insurance with Russia was wrong, because, as a matter of fact, we all know that he was proved right in 1914, when the moment came and our insurance with Russia proved a valuable asset. But we insured with Russia at the expense of our friendship with Turkey. The Young Turks when they came into power in 1908 were all of them Germanophobes. Marshal Von Biberstein, the German Ambassador, fell, overnight, from the top of the diplomatic ladder to the bottom. He was Abdul Hamid's friend, and regarded as his adviser by the Young Turks, and he was the least considered member of the Diplomatic Corps the day after the revolution. Izzet Pasha, who had been one of the Sultan's principal creatures, and is supposed to have done very well out of the construction of the Hadjaz Railway, had to fly from the Young Turks. He took refuge in the German Embassy, but from the German Embassy he was smuggled on board a British boat in the Golden Horn, and I well remember—I was at Salonika at the time—I remember Enver Bey coming to me and asking me whether the British Consul at Salonika could be induced to get the ship stopped at the Dardanelles. They wanted Izzet. Naturally, that was a thing that could not be done once he had taken refuge on the British boat. Enver Bey then said: "Of course, we do not bear the British any malice. We clearly understand what has happened. This is the parting kick of Germany. She has put the unpopular person that took refuge with her on a British boat." That was their general attitude. They were very enthusiastic about France, because they regarded her as the mother of the revolution. A great many of the Young Turks also had been in exile in Paris; and they were very enthusiastic about Britain, because they regarded Britain as the mother of Parliaments. When they opened their first Parliament in the following winter it was the occasion of an extraordinary demonstration outside the British Embassy. Sir Nicholas O'Connor had died in the summer of 1908, and the new Ambassador, Sir Gerald Lowther, had just arrived. After that things continued to change very rapidly. The German Ambassador was a man of outstanding ability. He had greater ability, I think, than his colleagues at the Bosphorus at that time, and he set himself to begin again at the beginning and to cultivate the Young Turks. Our policy was very unfortunate. In March, 1909, you will remember, the counter-revolution took place in Turkey, engineered by Abdul Hamid himself. Enver hurried from Berlin, and put himself at the head of the Salonika Young Turk army, and they marched on Constantinople. The British

Embassy did a thing then which has never been forgotten, and which finished us in twentieth-century Turkey for a long time after. The British Ambassador sent the First Dragoman of the Embassy out to San Stefano to ask these troops not to enter the city—an act which was taken, of course, as siding with the counter-revolution. That request was disregarded, the army entered, and there was fighting. Sultan Abdul Hamid was removed from the throne, and the Young Turks obtained their triumph; but, as I say, it completely altered our relations, which the previous July had been so wonderfully friendly. The following year, in the spring of 1910, Enver made his first visit to London. He was then at the Embassy in Berlin. He made it perfectly clear to me that Turkish policy at that time was undergoing a completely new orientation. Enver stated in conversation in London that Marshal Von Biberstein had convinced the Young Turks that, although Abdul Hamid had been a despot internally, he had been a wise and farseeing patriot in foreign policy; that Russia was the enemy; that Germany was their support against Russia; and that England would not support them. Enver stated that the Turks regarded this new policy with the greatest aversion and the greatest unwillingness. To them it seemed that the power that held India should be allied with Turkey against Russia, and he said that if Britain would agree to that, Turkey would at all times be willing to enter into a hard-and-fast treaty, so that whenever there was war between Russia and Britain Turkey would fight on the Caucasian front against Russia. That was impossible. I am not criticizing that. I do not think that Turkey would have been an adequate insurance against Germany. But it explains how Turkey was thinking. Then came the war itself. Now, there was an incident that happened at the beginning of the war which the Prime Minister should remember before making those remarks about closing the Straits. At the beginning of the war there was another war about to begin, and it was only prevented by the Great War. Mr. Venizelos, representing Greece, had gone up to Vienna to meet the Turkish Foreign Minister in a last desperate attempt to come to an agreement. If they did not come to an agreement there would undoubtedly have been war between Greece and Turkey at the end of July, 1914. There was a naval race. Greece had bought two cruisers from the United States, and Turkey had ordered two dreadnoughts in England. The Turks had had it brought home to them in the Balkan War that they must have some sea power, that the Greeks otherwise were too much for them. They had not any money, so they had a whip-up. The Turkish Navy League made a great commotion, and it was made a question of religion, and so on; everybody came forward, and enough money was subscribed by the faithful to pay for the dreadnoughts. Those two dreadnoughts were no ordinary ships in the eyes

of the Turks. They represented to them a great crusade, if we may use the word, and a great hope. The meeting in Vienna never came off, because of the complications over the Sarajevo murder. Mr. Venizelos got as far as Trieste, and had to turn back, and never met his colleague. The race went on, and Greece drew ahead. At the very last moment, just when the Great War was breaking out, the two Greek cruisers got through the Straits of Gibraltar—that is to say, the two cruisers which Greece had bought from the United States. The two Turkish dreadnoughts were still in British yards, and not quite complete. That was the situation. One of the first things we did the moment war was declared was to impound those two dreadnoughts, and give Turkey a huge cheque which she could not cash. In the light of subsequent history we can see that it would have been a good deal cheaper to have merely left those two dreadnoughts in the yards, and announce, as was perfectly true, that we could no longer, owing to the war, spare the labour to complete them. The events that happened with Turkey were certainly not worth the windfall of two dreadnoughts to the Admiralty. Unfortunately, however, there was no one to put those facts in that light to the Admiralty, and they quite brusquely seized those two dreadnoughts. There was a storm of indignation in Turkey, and when in the same week the *Göben* and the *Breslau* came racing to the Dardanelles to get away from the British Admiral, the Straits were opened to them, because everybody in Turkey regarded it as a kind of intervention of Providence to compensate them with the German ships for the dreadnoughts which the British Government had confiscated. The German vessels were not equal to two dreadnoughts, but they were two ships. Those two German ships, of course, became a vital factor in the situation. The Turks very soon realized that if they came into the war on the German side they would have the *Göben* and *Breslau* with them, and that, on the other hand, if they did not come into the war on the German side, the *Göben* and the *Breslau* would be very unpleasant customers indeed, dominating Constantinople. Those are facts that I believe ought to be borne in mind when we consider why it was that Turkey entered the war against us. The Allies came to Turkey, and they gave her assurances. No assurances were really any good to her. Nothing would convince her. We told her that Russia would not attack Constantinople, and that if she would only remain neutral she would be guaranteed possession, undisturbed possession, of the Turkish Empire as it was at that moment. The Turks did not accept those assurances, and it is difficult to see how they could have complete confidence in them, although they were given in complete sincerity. Supposing the Allies had won the war, with an Imperial Russia playing a great part in victory, it seemed almost certain that sooner or later, and much sooner rather

than later, a conquering Russia would have turned South. France and Britain would no doubt, in view of the assurances they had given Turkey, have tried to prevent that, but it is difficult to see how they could have done so. The promised liberties of Poland would have left Russia without any great compensation on the west, and it would have suited the Czar very much better to expand his Empire in the South and in the East amongst Mussulmans, whom he might hope to win over to allegiance much more readily than the industrial populations of Western Europe; and, of course, there was always the trend towards warm water. So those assurances were not accepted by the Turks at all at their face value. Then came the war itself. Before the war we had told Turkey that if she would remain neutral she would possess Constantinople, but the moment we came in we said Russia should possess Constantinople, and in January, 1917, we made a further statement in which we definitely put Turkey outside the pale of civilization; and said that whoever had Constantinople Turkey must not have it. In January, 1918, we said that certainly Turkey, if she was prepared to deal with us and leave Germany, might have the Thracian homelands and Constantinople. Turkey, although very nearly down and out, struggled on on the other side till the defection of Bulgaria at the end of September, 1918. Then she made peace. But she got no mercy at all, and it was not natural that we should give her full consideration in that moment of victory. But it seems to me that the Allies made two great errors at that time. One was that they used the sufferings of the Armenians as a stick to beat the Turk with, when they themselves were utterly incapable of doing anything whatever for Armenia. The only people who have ever done anything for Armenia are the Russians, who have set up a small Armenian Republic. All the Allied talk has ended in nothing whatever being done for Armenia. The second point was that they utterly underrated the reality of the Kemalist movement. We regarded the Kemalists simply as desperadoes outstanding from the war, a mess that would have to be tidied up presently when things more important would leave time for it. We utterly failed to see that the Kemalist movement was the real seat of the Turkish National spirit, and that the Government in Constantinople had been deprived of all weight and influence by the fact of the Allied Army sitting over it. Up to that point we had acted with our Allies. There was no particular reason why we should be criticized individually, but after that the situation changed. France up till then had been more drastic towards the Turks than we had. In Cilicia she had very vigorously championed the cause of the Armenians, but she disengaged herself from Cilicia, and at the fall of Venizelos, when the Greeks brought Constantine back, France took a definite stand. From that day she has gained prestige with the Turks, and we have

lost it. It is easy for us to criticize the French for treating with Kemal, but remember that the French were very unpopular in Syria, and that they were surrounded by enemies in Palestine and Trans-Jordania, and that if they had persisted in the attitude which they took up first when in Cilicia, and had the Turks against them, it would have been impossible for them to stay safely in Syria after we had taken Feisal, who was their known enemy, and put him in Mesopotamia; when we put Feisal in Mesopotamia and Abdullah in Trans-Jordania we forced France to seek reinsurance in Angora. In Arabia we have been unfortunate. We selected for support a family which has been unfavourably known in Islam for a very long time, because of their exactions at Mecca from pilgrims. I do not think it is true to say that the Sherifian family has in any sense the Arab world behind it, not to mention other races of Islam. Islam is aware that the Sultan in name is Khalif, but in fact no longer Khalif. The Sultan is at Constantinople, but we have set up a King in Mecca to recognize us as overlord. The essence of the Khilafat is to protect the holy places at Mecca and Medina. The Arabs before the war, to a large extent, kept their own end up, but in times of crises they have always recognized the authority of Constantinople. Now there is no question of authority at Constantinople. There is no actual Khalif left at all in Islam, and we can only rid ourselves of the Khilafat problem by refusing to intervene in Arabian politics. The Khilafat problem will have to be settled by Islam itself, and it does not matter who is set up. Probably someone will emerge from the struggle by force of arms; the Khilafat has always been settled in that way, and Islam recognizes force as an arbitrator; but the present grievance is that the arbitration in the matter rests with us. This brings me back to the real point, when Russia dropped out, and we were left alone with Islam, or rather Islam was left alone with us. Now, at the Armistice we unfortunately saw in that only a favourable moment for ourselves. We said: "We have always been friendly with Islam, and it has always regarded us as being the people on the side of liberty and Constitutions, whereas Russia has been the friend of despots. Now is our time. Let us increase our prestige in Islam." But Islam was thinking about the whole subject in a totally different manner. Moslems saw that if Britain should become restless they had no counterpoise. At that very moment we decided to be extremely restless; we came into Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, Kurdistan, and Persia. We had our line of communications right up to North-West Persia. We were in the Caucasus at Tiflis and Baku, and across the Caspian in Merv and Meshed and Northern Persia. At the same time we embarked on a policy, in the approved Russian style, of using our Political Officers to settle tribal affairs, and the result was that we raised against us right throughout Islam an

enormous wave of distrust. At the same time the Bolsheviks absolutely renounced all the old Imperial ambitions of Russia. They said: "We renounce all concessions, we renounce all privileges." Consequently, instead of the old position in which Russia was the great advancing land-grabbing power, while England, on the whole, might be looked upon as a support, the Bolsheviks were regarded by the Turks as the last word in liberalism and advanced thought—in fact, as fools—whereas England had become the dangerous power. It was a natural conclusion. Bolshevism as a creed or social theory—and I think most members here who have been longer in particular districts of the East than I have will agree with me—Bolshevism as a social theory I do not think is likely to establish a hold on Islam at all. "But here at our side," thought the Turks, "are the Russians, who are making a mess of their own country, and are now willing to ally themselves with us. They do not want any concessions or any privileges, and, in fact, are our only support against the Allies." Therefore, they naturally expect in a diplomatic tussle with the Allies to have their supporters with them. In the whole of our history I do not think it has ever occurred to us before that we can possibly settle the question of the Straits without reference to Russia. There is no real point in attempting a settlement unless both the Power that holds Constantinople and the Black Sea Powers are consulted. A settlement arrived at under such conditions could never be a stable one. I have talked too long, and I only wish in conclusion to point to the fact that we are now being driven by an argument about prestige into an impasse. We have been told that we are sitting in Chanak because we are preventing the Turks there from crossing into Europe. Well, now, that statement of facts does not at all seem borne out by the events that have happened in the last fortnight. We have to make concession after concession, and we have told the Turks that they can have Adrianople and Eastern Thrace. As late as last Friday morning we were told in the Press that the newest terms from the Turks were utterly unacceptable, but the very same afternoon Lord Curzon went to Paris to accept them. Why was that? There can be only one reason. It seems to me that if we had had no force at Chanak, and had acted with our Allies, we should have been in a position to discuss matters in Europe with the Turks. But all through these four years we have been misled by the word "prestige," and have utterly failed to see that the real prestige in the East depends upon a policy which has been thought out, which has the nation behind it, and which will not involve us in contradictions or the desertion of our friends. We have not had that policy. We have been entangled in that way at Smyrna, in Persia, and in Russia through lack of co-ordination, and through a post-Armistice movement forward in which the nation has never been taken into

confidence. I submit that as long as we go on in the same way we shall never get right with Islam. We have got to go back to the beginning, and start humbly and sincerely; get back to our own Empire, and prove that we have not got a restless adventurous spirit, and that we really wish to be friendly with Islam. Our restlessness is now making us feared as Imperial Russia was feared, and if the Government at the present moment were to resign I do not see, unless something drastic is done, that we have any guarantee that we shall get that policy from either a Liberal or Labour Government. As you will remember, my Lord, there was a time when, with Lord Lansdowne at the Foreign Office, we had a policy which a Government, although it was losing every by-election, was able to carry forward with the united support of the whole nation. Although we are not likely ever again to have a Foreign Minister allowed a free hand as Lord Lansdowne was—that is to say, not forced to consult the nation—it is the fact that unless we get that basis of national policy we shall not be able to speak any longer with outside nations at all, because policy depends both upon arms and the men, and we now see that the instrument upon which policy depends has broken in the Cabinet's hand. They have not got the country behind them in their policy towards Islam, and that would be an impossible position for a Liberal Government, or a Labour Government equally. That is the fault. It seems to me that the whole question of our policy in the East, the whole question of our various adventures in Arabia, Constantinople, and the East, should be liquidated at an all-party conference. In that way we should get a national policy for whatever Government or Cabinet came into power, a policy that could be explained to the men of military age in this country, who, after all, are the cannon fodder upon whom we have to look in the last resort to carry out a policy. Unless you have the men of military age behind you in this country it is quite impossible for any Government to carry on a foreign policy, and you can only be sure of that if you remove your Imperial and foreign policy from the sphere of party politics. (Applause.)

Sir ALFRED HAMILTON GRANT: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—It is very seldom that one can listen to any person speaking for over an hour, and at the end of it be able to say that one has agreed with practically every word that has been said. But that is my own feeling with regard to the extraordinarily interesting lecture we have just heard. I congratulate Major Moore not only upon the lucidity and the courage with which he has stated the case for Turkey, but I congratulate him also on the amazing temperance with which he has referred to the policy of the present Government. (Hear, hear.) As one who has had some twenty-five years' experience of Moslems in

Northern India, on the North-West Frontier of India and in Afghanistan, I should like to mention one or two of the more popular fallacies which seem to me to be at present liable to mislead popular opinion upon this very vital question in the Near East. The first popular fallacy is that the Moslem is an unreliable person, that he is perfidious, and that you cannot trust his word. My own experience has been otherwise. I do not say that all Moslems are truth-tellers, any more than I say, in the words of the old Greek philosopher, "all Cretans are liars" (laughter); but I do say this, that a Moslem, whether a Moslem barbarian or a civilized Moslem, when he enters upon an engagement, does so with the intention of carrying it out, and, as a rule, does carry it out. We have had ample experience of that in Afghanistan. In 1857 the Amir Dost Mohammed was true to his bond. During the Great War the Amir Habiballah was true to his bond when he might have embarrassed us very seriously, and he died a martyr to his good faith to us. The second popular delusion is that generosity is mistaken by Moslems for weakness; that is not the case—far from it. His Highness the Agha Khan lately emphasized this point in a letter to *The Times*. The Moslem is perfectly wide awake. He knows that when a strong Power is lenient it is not necessarily because it is frightened. He does not misinterpret things. But in my own experience in India I have seen so many foolish things done through fear of appearing weak that I can only trust that this error will not again lead us into disaster in the present crisis. We could easily have retired from Chanak when the French did, or, better still, after the French did, and issued a dignified manifesto at the time that we were doing so in the interests of world peace, because there was a risk that a small force located there might lead to incidents and collisions which might lead to more deplorable results in the end. We could have done so without risk of misinterpretation, without being called weak, with great dignity, and obviously acting in the interests of the world's peace. We did not do so, but probably shall do so yet. The present Government are to my own personal knowledge the more to blame in that at the time immediately after the Armistice when these questions came up, many of the evils which Major Arthur Moore has so ably presented, and other considerations chiefly connected with our Indian Empire, were most forcibly pressed upon the Government. The case was presented with the greatest clearness, and the dangers were foreshadowed with amazing accuracy. We predicted troubles in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Kurdistan, and Afghanistan, and they came about almost up to time; and the Government—the responsible members of the Government—had laughed at our warnings. They said that the whole Moslem business was a bogie, and that any Khilafat agitation was fictitious and nonsense. What is the result? We have had the Treaty of Sèvres torn

up and thrown in our faces. We have eaten dirt, and been led to the verge of a fresh war for no adequate reason. We have great interests and great obligations from the Mediterranean to the China seaboard, and if we are to safeguard those interests it is important that Islam should be a friend and not an enemy. Turkey is the leader of Islam, and unless and until we can arrive at a *modus vivendi* with Turkey and establish reasonable relations with what is left of the Turkish Empire, we shall not be able to safeguard those interests or, what I think more important, discharge those obligations.

Sir WILFRID MALLESON: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I regret that I am unable entirely to agree with either the lecturer or my friend Sir Hamilton Grant in what they have said on this interesting subject. The lecturer has given us an imposing list of places visited, and one might infer, if one did not know better, that in each and all the places mentioned there was not only virulent hatred of the British, but also passionate devotion for the Turks. I submit any such inference would be grossly misleading. The lecturer has put the Turkish case in an extremely favourable light, but in his endeavours to show how his countrymen were always wrong he has been less than just and by no means impartial. Whilst including amongst Turkish grievances the annexation of Bosnia in 1908 and the Tripolitan War of 1911, he has omitted to say that neither of these events had any countenance from the Government of this country, and that in each case the aggressor was the close ally of the German ruler who posed as being Turkey's powerful protector. When, too, I heard the lecturer definitely including Roumania as being in the Balkan coalition which attacked Turkey in 1912, I felt less confidence in the accuracy of some of his other statements.

I confess that I am left in some astonishment as to what exactly the lecturer and Sir Hamilton Grant want. The latter told us we had eaten dirt; both apparently desire that we should go on eating unlimited dirt in order to placate the Turks, to surrender everything, to place Turkey in a position even more favourable than that she occupied before the war, and thus to appease the Muslim world. I cannot agree with any such policy. That the appetite comes in eating is peculiarly true of the Eastern world, and were we to indulge in the orgy of surrender and self-abasement apparently recommended I make no doubt that our relations with our Mahomedan fellow-subjects would end by being infinitely worse than they are now.

What are the facts? We are all familiar with the argument, apparently favoured by the previous speakers, that Turkey, a poor, innocent, helpless country, was coerced into the war by Germany, and that the arrival in the Bosphorus of the *Göben* and *Breslau* left her no option in the matter. I believe any such notion to be a mere travesty of the facts. The three Turkish leaders of 1914 were Jemal,

Talast, and Enver. In the recently published memoirs of the first named it is definitely recorded that Turkey had signed an offensive and defensive alliance with the Central Powers long before the war actually started. I have no doubt this was the case. When war broke out in August, 1914, I was in Simla for the purpose of initiating the censorship. One of my first acts was to place a rigorous censorship on everything coming from Turkish, Egyptian, and Arabian ports. In this way, two or three months before Turkey actually declared against us, we obtained a great mass of absolutely conclusive evidence that Turkey was in it up to the neck with our enemies. From the very beginning—that is, from August, 1914—a perfect deluge of most inflammatory Pan-Islamic propaganda was issued under Turkish authority, and by the promptness with which this stuff was despatched it is fair to infer that elaborate arrangements for its issue had been made long before. So much for the fiction that Turkey was an innocent country coerced by stronger powers into the war.

I am prepared to agree with the lecturer and with Sir Hamilton Grant that in our handling of the somewhat delicate situation *vis-à-vis* our Mahomedan fellow-subjects consequent on Turkey joining our enemies we have not always been happy. But if at times our actions may have jarred on Indian opinion, at other times we have surely gone to the opposite extreme, and in our endeavour to curry favour—there is no other word for it—we have only earned contempt and ridicule. At the beginning of the war, for instance, the Viceroy himself cut out of the news telegrams, which had already passed the censor in London, practically every reference to Turkey and her increasingly hostile attitude. What was to be expected from this ostrich-like attitude it is difficult to imagine. After the war was over and the Treaty of Sévres signed, another Viceroy issued what can only be described as an abject apology to Indian Mahomedans. I submit that that apology acted as a direct incitement to Indian seditionists to intensify their unscrupulous and inflammatory campaign against us.

What, after all, is the real character of this supposed Pan-Islamic feeling against us? From the lecturer one might infer that there is a solid *bloc* of Mahomedan countries against us and in favour of the Turks. Ask the Arab, the Persian, or any of the inhabitants of Central Asia, whether they want Turkish rule, whether they would join a *jihad* for the purpose of restoring to Turkey her lost dominions, or whether they would subscribe even the smallest coin of their currency in favour of Turkey. The result would be extremely disappointing from the Turcophil point of view. I know, because I have made on the spot, with the help of an admirable staff of officers, many of them Mahomedans, such inquiries. There was a time, both before

and after the fall of Baku in 1918, when a Turkish irruption into Central Asia seemed imminent. Turkish agents swarmed throughout Russian Turkistan and Northern Persia. Caucasian Turks with apparently unlimited money actually came and bought up huge supplies for that "Army of Islam" which was to cross the Caspian, descend on Afghanistan, and, carrying with it myriads of eager martyrs for the faith, was to free India from the cursed rule of the infidel. All this inflammatory speaking and writing had not the slightest result on the peoples of Khorassan, Turkistan, or Western Afghanistan. No one wanted the Turk. His reputation as a ruthless and rapacious ruler had preceded him. I say without hesitation that the idea that all Mahomedans, or even the bulk of them, are in favour of Turkey and against England is a gigantic myth.

By all means let us endeavour, as far as is possible, to bear in mind the legitimate feelings of Indian Mahomedans. But unless we are careful we shall find that Indian Mahomedans, or rather those who pose as their leaders, or those who manipulate those leaders, will demand to control the policy of the Empire. It must not be forgotten how thoroughly artificial, to a large extent, is all this talk of Indian Mahomedan feeling. Islamic grievances in India are largely used as sticks with which to beat the British Government, and as fast as one removed one cause of complaint half a dozen others would immediately arise.

The lecturer has mentioned the present situation in the Straits. I am not a follower of the Government, and distrust all politicians. But although it seems almost dangerous for anyone to express opinions contrary to those daily trumpeted forth by the biggest circulations, I should like to say that I think that in this present matter the Government is right, and that to have withdrawn from Chanak or elsewhere would have had deplorable results. Every day we have the screaming headlines, "Get rid of the war-makers!" My Lord, in my opinion the real war-makers are those who on the platform and in the Press are daily encouraging the Turk to increase his preposterous demands, and who, by seeming to show that at this crisis we are a disunited nation, definitely invite the Turkish forces to take action which could only result in war.

Sir MICHAEL O'DWYER: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—It is interesting to notice that in spite of the sharp division of opinion between the speakers, so far all are agreed on one point, that in our relations with Islamic Asia at present we are in a terrible mess, and that our present Government is mainly responsible for that mess. That is a conclusion which all seem unanimous about. Well, while I do not accept certain statements of the lecturer, I am entirely at one with his main thesis, that it is the duty of Great Britain, in view of her long and close connection with Islam, to act as the interpreter

of Islam in the difficulties which are facing the world at present, and which Islam has to deal with as well as ourselves. I am also in agreement with his final conclusion, that to enable us to perform that duty it is essential we should have a national policy, and that we cannot have a national policy until we have lifted this question out of the domain of party politics. (Applause.) From the very beginning of our dealings with Turkey—indeed, with all Islamic nations—the fact that we have had no national policy has been our bane. At one time we have had the Liberals under Mr. Gladstone denouncing the Turk and saying that he must be turned out of Europe bag and baggage. We have had Mr. Gladstone appealing to the divine figure from the North to execute that pleasant but rather difficult task. On the other hand, we have had the Conservative party condoning the various atrocities on the Christian peoples, Greeks, Armenians, Bulgarians, by Turkey, and saying the Turk must be supported even in Europe as a counterpoise against Russia. The root of our trouble with Islamic nations is that we have had no national policy. There is a Persian proverb which I am sure will appeal to the lecturer:

“Ním Mullah, khatra-i-imán,
Ním Hakím, khatra-i-ján.”

“If you learn your theology from a man who is only half priest or half mullah, your religion will be in danger; and if you allow yourselves to be treated by a half-fledged doctor, your life will be in danger.”

I think our politicians who have been dealing with this question are in the position of the half priest and half doctor; they only know one-half of their business; they have never tried to learn it all; and that, after all, is inseparable from party politics. The party politician only wants to know one side of the case—that side of the case which he can most favourably present in the Press or Parliament or on the platform; he does not trouble to get to know all the case; all he wants is enough to enable him to answer a question and make the best cry he can for his party. Until we secure that this system is done away with, and that this country is able to rely, not on the “ním Mullah” and the “ním Hakím,” but on people who have no political axe to grind, on trained diplomats and trained administrators, we cannot, I believe, expect any real improvement in dealing with important foreign problems. There are only two remarks on points of fact connected with the lecture which I wish to say a word about. I agree with Sir Wilfrid Maleson that the lecturer, and I think Sir Hamilton Grant, fall into error through having a conception that Islam is synonymous with the Angora Turks. But the Angora Turks represent only a very small section, though at present a powerful section, in Islam, and their dominance, if there is any disposition to extend it, will be resented not only by Arabs, but by Persians,

Afghans, and the Mahomedans of Central Asia. I also agree to a large extent with what Sir Wilfrid Malletson said about the bogey of the Khilafat movement. As it started it was a bogey. Owing to very effective propaganda and to errors of the British authorities in tackling it, and, above all, to the three years' delay in the decision of the peace terms with Turkey, it has become a real danger. But in its inception it was a bogey, and it has become a danger only through our mishandling. We mishandled it through fear—fear of the unknown. I was in Simla when the Sherifian revolution took place in 1916, and I was asked by those in authority, would not there be dangerous excitement among the Mahomedans in the Punjab over the revolt of the Sherif against the Sultan? My reply was this: "There will probably be one meeting held this evening at Lahore, attended by no more than ten people, and it will be the first and the last held in Punjab." That meeting was held and attended by five people. It was the first and the last in my time. To give you a further proof—I have told it once before—of how essentially this thing was originally a bogey, I would quote the words used by one of the Khilafat leaders, Fazl-ul Hakk, at Dacca. In 1920 he said that several leaders of the Khilafat movement had admitted that they did not care one brass farthing for the Khilafat, but that their sole desire was, under cover of the Khilafat agitation, to revive the days of rebellion and revolution in India. (Applause.) They have succeeded very largely in that desire owing to our mistaken tolerance of their methods, and our delay in the settlement with Turkey. (Renewed applause.)

Sir VALENTINE CHIROL: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—There are one or two points of history which I think the lecturer in his very interesting address has rather overlooked. The first is that the practical alliance between Turkey and Germany began long before there was any rapprochement between England and Russia. It began in the days of Abdul Hamid, and it reached its apogee after the German Emperor went to Damascus in 1898, after masquerading a few days before as a crusader at Jerusalem and, at the tomb of Saladin, paid homage to the Sultan as Khalif, as the spiritual head—he said, with his usual exaggeration—of three hundred million Mahomedans. That was the first recognition of the Sultan's Pan-Islamic claims—the first recognition by any European potentate—and from that moment the alliance between Germany and Turkey ripened steadily. It suffered a momentary eclipse at the time of the Turkish revolution, but it was revived rapidly, the Young Turks carrying on exactly on the same lines as the Old Turks with Germany; and according to a mass of German and Turkish evidence, the war-treaty of alliance was signed some time before Turkey came into the war, and before even the British Admiralty foreclosed on those two cruisers. I would ask

Major Moore whether really he can make it a grievance that at the beginning of a war which strained all our naval resources—we have it on the highest authority that our naval resources were frightfully strained during the whole war—can he make it a grievance for Turkey that we should have detained, as it was absolutely our right to detain, and as other Powers have done before in similar circumstances, two powerful ships that were almost ready and in our dockyards? There is no real case for Turkey. Turkey entered wantonly into the war. One other remark I will make. He speaks of the feeling of Mahomedan Indians, of their sympathy for Turkey and of their gratitude towards us formerly for having saved Turkey. I would remind him that it was only one year after the end of the Crimean War, where we saved Turkey, that a large part of Mahomedan India rose against us in the Mutiny, and wanted to restore the King of Delhi against us! With regard to Enver, of whom the lecturer speaks with surprising friendliness, I would ask him whether he has read Liman von Sanders's book, one of the best of war books, written by the head of the German staff in Turkey during the war. He has produced a book quite like the old German military books, wonderfully dispassionate, and with no bitterness against the Allies. His only bitterness is against Enver, whom he denounces as having lost the war for Turkey by his corruption, venality, tyranny, and the way in which he starved his soldiers in order to fill his own pockets. That is the Turk that we have in general to deal with. Kemal, I admit, is a much finer type of man, and von Sanders pays him, and him only, a great tribute as being an honest man. But what has he got behind him? The same men that Enver had. The whole theory that Islam is united round Turkey I cannot accept. In Egypt there was no feeling of the kind unless out of resentment of our treatment of Egypt—no love of Turkey. In Arabia there is certainly none, and I do not see why we should be asked to sacrifice the King of the Hejaz—whatever may be said against him—who rendered us very valuable services during the war, to placate the Turks who went into the war against us and certainly prolonged it for two years. I have nothing against Islam itself. I have never had. But as I said not long ago in an address to this Association, I regard Turkey as the Power which has been a blight upon Islam since she first appeared upon the scene, long after the finest period of Islamic history, and a blight on every country she has ruled over.

The LECTURER: My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I will not detain you very long. Sir Wilfrid Malletson criticized my speech on the ground of inaccuracy in details, and he brought two instances against me. One was that of Bosnia in 1908. I cannot have made myself clear if I have been understood in that sense. I was not suggesting that we did any wrong against Turkey in 1908 when Aus-

tria acted in that way in Bosnia. I was giving a history of the failures of the Young Turks between 1908 and 1914, and showing how they had to withstand blow after blow from outside. I can only remember two cases in which we penalized them; one of these was when the British Ambassador tried to prevent their army entering Constantinople. The other was when, in order to please our French allies, we refused to allow a British bank, the National Bank of Turkey, to make a loan to the Young Turks. The National Bank of Turkey had undercut the Ottoman Bank. The French were very much annoyed about it, and Sir Edward Grey, to please the French, made the National Bank withdraw. The Turks were so extremely annoyed that they paid a higher rate to get the money from Germany. His other instance was when he said that when enumerating the States of the Balkan Federation in 1912, Greece, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Serbia, I mentioned Roumania. If Sir Wilfrid Malletson is correct, I was unaware I had done so. I am very well aware that Roumania was not a member of the Balkan Federation, and did not come into any war until July, 1913, the second war, when she came in against Bulgaria. But I do not see that that affects the course of my argument very seriously. His third point was that he represented me as saying that Arabia was in sympathy with Turkey, and Persia in sympathy with Turkey. I was not aware of saying that; my point is not that there is natural sympathy between Arabia or Persia and Turkey, but that we have made a bond of sympathy in a most disastrous way. There is a chord of sympathy in a common hostility to Great Britain which exists in Persia, Mesopotamia, Turkey, and, unfortunately, in India; I would go further, and say that it is a chord of sympathy throughout the East. I speak with all respect, but I think that if Sir Michael O'Dwyer is counting on the differences inside Islam, of which I am well aware, or the differences in the East, he is banking on something not reliable. I was extremely struck in Kabul, in conversing with certain Sirdars there, when they said to me that they entirely approved of a rapprochement between Moslems and Hindus in India. They said: "Islam is desperate; we are like people shut up in a room and forced to break down the door. We do not want to work with Hindus because we love them, but because it is our duty to make friends and work together until we are able to accomplish something." Their feeling is a feeling of desperation. Some cannot believe it; others believe in it, and, like Sir Hamilton Grant, agree with me. I do not think there is any way of resolving that difficulty; but, as regards Sir Valentine Chirol's point, I am, of course, perfectly well aware—and I think I stated it—that Abdul Hamid and the Kaiser through Marshal von Biberstein were closely together, but there was a distinct break when the Young Turkish revolution came in 1908. At that time Sir Edward Grey

very vigorously championed the Young Turks, and there was a definite rapprochement with us, all of which came to an end in the following spring, when the incident happened over the army entering Constantinople. Again I am not saying that our policy was wrong; I think I said that I agree with our insurance with Russia, but, knowing that this was so, I see no point at all in accusing Turkey of treachery, or being surprised that Turkey came into the war against us, if she had this old and long alliance with Germany of which Sir Valentine Chirol speaks. Why Ministers should say that Turkish Ministers were bribed . . .

Sir VALENTINE CHIROL: I did not say that.

The LECTURER: I know you did not, Sir Valentine, but my point is that we were all, or should have been, perfectly well aware that the Turkish entente with Germany existed, and therefore it is not right that representatives of the British Government should publicly make these statements. As to its being considered reasonable to suppose that Turkey would appreciate the position of the British Admiralty—if we suppose that, we are utterly incapable of putting ourselves in the other fellow's place. It is impossible to suppose that Turkey should appreciate any such thing. The money had been collected by the Turkish Navy League, and was suddenly seized by England; we had a right to do it, I agree, but to say that Turkey should appreciate and understand it—it seems to me beyond the power of human nature. We might have kept those ships until the following November, and then, when Turkey was in against us, the whole question would have been settled. But instead of that we confiscated them at the beginning. I think that deals with all the points that have been brought against me, except one last point. I did not suggest that we should desert the King of the Hejaz. I think we have done extremely well for the Sherifian family; we have provided them with three thrones; we have put them there. Sir Valentine thinks that we should keep them there by British bayonets; but I think that if they represent the Arabs, let us get out, and let them remain if they can.

The CHAIRMAN: I have no desire to contribute views of my own to the most interesting discussion which we have listened to; I shall only ask you to join with me in conveying our best thanks to Major Moore for his very lucid and excellent lecture.

A hearty round of applause was given, and this ended the meeting.

THE KNIGHTS OF ST. JOHN IN RHODES AND ASIA MINOR

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., on Tuesday, October 31, 1922, when Dr. Gilbert Bagnani lectured on "The Knights of St. John in Rhodes and Asia Minor." The Right Hon. Lord Carnock presided.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I am happy to say we are honoured this afternoon with the presence of the Italian Ambassador, and I am sure we welcome His Excellency with all cordiality. It is now my pleasure to introduce to you Dr. Bagnani, who will lecture to us this afternoon upon "The Knights of St. John in Rhodes and Asia Minor." I think perhaps it will be a pleasant relaxation, in the political turmoil in which we are at present living, to go back for awhile to the Middle Ages, and listen to a recital by so competent an authority as Dr. Bagnani on the deeds of the Knights of St. John in the Eastern Levant. (Applause.)

THE LECTURE

I think that few of those who generously contributed to the appeal on behalf of the Red Cross and the Order of St. John a few weeks ago realized that the Order of St. John is the most ancient and illustrious order of chivalry in Europe. All are familiar with the splendid work it has done, few with the fact that it is the sole surviving link with the Crusades. Early in the eleventh century some merchants of Amalfi were allowed by the Caliph of Egypt to found within the walls of Jerusalem a church and a hospice for pilgrims. This hospice was tended by a body which called itself the Poor Brethren of the Hospital of St. John. It was then, even as it is now, a purely healing and humanitarian fraternity, and to-day the Order, having lost its Sovereign and Military character, may well lay claim to have returned to the Apostolic simplicity of its earliest years. But the events of the Crusades caused the Brethren to assume a strong military organization similar to that of the Knights Templar.* Pope Pascal II. formally established the Brotherhood as a Military and Religious Order of Knighthood, governed according to the rule of St. Augustine, with Raymond du Puy as Grand Master. Since the Order was international, its members were divided into seven nations or *tongues*—Provence, Auvergne, France, Italy, Spain, England, Ger-

* There is fair evidence that the Hospitallers assumed a military organization in 1118-19, and that the Templars did not do so till 1128-30. *Vide* Whitworth Porter's "History of the Knights of Malta," edition 1888, p. 28.—A. C. Y.

many. In 1462 the Tongue of Spain was divided into the two Tongues of Arragon and Castille. The Tongue of Provence took precedence of all the others, since from it had come the founder of the Order, and to this day the west wind, the wind that brought the galleys of the Religion to the shores of Anatolia, is called in Rhodes *Provenza*. The Knights of each Tongue were commanded by a Bailly, who had also charge of some special branch of the administration: the Bailly of Provence was the Grand Preceptor and ruled the Order in the absence of the Grand Master; that of Auvergne the Marshal; that of France the Grand Hospitaller in charge of the Hospital; that of Italy the Admiral; that of Spain the Draper in charge of the stores of clothing. The Bailly of England was called the Turcopolier, and was in command of the Turcopolæ, a body of light cavalry recruited locally among the natives of the Islands; it was his duty, in Rhodes, to police the coasts of the island and to prevent piratical raids. One Turcopolier, Sir William Dawnay, in 1456 was charged with what we would call *la police des mœurs*, so the office can have been no sinecure. Finally, the Baillies of Germany and Castille were the Grand Bailly and Grand Chancellor. It is curious to find in an institution of the Middle Ages such a well defined international organization, and the Order can claim to have preceded Mazzini with the doctrine of language as a test of nationality. Moreover, in each country the numerous and wealthy possessions of the Order were administered locally by separate Priories. In battle the arms of the Order were the white cross on the red ground which, bordered with azure, are still the arms of the House of Savoy; the eight-pointed cross, which stands for the eight Beatitudes, was the religious and civil emblem of the Order.

In 1187 Jerusalem fell before Saladin, and the Sovereign and Military Order of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem withdrew to Acre, which has ever since then been known as St. John of Acre. Despite prodigies of valour, in 1291 Acre was captured by the Saracens, and the Order took refuge in the Castle of Kolossi, in the Island of Cyprus, a Castle still owned in part by the Grand Priory of England. But the Knights thought that they would be in a far stronger position as independent sovereigns than as guests in a country that might not always be friendly, and so in 1306 the Grand Master, Foulques de Villaret, bought Rhodes and some other islands from a Genoese Admiral, who incidentally did not own the place and had no right to sell it, a kind of contract not unknown even at the present day. Two years later the Grand Master was able to secure by force of arms the islands of Rhodes, Nisiros, Kos, Leros, and some other smaller ones. The Order had got a home only just in time. Had they not done so, there is little doubt that they would have suffered the terrible fate of the Order of the Temple, which was

suppressed a few years later. Eventually a considerable part of the riches of the Knights Templar were devolved to the Order of St. John, whose power greatly increased in consequence. But the first years in Rhodes proved to be very difficult, and in 1321 the Florentine bankers Perruzzi and Bardi lent the Order, at 6 per cent., 324,000 gold florins, corresponding to about half a million sterling. The Knights took a leading part in the Crusade of Pope John XXII., which in 1344 captured Smyrna, whose defence was in 1375 entrusted by Europe to the Order alone. In 1402 the hordes of Timour the Lame overwhelmed the small but valiant garrison of Smyrna. At once the Grand Master, Philibert de Naillac, decided that the Order had to have a base on the mainland of Anatolia, both for offensive and defensive measures. He chose the abandoned Acropolis of the famous Carian city of Halicarnassos, and there built the formidable Castle of St. Peter, which, corrupted by the Greeks into Petrunion, gave to the town its modern Turkish name of Budrum. A German Knight, Henry Schlegelholz, at that time Captain of the Castle of Kos, was charged to build it. The position of the Castle of St. Peter, about an hour and a half's sailing north of the Castle of Kos, was of the greatest strategic importance. These two Castles, both in the hands of the Order, commanded the channel of approach to Rhodes itself, and thus in 1522 Suleyman was forced to gather his army and fleet for the attack on Rhodes in the Bay of Marmariza, and did not dare proceed directly from Constantinople.

The Castle of Kos (it is a curious coincidence that the Order of the Hospital should have held the birthplace of Hippocrates, the father of medicine) is a magnificent example of a fortress built for defence against attacks both from the sea and from the land.

The harbour itself is small, but was quite sufficient at that time for the galleys of the Order, which cannot have been much larger than the caiques which use it at the present day. The approach from the land is dominated by the great round bastion built by Grand Master Del Carretto, which has three orders of casemates for large cannon, with a very extensive angle of fire. In the distance are seen the hills of the Carian mainland, at the foot of which stands the Castle of Budrum.

The latter is certainly one of the most imposing monuments in the East. Rising on the high ground of the promontory separating the two bays, and dominated by the two Towers of France and Italy, it stands out prominently on the bleak coast of Anatolia. For many years before the war it was the great State prison of the Ottoman Empire, and many disgraced dignitaries were enclosed within its walls. When Newton visited it seventy years ago for his fortunate excavations at Halicarnassos, the Castle was still in a perfect state of preservation. But it has been one of the victims of the Great

War. In 1916 a French cruiser bombarded it severely, and for the next two years hardly any French or English ship that cruised before it failed to send a shell into the walls that their ancestors had raised.

The Castle itself only occupies a small portion, the Acropolis, of the ancient city. The port is still protected by the ancient sub-aqueous mole, and the line of the walls and the site of the theatre can still be distinguished. But the Knights were practical people, not archæologists, and only saw in the ruins of the Carian capital a vast stone quarry which they could utilize to build their stronghold.

The Mausoleum, one of the seven wonders of the world, is now but a fig-garden, and the site itself is only recognizable by the slight rise in the ground. It may be a fancy, but I do not think I have ever tasted such good figs as those I picked on the grave of Mausolus.

But if the Knights destroyed the ancient monuments, they employed their booty well. The Castle rose upon the site of a small Seljuk stronghold, certain portions of which, notably the northern tower and the water-gate, were incorporated in the later defences. A deep moat cut through the narrow neck which joined it to the mainland rendered it almost impregnable from that side from which an attack was most to be feared. The main part of the Castle probably dates from the time of the founder, Grand Master de Naillac, who built it between 1402 and 1421, but at the beginning of the sixteenth century such defences were insufficient to meet the improvements in artillery, and so Grand Master Del Carretto built all across the north side, the only side where an attack with heavy artillery could be feared, a formidable series of bastions of immense thickness, full of casemates for powerful batteries. His predecessor, Blanchefort, built an enormously strong casemate to protect the moat and the landing-stage at the water-gate.

The bastions skirting the moat are noteworthy for the number of the coats of arms with which they are decorated, and for their artistic excellence. On the great round tower which forms the centre of the defences landwards four medallions are grouped round the octagonal cross, which was afterwards called Maltese. It is one of the very rare instances in the monuments of the Knights in the East where this type of cross was used, since it was their emblem in peace and not in war. It is surmounted by the half-figure of St. John the Baptist, protector of the Order, a rough but singularly impressive piece of sculpture; while on the right is the more usual military cross of the Order, and on the left the coat of Grand Master Fluvian; below is a private coat.

Of even greater artistic merit is the group on the bastion to the west of this tower, in which two angels support the arms of the Kingdom of France surmounted by the Royal crown. As a rule the few attempts of the Knights at sculpture were not a great success.

The sculptors were usually soldiers who were quite good at carving the heraldic devices with which they were well familiar, but were quite hopeless at anything else. It is curious to note that the same explanation can be given for the artistic peculiarities of the numerous monuments built by the Roman legions, notably the Arch of Augustus at Susa and the Trophy at Adamklissi.

The most ambitious piece of sculpture attempted by the Knights, and one in which these defects are very evident, is to be seen inside the Castle. Above, the Virgin and St. Peter, patron of the Castle, support the arms of Grand Master Orsini quartered with the cross of the Order. Underneath is the date 1472. In the lower half St. Mary Magdalen and St. Catherine of Alexandria support those of Francisco Boxols, who was several times Captain of the Castle. A shield of this knight has, strangely enough, migrated from Budrum Castle to England, and was found a few years ago in a Sussex village by Mr. G. F. Hill, in whose possession it now is.

On the inner side of the gateway that leads through the glacis into the moat is written the defiant inscription which summarizes briefly the aims of this last bulwark of Christianity in Asia, *Propter catholicam fidem tenetur locum istum*, and below the name of the Captain of the Castle, James Gatineau, with the date 1513. The inscription proves that Brother Gatineau was greater as a soldier than as a Latin scholar. Above are the arms of the Order, Gatineau and De Blanchefort. To the left is an ancient lion, probably from some tomb, which has escaped the attentions of Newton.

Gatineau also built the casemate which, with its gun emplacements at the water-line, was able to sweep both the moat and the harbours, and could have put a stop to any naval attempt against the Castle. This casemate was used by the Germans as a storehouse for supplies for their submarines, and when we occupied Budrum for a few months in 1919 we found many empty cans of petrol inside. Protected alike by the immense thickness of the masonry and by its northerly position, it escaped unscathed from the bombardments, and it is melancholy to consider that these bombardments, that wrought irreparable damage to the southern sea-wall and to the loftier towers, did not accomplish any military damage whatsoever.

The main entrance to the Castle was by the water-gate, protected by a strong tower, which probably dates back to the early Seljuk fortifications. Ancient columns, walled up into the tower, still do office as mooring-posts. This was the point of safety to which the numerous Christian slaves and other "oppressed minorities" fled for refuge. There is a story that the Knights used to keep in the Castle a number of fierce bloodhounds which would welcome and assist, like St. Bernard dogs, a Christian refugee, but would tear to pieces an infidel, however well disguised.

One of the most charming pieces of architecture in the Castle is the little chapel of the Knights. The fully developed Gothic style of the building, together with the decorative details, point to the beginning of the sixteenth century, a date confirmed by some recently discovered inscriptions on the façade. During the brief Italian occupation of Budrum we were able to undertake a restoration of the building, which had been turned into the prison mosque. Stripped of its coating of whitewash, the walled-up windows were reopened and their beautiful mouldings were found almost intact. When Newton visited the Castle the beautifully carved Gothic rood-screen was still in its place.

On the highest point in the interior of the Castle rise the two magnificent Towers of France and Italy, identified by means of the shields which still decorate them. Together with the intervening building, they form a kind of keep which was probably used for the residence of the Captain of the Castle. Characteristic is the little look-out on the French Tower from which one can dominate the whole of the surrounding country. These two towers were the ones to suffer most severely from the effects of the Allied bombardments, and when we occupied Budrum they threatened instant ruin. Our attention was at once directed to the task of their preservation, and, though we had but little means and still less time at our disposal, we were able to patch them up sufficiently to ensure their stability.

The Italian Tower is decorated with what must be a shield unique in heraldry. A fine Ionic capital, very probably from the Mausoleum, has been walled up into the tower; on its lower surface, where the hole for the clamp which bound it to the column is plainly visible, Angelo Muscettola, Captain of the Castle from 1481 to 1486, has carved his coat of arms. Above it, as it were in melancholy remembrance of his distant country, he wrote the word "ITALIA," and it was with no little emotion that I read the name of my country written nearly 500 years ago in that desolate corner of Anatolia. It should be noticed how, here and elsewhere, the Turks have respected the symbols and images of the Order.

But the most severe damage which the Castle had to suffer from the Allied bombardment is on the south wall, which faces the sea. Along all its length the effect of the shells are only too visible. At the extreme end of the wall rises the imposing Tower of England, which has also suffered serious damage, and which, unfortunately, we did not have time to repair.

The entrance, which is on the north or land side, has escaped serious injury. A shell, bursting inside the tower, displaced some of the courses of the masonry, but not in a vital part. Across the whole of the façade runs a continuous frieze of English coats of arms, twenty-eight in all. They are protected by a drip moulding and form an

heraldic *ensemble* of unique magnificence and interest. In the centre are the arms of England, the Leopards quartered with the Lilies of France and surmounted by the helmet with a lion's crest. It is probably to be ascribed to King Henry IV. On either side are shields bearing the cross of the Order, and below six shields, three on each side, of English Royal Princes, and, as a matter of fact, just before the death of Henry IV. there were living just six Princes of the Blood. The identification of the other shields is not always certain. Beginning from the left, they appear to be Lord Grey, Lord Zouche, De la Pole quartering Wingfield, the Earl of Westmorland, the Earl of Northumberland, the Duke of Exeter, the Earl of Warwick, Sir John Burley, a K.G. and a staunch adherent of Bolingbroke. On the other side are Lord Strange of Knokyn, the Earl of Arundel, the Earl of Salisbury, Lord Stafford, Vere, Earl of Oxford, Courtnay, Earl of Devon, Lord Fitzhugh and Cresson. The three coats below the Royal arms cannot be identified with any certainty; one may belong to Grand Master de Naillac, and another to the Wolfe family. The names are those of the greatest families of the time. When Henry V., in his speech to Westmorland before the Battle of Agincourt, says:

"Then shall our names,
Familiar in his mouth as household words—
Harry the King, Bedford and Exeter,
Warwick and Talbot, Salisbury and Gloster—
Be in their flowing cups freshly remembered,"

he probably did not think of the distant Castle in another continent which bears the memory of those warriors' valour. Of course, these shields do not mean that any of their owners was ever at Budrum: they simply mean that they have contributed to the expense of building it.

There is in the British Museum an indulgence, dated 1414, granted to Sir William Fitzhugh and to Margery his wife by the Proctors of Pope Alexander V., for contributing to the fortifying of the Castle of St. Peter. Taking into consideration the date and the fact that the arms of Fitzhugh appear on the frieze, I think there can be little doubt that this indulgence is to be connected with the building of the tower we have just seen. In 1480 the Turcopolier, Sir John Kendal, the hero of the first siege of Rhodes, and whose medal, the work of some Italian medallist, is the earliest portrait medal struck in commemoration of an Englishman, went to Ireland with letters patent of Edward IV. to collect money for the Castle of Budrum by selling indulgences granted by Sixtus IV.

A particularly fine example of the arms of England is to be seen on the western side of the tower in a little niche above an ancient marble lion. Here, as nearly everywhere else, the Leopards of

England are found quartered with the Lilies of France, and I always wonder what the French Knights, who had, after all, the preponderant share in the administration of the Order, said about this action of their English colleagues. On this side the effects of the bombardment are very apparent. The bursting of a shell has destroyed several courses of the corner, and the cracks that already appear in the superstructure show that before long all this corner will collapse, including this beautiful heraldic group. If this is allowed to occur, the north front, with its wonderful frieze of arms, will not be able to survive for long. Still greater damage was done on the south side, for a shell struck one of the small windows which illuminated the hall, and has produced a breach in the masonry about 14 feet high and destroyed the last traces of the floor in the interior. Placed as it is right on the sea, it suffers still further from being exposed to the full fury of the wind and of the winter seas, which in the Kos Channel are sometimes of considerable violence. Two more shell-holes are to be seen on the eastern side, but they have done comparatively little damage, nor have they impaired the stability of the whole building. Could one have the money to restore the Castle thoroughly it would almost have gained through the Allied bombardment, since all the Turkish additions and prison buildings have been swept away; but in its present state the Tower of England is in imminent danger of collapse.

Another pathetic English victim of the bombardment is the corner-stone of a cornice which decorated another tower. The shield was so disposed that the angle of the tower divided it exactly in half: the shell, striking one face, destroyed it completely and hurled the other side on to a heap of debris, where I was fortunate enough to find it. Luckily, it is the side which bears the motto *Drede Shame*, a translation of the Latin motto *Time Pudorem*, of Sir William Dawnay, who was Captain of the Castle in 1468. Other English Knights have held the same post, notably Sir Thomas Docwra, later Grand Prior of England and builder of St. John's Gate, Clerkenwell, the present seat of the Order of St. John in England. In one place he surrounds the shield of the Order with the Garter, the only example I know of this Order in the East. Another Englishman who held this office was Sir Thomas Sheffield, who in 1521 narrowly missed being elected Grand Master instead of Villiers de l'Isle Adam, his great personal wealth recommending him to the electing body. In fact, the Castle of Budrum, from the indulgence granted to build it to the shells that have so seriously damaged it, has always been closely connected with Englishmen, and I hope that even now Englishmen will join in its preservation.

And now I must speak about Rhodes itself, a subject which would be sufficient for many lectures. Of all mediæval cities I have ever

seen, Rhodes surpasses them all both for the grandeur of the monuments themselves and for their excellent state of preservation. Exactly 400 years have elapsed since the Knights left Rhodes for ever, yet the city is almost exactly in the state they left it. The port is still crowded with small sailing-vessels which cannot be very different to the boats that used it in those days; the round, tower-like wind-mills which must have been introduced by the Northern Knights into the East still dominate the city, and only a few minarets have taken the place of the original church spires. But before anything else the perfectly preserved fortifications claim the interest of the visitor, both on account of the deeds of heroism which are associated with them and for their great importance in the history of fortification. They were built at a time when the capture of Constantinople in the East and the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII. in the West had shown but too clearly that the mediæval type of walled town was unable to sustain a prolonged bombardment. The walls of Rhodes show the new system of fortification applied to a town of the earlier type. The whole circuit of the walls, some six kilometres in length, was divided into eight sectors or posts, each entrusted to one of the Tongues of the Order.

Those skirting the port belong still to the early fifteenth-century type, nor were they ever bastioned, since they could be beaten by no artillery, but are strengthened by several advanced ramparts. Such was probably the type of the fortifications landwards in 1480, when the Knights of St. John defeated the great Turkish forces and compelled their general, the renegade Greek Paleologus, to raise the siege. It was in this heroic and fortunate enterprise that Sir John Kendal held high among the other nations of the Order the name of England, and for this victory the Grand Master, Pierre d'Aubusson, one of the ablest and most valiant soldiers of the time, received the Cardinal's hat. But the defeat of the enemy was due more to the valour of the Knights than to the strength of the defences, and after the siege d'Aubusson and his successors almost entirely rebuilt the fortifications landwards.

In some points, however, the older constructions were allowed to remain, especially in places where the nature of the ground still further strengthened the ingenuity of man. The work of fortification was still further carried on by the Italian Grand Master, Fabrizio Del Carretto, since the Turkish menace was ever on the increase. He was aided by the best military engineers of the age, and had practically completed his work when he died in 1521. He was only just in time. The following year the storm broke. For six months, from June to December, 1522, exactly 400 years ago, the new Grand Master, Philippe Villiers de l'Isle Adam, at the head of about 600 Knights and some 5,000 soldiers, held at bay a Turkish army of not

less than 100,000 men. This great host was commanded in person by the greatest soldier of the day, Suleyman, surnamed the Magnificent, flushed by his victory at Belgrade. And yet the city was not captured by storm. On Christmas Eve the Grand Master capitulated with all the honours of war, when the ammunition was almost entirely exhausted, when the forces at his command were reduced to about 100 Knights and 1,000 soldiers, and when the Greek inhabitants of the city threatened to rise were the Knights to attempt to put into action their desire of burying themselves under the ruins of the city.

Had the Christian powers sent the least aid to the besieged there is little doubt that all this heroism would not have been in vain. But Europe was at the time occupied with the struggle between Charles V. and Francis I. The Crusading spirit was dead, and the Knights of St. John must have been considered as a rather objectionable society of Die-Hards. Rhodes fell, and the following act of the struggle between Europe and Asia was fought round the walls of Vienna, not in the Mediterranean; but the Crusades could not have had a more glorious ending, and I hope that you will allow me to touch upon two or three of the principal episodes in the history of the siege.

For Englishmen the interest must culminate at the Post of England, which is one of the most imposing sectors of the fortifications. Here one can see at a glance the general principle of the fortifications as they were in 1522. The front of the wall itself, strengthened with square towers connected at a lower level by a barbican or *fausse-bray*, belongs to the earliest period, and is in many respects similar to the walls of the harbour. But Del Carretto rendered this wall almost unassailable by the artillery of the time by heaping up an enormous bastion of earth all along the inner face, and so for almost the whole length of the wall it is some 25 feet in thickness. Instead of the previous narrow *chemin-de-ronde*, a broad platform runs along the top of the wall, where can still be seen the emplacements for the heaviest ordnance, and by means of which it was easy to bring reinforcements to any menaced point. The two fosses are divided by an imposing *terre-plein* or ravelin, built in order to protect the foundations of the wall from the enemy's fire. It is so placed that the batteries posted on the wall could dominate the glacis, while reducing the angle of fire of the opposing batteries almost to a minimum. The fosses are disposed in a manner similar to our modern wire entanglements, to detain the enemy in a position which can be swept by enfilading fire from opposite redoubts. Each sector of the walls is bounded on either side by great bulwarks or *boulevards*, also entrusted to the different Tongues. In 1522 the Captain of the Post was Sir William Weston, who later had the melancholy distinction of being the last Grand Prior of England, dying of a broken heart when Henry VIII. suppressed the Order. The family to which

he belonged from a very early date has been, and, in the person of Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston, still is, closely associated with the history of the Order, to which it has furnished some of its most distinguished members. The Captain of the Bastion was Sir Nicholas Hussey, while the Turcopolier, Sir John Burke,* as Captain of Succour, commanded the reserve for the whole sector.

The walls and bastion of England were among the points most violently attacked, so much so that during the siege the Grand Master, who had at first taken his station at the walls of Italy, moved with his guard behind the walls of England. On the 4th of September, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, the Turks exploded a mine at the point where the bastion joins on to the wall. The violence of the explosion was so great that all the city was shaken by it, and the enemy, attacking in force, were able to seize the breach and plant seven standards on it. At the moment the Grand Master was in a church close by. The choir had just arrived at the verse *Deus, in adjutorium meum intende*, when the clamour of the attack was heard. At once, seizing a pike and calling to the Knights of his guard to profit by the fortunate omen, Villiers de l'Isle Adam rushed to the breach, which, after a most obstinate engagement, was retaken from the enemy. Five days later another mine was sprung under the wall, which collapsed with such noise that at first it was supposed that the whole of the Post had been destroyed, and the garrison were about to retire before the violent assaults of the enemy, when again the Grand Master appeared on the scene with the Standard of the Crucifix, and after three hours of struggle the Turks were forced to retire. A third assault was delivered by surprise on the 17th of the same month at midday. This attack also was unsuccessful, but some of the bravest Knights fell in the engagement, including the Turcopolier, Sir John Burke.* The great general assault took place on the 24th of September, when the four breaches which had been made by them in the walls of Italy, Provence, England, and Arragon were attacked simultaneously. The troops were massed under cover of a smoke screen created by all the numerous batteries that had been posted on the very glacis itself, which only stopped firing a few moments before the attack. Although at first the attack was successful, by nightfall the Knights were left in complete possession of all the points attacked, and the Turks were forced to retire, having lost, it is calculated, some 15,000 men. This failure came as a great disappointment to Suleyman, who had been confident of taking the town by storm, and had supervised the attack from a scaffold erected on a commanding position near the walls.

One of the most interesting features of the siege was the great use of mining operations, for which the Sultan had brought some 50,000 Bosnian miners. Fifty-four mines were dug under the walls,

* English historians quote the name as "Booth, Bouch, or Buck."—A. C. Y.

but most of these were intercepted by the skill of the great military engineer, Gabriele Tadino da Martinengo, to whose courage and ability is chiefly due the prolonged resistance of the fortress. He is usually believed to have been the inventor of the countermine, and also of the various systems of detecting and calculating the course of the enemy's galleries. He dug long galleries parallel to the walls, in which he suspended barbers' pannikins, which vibrated at the approach of the hostile miners. The task of the besieging forces must have been greatly facilitated by the fact that the Knights, in digging their fosses, had cut through many of the drains and aqueducts of the ancient Greek city. There are numerous ancient galleries that run right through the ravelin and under the wall of the Post of England.

In the walls of England there was originally a gate, called the Gate of St. Athanasius. Through it at the beginning of the siege the English Knights made a successful sortie. There is a tradition that Suleyman entered the city by this gate, and rode down the street, which cannot have had an appearance very different from that which it bears at present. He afterwards ordered it to be closed, and closed it has remained up to the present year, when the Government of Rhodes ordered it to be reopened and the bastion of England restored in commemoration of the great siege. It is a curious fact that Mustapha Pasha, Suleyman's Chief of Staff, who was disgraced and exiled after the failure of the general attack on the 24th of September, in his old age led the unsuccessful Turkish force at the great Siege of Malta which has immortalized the name of Philippe de la Vallette.

Within the city the Latin civilization of the Order finds its greatest expression in the famous Street of the Knights. In it are the Auberges of the various Tongues, which were their headquarters and the residence of their Baillies. We have been able through the interest and generosity both of the Government and of private individuals to restore nearly all these historic buildings. First comes the Auberge of Italy, the work of Grand Master Del Carretto, and, higher up, the Auberge of France, the finest and most imposing of them all. It has been restored at the expense of H.E. M. Bompard, late French Ambassador at Constantinople, who presented it to his Government. Further up, the great arch spanning the road belongs to the Auberge of Spain, one of the largest, as it held the Knights of Arragon, Castille, Navarre, and Portugal. At the very end of the road, near the Turkish hospital, towered the Palace of the Grand Master, which was also the central keep of the city. It is the intention of the present Governor of the island, Count Bosdari, to restore the Palace and make it again the seat of the Government. Most of the other buildings along the road have also been restored, and I hope that in

a few years' time the whole street will have returned to the state it was in when the Knights used to hold their reviews along it, before going into battle.

The Auberge of England, which stands just opposite the Hospital, has been thoroughly restored through the interest of Colonel Yate and the generous munificence of Colonel Gabriel.

No lecture on Rhodes would be complete without any mention of the wonderful Hospital, *raison d'être* of the Order, and finest of the Latin monuments in the Levant. When we occupied Rhodes we found it in a truly deplorable condition. Turned into a Turkish barrack, the second story ruined by the opening of large and shapeless windows, everything covered over with whitewash, it showed but little of its original grandeur. From 1914 to 1918, notwithstanding the great difficulties caused by the war, the work of restoration was carried on, and now the museum of Rhodes is housed in a building which for strength, simplicity, and grandeur has few rivals in the world. The simplicity of the façade clearly proclaims its early date, and we have been fortunate enough to discover the original inscription of the founder. From it we learn that it was built, in substitution of an early building, by Grand Master Lastic, who dedicated it on the 17th of July, 1440, as executor of a legacy of 10,000 gold florins left for the purpose by his predecessor, Antonio Fluvian. This early date is proved by the absence of those great windows with their beautifully decorated mouldings, or of the numerous coats of arms which are so characteristic of the Rhodian architecture at the end of the fifteenth century. The whole building is modelled on the Cistercian architecture of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. The beautiful carved cypress-wood doors are still in existence, but, alas, no longer in their original place. In 1836 a Vali gave them to the Prince de Joinville, and they are now at Versailles. Our sorrow at their loss is tempered by the reflection that, had they remained, they would probably have perished completely.

No less simple and imposing is the interior. The great low two-storied cloister is well in keeping with the monastic and military character of the Order. The wide and comfortable staircase, with no parapet, is typical of the Rhodian architecture. Near by is the covered well which ensured the purity of the water-supply for the guests. All the ground floor was probably exclusively used as store-rooms, the upper floor being set apart for the sick and the pilgrims. All about are the innumerable stone and marble cannon balls, many of which were probably fired into the town during the siege. The imperfection of ancient artillery is well illustrated by the Siege of Rhodes. The Turks started to bombard the houses inside the city in order to impress the inhabitants with their frightfulness. The Knights placed watchmen on the steeples of the churches, who rang

the bells when they saw a gun being loaded, upon which signal all the inhabitants took refuge in the cellars, and nobody felt any the worse. After firing into the city a couple of thousand stone cannon balls, the Turks learnt from traitors inside the town that the casualties to date were some twenty-five killed and wounded, so they stopped, since it seemed rather a waste of gunpowder.

The great hall of the Infirmary itself occupies the whole of the width of the front. It is a great hall divided into two aisles by a row of pillars down the middle. These pillars are an addition of d'Aubusson, as the capitals are formed by shields alternately bearing the simple cross of the Order and the cross ancree of d'Aubusson. In the middle, over the entrance-door of the building, is the little chapel, so placed that every day the sick from their beds could assist at Mass, as was ordered by the Rule. Some one hundred cots could be normally contained in the hall, but in times of war or pestilence a great many more could be accommodated. In the thickness of the wall are many little rooms which probably served as cupboards for the Hospital necessities.

And now, in conclusion, I hope I may be allowed to say a few words on the moral significance of the monuments I have had the privilege to show you. At the present moment, when many believe that the future of the world lies in some form of Internationalism, it may not be useless to study the history and the ideals of the mediæval International. Gone are the glorious conquests in the East, but the East has faithfully preserved, more durable than bronze, the memory of that glory. At a time when Europe was seething with war and with hatred, when the Renaissance and the Reformation were laying the foundations of the modern world, the ideals of the Order of St. John could find but little sympathy and get but little help from the ambitions of the warring Princes. It should be remembered to the honour of the Order of St. John that it tried to carry out an international ideal. Men, young, wealthy, noble, belonging to rival and often conflicting nationalities, their pride of race increasing their pride of birth, were yet ready to take solemn vows of eternal poverty, chastity, and obedience, and undergo a life of almost incredible hardship and danger, in order to make of Rhodes, in the words of an ancient chronicler, "a harbour for the shipwrecked, a refuge for the unfortunate, and a resting-place for the weary." And though now the Order of St. John is no longer a formidable military power, it is still an international organization which still carries on the ideal expressed in its motto, a motto which might be recommended to the League of Nations: *Pro fide, pro utilitate Hominum*.

The CHAIRMAN: I would ask Colonel Yate, who, I believe, is a Knight of Justice of the Order of St. John, to say a few words.

Colonel A. C. FATE: Your Excellency, My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I feel that the lecturer has most thoroughly covered the subject in his lecture. I congratulate not only myself, but this audience, I think, if they will allow me, on the fact that a pure accident—a couple of letters written in the *Morning Post* about three months ago—brought the lecturer and myself into communication, and thus led up to the admirable lecture to which we have listened. (Applause.) Among the noblemen mentioned as having their arms on the English Tower at Budrum, I think there is one, perhaps, not familiar to Englishmen, that of Lord Strange of Knockyn (as spelt to-day, “Knockin”). I believe you must be a Salopian, as I am, to know Lord Strange of Knockyn. I have often been at Knockin, near Oswestry, and in that neighbourhood his name is well known and remembered. The remnant of the old Castle still stands there. All the other names mentioned are familiar to any student of English history. Now, we heard mentioned by the lecturer that an armorial tablet from Rhodes had been discovered in Sussex. It is a curious fact that a certain General Fox, a son of the third Lord Holland, who held a high military appointment in his day—i.e., about eighty years ago—found his way in the course of his duty or pleasure to Rhodes, and brought away from the Auberge d’Angleterre the armorial tablet of Sir John Kendal, whose medallion you saw pictured upon the screen.* We have been able, curiously enough, to trace home that tablet, and at this moment, to the best of my belief, it is still standing in the entrance-hall of Workington Hall, in Cumberland, the seat of the Curwens; and the explanation of its having found its way there is that the Kendals and the Curwens, Westmorland or Cumberland families, are one and the same originally. It is difficult to trace how exactly it came there, but anyhow there it is; and Colonel Gabriel, whose name has been mentioned to you as the man who found the funds for restoring and purchasing the Auberge d’Angleterre, and at this moment is the owner thereof, has told me that the present Mr. Curwen of Workington Hall has informed him that at a convenient season he will hand over that tablet, provided it is restored to the Auberge d’Angleterre at Rhodes. (Applause.) That we sincerely hope will some day be done. I found, as I left my Club to-day, that Colonel Gabriel, who would have very much liked to be here, had taken the trouble to send to both my Clubs a letter—which I have in my hand—expressing his deep regret that a political engagement prevents his being present. He is a retired Indian Civil Servant, and possibly meditates standing for Parliament.

* Colonel Hugh Rose, afterwards Lord Strathnairn, brought away from Rhodes in 1854 the fireplace of the Hall of the Grand Master’s Palace. (See “Rhodes of the Knights,” by Baron de Belabre, p. 103.) Nothing is now known of this fireplace.—A. C. Y.

Had he been here, he wished particularly to acknowledge his debt, first of all, to the help which he received from the Italian authorities at Rhodes in acquiring the Auberge and in carrying out the repairs, and secondly to the great and precise care which the archæological authorities there exercised in carrying them out. He says that only the old has been restored, and nothing new introduced.

I think that it is hardly necessary for me to say anything more at present, except, perhaps, to mention something that I have brought here, in order that you may see that English people have not altogether neglected the English Tower of Budrum. Sir Charles Newton* began between the fifties and the sixties of the last century, assisted by Lieutenant (later Major-General Sir Robert) Murdoch Smith, R.E., and an architect of the name of Pullan, to thoroughly overhaul the tower, while a non-commissioned officer of the Royal Engineers was employed to most accurately copy the armorial designs, etc.; and, curiously enough, although Lord Amherst of Hackney—in his day a well-known Knight of Justice of the English Grand Priory—had all these drawings prepared for reproduction and publication in 1884, by some extraordinary oversight those reproductions appear to have remained in the hands of the publishers until last year, when their existence became known to our Assistant Librarian at St. John's Gate, Mr. Fincham; and he has been so kind as to give me a set, which is here. I may also add that a Masonic Lodge, known as the Quatuor Coronati, and the Society of Antiquaries, have published in their Transactions monographs by the very well known President of the Royal Geographical Society, Sir Clements Markham, by Admiral Sir Albert Markham, and by Mr. Andrew Oliver, on the Castle of Budrum and its Heraldry. I wish it to be known that Englishmen have shown interest for the last seventy or eighty years at least in a tower which I have seen spoken of by an English archæologist as one of the finest monuments of English chivalry in the Near East. (Applause.) The Central Asian Society has done well to-day—I speak as a Knight of St. John—in advocating the repair and preservation of that monument.†

* See his "Travels in the Levant," and "Halicarnassos," and also "The Life of Sir Robert Murdoch Smith," by his son-in-law, Mr. Dickson.

† It is of interest to put on record that on December 31, 1919, among the members of the Central Asian Society were numbered seven Knights of Justice, one Lady of Justice, and eleven Knights of Grace of the Grand Priory of the Order of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem in England. These are, in order of seniority:

Knights of Justice.—Lieut.-General Sir A. Hunter-Weston; Mr. Edmund Fraser; Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate; Lieut.-Colonel Sir R. C. Temple; the Lord Sydenham of Combe; the Lord Chelmsford; the Earl of Donoughmore.

Lady of Justice.—The Lady Constance Milnes-Gaskell.

The Right Hon. Sir WILLIAM BULL (Maltravers Herald-Extraordinary): My Lord, Your Excellency, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I was abroad when these two letters appeared in the *Morning Post*, and I think we owe a debt of gratitude to the editor of the *Morning Post* for his patriotism in publishing them, and attracting attention to this remarkable and interesting ruin. We are all deeply grateful to Signor Bagnani for his kindness in giving us this lecture here this afternoon. (Applause.) Some of you may be aware of the fact that I am the Vice-Principal of the Imperial Society of Knights Bachelor; when the letters were sent out to me with a request that my Society should undertake the cost of repair, I telegraphed home at once suggesting that we might help, and would be proud, as far as we are able, to contribute towards the restoration of the tower. The Imperial Society of Knights Bachelor, who represent the oldest order of chivalry in the world, feel a very great pride in taking part in such a work. The amount to be collected is comparatively small—some five or six hundred pounds will do it, I am told—but we have had difficulties in the way. Some of you may be aware that there is “a certain liveliness” in politics both in England and in Italy; a great many of us have been busy and not able at the moment to devote the attention we should like to this subject. Other things have also interfered with my activities in the matter, but I sent round a circular to all the Knights Bachelor who belong to the Society. I have had a good response up to date, have many more promises, and, without being too optimistic, hope we shall collect the sum without very much difficulty in the near future. I am very pleased to be here this afternoon, and am grateful to Signor Bagnani for bringing it to the attention of so distinguished an English audience. (Applause.)

Mr. H. W. FINCHAM, F.S.A. (Assistant Librarian of the Order): May I say, with regard to the papers on the Heraldry at Budrum which

Knights of Grace.—Colonel Sir Charles Yate; Lieut.-Colonel J. T. Woolrych Perowne; Lieut.-Colonel E. V. Gabriel; H. E. the Lord Willington; Sir H. S. King; Lieut.-Colonel Sir A. H. McMahon; the Right Hon. Sir Maurice de Bunsen; Sir Michael O'Dwyer; Field-Marshal the Viscount Allenby; General Sir C. C. Monro; General Sir F. Reginald Wingate.

In view of the interest which it was felt the Grand Priory of England must take in restoring a Tower constructed with funds provided during the fifteenth century by the King, nobility, and gentry of the land, and to this day still known as the English Tower, the Council of the Central Asian Society offered to place at the disposal of the Chancery of the Order one hundred tickets of admission to this lecture. The offer was accepted. Among those present were: Lord Ranfurly, Lord and Lady Shaftesbury, Sir Dyce Duckworth, Mr. Edwin Freshfield, Surgeon-General Sir R. C. Charles, Lady Perrott, Lieut.-Colonel Ewen Cameron (Secretary), Mr. H. W. Fincham (Assistant Librarian), and many more.—A. C. Y.

Sir Clement Markham read at the Society of Antiquaries in 1893, that he expressed considerable difficulty in explaining why those coats of arms were placed upon the Castle of St. Peter, seeing that none of them represented Hospitallers, and as Sir W. H. St. John Hope pointed out, seventeen of the twenty-eight were Knights of the Garter, and he put it down to the enthusiasm of the English wanting to be reminded of their famous men at home. But to-day, after seeing that beautiful indulgence manuscript that the lecturer has shown us, there is no doubt whatever that those arms represent the principal contributors to the cost of building. I have found just lately another indulgence to another person: "To all who shall see the present letters, Brother John Seyvill, Knight of the Hospital of Saint John of Jerusalem, Proctor of the Indulgence of the Castle of Saint Peter, sends greeting. Know ye that the Most Holy Father Alexander, by Divine Providence Pope, granted an indulgence to all who stretch forth their hands for the defence of the faith, the fortification and ward of the said castle. And because our Beloved in Christ Richard Mauncell and Margaret his wife, John Mauncell and Agnes his wife, and all their children, and Agnes Mauncell, have given the subsidies of charity to the said castle, they have by apostolic authority license to choose a confessor. Given at Temple Bruer in the Year of Our Lord 1413." This document is a year earlier than the one Dr. Bagnani shows us. I am inclined to think this Mauncell is one of those coats unidentified. The coat is very similar to one—not quite the same, but near enough for a rough sketch sent out from England, say, in the early fifteenth century. Also I might mention that when the Order of St. John built its new chapter hall in 1903 it placed in the stained glass of the lantern twelve of the coats of arms from the Castle of St. Peter. The intention was to put up the whole twenty-eight: the present twelve were put up at the expense of Lord Amherst of Hackney, the late Lord Knutsford, and Dr. Edwin Freshfield. There were no further contributors, possibly because there was no chance of indulgences. (Laughter.)

The CHAIRMAN: I think, if nobody else wishes to address the meeting, it only remains for me to echo, I am quite sure, all your feelings, by expressing our very best thanks to Signor Bagnani for the full and ample justice he has given to a most fascinating and interesting subject, and also expressing our admiration of those very beautiful plates with which he has illustrated the paper he has read. (Applause.) I only hope that the anticipations of Sir William Bull will be realized, and that he will collect funds sufficient to restore the English Tower of Budrum, which was so unfortunately damaged during the war. I now convey in your name the best thanks to Signor Bagnani. (Renewed applause.)

APPENDIX

R. SCUOLA ITALIANA DI ARCHEOLOGIA

1, 'Οδὸς Διονυσίου τοῦ Ἀρειοπαγίτου,

ATHENS,

August 4, 1922.

DEAR SIR,

My attention has only now, on my return from the Dodecanese, been drawn to your letter in the *Morning Post* of July 4 on the Auberge d'Angleterre in Rhodes. Both as the writer of the article to which you refer and as a Fellow of the Italian School of Archæology, I wish at once to assure you that the omission of any mention of the restoration of that Auberge was due neither to ignorance nor to any desire of minimizing the work done, but only to the fact that my article referred only to the great siege and to the restorations now in progress. I hope to treat of the Auberge in an article I am preparing on the English monuments in Rhodes. I wish to assure you that the restoration of the English Auberge and the generosity of the Grand Priory of England are greatly appreciated by us, as being the only case in which members of the Order of Jerusalem have shown any interest in the monuments of Rhodes. Might I suggest that it would be better if the Auberge became the official property of the English Grand Priory and not of the nation, thus preserving the link between the Sovereign Order and Rhodes? It may interest you to know that the French have only restored the façade of their Auberge, while the interior is still in complete ruin; also that the Auberge d'Auvergne has become the property of the Italian Government, and, after having been properly restored, is now the residence of Professor Maiuri and the headquarters of our Archæological Mission in the Dodecanese.

I hope that you will not think me importunate if I now draw your attention to the very serious state of one of the finest monuments of the English Order in the East—i.e., the so-called refectory of the Castle at Budrum.

The Castle is, to my mind at least, the most splendid mediæval castle in the East, and during our recent stay at Budrum for the excavations I was able to explore it thoroughly and take numerous photographs. It has always been connected with England, since both Sir Thomas Docwra and Sir Thomas Sheffield were for some time Captains of the Castle. Over the entrance to the inner circle of walls are the arms of the Order, surrounded by the Garter, and one of the largest towers on the seaward side was built by English Knights. Over the entrance runs a magnificent frieze of twenty-eight coats of

arms with the arms of Edward IV. in the centre. The latter are repeated in a niche on the west side and placed over a classical lion, probably from a tomb. It is the building described and drawn by Newton as the refectory, and is without a doubt the finest heraldic *ensemble* in the Levant. Unfortunately, during the war the Castle was bombarded by the French and English Fleets in revenge for the murder of some French sailors. The Castle naturally suffered severely, and especially the central towers and the southern wall, which faces the sea, which in places has been almost completely destroyed. During our brief military occupation of Budrum, Professor Maiuri began the work of restoration, and managed to restore the two central towers of France and Italy, which give the Castle its characteristic appearance. Unfortunately, we evacuated Budrum before work could be begun on the Tower of England, and it is now in an exceedingly perilous condition. The enclosed photos, which are the first I have been able to develop, show you sufficiently clearly the extent of the damage. The tower was struck by three shells; one on the South side in the embrasure of the window made a breach about 15 feet high by 8 feet wide; another similar breach was formed on the East side (I have not yet developed my photo of the latter), and the shell, bursting within the tower, displaced several courses of masonry on the North wall, fortunately just below the frieze. But the most serious damage of all was done by a shell which struck the south-west corner of the tower and destroyed the whole corner just below the arms of Edward IV. for a height of about 8 or 10 feet. The destruction of the floor in the interior, moreover, still further compromises the stability of the building, which is exposed to the whole fury of the wind and the waves, and the numerous cracks in the tower become every month more menacing, as I myself can testify.

Both Professor Maiuri and myself feel that the fall of the tower would be an irreparable loss to the monuments which testify Western civilization and culture in the Levant, but it is absolutely impossible for our Government to spend large sums in the restoration of a building which is only in our zone of influence. The little money we have must all be spent in Rhodes itself. It therefore has occurred to me that the only way to save this building is to trust to the well-known generosity of the English Order and of Britain in general, feeling sure that, even as it co-operated in the bombardment of the Castle, it will be ready to repair the damage done. The work will be of considerable difficulty and expense, since everything will have to be brought from Rhodes or Kos, Budrum being now practically a deserted village. Moreover, the consent of the Angora Government will have to be obtained—not an easy matter. Our official relations with the Turks are fairly good, so much so that they allow us to excavate; our personal relations with the Kaimakam of Budrum are excellent.

H.E. Count Bosdari, Governor of Rhodes, has promised me his full support in the question, and would be willing to put a Government vessel at our disposal during the period of the work. Once the funds can be obtained, all the other questions can be easily settled. The sum required would be large; the wages of workmen remaining what they are, it would cost about 50,000 Italian lire, at the present rate of exchange about £500. It is a considerable sum, but I hope that Britain will not allow the tower to disappear.

I will go to England about the middle of September, and I hope to have the pleasure of being able to discuss the matter personally with you. I intend bringing a good collection of slides of the principal buildings of the Order in the East, and it may be of interest to the British public to see some of the places where, 400 years ago, their forefathers fought side by side with Knights of all the other European nations, upholding its glorious crusading tradition. We feel that, in holding Rhodes, we are merely the caretakers, not the possessors, of monuments which belong to the whole of the Western civilization.

I hope that you will forgive me, sir, for having taken up so much of your valuable time, and believe me,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) GILBERT BAGNANI.

TO LIEUT.-COLONEL A. C. YATE,
THE ATHENEUM,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

ARABIA AND THE HEDJAZ

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL C. E. VICKERY, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.F.A

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, London, S.W., on Thursday, November 9, 1922, when a lecture was given by Lieut.-Colonel C. E. Vickery, C.M.G., on "Arabia and the Hedjaz." In the absence of Lord Carnock, the chair was taken by General Sir Edmund Barrow, G.C.B.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I regret to say that Lord Carnock is laid up and unable to preside at the lecture to-day. It is very unfortunate, because I am afraid I shall be a very poor substitute, as I have not been considering this question at all with a view to presiding to-day. My only duty at present is to introduce the lecturer to you. Colonel Vickery has had, as you know, a distinguished record during the war, after which he was appointed British Agent at Jeddah as a sort of liaison officer between the British Government and the King of the Hedjaz. As such, of course, he has had a great experience of the Arabian internal situation and more particularly of Hedjaz politics, so I am sure you will welcome his presence here this evening to instruct us on matters connected with the Hedjaz. (Applause.)

THE LECTURE

The subject of my lecture is "Arabia and the Hedjaz." I propose to discuss it under three headings.

Firstly, I must make a few introductory remarks on Arabia and on Islamism. The complexities of the Arab question to-day are so many and varied that they are not easily understood without some reference to the mythology of Islam and the country of its birth.

I shall then pass to a description of the Hedjaz and its government in pre-war days and at the present time, noting briefly its position *vis-à-vis* with pan-Arabism.

Finally, I shall give you a short account of my journey beyond Mecca to Taif as the guest of King Hussein.

On looking back to the days of one's childhood, one seems to have a dim remembrance that Arabia was envisaged then as a very wonderful and rich and romantic country. Perhaps my recollections are at fault, and one confused Arabia with other countries and romances of the East. Be that as it may, the impression was certainly unfor-

tunate. A quarter of Arabia is a bare desert, untraversed and unexplored, while of the remainder the greater portion—I should not like to say what actual percentage—is utterly unproductive.

It is inhabited, certainly, in the west, by Arabs who fall far below the standard of their co-religionists or of their stock settled in other countries, whether it be in the profession of arms, or in learning, or in morals.

Hundreds of years ago the caravan of the East passed through Arabia to Asia Minor and thence to Europe.

Mecca was on the direct caravan route—a natural staging station. Here were gathered annually many people of diverse nations. It was known then as a great mart; it is referred to by the father of all history—Herodotus.

An inhabitant of Mecca in those days would have known much of the world; he would have been familiar with the teaching and religious beliefs of Zoroaster, of Gautama, of the Jews, and later of the Christian.

It was in such an atmosphere that the prophet of Arabia was born. The religion of his country was one of idolatry—stone worship, a worship of heavenly bodies. Muir denotes it as a system of Sabeanism. To the fact that Abrahamic tribes were early mingled with the Arabs—indeed, a branch settled down near Mecca—the many legends of Arabia concerning Hagar and Ishmael, the sacrifice at Mina, and so on, owe their origin and belief. At Jeddah, which signifies in Arabic “ancestress,” one finds to-day the tomb of Eve.

Mohammed in his travels learnt much of the beliefs of Christians and Jews. He spent many weeks annually in solitary meditation in a cave on the slopes of Mountain El Nur. I consider it a great privilege to be probably the only European to-day who has stood by that cave where the Prophet evolved in his great intellect the principles of the religion which he proclaimed subsequently to the world.

He was faced with a grave problem, for he wished to attract and convert the Jews and Christians, while he knew it to be vital to his success to placate his own tribesmen, the Koreish.

I have said that the religion of the country was that of idolatry. The worship of the black stone, the circuit of the Ka-aba, were rites of great antiquity. They were also referred to by Herodotus. They attracted yearly many pilgrims, and provided a source of revenue to those who guarded the holy places, since they gleaned a rich harvest from the pilgrims' offerings.

Thus was Mohammed confronted with the problem of gaining over his fellow-tribesmen, whose means of livelihood the new religion threatened. He retained, therefore, in Islamism the rites of the pilgrimage and the circuit of the Ka-aba, but stripped of all idolatrous

tendency, though they still hang "a strange unmeaning shroud round the living theism of Islamism" (Muir).

I am not attempting to-day to discuss Islamism or its founder. I hold him to have been a great man, bent on substituting a religion of singular purity and of broad conception for the idolatrous beliefs of his countrymen.

It is customary to seize on the faults of great men, and enlarge on them, while their many great qualities are ignored or decried.

I pass, therefore, to his death, and the proclamation by Abu Bakr of a fundamental fact of Islamic history. To the assembled multitude wrangling over a successor to the great prophet of the wilderness—his corpse scarcely cold—it was pointed out that the Caliphate for ever, by the decree of the vicar of God, was to remain in the Koreish—his tribe. It was lawful for none outside this clan to occupy the throne or to perform the sacred duties of the head of Islam.

"We are the Emirs, you the Wazirs," said Abu Bakr to the quarrelling people outside the walls of Medina. "The Imams from the Koreish for all time." This fact is the corner-stone of the claim of the Sherifian Arab to the Caliphate. On it he builds his demand, for this heritage of birth is denied to other claimants, save the Imam of Yemen, and has been so denied for four centuries.

Of the spread of Islam, of the conquests of the Arab, I have no time to speak, nor do they rightly enter into the limits of the subject of this lecture. Let it suffice to refresh your remembrance in a few words.

The tribes of all Arabia were quickly converted to the principles of Islam; its triumph was carried by the victorious sword of Khalid, the scourge of God, to the banks of the Euphrates, while Amrou marched by Gaza to the conquest of Egypt.

Northern Africa was overrun, and the advance of the Mohammedan was only stayed by the valour and ability of Charles Martel in the year A.D. 732. It is interesting to reflect what might be our religion or our state to-day had the Arab armies pursued their career, unconquered and unchecked, through France to this remote island of ours in the North Sea.

The simple unity of Islam was, however, not to continue long after the Prophet's death. Ambition of temporal power, visions of a great kingdom, created differences which led to internal strife. The vicarious triumphs of Omar and Khalid were forgotten, while the descendant of Mohammed was murdered on the banks of the Euphrates. The split of the Moslems into two sects—the Sunni and the Shiah—had a far-reaching effect, whose importance to-day is in no way qualified or diminished.

Yet the glories of the Caliphs of Arabia lasted till the thirteenth century. They had many associations with the West. As Sir Percy

Sykes points out, the West depended on the East for its light till the twelfth century. "Ex oriente lux" is an aphorism that crystallizes a profound truth.

In the early days of the sixteenth century the Sultan Selim annexed the Caliphate from the Fatimites, who ruled still in Egypt, and conveyed the sacred relics—the mantle of the Prophet—to Stambul.

Arabia sank into a slumber. Her religion, formerly an inspiring and magnetic force, stifled by its very precepts any attempts to keep pace with the advancing civilization of the West.

Thus do we find her a few years before the war, when nascent hopes of an Arab kingdom had been kindled in the minds of the Sherifian Arabs who inhabited the Hedjaz.

And so I pass to the Hedjaz. The tribes and peoples of Arabia may be grouped under three heads: Firstly, the coastal towns and small sultanates on the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, such as Koweit, Bahrein, Oman, Lahej, and others; secondly, the three countries occupying the Red Sea littoral on the west coast of Arabia—viz., the Hedjaz, the Asir, the imamate of Yemen; and thirdly, the great central emirates of Nejd, ruled over by Bin Saud and Jebel Shammar (Bin Rashid). These latter countries are now virtually merged into one emirate under Bin Saud. Their history is curiously interwoven, and the life of Bin Saud would provide material for as wonderful a romance as any Eastern tale of old.

The Hedjaz derives its name from the mountain range which forms the watershed between Nejd and the sea. The name means "the divider." The country grows nothing; its exports are insignificant, and it lives on the pilgrims.

It was ruled, like the Yemen, as a mediatized province by the Turks, through the Sherif of Mecca. It was not independent, as were the central emirates of Hail and Riadh. The Sherif had, however, very great power. The Turkish principle of government was the old Roman method of "divide et impera." They retained control of the customs, the posts and telegraphs; they maintained garrisons at Jeddah, at Mecca, at Taif, and at other places on the Red Sea littoral; but the administration of the tribes was completely in the hands of the Sherif. He could extend his influence as he liked, make treaties with other tribes, and invoke the assistance of Turkish troops to impose his will on his neighbours. He had his own bodyguard, and kept up in his palace a certain state. He was, however, appointed or dismissed at will by the Sultan of Turkey, while he was chosen only from the Koreish, the hereditary guardians of the holy place.

Before the war the Hedjaz was known to the world as being a country to which yearly thousands of pilgrims consorted to fulfil the obligations of their religion. It has now a further claim to the

regard or attention of the world, owing to its revolt from Turkey during the war and its alliance to our side.

The formation of a vast Arab kingdom was, it is alleged, one of the dreams of Lord Kitchener. Certainly he had conversations with Sherifian princes on the subject before the war, and on the outbreak of hostilities at once gave instructions for pourparlers to be opened with the Sherif of Mecca.

The latent ambitions of the Sherif needed little fanning, for he had been preparing for several years a plan to establish the independence of the Hedjaz, to create an Arab kingdom. His dreams assumed shape; he saw the goal of the Arab cause; he pictured a mighty Arab kingdom, a Caliph once again—and more, a Caliph of the tribe of the Koreish, enthroned in his own sacred person in the holy city of Mecca, the birthplace of Mohammed, the cradle of all Islam. Of the history of the Arab revolt I can say but little, for it involves too many political questions, which do not concern the soldier.

No acolytes ever served their shrine as devotedly as the Sherif's advisers served him, nor was ever zeal so misdirected.

In Utopia there may be an Arab kingdom, but not in this jarring and concrete world of ours. The student of history will not blind himself to the many and yearly internecine wars of the Arabs; to the divergence of views between the Sunni and the Shiah; to the claims of others to the Caliphate—claims based equally on birth, such as those of the Imam of Yemen; to the other tribes of Arabia, more powerful and numerous than the Hedjaz; to the growing and threatening rise of Wahabism; to the many other disruptive forces at work in the lands of Islam; or, lastly, to the numerous political factors which tied our hands as they had pledged our word during and before the war.

No brake was applied to the dream chariot of the Sherif by his advisers; with myopic vision they fostered his aims, which coincided with their own desires, regardless of all the facts of history or of common sense.

The progress of the war is well known to you. As far as Arabia was concerned, I saw nothing of that theatre until the winter of 1916, when, after the Somme, I was sent to the Hedjaz as a member of the military mission. It was eminently enjoyable after the mud of Picardy, but the war was not very much *en évidence*. On my arrival I learnt that the capture of the small coastal town of Wejh, garrisoned by about 300 Turks, had been ordered by the Sherif, and the story of its capture will illustrate my experiences of the Arab as a fighter.

A plan was made at an interview with the Emir Feisal for the capture of the town. It was agreed that I should embark 800 Arabs in ships of the Red Sea patrol—the senior naval officer was, of

course, present—and land at daybreak three miles north of the town. The Navy would then bombard the town, while the Emir attacked from the south and east.

The success of the plan depended on co-operation and the simultaneous attack of land and sea forces. The Emir was encamped by the sea, approximately fifty miles from Wejh. He allowed himself five days to make his arrangements and for the approach march. It was imperative that the Navy did not appear near Wejh till just before daybreak of the morning selected for the attack. It was arranged to anchor near dusk at a spot some ten miles south of Wejh the afternoon previous to the zero day. On reaching this rendezvous on the appointed day no signs of the Emir could be seen. I landed and interrogated a Bedu, who said the Emir was nowhere in the vicinity. He stated that Wejh was expecting an attack, and that the Turks were evacuating. On communicating this to the S.N.O., it was agreed that the Emir might arrive later according to our arrangements, and that we would therefore carry on with the plan, since the Turks were retreating.

We weighed anchor, and shortly before sunrise the following morning, in company with another officer, I was disembarked firmly and quietly three miles north of Wejh with the 800 Arabs who had been embarked some days previous for this attack from the north.

It was not an enviable movement. France seemed at that moment a haven of peace.

One Arab had attracted my notice—one Saleh, and he was asked to act as chief of staff. He replied that he could only answer for his own men—thirty in all.

On trying to form up the remainder, three hundred at once sat down on the beach, saying they were tired, and they had come ashore for a little rest and a sleep. They started to light fires, and were obviously not going to fight. I turned to the remainder, two hundred of whom at once announced that they were not fighting men; they had come to loot. Off they went along the seashore, saying that they would wait outside the town till I had captured it, an operation they hoped that I should execute with great promptitude, as they were in a hurry. The remainder condescended to follow us at the moment when the first gun of the S.N.O.'s flagship opened on the town. A seaplane which went up was received with a brisk fire by the Turkish garrison, and the observer was unfortunately killed. Shortly afterwards we ran into a Turkish patrol. We were lucky enough to shoot first, and dropped three of them, but it was enough for some 250 of the Arabs.

The force had now dwindled down to Saleh and his thirty men; after a few hundred yards more they gave it up and lay down. There we remained throughout the day, a mile from the town, sniped at

by the Turks, while I prefer to forget some of the signals of the Navy encouraging us to go on.

A plan had been made that a detachment of sailors would land to assist us if we were in difficulties. This party landed, and, after passing a very cheerless night, the town was captured with their assistance next morning. The looting-party at once got to work, and certain articles of female attire captured in the Turkish commandant's house appeared to cause great disgust to these delicate-minded and sensitive Arabs.

From the few Syrian prisoners who had remained to give themselves up we learnt that they had had full intelligence of all the Emir's plans, and that the commandant had left two days ago, leaving only a small rearguard, which was the force that we had encountered the previous day.

There was no sign of the Emir, so we all re-embarked, leaving the Arabs to the thoroughly congenial task of looting the city.

The Emir arrived the following morning, disappointed, so his adviser said, at being deprived of the military triumph of the capture of Wejh. Various journalists, however, have readjusted that point, and I am almost convinced that I am the subject of an hallucination, and that I was not there at all, still less helped to take the town.

I went ashore in the afternoon of the day of his arrival to pay my respects to the Emir Feisal. On my return I passed a few tents, from one of which my late chief of staff, Saleh, the leader of the heroic thirty, emerged with many and fervent welcomes. His father Mohammed was produced. He was also very friendly, and insisted on my coming in to drink coffee. We chatted for some time, when Mohammed asked me for my advice, just as I was leaving. He said that he had to go to the Emir to draw the pay for his men, and he had heard that a sheikh of the Harb had drawn for 400 men when he had only 100. "Now," said Mohammed, "I have really 200 men: for what number should I claim?" "Undoubtedly, a thousand," I replied sarcastically. The old man seized me and embraced me most tenderly, saying, "How just and wise are the counsellors Great Britain sends us! Farewell. I go to the Emir."

Off he went, while I returned to the ship, thinking sadly of the British taxpayer who supplied those bottomless bags of gold sovereigns for Eastern potentates to squander.

After a very short stay in the Red Sea I returned to France, and it was more than two years before I returned to the Hedjaz as British Agent to the Sherif, now King Hussein.

The story of the intervening months is quickly told. The march of the Arab armies on Lord Allenby's flank; the ill-advised *coup d'état* of Feisal in occupying, after the Turkish defeat, the towns of

Syria; our prolonged occupation of this country, raising false hopes on our side, and awakening bitter and amazed suspicion on the other; our inevitable evacuation in favour of France, are all well known to you.

The story of the King's troubles was not finished, for his neighbours, jealous of his ambitions, furious at his assumption of the title of King of the Arabs, convinced that he would obtain no material support from England, attacked him. The Emir Abdullah was crushed by Bin Saud at Tarabah, some forty miles E.N.E. of Taif. Bin Saud and his Wahabite followers had shown their hand. Syria, the vineyard of the Arab kingdom, was lost, and the existence of his small and bankrupt State was even threatened.

It was at this period that I arrived in Jeddah.

Years ago at school I remember reading of the taunt of a Russian Minister to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg at the time of the Danish crisis. I did not think in those days that I should be compelled one day to sit on a richly carpeted divan, an unimportant representative of a great country, and hear the same taunt shrieked out by an Oriental potentate, with eyes ablaze with passion, a body rigid with anger.

Nor was the internal state of the Hedjaz good. The Bedouins had broken out and were raiding all caravans. The Hedjaz was unwilling or powerless to control them. The withdrawal of gold supplies and the reduction of the subsidy was advanced by the King as a reason for the behaviour of the Bedouins, since he was able to pay them to behave as in Turkish days.

In history it would be difficult to find an example of a more autocratic or tyrannical administration. No man was safe from the anger or greed of the monarch. Yet his officials, although they complained bitterly, were not themselves of unimpeachable integrity.

I remember attending the sitting of a court of justice, a new pleasantry of the King's, which was presided over by the Governor of Jeddah. No one was acquainted with the procedure of a court or its powers. The prisoner was being tried on some charge; as far as I could make out, he had the impertinence to have too much money. A member of the court asked another member what punishment they could inflict, and received the reply that the prisoner could be imprisoned or fined. "Who gets the fine?" was the further question. He was told, "The Government." At this point the Governor, an aged man, who had been dozing, woke up, rose in wrath, and thundered at the luckless member: "Why, then, in the name of Allah, do you think that I accepted this post?" Amidst sympathetic murmurs of complete understanding, he resumed his seat.

At the time of my arrival in Jeddah the pilgrimage season was

at its height. After seeing two pilgrimages, I must observe that the numbers of the annual pilgrimage are in my opinion very grossly exaggerated. The preponderance of the lower classes amongst the pilgrims was overwhelming, nor was one greatly impressed by the appearance of any except the Javanese. The organization of their pilgrimage was excellent. The pilgrims were all inoculated against cholera, typhus, and enteric, and looked a most respectable class. In them I see the greatest hope of a Moslem renaissance.

Before passing to a short account of my trip to Taif, I touch with reluctance and pass with impatience the question of the moral depravity of the inhabitants of the Hedjaz. As a French officer said to me, "There is no one who arrives in the Hedjaz without a certain respect for the Mohammedan religion and its believers. A few days at Jeddah and that passes as far as the Arabs of the Hedjaz are concerned."

It is no exaggeration to say that the earnest pilgrim is disgusted and revolted by the open bestiality of the Hedjazis, while Arab admirers may find food for reflection in the thought that the Moslems of India and of many places in the Iraq refer to the Arabs of the holy cities as dogs. The whole community is infected and saturated with vices of which nature abominates the idea.

Drunkenness is also rampant—not drunkenness as we know it, but a drunkenness of complete and absolute insensibility.

The invitation to visit Taif was peculiarly attractive to me, for it cannot have fallen to the lot of many Europeans to visit this Damascus of Arabia at the invitation of the Sherif of Mecca, certainly not in recent times. The pilgrimage season was nearly over when I started out on a mule lent me by the King through the Mecca gate across the plain to the hills.

Highway robberies had been very frequent, so a large escort had been provided for me; whether to impress me, or whether it was actually necessary, I do not know. My experience of the Arab as a fighter had not been such as to cause me much alarm at the thought of a possible attack.

It was a tiring march, as the transport camels were dreadfully slow, enlivened only by the passage of the last pilgrim caravan returning to the coast from Mecca. They presented a curious spectacle, seated in the "shug-dug," or litters, strapped on the camel's back, taking their ease as if the slow and lumbering movement of the camel in no way incommoded them.

Some fifteen miles out of Jeddah the local escort turned back, and I was met by a Sherif of the Harb, who was to be my escort till he handed me over to the Sherif of Taif. In the company of a sherif no one was likely to interfere with me.

I was amused on meeting this Sherif, whom I greeted with com-

pliments due to his position, by one of his slaves coming up and whispering to me: "Do you not see the Sherif? Dismount and kiss his hand." I waved him away, but reflected for the next mile on how strange a personality was the Arab. He worships birth; an ancient lineage is held in the highest respect; he is at once the most aristocratic and the most democratic of men. The man of humble birth would not dare to approach a Sherif—even an unimportant member of this Arabian trade union—without kissing his hand with approved deference and humility. Yet they will sit at meat together, dip in the common bowl, and converse with perfect frankness. The Sherif will have little authority over him, he will be able to oppress him in many Oriental ways, but the "Come, and he cometh," of the Roman centurion finds no re-echo in Arabia.

I have digressed somewhat from the point. It was late that evening, nearly two hours after sunset, before we arrived at the King's farm, which had been indicated to us as our first halting-place.

The King's farm had a fine regal sound on paper, but actually it consisted of a few fields of lucerne, a date-grove, and a spring which by many small canals dispersed its water over the garden.

The road over which we had travelled was the pilgrim route to Mecca. In places it runs through a narrow valley with hills rising steeply on either side, and in others it passes over a broad plateau encircled by hills like some gigantic amphitheatre. It rises gradually from the coast.

We spent the next morning at the farm. A slave of the King had brought some cold fowls and various excellent delicacies made by his Turkish cook. Shortly after midday, when the heat was really at its height, the Sherif of the Harb pressed us to continue our march. I agreed, of course, although the rays of an Arabian sun were anything but pleasant when one's head was protected only by the Bedouin headdress of a light cloth secured by a silken cord around the temples.

Our route lay over a large open space intersected by the Wadi Fatma. There were several little gardens dotted near the wadi, and there were, in fact, many springs of water. There were traces of a very old irrigation of considerable magnitude. Stone aqueducts 3 feet in breadth by 2 feet in depth existed in a state of perfect preservation. The Emir Abdullah informed me at a subsequent visit to this place that these aqueducts were more than 600 years old. Certainly one gained the impression that cultivation on a large scale might be possible in this area.

I suspect the Emir to have given me the real reason for the unproductiveness of the country one day when I was sitting in the King's tent with him and the King and three Syrians. These latter were agricultural and geological experts summoned by the King to

advise him on such matters in the Hedjaz. They were ignorant peasants, but the King delighted to show them to all visitors as instancing how much at heart he had the development of his country. He would not accept any Western advisers, so fearful was he that it would be but the initial stage of a penetration of, and perhaps protectorate over, his country.

These Syrian gentlemen held forth at great length on the agricultural future of the country, and what mechanical appliances could do for the Hedjaz. The Emir interrupted with the remark that the Hedjaz only wanted one thing for its development, and that was a few Bedouin who would work as the fellahin of Egypt did. The King was not amused at the remark.

I remember about the same time the King took a walk one afternoon with his geological expert. Arriving at the base of a hill, the expert pointed out a lump of granite and expatiated on its properties, declaring that it was an exceedingly valuable piece of gold-bearing quartz. The delighted King ordered him to take the piece back to my tent to show me. The unhappy man—for the stone weighed nearly a hundredweight—staggered back to the camp across the heavy sand of the wadi, and threw the mass at my feet, where I was sitting by the door of my tent. But the name he gave it, so a slave told me, was not that by which he had described it to the monarch!

To return to our march. We went some few miles before branching off from the main Mecca road in order to skirt the Holy City. Our road onwards was simply a wadi bed, winding through the hills, on whose banks bordered from time to time the precipitous slope of the hills, but ever and again they receded, leaving the wadi to cross an open space of some extent.

Neither here nor at any time during the march did we see any game, small or big. At one well where we halted at sunset for the evening prayer a few sand-grouse came down to drink, but I saw no other bird-life save a few carrion kite.

That night we slept at an altitude of some 1,500 feet above the sea-level, and for the first time were really glad of our blankets. The following morning we were met by an official from Mecca, and camped at midday in a garden on the Wadi Limun. This is a wonderful wadi containing many gardens—in fact, wherever there is a spring. At various places the wadi is prepared by banks and canals to hold the "seil," or flood, when it comes, so as to permit of extensive irrigation with the water so stored. Unfortunately, heavy rains are of rare occurrence, so a flood year is an exception, although I am convinced that a great deal in this connection could be done to make self-supporting a country which now imports the whole of the necessities of life for its inhabitants and the pilgrims.

It was pleasant indeed to rest awhile under the shade of a tree to the sound of running water as it raced down its tiny aqueduct to disperse in many canals spread chequerwise over the garden.

The Sherif did not give us long before we resumed our march. This time our wadi-bed road led us up a narrow valley bordered by rocky hills, bare of vegetation, sombre from base to brow. The road ascended gradually, and when seemingly near the head of the valley we halted for the night.

Our escort professed to be frightened of an attack by a Bedouin raiding-party during the night, and kept us awake by frequent shouting to warn any would-be raiders lurking in the hills that we were a well-armed party and the King's guests.

However, the night passed without incident. On resuming our march, in a mile or two we reached the head of the valley, when a big open expanse covered with light scrub spread itself before our view; beyond loomed the mass of the Hedjaz Mountains.

By a well near the far side of the plateau we found the Sherif of Taif waiting for us, an agreeable man and a wonderful horseman. After lunching and enjoying the luxury of a bath, for there were a few rude Bedouin huts near, we set off about 1 p.m. for the final stage of our journey. A half-mile brought us to the foot of the pass which crossed the Hedjaz range.

In many places for the next four hours we had to dismount and lead our mules, and everywhere the path was steep and rugged. Just as the sun was close to the horizon we emerged into the open, clear of the pass. The rolling plain sloped gently downwards to the uplands of the Nejd on the east and southwards to Taif, not yet visible; beyond and on the west an unbroken succession of rugged peaks, sinister and forbidding against the setting sun.

We waited a few minutes and prayed the evening prayer. Wrapping ourselves in Bedouin cloaks, for it was very cold, we rode on. About eight o'clock we saw lights, and we soon reached a lofty wall; passing through a gate into a large courtyard, we dismounted. We learnt that it was the country villa of the Sherif of Taif, and at that moment the Sherif himself advanced, embraced me, and welcomed me with the charming compliment that I was now in my own home.

We entered the house, and ascended the staircase to the guest-chamber, which extended along the whole front of the house. Here we sat with the Sherif, on divans covered with carpets from Kurdistan, from Bokhara, from Persia, from towns and places which conjured up by their very names remembrance of all the romances of the East. We drank tea and coffee while we enjoyed the rare and pleasing privilege of seeing an Arabian Sherif in his own home, amongst his own people.

We watched a scene which the lapse of years, the passage of

time, has sought neither to qualify nor to change—a scene of Eastern life, a page from a book centuries old. Passed through that guest-chamber Arabs in rich clothing, men in soberer dress, dependants, slaves, and relations of the Sherif. The hurried kiss by some of the extended hand, the proffered cheek to another, the tender embrace to relatives with the murmured prayer to Allah, denoted the rank of all and each.

It was the time of the last prayer. Seated cross-legged on our carpets, we recited together the Fatha, that opening verse of the Koran, sublime and simple as any in the Book of Job. The Sherif bade us good-night, and we ate, and then lay down. Through the window we saw in the waning moonlight of an Arabian night the Sherif's garden, and beyond the desert plain stretching to the hills.

We slept soundly, and it was past eight when I was awakened by a slave who brought me greetings from the Emirs Ali and Abdullah, the King's sons, who were to be my hosts at Taif.

After breakfast we started off for the final stage of five miles into Taif. Our cavalcade was of fair proportions—some were riding horses, others camels or mules, or even the humble ass.

We were still a mile and more from Taif, when we were met by the Emir Abdullah with a hundred Bedouin horsemen. Cordial greetings were exchanged, and various sherifs were presented to me. Five minutes more and the road passed a low knoll, when the walled city of Taif came into view. A few hundred yards from the walls we saw the stately palace of the King. A few more minutes and we alighted at the steps of the palace, and passed into the great audience-hall, where the Emir Ali awaited us.

We exchanged cordial greetings, drank the inevitable cup of coffee, and smoked a cigarette. The Emir then conducted us to our rooms and left us to rest.

My first impression was one of amazement, for here in the midst of a desert plain of Arabia stood two wonder palaces, furnished with great luxury. Over a rugged mountain road exquisite furniture, great mirrors, glass for windows, all had been transported by a lumbering camel. Six stories in height, one felt that the slave of Aladdin's lamp had worked some miracle. From great bow-windows with luxurious seats covered with priceless carpets one was given a view for miles over a strange and fascinating country. With the glorious sunshine and air, cold, fresh, and invigorating, a comparison with the climate of Switzerland naturally suggested itself. While we stood and gazed, a slave approached and presented the compliments of the Emirs, who asked if I would come into the garden.

The luxury, the appointments, the size, of these desert palaces amazed me, and I was not prepared for a further *coup de théâtre*. Across a stony courtyard, through a wooden door in a lofty wall, I

passed into a garden of exquisite beauty, a veritable grove of Mycerinus. There I found the Emirs seated by a stone pool in which the goldfish swam idly to and fro. Surrounded by their slaves, richly clothed, silent, inscrutable, dark with "the shadow'd livery of the burnished sun," they sat in the midst of this verdant loveliness by the pool under a copper bougainvillea. Around I gazed on vines and fruits of all description—orange, lemon, pomegranate, quince, fig, apricot—and flowers whose blossoms filled the air with intoxicating perfume.

I sat and talked with these Sherifs of Arabia, and wondered if the world had gone back a thousand years, for we spoke of the Arabian heroes of old in surroundings that evoked memories of the tales of those hanging gardens of Babylon which challenged the envy and admiration of the world. And then we passed out from this wondrous setting through the gate to the arid desolation of a stony plain and barren hills.

Fourteen days were spent at Taif. The King, with exquisite courtesy, had ordered that no political questions should be discussed during my visit, or any matters that would embarrass a guest.

One day was much like the other, and one had the opportunity of seeing what manner of life a prince or noble of Arabia led in his own home. They lived a life of sloth and self-indulgence. Gifted by nature with great intellects, a narrow and vicious life soon undermined their brain-power. Flattered from childhood, surrounded by sycophants, their lightest wish obeyed, even forestalled, it would be astonishing if they were other than they are. As potential reformers, as leaders of an Arab renaissance, I do not find in them many of the qualities which are vitally necessary for the successful realization of such hopes.

The hospitality of the Arab is the theme and admiration of the stranger, says Gibbon. To that opinion I subscribe willingly and gratefully, but I see in them few other traits to evoke either tolerance or admiration.

In that perfect climate of Taif the days passed all too quickly. Each afternoon we rode with the Emir for an hour or so while the Bedouin horsemen showed off their horsemanship. They rode only mares. On one day they had a race; many of the riders competed without saddle or bridle, guiding their horses with a stick. A touch with the latter was sufficient to stop them.

On another day I attended a banquet given by the Sherif of Taif in his town house inside the walls of Taif.

The invitation was for midday, but I found—it was a Friday—that an unusually long sermon had delayed the party, and I was left for half an hour to be entertained by the Emir's son, aged nine, a most interesting and precocious child.

The banquet was a lengthy business, but the food was really admirable. After it was over we repaired to the guest-chamber and sat down to drink coffee, to smoke and talk till it was time to ride.

The court buffoon was introduced. He took the form of a whipping-boy. It gave intense pleasure and amusement to the Emirs and nobles to beat the man with a cane. They would induce him to lie down on the pretext that they would give him only three or four light blows. Sooner or later they always administered a stroke with all their power. The man then went through exaggerated contortions of great pain, jumping up and running round the room, clapping that portion of his body which generations of schoolmasters have held to have been indicated specially by nature for the practice of their skill. He would be induced to lie down again on the promise that he would get only seven light strokes. His suspicions would be allayed or dulled by a faithful adherence to their promise for three or four strokes, when he would cease to look round as the stick descended. Then came the stinging stroke, with its concomitant antics, half real, half serious.

Late that evening my servant brought me news that this man was waiting outside in case I should like to reward him for the good performance that he had given that afternoon.

The time approached to say farewell to my kindly hosts, and I arranged to return by another route. The Emir Abdullah accompanied me on the first stage. The route taken was the identical path—centuries had not changed it—by which the Prophet of Arabia had fled from Taif after his unsuccessful mission of proselytism, pursued by an angry mob to the outskirts of the Holy City.

We passed by the same villages, whose inhabitants gazed with astonishment at the Emir passing by with an infidel in his train.

That night we camped on a plateau near the head of the Pass of Kura. Here there was rain cultivation, for we were some 9,000 feet above sea-level. The hill-slopes were covered with a species of fir, and herbs of many kinds grew in wild profusion. The houses were built of stone, and these stones fitted so closely together that no mortar was necessary to hold them. The roofs were flat, of beaten dung and mud.

It was bitterly cold, and it was some time next morning before we could get the camels to move.

We started eventually, and in a quarter of an hour arrived at the head of the pass. We halted to say good-bye to the Emir and to gaze on that view.

In India and in Africa and in Europe I have been privileged to see many views of infinite beauty. From the Mount of Olives I have gazed on the Dead Sea in the still beauty of a summer day, but nowhere have I seen such a panorama as that which spread itself that day before my eyes.

The path fell sheer away from one's feet; below us the plain, intersected with the silvery streaks of the wadi-beds; the lofty, rugged Hedjaz range stretched north and south, and to our front the hills of mighty moment to millions of believers—Mount El Nur, where the prophet of the wilderness sat and dreamed and communed with the angel of Gabriel; Mount Arafat (Mount of Knowledge), where Adam knew Eve again; and last but not least, the hills which girt the Holy City itself, bathed in an Eastern sun. Far away to the west loomed the shimmer of the sea, and all around was solitude and a spirit of ineffable peace.

In four hours we had descended the pass, leading our slipping, struggling mules and camels. In places there were paved steps for considerable distances, the remains of the military road which Mahomet Ali constructed over the pass for the furtherance of his operations against the Wahabis of Nejd.

That afternoon we passed, and I ascended the Mount El Nur to which I have already referred. Towards sunset, when near the Holy City itself, we turned northwards to pass round it. In places there were small, very small, patches of cultivation by the banks of the wadi, wherever there was a spring. We passed a few herds of goats and sheep, shepherded by Bedouin boys, obtaining a struggling existence off a few thorn-bushes and patches of dried-up grass. With these exceptions there was nothing but stony plains and valleys surrounded by rugged hills, with the mountain range behind us.

Very late that evening we camped some six miles north-west of Mecca by a well on an open plain. It was full moon, and as I lay, wrapped in my blanket, I saw two Bedouin steal down to the well, fill their skins, and depart silently, just as nightly they and their ancestors for hundreds of years had done. There was nothing to break the stillness of the night, and in the moonlight the watching hills, the white pillars marking the boundaries of the Holy City, stood out clear to the vision like sentinels over the country.

Next day we reached the pilgrim road from the coast, and hearing that the King had gone on to Jeddah, we pressed on to arrive there late the following evening.

Thus I have talked to you of Arabia and the mythology of Islam, of the country and life of the sherifs and nobles of the Hedjaz, and I will conclude by submitting to you my deeply considered opinion that Arabia is destined to play in the near future a far-reaching and important part in the maintenance, or even in the existence, of our Empire.

No deep knowledge of strategy is required to grasp the importance of Arabia, of Iraq, of Kurdistan and of Palestine. Years ago our relations *vis-à-vis* with Islamism were supreme and unchallenged, but now others are in the field. Representatives of many nations sat

in years gone by at Tehran, at Baghdad, and elsewhere in the East, but foreign missions did not exist, as they do to-day, at Kabul. We are no longer alone in the field. I see also in Arabia a growing power, a power not of our forging, a power which eventually will overrun the very homes of those whom we have so openly and so prodigally supported.

I refer to the lowering menace of Wahabism. The activities of the Akhwan (brothers)—for thus did Bin Saud name the followers of this new revivalism of Wahabism—have redoubled. They have permeated Nejd, and in Central Arabia has risen a power saturated with as blind a fanaticism as that which enabled the early followers of the prophet of the wilderness to overrun the world from Granada to Delhi.

Any discussion of Arabia must necessarily bring into prominence other Islamic countries, and I make no apology for reminding you of one other point. It is a mistake to think that Mohammedan countries are divided hopelessly amongst themselves in all their aims and ambitions. On one point at least they are united—viz., on the necessity to maintain an Islamic power in the councils of the world.

It is often urged that the Arab hates the Turk; be that as it may, yet there is a growing desire in Arabia and Iraq for the return of the Turk.

The custodianship of the holy places lies now with the Sherif of Arabia, but I feel that peace will not descend on Islam till the cities of the Prophet are once again under the ægis of a Mohammedan nation which unites both spiritual and temporal power.

The CHAIRMAN: I hope that after this very interesting lecture some discussion may arise, or if not discussion, at least some remarks may be made by some of the audience.

Dr. HOGARTH: Well, if you wish it, I will congratulate Colonel Vickery upon the very amusing and ingenious travesty of the facts of the Arab revolt, and the aims of its promoters, with which this lecture began, and I condole with him upon the miserable time that he must have had in being sent twice into a country with whose inhabitants he seems to have so little sympathy. I would also assure him that those to whom he alluded as the Sherif's advisers are by no means biting their nails at what has happened, because the present state of affairs in Arabia is extraordinarily like what we had every reason to expect. The last thing in the minds of any of them was that a great Arab kingdom should come into existence. Still less did they expect an Arab Khalifat, and least of all one centred in Mecca. Not only did we not expect that; neither did the Sherif. He belongs to those Moslems who think that any rightful Khalifat has not existed for a great many centuries, and that for any Khalifat at all the war-

rant is not simply birth. Birth may not disqualify; but the only possible qualification is that the Khalif should exercise rule—effective and supreme temporal power. That is a very old idea in Islam. When the Omeyyad Khalifat came into existence it was based neither on descent from, nor nomination by, the founder of Islam. It came into existence within a generation of the death of the Prophet, by pure virtue of its founder being the most powerful Islamic sovereign for the moment in the world. As regards the wisdom of the promotion of the Arab revolt at all, I should have been glad if Colonel Vickery had found time to deal with what might have been if the Arab revolt had not taken place. What would have been the condition of the Red Sea, our main route of communication to India and the East, if the eastern shore of that sea had remained under the unrestricted control of the Turks, after our failure at the Dardanelles, and after Germany had developed her maximum power of reinforcing her allies and sending deadly machinery about the world? That is one question. The other is, What further trouble might we have had if Islam had not been divided in authority? When the Sherif of Mecca was brought in it was not with any idea that the whole Islamic world would rally to him and desert the Ottoman Khalifat; but we knew—and we were justified in the result—that there would be a division of authority in the Islamic world, and that those who were not anxious for Jihad—Holy War—would have their excuse just because the city of Mecca (much more important than the person of the Sherif, and over which he had control for the time being, thanks to the revolt) refused to fight against us. Those were two great benefits. If you will throw your minds back to 1916, you will remember that things were not going well for us then in the East. We had scored no sort of success. Those two results, then, were brought about, to my mind, by the Sherifian revolt. The only regret and shame that I have I share with Colonel Vickery, that we should have gained those benefits at the price of not fulfilling certain ambitions of the Sherif; which, as a matter of fact, we never encouraged him to hold, but did not sufficiently discourage him from holding. (Applause.)

MR. BENNETT: Mr. Chairman,—I cannot pretend to know, except from studying Constantinople and looking southwards, the state of affairs in Arabia; but there is one fact which disengaged itself from Colonel Vickery's lecture, and it seems to me from all study of Arabia, that at the end of the war in 1919, when we might have drawn in our horns in regard to our policy towards the Sherifian family, we failed to do so. On the contrary, we allowed the Sherifian family to push its claims farther and farther afield; particularly, great responsibility attaches to us for the Emir's fatal Syrian adventure. Most people who have studied the Near East since the beginning of

the war are aware of the growing power of the Wahabis, and when in 1919 Bin Saud began to move southward, most people know the terror which struck the hearts of the Sherifian family, and the general fear that Mecca would be occupied and sacked. It is a thing very greatly to the credit of Bin Saud that he sacrificed his great policy of Arab unity to his word to us, and did not go on and occupy Mecca when he might have, but turned back after his victory over Sherif Feisal and the Sherif Abdullah. I think that all Englishmen should realize and remember this act of loyalty of Bin Saud's. If he had not been loyal then we should have been forced to drop our Sherifian policy, and obliged to establish ourselves in Arabia on a policy of friendship with Bin Saud. Now we are coming more and more clearly to realize to what extent we built on sand. King Hussein, poor madman, is getting more and more difficult to control; and Colonel Vickery's description of the state of affairs in the Hedjaz is perhaps unkind to the Arabs, because I think the present state of affairs is more largely to be attributed to the bad personal influence of King Hussein than to any inferiority of the Hedjazi to other Arabs—except, possibly, the Yemeni, who are very superior. My object in standing up, when I cannot pretend to be an authority, is to try and urge on everyone the need for studying and realizing the situation in Arabia. We must realize that we are bound, by promises foolishly made—promises made in writing and supported again and again by documents and asseverations to the Sherifian family—to follow a policy which we ourselves at the time knew to be unsound, and knew to be leading us into very deep waters, which deep waters we have now entered. To-day our authority in Arabia is very small, and probably the chief rock of our hope is Bin Saud. He has been loyal to us for four years, and he is loyal to us to-day. We should move steadily and honestly in the direction of friendship with Bin Saud, without breaking our promises to the Sherif, but at any rate without enmeshing ourselves still further in this policy of supporting the Hussein family, who rule to-day in Baghdad, in Trans-Jordania, and in the Hedjaz, and who rule with no moral authority. They are the chiefs of a small tribe, a tribe which is indeed the tribe of the Prophet; but the Prophet himself said before his death: "If you find no one worthy to follow me in the tribe of Koreish, choose the most worthy of the Arabs." Let us choose Bin Saud and pin our faith on him for our Arab policy.

Sir MICHAEL O'DWYER: I speak as one having no personal acquaintance with Arabian politics, but I can confirm what Dr. Hogarth said as to the great value to us who had to deal with the Mohammedan situation in India of the Sherif's revolt from the military and political point of view. Let us take our minds back to what the situation was in the East at the time. I was then in the

Punjab. Mesopotamia was in the hands of the Turks; German and Turkish missions had penetrated through Persia into Kabul; plots of the most far-reaching description were being hatched in Kabul to unite not only all Islam against the British Empire, but to draw all seditious sections in India into union with Mohammedan propagandists. That plot was very cleverly engineered by Hindoo and Moslem revolutionaries with headquarters in Kabul, and ably supported by Turkish and German missions established there, whom the Amir of Kabul, although a very loyal ally, was not strong enough openly to oppose, and who, after the Bolsheviks had taken the place of the Germans, finally brought about his murder. At that time the centre of the plot and of the Pan-Islamic conspiracy was the Hedjaz. The Sherifian family there were supposed to be the links between Eastern Islam and Western Islam, and emissaries were sent, as we know, from India—leading Mohammedans in India—early in 1916 to Arabia to bring the Sherifian family and the Arabs of the Hedjaz into the plot. It was held that if they were brought in all the forces of Islam would then become hostile to England. Already Turkey, and all Islam which Turkey could influence, were our open enemies; and it was believed that if the Arab nations could be brought in by the influence of the Sherifian family the combination would be complete. It was at that very critical period, when our flank was open to attack in India from the west, that the Sherifian revolt against the Turks, which had been promoted very carefully and very secretly, broke out; and I can say from personal experience that, though it caused needless anxiety to some nervous people in Simla who should have known better, it had the most marvellous effect in strengthening our position, in dividing Islam—as Dr. Hogarth has very aptly put it—when it appeared likely to combine against us, and in encouraging those Mohammedans who were lukewarm to rally to the British Empire. For that reason I think the political results of the action taken in bringing the Sherif of Mecca on to our side were most important. As to what subsequently followed, or what promises we made, or how those promises have been fulfilled, I am not competent to speak; but looking at it from the point of view of an outsider I should think that on the whole we have not done the Sherifian family badly. The Sherif is King of the Hedjaz, one son is King of Mesopotamia, and the third, who is now our guest in London, Abdullah, is Emir of Trans-Jordania. This hardly bears out the Lecturer's sweeping condemnation of our policy as one of lies and of broken promises. Moreover, it has to be borne in mind that our hands were not quite free. We had allies to consider—the French—and their point of view was different from ours. The Arabs are intelligent enough to understand our difficulties. One other point I would like to bring out in reference to what the Lecturer described

as the growing menace of Wahabism in Arabia. We have seen Wahabism in India; we know how hostile it has been and is in India, what its power of secret conspiracy is, what trouble it has given us in the very near past from those tribes which have their "habitat" in the Black Mountain, or on our Peshawar border, and come over the frontiers of India and encourage Mohammedan fanatics in India against us. We know how many valuable British lives have been sacrificed to that militant and often murderous fanaticism. The counterblast to that militant Wahabism is to be found, and has perhaps been found, in a good understanding with the recognized head of the Wahabis, the Emir Bin Saud. There is no reason why we should not maintain our good understanding with Bin Saud, as we have done in the past. A friend of mine, the late Captain Shakespeare, an old assistant of mine, had seen a great deal of Bin Saud and swore by him. His friendly attitude throughout the war and since has been a great asset to us, and he has never broken his word. But there is no reason, because we have a friendly arrangement with Bin Saud, why we should throw over the Sherifian family. That understanding has been proved in the past to be profitable to the Sherifian family—for it is that which two years ago stayed the Wahabi advance on Mecca—and there is every reason to maintain it in the interests of both parties, and of Arabia generally, where our note should be that of friendly adviser and peacemaker between the contending factions.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—As apparently no one else desires to enlighten our ignorance on the subject of Arabia, and as the Lecturer does not wish to reply to the remarks of those who have been so good as to address us, it falls to me to close this meeting; but before doing so I would like to make one or two remarks on what has been said, and I hope the Lecturer will forgive me if I do not altogether agree with him in certain aspects of his lecture. The first remark I would make on his lecture is that we are much indebted to him for the very interesting account he gave us of Arab warfare. I have read a great many narratives of the Great War, and heard a great many lectures about war; but I never heard a lecture which put Asiatic warfare in such an amusing light as our Lecturer did to-night; and I am perfectly sure his is an admirable description of what Arab warfare is like. The next remark I would like to make is that I am inclined to think that the Lecturer somewhat ignored the very vital danger which threatened us at the very beginning of the war, or, rather, I should say, directly Turkey came into the war—the very vital danger of Jihad being not only proclaimed, but put in action against the British Empire. It was because we had by that time already succeeded in detaching some of the Arab States or tribes to our side that this grave danger was averted. I remember just before Turkey came into the war—when, indeed, it was quite

obvious that Turkey intended coming into the war—that that very gallant officer, Captain Shakespeare, left London to return to Koweit with instructions to pass on from there, if possible, to visit Bin Saud, whom he had known during his previous journeys in Arabia, and to endeavour to detach him to our side. He accomplished his mission with complete success, but he paid for it with his life, because in a battle that took place between Bin Saud and Bin Rashid in Central Arabia a stray bullet put an end to this very valuable life. That was a great misfortune for us, but the extraordinary influence he had acquired over Bin Saud was such that Bin Saud remained our firm friend throughout the war, and I was very glad to hear Sir Michael O'Dwyer's remarks on that point. None of our allies—I do not think there is one of our allies served us so faithfully under great difficulties as Bin Saud. Not only during the war, but since the war he has behaved most loyally under trying circumstances, more especially when we had trouble in Mesopotamia. I feel convinced that if it had not been for our Arab friends, and notably Bin Saud, the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit, the Idrissi, and some of the Sherifian family, we should have fared very badly, in that Islam might have been united against us. That it was not so, I think was most fortunate. The hour is late, and therefore I will not detain you any longer with my somewhat futile remarks on the subject of Arabia, but I am sure that I can call upon you to give a very cordial vote of thanks to the Lecturer, for a lecture not only full of information, but also, if I may say so, in some of its aspects extremely amusing.

This ended the meeting, which recorded unanimously a vote of thanks to the lecturer.

THREE DIFFICULT MONTHS IN 'IRAQ

FROM A CORRESPONDENT IN BAGHDAD

OWING to the proximity of the events and to the perplexing intermingling of the causes which produced them, it is by no means easy to maintain a proper sense of proportion in recording the history of what has passed in 'Iraq during the last three months. Solid foundations have in many cases been obscured by, or completely hidden under impressive exteriors resting on air or even less stable bases, while many tendencies which at close view appear to be of great significance may prove in the more distant and more accurate perspective obtainable in the future to be comparatively unimportant and to possess little or no influence on the trend of affairs. The writer must claim indulgence, then, if he at times exaggerates the importance of some events or underestimates the true significance of others.

In June of this year, at the time when the article on "The Early Days of the 'Iraq Government" was written, it appeared as though the difficulties which had confronted those responsible for the administration of 'Iraq were to some extent being smoothed away; Feisal was showing a less marked inclination towards the extremists, the electoral law had been passed and published, and a note of hope was sounded that the corner had been turned. Unfortunately, however, this apparent improvement was only a passing phase, and things are still in much the same position as they were three months ago.

The pivot round which all interest and all activity has centred has been the treaty and the mandate. Individual incidents have at various times assumed an air of importance and attracted considerable attention, but in every case its origin can be traced back, directly or indirectly, to this one underlying cause.

In view of the important position which the treaty and the mandate have held and still hold in fashioning public opinion and policy in 'Iraq, it may be of interest to set out in brief the views of the people of the country in this connection. In its views on these important questions the country is divided into two camps—the Nationalists and the Moderates. The Nationalists are in general xenophobe, and consequently violently opposed to the mandate and to any treaty which affords any loophole for foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the State. Their demand is for complete political and economic independence. The party is ostensibly led

by Iraqis, but its inspiration is derived from the band of Syrians who came to the country with or about the same time as Feisal, and who, having fought with him and served him in Syria, are looked on by him as his right-hand men in this country. These Syrians have no interests in 'Iraq, and do not at heart care a jot about its future, nor do they want to remain in the country any longer than they can help. Their eyes are fixed firmly on Syria, and their one desire is to get back there with as little delay as possible. It is this which fashions their policy in 'Iraq and renders so intense their opposition to the mandate. They realize that as long as the French mandate for Syria remains and is interpreted in the manner which they have seen hitherto, they have no chance whatever of getting back themselves to Syria or of setting up an independent Arab State there, and they see no signs of hope that the French will relinquish their mandate or modify their interpretation of it. On the other hand, they see that there is a considerable body of opinion in Great Britain which persistently advocates the relinquishment of Britain's mandate over 'Iraq and the evacuation of the country, at any rate as far as Basra. It is on that feeling in Great Britain that the Nationalists, or at any rate the Syrians and pan-Arab elements among them, base their hopes. If they can, by playing on that feeling, intensify the demand at home for the revocation of the mandate to such a degree that Government will have to give way to the public clamour, they will then get into their own hands the control of 'Iraq's foreign relations, and will have a very strong precedent on which to base their demand for the revocation of the French mandate for Syria.

To attain their object and to assist them in raising a popular clamour against the mandate and the treaty, they have called in the assistance of the Shiah *ulama*, some of whom have answered the call, and have been most violent in denouncing the mandate and in urging both the Cabinet and the people to oppose to the bitter end any treaty which does not leave to Iraqis an unconditional independence. Their object in adopting this attitude, however, is far different to that of the Syrians. They have no care for Syria and their aims are purely personal. Their desire is to be in a position to create a theocratic *imperium in imperio* in which they will reign supreme. They realize that they can only attain their end in a country where the Government is weak, and they realize that an independent Arab Government, unsupported by any foreign advisers, is likely to provide for them the atmosphere in which they can most easily flourish. With everything to gain, then, from the existence of a weak Government, the only surprise is that so few of these *ulama* have given their support to the opponents of foreign assistance.

The number of genuine Iraqis who belong to the Nationalist party is very small, and their motives are varied, while their already small

numbers show a tendency to grow even smaller as the strength of the moderate party increases.

The moderate party contains most of the genuine Iraqis, whether townsmen or tribesmen. While looking to complete independence, freed from all foreign assistance or control, as their ultimate object, they realize that at the moment this is but a Utopian ideal, which cannot be realized for several years to come, and they are anxious to retain British advisers until that time comes when they are able to stand alone. Their attitude towards the mandate is, however, one of suspicion, and the majority would prefer to see it revoked and replaced by a treaty which, while making provision for the maintenance of a number of British advisers, would definitely and unequivocally declare the independence of the country. The motives which underlie this attitude are partly a sense of national pride and partly a vague sense of fear. They look with unfeigned gratitude on the liberal manner in which Great Britain has interpreted her mandate for 'Iraq hitherto, and the degree of independence which has been given to the country. On the other hand, they compare it with the much less liberal interpretation which has been placed on the mandate in Syria and Palestine, and feel that while such widely varying interpretations are possible there is always the chance that a change of Government at home or the appointment of a High Commissioner for 'Iraq less in touch with local conditions and less sympathetic towards national aspirations than Sir Percy Cox might result in a considerable tightening of British control and a severe curtailment in the degree of independence granted to the inhabitants of the country. Added to this is the feeling that acceptance of the mandate would imply an admission of inferiority on their part, whereas the revocation of the mandate and the recognition of their independence would rouse feelings of national satisfaction and pride which even the acceptance of foreign advisers would do little or nothing to compromise. It is understood that the treaty as at present drafted makes no mention at all of the mandate, and that though acceptance of the treaty will be tantamount to acceptance of the mandate, it is considered that the moderates will be willing to accept the treaty as it stands, as they will not be called upon to sign any document which expressly states that they accept the mandate, and will thus avoid expressly admitting their inferiority.

As in every country, it is the Nationalists who form the vocal and more active, even though the less numerous, section of the population, and in 'Iraq the activities of the Nationalists have been on occasions such as seriously to endanger the maintenance of public order and security. This has been especially so in the Middle Euphrates. It is there, owing to the presence of Karbala and Najaf and the *ulama* resident there, that the Nationalists made their

greatest efforts. It was in this area, too, that the heaviest fighting took place during the insurrection of 1920, and where consequently the tribesmen suffered the severest losses both in men and material; and, lastly, it was in this area that the only supporters possessed by the Nationalists among the tribal sheikhs lived. Everything, then, pointed to this area as the most suitable ground for the cultivation of anti-foreign and anti-mandate clamour. The method adopted by the Nationalists was to obtain the appointment of a complete suite of Nationalist officials to that area, who then proceeded to attempt to intimidate sheikhs and tribesmen who did not hold anti-British opinions by differentiating against them in all their dealings with Government. Cases to which moderates were a party remained unheard or were repeatedly adjourned, and in the assessment of the land revenue distinctions were made in favour of Nationalist sheikhs and cultivators, while all manner of intimidation was adopted in order to make the tribesmen sign resolutions denouncing the mandate and the treaty. These methods, however, failed completely, and the result was merely to unite the sheikhs into common resistance to the Nationalists and their aims.

In Baghdad, too, no pains were spared to rouse popular opinion against the mandate. The Nationalist papers published inflammatory leading articles and gave prominence to xenophobe *fatwahas* issued by Shiah *ulama*, while on more than one occasion attempts were made to organize demonstrations.

Towards the end of August these efforts were redoubled, owing to the formation of definite political parties under the newly published law regarding the institution and organization of societies and clubs. Three parties were at once formed, two of which were Nationalist, differing from one another only in detail, while the third was the moderate party. On the eve of the anniversary of the King's accession (August 28) the executives of the two Nationalist parties held a joint session, as a result of which they issued a manifesto which was distinctly against the Government and calculated to cause trouble. This was followed on the anniversary day by a deliberate insult to the High Commissioner when he was, as the representative of King George, paying an official visit to Feisal to congratulate him on his having reached the first anniversary of his reign. Inquiries showed that this insult had been organized by members of the committee of the two Nationalist parties, with the assistance, or at any rate with the cognizance, of the King's Chamberlain.

The position was critical. The Middle Euphrates and the Muntafiq were in a state of unrest which threatened to cause bloodshed at any moment. In Baghdad an active campaign was being waged against the Government and the mandatory power which had culminated in a deliberate insult to the British Government; the

Cabinet had resigned owing to a disagreement with the King on matters of constitutional procedure, and on top of it all the King himself developed a rather severe attack of appendicitis, which necessitated an immediate operation and removed him for some time from active participation in the direction of the affairs of the State. It was essential that strong action should be taken if serious trouble was to be avoided, and in the existing circumstances the High Commissioner was the only person in a position to take it. He therefore issued orders for the arrest of the Nationalist leaders, closed the Nationalist papers, and suspended the Nationalist parties pending the production of adequate guarantees that they would conduct their affairs in future in a legitimate manner, and at the same time he issued to the public a notification explaining what action he had taken and why, and warning them that he would not hesitate to visit with the heaviest punishment any persons who behaved in a way calculated to disturb the peace or jeopardize the good relations which had existed hitherto between Great Britain and 'Iraq. At the same time he emphasized that this action on his part did not signify any change in the fixed policy of the British Government of developing legitimate National ideals and setting up a National Government.

The effect of this action was magical. All signs of unrest disappeared, and both Baghdad and the outside districts have been quieter and less turbulent than for many months past. Faisal has now recovered, and a new Cabinet will, it is said, be appointed immediately, and it is hoped that it will at once finish off the question of the treaty in order that the elections to the National Assembly may be proceeded with.

One of the most disquieting factors in the situation throughout the past few months has been the attitude and the behaviour of the King's personal staff. Largely composed of Syrians, they have consistently thrown their influence on the side of the Nationalist extremists. They have been a cause of great discontent among the moderates and have done much to discredit Feisal in public opinion. Hopes are expressed that a drastic reconstitution of the personal staff will soon be made, composed of men of less extreme views and containing a larger number of Iraqis possessing a stake in the country.

No mention is made here of the recent events in Southern Kurdistan and Anatolia, which have brought the Turkish question to the fore in this country, as it is still too early to gauge its effect, and it can better be left for consideration in a future article.

EVACUATION OF KURDISTAN: AN ILL-FATED EXPEDITION

By E. B. SOANE

A SMALL Turkish force had been at Rawandiz for some time, and had been the centre of propaganda in Middle and South Kurdistan. This had been successful to some extent, and was assisted materially by the uncertain policy of the British Government in Kurdistan, and the defeat of Simko farther north, which resulted in the break-up of his federation of tribes, most of which, seeing no prospect of employment with him for the time being, turned to the Turks. Meanwhile, the authority of Babekr Agha of the Pizhder (a tribe upon which the British relied almost entirely for the maintenance of their administration in the northern part of the Sulaimani area) had become undermined by his cousin and rival, Abbas Agha. The moment being favourable, the Turkish force (variously estimated at 70 to 100 badly equipped regulars) turned its face southwards, and, with the assistance of Abbas Agha Pizhder, reached a point near Rania, in the north of Sulaimani district.

In order to prevent a further advance by this force, a column, composed of the Sulaimani levy, two companies of the 15th Sikhs, two mountain guns, and some Supply and Transport Corps details, was despatched. Previous to its arrival at Derbend (Rania), aeroplanes had bombed part of the country, but the measure was not successful or effective, as only three casualties resulted.

The column having arrived at Derbend (Rania), beside the Lesser Zab River, a piquet of twelve Sikhs and a Lewis gun was posted on a ridge on the opposite bank. The first disaster was the loss of this piquet, which was rushed by Kurds, only three Sikhs escaping alive. Tribesmen then occupied the heights overlooking the camp, and proceeded to open a long-range but very effective fire on it, killing a great number of the mules and causing some casualties. There was no alternative but to retreat, which was the signal for the whole country to blaze up. Our adherent, Babekr Agha, thus left, fled with his small band to Persia.

The force was surrounded by tribesmen, both mounted and on foot, but it fought its way on slowly, losing heavily and having to abandon all wounded, until it floundered into a rice-field in Rania

plain, where both guns and the remainder of the kit, gear, and supplies were lost. The position here became so desperate and the fighting so close that a charge was ordered—the Sikhs with bayonets and officers with revolvers—and the enemy gave way sufficiently for the force to proceed, but leaving guns, all transport, and wounded behind.

Escape was eventually effected through the country of the Piran Kurds and via Koi to Kirkuk. The British casualties were two officers wounded and between thirty and forty Sikhs killed and missing. The levy behaved badly, giving little assistance; its sympathies were probably with the other side, and as the Turks apparently did not figure in the fight at all, it was opposed by Kurds of the same district as itself.

During the first part of the retreat the force was supported by aeroplanes, but later on their supply of petrol at the Kirkuk base gave out, and they were out of action.

As G.H.Q., Baghdad, feared that the enemy would advance on Sulaimani (about 100 miles to the south), orders were given for the evacuation of that place by aeroplane. By arranging for the British and British Indians to go quietly in the early morning to the aerodrome, the evacuation was effected without incident. Just prior to leaving, the Political Officer sent for Shaikh Qadir (one of the leaders of the 1919 rebellion, who had been recently allowed to return). This notable was made Government representative in our absence, and was handed the keys of the Treasury, containing $4\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of rupees (about £30,000), and of the armoury, with 500 British rifles and as many Turkish and miscellaneous ones.

Kerim Fattah Beg, murderer of Captains Bond and Makant, returned to Sulaimani the following day, and other bad characters have joined Shaikh Qadir. It is not to be expected that the Treasury or armoury will have remained intact, as no one will credit the possibility of the return of British officials.

A NOTE ON PALESTINE

I.

THERE has been considerable vagueness—perhaps also indifference—in our conceptions regarding the British Mandate in Palestine, while in the country itself unrest and ill-feeling have not died down. These were the outcome of the unhappy Balfour declaration and its rather obscure interpretation, which differed as viewed by the British Government and the Zionist Organization respectively. Hence much doubt and suspicion regarding our aims. In spite, however, of the trouble that has arisen, and of hostile propaganda, fanned by various foreign influences, the Colonial Office has been able recently to state that the country is "quite tranquil." The proclamation of the Mandate took place on Mount Olives, Lord Allenby and the Emir Abdullah being present to support Sir Herbert Samuel. The future of the country has been defined for twenty-five years. Britain has assumed responsibility for the development and well-being of Palestine. There has been, even at home, a general impression that the mandatory power implies conditions hardly compatible with our pledges to the Arabs, or with Anglo-French declarations of 1918. This the Government does not admit. It holds that "saner views" are now taken of the political situation, and that the outlook is hopeful. The object is to build up a Palestinian nation in which Arabs, Jews, and Christians will settle down peacefully and prosperously under a stable Administration which holds the scales of justice evenly between all creeds and races. Hitherto, instead of the confidence with which we should have been welcomed, had our policy been wiser, there has been good ground to suspect that the Government and Zionist extremists were working for Jewish predominance. Hence the various national movements and the Moslem-Christian delegation to London, which has so many sympathizers. As pointed out by Mr. Philip Graves, the Zionist Commission and the Zionist Organization behind it have not shown themselves "appropriate" bodies to advise and assist the Government.

Meanwhile, as regards progress in Palestine, much excellent work has been carried out under the zealous and hard-working officials of the Administration, which is rapidly transforming the country. Space does not admit of details. Law and order now reign. The British

gendarmerie and camel patrols do efficient work in regions ever subject to harassing raids. Much is being done by the Forest and Land Registry Departments, and by those of Education, Public Works, Public Health (anti-malarial, water-supplies, town sanitation, etc.), Posts and Telegraphs, and Archæology. All this is recognized and appreciated even by opponents of the Mandate. Sir Herbert Samuel has stated that the Administration is self-supporting. The cost of the garrison has been halved, and should be greatly diminished next year. The expenses incurred by Government during the occupation, military and civil, on public works are to be regarded as due to the British Government; and the cost of railways, telegraphs, and telephones set up by the military authorities is to be repaid.

With regard to British trade, it would seem that our firms are not sufficiently active or enterprising in view, *e.g.*, of the German "business offensive." It is to be hoped that they will wake up, and also that shipping freights will be reduced.

II.

While the British Government seeks to build up a Palestinian nation west of the Jordan, it desires to carry out as far as possible pledges made to the Arabs. The idea of creating a homogeneous Arab Empire, including the Hedjaz and Mesopotamia, would seem to be quite impracticable at present owing to the distances and to the differences of character and customs that separate provinces and peoples. It is to be hoped that the relations of the two countries on either side of the Jordan will be friendly. The Emir Abdullah, who rules in Trans-Jordania, holds that his country is already independent, having a common frontier with Palestine, but little connection with the Government at Jerusalem. He sincerely desires cordial friendship with Britain. It was very desirable that he should be invited to England in order to discuss the various important questions that call for settlement. In his recent visit he created a very favourable impression. The Emir was the guest of the Dinner Club on the evening of November 2, and made an interesting speech in response to the toast of his health. Owing to the change of Government, he was obliged to leave without reaching final agreements. But his Prime Minister and Mr. Philby remain to continue negotiations. It is understood that Trans-Jordania will probably be established as an independent State on "constitutional lines," subject to the approval of the League of Nations. The framing of the Constitution will naturally require considerable time. There are other important questions, such as those relating to Customs.

Among the matters that have occupied the Emir are the relations with the Wahabis. Since the latter occupied Jof, the restless state

of the country and Wahabi raids have been aggravated. The Emir resolved to put an end to the friction, and to take action should an ultimatum to the Wahabis to evacuate Jof be disregarded. It would seem, however, that for the present tranquillity has been established.

As regards our relations with Egypt, whatever settlement may be arrived at in that country, it is very desirable that we should have peaceful and contented neighbours both in Palestine and Trans-Jordania.

R. L. S. MICHELL.

REVIEW

THE HEART OF ARABIA. By H. St. J. B. Philby, C.I.E., I.C.S.
2 vols. Constable and Co. £3 3s. net.

Since the publication of Doughty's immortal work, there has been no more delightful book on Arabia than that just written by Mr. Philby.

The author was sent from Baghdad during the war to Riyadh as the head of a British Mission, with the object of gaining over Bin Saud to an active co-operation with the Allies. From one cause and another he found himself in a short time the sole representative of the mission at the court of the Sultan of Nejd, whose permission he obtained to traverse Arabia to the Hedjaz, and at a subsequent date to undertake a journey of considerable magnitude and greater importance through the districts of El Kharj and El Aflaj to the Wadi Dawasir, situated some 300 miles south of Riyadh.

The whole book bears the stamp of the scholar as well as that of an English gentleman who did not fail to maintain the prestige of his race and the dignity of a representative of Great Britain, while subscribing with infinite tact to the customs, habits, and traditions of his hosts. To the student of Arabian history the book cannot fail to be of absorbing interest, for it tells much of the geography, and of the many Bedouin tribes, and of the great Emirs of Central Arabia.

The author gives an introductory note on Wahabism, of special interest at the moment, when the growth of the movement has reached grave, if not alarming, dimensions. The foundation by Bin Saud of the Akhwan (brothers), which was but a religious revivalism of Wahabism, may have been inspired by the highest motives, on the other hand, it may have been a deliberate act of statesmanship, the first step to the foundation and consolidation of a great Central Arabian empire.

Taught by the example of Bin Rashed at Hail, it was ever the aim of Bin Saud to settle his people in towns and villages. The advantages of administration of such settlements as against those of the nomad are obvious.

After relating the story of his journey to Riyadh, the author goes on to the tale of his wonderful march across Arabia to Taif, and thence to Jeddah. The motif of the journey was to meet the Sherif

of Mecca (King Hussein) and to bring about a reconciliation of the interests of Bin Saud and the ruler of the Hedjaz.

The bitter controversy between Hussein and Bin Saud dates from the day when the former styled himself King of the Arabs, and sent out emissaries throughout Arabia with letters signed under this title as well as that of Emir el Mu'minin. If a trace of partisanship can be detected in Mr. Philby's account of the relations between the two rulers, it is perhaps only natural under the circumstances, and it must be said that Bin Saud as a statesman loomed far ahead of his rival. There is no doubt that both had ambitions, unbridled and far-reaching, of a great Arab kingdom under their overlordship. Bin Saud may yet accomplish it, but his rival is now "out of the hunt," a pathetic figure, an epitome of British dishonesty. The author of the book says that Bin Saud might have accomplished what Feisal and his Hedjazis did, and at a much earlier date in the war, had his co-operation with the allied cause been obtained in the first year of the war. This is, indeed, the charge against Bin Saud by the protagonists of the Sherif—viz., that at no time did he throw himself wholeheartedly into the Allied cause. In Turkish days the positions of the Sherif of Mecca and the Emir of Nejd were vastly different *vis-à-vis* with the Turk, for the former was a mediatized prince and the latter an independent ruler.

In the second volume of his book Mr. Philby describes his second journey from the Persian Gulf to the camp of Bin Saud, and his return to Riadh with the Emir.

After some delay, Bin Saud fulfilled his promise to send the author on a journey of exploration southwards over the plateau of Jebel Tuwaiq. The illuminating story of that journey is left to the reader, but mention must be made of the wonderful pools or reservoirs of El Kharj and El Aflaj; indeed, in the latter district one of the pools, "Umm el Jebal," is of such dimensions, three-quarters of a mile by a quarter of a mile, that it is rightly named lake, nor is there any record of another sheet of water of such an area in Arabia. The possibilities of extensive cultivation in these areas by modern methods of irrigation are immense.

The author devotes a chapter to dispute the veracity of Palgrave, and it must be said that he would appear to have proved his case, although his remarks as to the length of a day's camel march are not very convincing. In the Sudan 70 or 80 miles in a day would not be considered beyond the endurance of an Arab if an occasion arose which necessitated speed; indeed, there is the record of a British officer who traversed in the space of fifty-four hours 170 miles.

The author turned back at Wadi Dawasir, when on the edge of the empty quarter of Arabia, probably the first European who has ever visited the Wadi.

Throughout the book the many human incidents of his troubles with the various members of his party, and the anecdotes of Bedouin life, will charm the reader, while the author's unfailing enterprise in mapping, photographing, and collecting notes on many and varied subjects will evoke his admiration. The book is admirably illustrated with productions of the author's photographs, and the maps are excellent. There are one or two mistakes in the transliteration of Arabic names, and the same word, such as Jebel, "mountain," is sometimes spelt with a "d" before the "J," and sometimes without.

In an account of the home of one of the slaves of Bin Saud reference is probably intended to the Tekruri of Singa in Sennar, and not as stated.

The author may well be proud of his monumental work, an epitome of profound observation, of great courage, of boundless energy, and of infinite tact.

C. E. VICKERY.

OBITUARY

SIR WILLIAM MEYER

THIS Society has to deplore the sudden death of a very distinguished member, Sir William Meyer, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., High Commissioner for India. The son, like many other Indian civilians, of a clergyman, William Stevenson Meyer was born on February 13, 1860, and was educated at the London University College School, and then at the London University. He entered the Indian Civil Service in 1881, and after serving in the Madras Presidency, where he rose rapidly to the post of Secretary of the Board of Revenue in 1890, he joined the Government of India for the first time in 1895 as Deputy Secretary in the Financial Department. He edited the Imperial Gazetteer in 1902-3, and was a very active member of the Royal Commission of Decentralization in 1907-9 and of Lord Nicholson's Committee on the Indian Army in 1912-13. He was then appointed to be Finance Member of the Government of India, a post which grew to be especially arduous after the outbreak of the Great War. The Finance Department incurred a great deal of unmeasured criticism in connection with the shortcomings of the early Mesopotamian expeditions before the fall of Kut, but the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry at Westminster exonerated Sir William Meyer from all blame, and he was able to show that he had never refused a single demand made upon the Finance Department by the Military Department of the Government of India in connection with the Mesopotamian campaign. In 1917-18 he was President of the Central Recruiting Board, which brought very large reinforcements to the Indian Army. He retired from service in India in 1918, but when, on the analogy of the Dominions High Commissionerships in London, the post of High Commissioner for India was created in recognition of India's new status under the Constitutional Charter of 1919, it was very appropriately given to Sir William, who had associated himself throughout with the cause of Indian reforms. He at once threw himself into his new work with all his accustomed energy, and his plans of organization were rapidly maturing towards completion, when he died prematurely from heart failure, which seized him in the street in Westminster on October 19.

Sir William Meyer, though too busy a man to take a very active

part in the proceedings of this Society, attended its last annual dinner, and was well known to many of us. We cannot, perhaps, do better than quote in conclusion some passages from the touching tribute paid to him by his friend Sir Valentine Chirol, when he took the chair at a meeting of the East India Association only four days after the sudden death of the High Commissioner, who was to have presided.

Sir Valentine said he would not dwell on the distinguished official career and the able and devoted services to India of his old friend, but he would like to speak of his human qualities. He had so keen a sense of humour and a wit so telling that he was sometimes suspected of cynicism, but in fact he was a singularly kind and tender-hearted man. He had drunk the cup of human sorrow as few had done. He arrived in this country with his wife on leave some years ago to learn on landing that their only son had, in play at his public school, accidentally hanged himself. Lady Meyer never recovered from the shock, and died after a long and trying illness. Sir William found consolation in the companionship of his only daughter, a singularly attractive and gifted girl of seventeen; but one night at Simla; when they had spent a happy evening together, she reached out in the darkness of her bedroom for a mixture for her cough, and accidentally took the wrong bottle, and died of poisoning in a few hours. Sir William, he added, bore these blows with unbroken fortitude, and, always a hard worker, worked harder than ever under a supreme sense of public duty which never faltered, but, on the contrary, was his one great solace under the cruel blows of fortune that had wrecked his domestic happiness.

DINNER CLUB

THE Central Asian Society Dinner Club met on November 2, Sir Michael O'Dwyer in the chair. The Emir Abdullah, accompanied by Mr. Philby and his Prime Minister, was the guest of the Club.

The Committee for 1922-23, as elected at this meeting, was as follows:

Chairman: Sir Michael O'Dwyer, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

Committee: General Sir Edmund Barrow, G.C.B.; Lieut.-Colonel C. B. Stokes, C.I.E.

Hon. Treasurer: Sir Edward Penton, K.B.E.

Hon. Secretary: G. C. Stephenson, Esq.

Membership of the Club is limited to seventy-five, exclusive of members and ex-members of Council. Members of the Society home from abroad on leave are eligible for election as temporary members if they so desire.

The subscription is 5s. annually.

JOURNAL

OF THE

CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

VOL. X.

1923

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74, GROSVENOR STREET, W. 1.

NOTICE

THE Library is now open for the use of members.

The following books have lately been given to the Library :

"The Heart of Arabia," by H. St. J. Philby.

"The Turkish Empire," by Lord Eversley and Sir Valentine Chirol.

"Travels in Eastern Thibet," by Eric Teichman.

"The Spirit of Islam," by Syed Ameer Ali.

"The Ins and Outs of Mesopotamia," by E. T. Lyell.

"Turkey," by S. Lane-Poole.

"The Insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920," by Lieut.-General Sir A. Haldane.

"Siwa : The Oasis of Jupiter Ammon," by C. Dalrympe Belgrave.

"The Babur-Nama in English," by Mrs. A. S. Beveridge.

Since the Library is a small one, members are asked to return their books within six weeks. If books are sent by post, carriage must be paid in both directions.

CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, London, S.W., on Thursday, January 18, 1923, the Right Hon. Lord Carnock presiding, when Lieut.-Colonel P. T. Etherton gave a lecture on "Central Asia: its Rise as a Political and Economic Factor."

The CHAIRMAN: Colonel Yate will announce the number of new members elected.

The HON. SECRETARY (Colonel A. C. Yate): We have to-day elected ten new members: Lady Twining, Mrs. Bruce Cooper, Miss M. Sylvester Samuel, Sir Benjamin Robertson, K.C.S.I., Colonel Sir James Walker, Squadron-Leader K. C. Buss, R.A.F., Captain J. H. L. Hindmarsh, Captain Hon. P. G. Scarlett, M.C., Colonel R. A. Steel, C.M.G., Mr. F. W. Stewart, M.C.

The CHAIRMAN: Before I introduce Colonel Etherton, I should like to say that I have received notice from the University of London that a series of lectures on the nomads of Central Asia will be given at King's College, London, by Professor W. Barthold, of the University of Petrograd. The lectures began to-day, but they are continued every Thursday up to the end of February. Admission is free without ticket. I thought, perhaps, some members of the audience might like to know that, as I should think they would be very interesting lectures, and, of course, they are closely connected with the object and purpose of this Society.

I now have the pleasure of introducing Colonel Etherton, who is His Majesty's Consul-General in Kashgar, and naturally, therefore, is, on the subject on which he is going to speak to-day, a first-class authority. Colonel Etherton, as I dare say you know, made a very important and adventurous journey, I think in 1909, from India, over the Pamirs, and through Turkistan, Mongolia, and Siberia, to Russia. It took him twelve months, in which I believe he traversed a great many districts hitherto untrodden by European travellers. He, unfortunately, was severely laid up by frost-bite, and, as I happened to be at Petrograd, I think he will agree with me in saying that the Russian authorities gave him every possible attention and care.

The subject on which he is going to lecture to us to-day is "Central Asia: its Rise as a Political and Economic Factor"; and although we occasionally hear some comments—most friendly and sympathetic I am bound to say—as to this Society expanding itself

beyond its strict geographical limits as connoted by its title, I do not think the most meticulous critic could possibly object to the lecture to be given to-day. (Applause.)

[Before proceeding with the subject of his lecture, Colonel Etherton showed a series of remarkably interesting slides, illustrating the route to Central Asia, the habits and customs of the various peoples, and the social, industrial, economic, and military aspects of his address.]

CENTRAL ASIA: ITS RISE AS A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTOR

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL P. T. ETHERTON,

H.M. Consul-General at Kashgar.

MY LORD, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,—From a political and diplomatic standpoint Central Asia is comparatively new, for it is only within the past two generations, and as the result of territorial expansion, that it has become of direct interest to us. Moreover, the rise of Bolshevism, and the course of events throughout Asia, must necessarily exert an influence on the industrial and economic possibilities of China and the western dominions of that country with which I am more particularly concerned in my capacity as Consul-General, and the situation as it now is in Russia must ultimately affect the balance of power in the Far East and the destinies of both Russia and China.

It does not come within the province of my remarks to deal with the history, ethnography, or geography of Central Asia, as the latter is so well known to the great majority of you, that I pass to the more vital questions of the day which affect the British Empire as a whole, and India and the Indian borderland in particular.

Prior to the Great War it was more or less an accepted probability of political and economic development that the greater part of Central Asia, including, of course, Chinese Turkistan, would pass into the hands of Russia, who was at that time a powerful colonizing force in the area in question, but it is not possible to predict what may happen in the future in the evolution of Central Asia, when we contemplate the creation of new and independent States that has been going on since the Armistice, coupled with the advent of Afghanistan as a Muslim Power imbued with progressive ideas.

We may regard Russia as the modern pioneer of Central Asia, for she realized its potentialities and set about its conquest with that tenacity and patience which have ever characterized her movements; she organized her advance for the benefit of the Russian State, and the consolidation of Russian power, and in pre-war days was the forerunner of an era of progress and prosperity.

Strictly speaking, Central Asia comprises Chinese and Russian Turkistan, and the Pamirs, or "Roof of the World," a region that attracted much attention some years ago when its occupation by Russia was regarded as detrimental to the peace and tranquillity of our Indian frontier and Afghanistan. Central Asia is of considerable ethnological importance, for from it we can learn more of the world's history than is available from other sources. The Greeks, under Alexander, traversed it, the Huns followed in their wake, whilst Persian rule extended from the Oxus to the Danube. The Huns had carried fire and sword through Asia centuries before the Christian era; indeed, the Great Wall of China was built as a barrier against those fierce invaders, and it stands to this day as a monument to the constructive ability and patience of the Chinese.

In the seventh century came Mohammed, the founder of the Islamic faith, and six hundred years later appeared the Mongols, who, in their turn, created a kingdom from the Sea of Japan to the German frontier, and from the Arctic Ocean in the far north to India and Mesopotamia in the south. Various other conquerors came and went, until Russia and China appeared definitely upon the scene, and they are now the principal landowners in Central Asia.

It was with the fall of the Russian Government, and the resultant anarchy and chaos throughout the Asiatic dominions of Russia, that Central Asia came into prominence. Germany and the Central Powers were casting longing eyes in that direction. Through Turkey Germany hoped to weld together the Mohammedan races for the resuscitation, *inter alia*, of Turkish power, and as one of the means to destroy British supremacy. This movement to bring about a combination of Mohammedans not only in Asia, but throughout the world, is no new thing; it is, indeed, as old as the Muslim faith itself, although it was only in the reign of the late Abdul Hamid that it took concrete shape, for it had then received considerable German support, and the original Turkish movement in Pan-Islamism had been developed by German ingenuity. Germany declared herself in sympathy with Pan-Islamic ideals, and, in setting herself up as the friend of Islam, she may perhaps have realized, as Napoleon had done more than a century before her, that allied with Islam, she might be in a position to control material resources of the first magnitude.

There was, however, another and possibly more vital question dictating German policy in 1917-18, and that was the replenishment of the stocks of cotton for the manufacture of munitions. Russia had, prior to the war, devoted much attention to the cotton industry, for cotton is an article much in demand in Russia, besides which the industry was fostered with the idea of making it a national and self-dependent one, and to supplant the American article. In 1918 vast stocks of cotton were lying in Central Asia, and their ultimate fate was

a matter of moment to the Allied War Cabinet. The acquisition of the cotton was contemplated, but it was eventually decided that the task was such as to preclude all possibility of its being carried through within such a time as would admit of any direct influence on the course of the war. I mention the matter as demonstrating two facts, the magnitude of the difficulties confronting the Home Government and the Government of India amidst all the many questions in which they were involved at that time, and as proving the future that the Central Asian cotton industry has before it.

Early in 1918 I was sent up to Central Asia as one of a mission to study conditions there, the party being in charge of Lieut.-Colonel F. M. Bailey, C.I.E., whose remarkable experiences, and the consummate skill and ingenuity he displayed under harassing and trying conditions, have already formed the subject of a lecture before this Society. The mission, amongst its other duties, studied the cotton question, which much impressed me from a commercial aspect.

In November, 1918, came the Armistice, and with it the hope that war and tumult would end, and that we should see the dawn of a brighter day and the opening of an era of prosperity. The doctrine of self-determination, the seeds of Bolshevism, and the general spirit of unrest had, however, taken too deep a root for those dreams to be capable of immediate realization in Asia. The Bolsheviks then brought out their scheme for the emancipation of the East, Tashkent being made the base of operations, and a school was opened there for the training of propaganda agents, who were to go forth amongst the different races and tribes of Asia, and endeavour to convert them to Soviet ideas. It cannot be said that the movement made much progress, for scarcely any of the Central Asian nationalities wished to be emancipated by this particular means, and the propaganda fell mostly on stony ground. It is not for me to say where the Bolsheviks were at fault, but with such a conservative people as the Mohammedans of Central Asia religion is a powerful factor, serving as a bond of unity amongst them, and one that has gained in strength and dynamic force since the unfortunate massacres at Kokand in 1917. In this religious question the Chinese have always shown sagacity and prescience; they have appreciated the value of this religious factor in studying to some extent the psychology of the masses, and in assessing it at its true value they have shown toleration towards any religion which did not threaten the fundamental principles of their policy, or bring foreign domination in its wake. The basic principle of Chinese policy in Turkistan is freedom from foreign interference, and that being secured, they show the greatest toleration of differences of opinion.

I now come to the question of Pan-Islamism, and the nationalist movement which arose in Asia before the War and inculcated the idea that Turkey, and the tribes and races in affinity to her, must assert

their power and authority and effect a Mohammedan combine. After close study of the matter, I find very little indication of the Mohammedans of Central Asia being influenced by the Pan-Islamic cry; sympathy with Turkey was certainly not pronounced, and she is not regarded as the hub of the Islamic world. The politically independent factors of the movement are divided amongst themselves, and they would be apparent if it came to a question of definite organization and control.

The Pan-Islamic idea has been exploited by various elements as a means to further their designs in the East against British power, but, to my mind, the movement is so far purely platonic, and the idea of its developing in the near future into a serious menace does not impress me at all.

Morally, the common aims and interests of Islam have achieved some progress, which, as is usually the case, can be traced to the influence of the Press, but this applies only to the Turkish, Persian, and Arabic newspapers, for in Central Asia the mullas and priestly caste exercise considerable influence, and they have eliminated everything that is at variance with early conservatism, and newspapers and secular literature are regarded with disfavour. It is, therefore, only the Muslim Press, especially the Turkish and Persian, that has brought together distant parts of the Muslim Asiatic world. In the present stage there is little in the movement, and the progress it has made in Central Asia and Western China may be regarded as negligible.

In any review of the Pan-Islamic question, we must remember that Mohammedanism in its adherents outnumbers the Christian religion; and although it lacks some of the essentials which characterize the latter faith, it is still a portent in the world, and one that cannot be supplanted. I find that there is little open hostility to non-Mohammedans, and, speaking generally, the Asiatic dislike of Europeans is less pronounced in Central Asia, due in a measure to the methods of the Russians, as well as to the fact that the Russian is not pure European, and mixes more freely with Asiatics, with many of whom the Russian is on a footing of equality.

Coming within the field of Central Asia is the Mongolian question, and the interesting—albeit fallacious—report of a projected Buddhist-Moslem combine, which should unite these two religions in a common alliance, largely concerns the welfare and destiny of Central Asia. It will, therefore, be appropriate to deal briefly with it, and endeavour to gauge its influence upon the future of Asia as a whole. In the thirteenth century Mongol power was at a high level: the Mongols had extended their conquests right across Asia, and in the following century Tamerlane, under whose sway Mongolia attained to heights of splendour, came near to dominating the Old World. But the rise of the Mongols was scarcely less rapid than their fall, for they lasted

less than one hundred years ; and when I travelled through Mongolia and studied the people in their past and present life, I could not help noticing the change that must have come over them since the historical days when they carried fire and sword through Europe. This decadence is largely due to the influence of the lamas, or priesthood, who now constitute 40 per cent. of the population, and are averse to progress or anything concerning the forward march of the people. Moreover, the two religions are so diametrically opposed in principle and practice to each other that any combination between them is inconceivable.

Closely connected with the Pan-Islamic campaign, and the course of events in Central Asia generally, is that prominent and somewhat elusive Turk, Enver Pasha, who is credited with decided views on Bolshevism, and has no intention of contributing to Bolshevik aspirations. It was said by some of the leading Ferghana Mohammedans that Enver aimed at being a Napoleon of Central Asia, a sort of Saviour who should come and deliver the people from the hands of the Philistines, that he would form a Mohammedan State as a buffer against Russia in Asia, and would lay the foundation-stone of an Asia for the Asiatics. Enver is supposed to be dead, but it is quite possible he may be in the land of the living, for it would be in his own interests, no less than in those who are supporting him, to suppress his name and presence as much as possible.

In the course of my remarks this afternoon, I referred to Ferghana, the rich province of Russian Central Asia, some 36,000 square miles in extent, formed from the old Khanate of Kokand in 1876. Its resources are many, such as gold, silver, lead, oil, and iron, all as yet scarcely touched and offering a favourable field to commercial enterprise. The eastern frontier of Ferghana marches with that of Chinese Turkistan, so that it is of special interest to us and the Indian borderland.

Since the massacres by the Bolsheviks at Kokand in November, 1917, Ferghana has been in revolt, firstly under the leadership of Mohammed Emin Beg, who was in 1920 seized and executed by a rival chieftain, Sher Mohammed, who then became the leader of the Ferghana insurgents. He is hostile to the Bolsheviks, and had, up to the early summer of last year, rejected all overtures from the Soviet. The latter are nominally in possession of the country, but in actual fact they hold only the towns, the country beyond being in the hands of the insurgents.

South of Ferghana lie the Pamirs, and it is there we find followers of the Aga Khan, who are a well-ordered community, and a credit to the enlightened leader to whom they owe allegiance.

Afghanistan and Bokhara come well within the purview of Central Asian politics ; but that is a portion of the subject on which I refrain from making any remarks, as communications on matters affecting our

relations with other States is very rightly deprecated in official quarters, and cannot but be detrimental to public interests. Moreover, we have ceased to play an active rôle in Central Asia; and since the withdrawal from north-eastern Persia some three years ago, His Majesty's Government decided that no further assistance could be granted to any anti-Bolshevik organizations, and the obvious corollary to that decision was not to engage in fresh commitments. Since then no support in any shape whatever, either directly or indirectly, has been given to any person or organization.

I will now deal briefly with the commercial possibilities of Central Asia. As I have already remarked, the province of Ferghana produces excellent cotton, but in the present welter the industry is at a standstill. The mineral resources of both Russian and Chinese Central Asia are unlimited, whilst the wool trade of Mongolia is open to development, and good routes are available for its export. Formerly British goods to some extent reached Chinese Turkistan through the ports of China proper, but the spread of brigandage in Western China has virtually stopped this route, and only the establishment of a central authority in China, with the requisite power of control, can restore trade from that direction.

For trade with Central Asia, from either Europe or America, the only practicable road is through India and Kashmir, occupying nearly fifty days, and leading over the highest and most difficult passes in the world. A great deal has been done by the Government of India to improve this route; halting places have been built, and facilities afforded men and animals to cope with the physical obstacles. There is a good trade in cotton goods both from Lancashire and Indian mills, British medicines are in demand, whilst unrefined sugar finds a ready sale owing to the Russian market being closed.

In so far as Chinese Turkistan is concerned, British and Indian goods have always been favourably regarded, due to their reliable quality. The trade is at present carried on largely by British-Indian subjects, who show themselves trustworthy and are on good terms with the local population.

Those traders and merchants of Central Asia who have gone down to India have, in the great majority of cases, returned with a feeling of admiration for the law and order and general system of government of India, and I think it is largely due to the visits of these people, who have been able to see for themselves, that the attempts to create unrest and disaffection in Central Asia have been abortive.

It will be of interest to comment briefly on the opium trade in Central Asia, since the suppression thereof is occupying the earnest attention of the League of Nations. The traffic in opium flourishes practically unchecked in Chinese Turkistan, and is not interfered with in the province of Semirechia across the frontier in Russian Turkistan.

To the credit of the Chinese it must be said that there is no planting of the poppy in Chinese Turkistan, as the prepared article is imported from elsewhere, and so lucrative is the trade that it has been estimated to yield a profit of as much as Rs. 2,500 per pony load. We have exerted strenuous efforts to suppress the traffic, and it is hoped that, with the cordial co-operation of all the Chinese officials and subordinates, we may succeed in stamping it out.

In considering the commercial and agricultural future of Central Asia, we are obviously more concerned with Chinese Turkistan by reason of its proximity to India. In general, Chinese Central Asia is a land of desert and bush tracts similar to Western Australia, and cultivation is rendered possible by means of irrigation channels. Only in the vicinity of these waterways is cultivation met with, the rainfall being insufficient in itself to ensure the successful exploitation of the land. We may compare Chinese Turkistan to the Punjab, in Northern India, but with its rivers it can more easily combat famine—that menace of countries who look to the rain to supply their food requirements. This difference in the physical formation of Central Asia accounts for its leading feature, for both are governed by similar conditions.

Taken as a whole, Central Asia is a desert traversed by river-beds, and only where a river occurs is cultivation found; wherever the water, there the fertile and thickly-populated oasis. The problem of agricultural and industrial development is, therefore, largely one of irrigation; and the total area at present under cultivation in Central Asia as a whole could be largely increased with the introduction of a scientific system adapted to exploit the available water-supply. This could only be effected with the aid of foreign capital—at any rate, so far as Chinese Central Asia is concerned—and given sound schemes, such as have brought prosperity to India and Egypt, the result would be a very material enlargement of the cultivated area with a proportionate return. From that would accrue an increase of population, an expansion of trade, and the development of all industries, such as the production of cotton and jute, for which there are great possibilities.

With the establishment of a stable government in Russian Central Asia must come a trade boom, and both Japan and America are alive to trade potentialities, and have had commercial men there with a view to securing what will prove to be a favourable commercial field. It is unnecessary for me to detail the articles and the class of machinery, etc., that will be in demand, since they are fully dealt with in the Annual Trade Report, a copy of which is submitted to the Overseas Trade Department of the Foreign Office.

With regard to Chinese Turkistan which concerns us so closely, many wars and revolutions have disturbed the peace of the New Dominion, as the Chinese style it, since the Celestial army from

Peking first took possession in 1755, and the Chinese have by no means remained in undisputed occupation, although their hold has been made fairly secure within the past generation. The wars that have raged from time to time in Turkistan between the Chinese, Mohammedans, and others for supremacy have left traces deep-rooted in the character of the people, and they do not display any marked energy or enterprise, so that it is not surprising that the Chinese are able to hold the country with a minimum force, the actual Chinese element in the population being only six per cent.

To the Chinese the new Dominion forms one of the basic factors in the Asian problem—that of accommodating the ever-increasing population of China—so that Turkistan offers a field for colonization when roads, railways, and irrigation shall have opened the way. The first organic essential in any country, and particularly here where the agricultural and mineral resources are rich, is adequate arterial communication. There are no roads, properly speaking, in the province, communication between towns and villages being limited to tracks and footpaths.

Generally speaking, Chinese rule is acceptable to the Turkistan races, for it sits lightly upon them; they are not unduly worried by their rulers, and are allowed to go very much their own way. In Turkistan the Chinese have a country full of mineral and agricultural resources, which they will doubtless develop so soon as conditions admit, and they are able to improve communication by means of the railway. The building of the latter will consolidate their hold upon the outlying portions of their dominions, for at present distances are so great, and so much time elapses in the conveyance of instructions, that the influence of Peking is exhausted before it reaches Central Asia.

I have already remarked on the failure to inculcate Bolshevism amongst the people in Turkistan and Western China. Bolshevism does not find favour with the Chinese since it interferes with private trade, which is vital to them, whilst it strikes at private liberty, which is a feature in the social life of the Chinese. Moreover, although it may never develop, there is a feeling in the west of the Chinese dominions in favour of the restoration of the monarchy, for a republican form of government is not suited to the Celestial temperament. The essentials for creation of a republican spirit do not exist to any extent in China, and until they do arise the rule cannot be other than oligarchic. In my own dealings with the Chinese I have always noticed with what respect the Emperor was regarded as the temporal and spiritual head of the people. Under the Imperial régime the family was the unit of the Chinese nation, and the Emperor was the father of the whole. With a republic there must necessarily be a change of leader, and this in itself invests the head of the nation with

transitory power, and one without prestige, whilst it lacks the main feature of Chinese imperialism in concentrating authority and focussing the loyalty of the people as a whole.

The history of China has shown us the various stages of evolution through which she has passed, whilst it has also demonstrated how her ancient civilization has developed in complete independence of Europe. In population and potential strength China is the first in the world, but the lack of a central authority, and the disorder prevailing in so many of the provinces, make it impossible to transform the assets into an efficient and powerful nation.

Time does not permit of my discussing the basic cause of the present unrest in China, which naturally has its repercussion in Central Asia, and the means by which it might be possible to establish general law and order and commence the moulding process; but the main difficulty confronting China at the moment is the presence of numerous military bodies acting under the orders of provincial governors, and the impracticability of breaking them up until a responsible central government can produce the money to pay them off and so effect demobilization. That brought about it would be feasible to take up trade and economic questions, which will be all-important, for the economic life of China is industrial, and three-quarters of the population are agricultural.

The peace and prosperity of Central Asia will be largely influenced by the state of affairs in China, and particularly in the west of that country, and if the Chinese only act up to their beliefs they can effect a good deal. It must of course be admitted that they have, perhaps, somewhat exaggerated ideas of their own standing and importance, but then they are based on thoughts and customs different from those in Europe or the New World, and all similar ideas are merely the outcome of the individual standard of appraisal. So far as reform is concerned, a stable government is the first essential, to be followed by industrial development, and education. The latter is a great point in China, and it exercises remarkable influence on public questions, so that education will play no inconsiderable part in the reformation of a country where there has ever been respect for learning.

You will naturally ask what are the possibilities of restoring peace and tranquillity in Russia, and thereby bringing about the same result in Central Asia. We must bear in mind that the vast majority of the Russian people are ignorant and quite illiterate; it is mainly an agrarian population, and the future of Russia centres to a large extent on the efforts the peasants are able to put forth. The ignorance and illiteracy of the people, coupled with the war and internal disorder through which they have passed in the last eight years, have made them indifferent; and from what I have seen of them it would appear that, so long as they possess a voice in the settlement of local

questions affecting their own immediate interests, and are left with land sufficient to their needs, they care very little for what may be happening in Petrograd and Moscow. From this we see that the Russian people are an inert mass, without political opinions or mark of racial or national unity on which it might be possible to build up something tangible. If this is to be done—and it can only be effected by Russia and the Russians—and if the entire political, economic, and social fabric in Russia is to be recast, the basic principles on which Bolshevism has been working will have to be thrown overboard; and seeing that power in Russia is in the hands of a determined class, it is open to question whether they will exactly welcome such a course of action.

Finally, the political, economic, and industrial possibilities of Central Asia must be one of the factors affecting the balance of power in Asia, and the situation there requires careful watching, although there is no immediate danger to us, and the reputation of Great Britain would seem to stand as high in that important area of the world as it has ever done.

Sir FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—It is thirty-five years since I was first in Kashgar, and it has been a matter of extraordinary interest to me to hear of and see the changes which have occurred there in that time. Sir John Jordan, who is present this evening, will remember how I set out from Peking to ride through to Kashgar—some nearly three thousand miles. When I arrived at Kashgar there was no sign of British influence at all. The Russians were then very firmly established there, and had a very able Russian Consul-General, Petrovsky, who had all the influence that there was with the Chinese. We had no representative there, and so far as foreign influence was concerned, he had the field entirely to himself, and he made excellent use of his opportunity. Three years later I was sent up by the Government of India, with Mr. Macartney as interpreter and secretary, to watch Russian movements; the Russians were then very active in Central Asia, and were steadily working down towards India. They culminated in the annexation of the Pamirs, and the despatch of a Russian force, which actually crossed the Hindu Kush into territory under the suzerainty of the Maharajah of Kashmir, crossing by one pass and going out by another. I left Mr. Macartney up there. He had not any standing at all, but he was left up there as what we call a news writer—just to continue on as best he could from year to year, and keep a watch on the Russian movements, and also foster as well as he could what trade there was between India and Turkistan. I think that the work Mr. Macartney did from that time on until he retired as Sir George Macartney just a year or two ago was one of the best pieces of work that have been done on the Indian frontier for

many a year. (Applause.) As I say, I think it was for about a dozen years that he had no official standing whatever. He was not a Consul, he had no official position; he had just to stay up there, sit tight, and hold his own against this very able and very pushing Russian Consul-General. But Macartney was a man of great coolness and astuteness, and he had this advantage over the Russian Consul-General—that he spoke Chinese perfectly. He also knew the Chinese classics, and was able to get on extraordinarily well with the Chinese officials. Gradually and effectively, year by year, he built up his position, till he was eventually recognized as Consul. He was made a C.I.E. and then became Consul-General, and was eventually given the K.C.I.E. It is due to him that British influence in Chinese Turkistan has been built up, and it is a matter of congratulation to us that when Sir George Macartney retired a few years ago his work was carried on by Colonel Etherton. (Applause.) Colonel Etherton had the enterprise some years ago to strike out into Central Asia, as our Chairman has described. He went up through Hunza on to the Pamirs, into Chinese Turkistan, into Siberia, and back home by a way that had not been traversed by Europeans before. In these recent years he has had enormous difficulties to contend against. It is a long distance from India. It takes many weeks for the post to arrive. Nowadays you have the telegraph through China, but still he has to work up there under great difficulties and in much solitude; nevertheless he has carried on the traditions that had been established by Sir George Macartney, and he has told us this evening that British influence in Turkistan is now strong and firm. As regards the people themselves, the lecturer this evening has spoken of them from two aspects—their religion and their trade. As regards their religion, it always struck me that the people of Turkistan, although they were quite firm Mohammedans, were yet somewhat lethargic. They were not of the excitable, fiery type, but quiet, and I quite agree with Colonel Etherton in saying they are not the kind of people likely to fire up over Pan-Islam. They are exceedingly comfortable up there apart from the world, and lead a nice easy-going life. They are also very fond of making pilgrimages to Mecca. A family will set off in the middle of Turkistan, cross the whole Himalayas down to India, and go through India and across the seas to Mecca. During that passage to Mecca, as soon as they have got out of Turkistan, they find that their way is made easy for them throughout territory under the influence of British government by the British authorities. All the way through Kashmir territory—first of all through Ladak and then through Kashmir and down to India—arrangements are especially made for the convenience and comfort of these pilgrims. I know what it was in the old days: these wretched people crossed the Himalayas without any arrangements being made for them, suffered frightful hardships; many and many

died from what they had to endure on the way. But one can understand now that when they get back into their own country, after seeing what arrangements the British Government make for them, they are impressed very deeply with the advantages of British rule. Therefore, as they have nothing to fear from the British, and have had evidence like that of the good that the British do, I think it is not surprising that they are on the whole well disposed towards us. As regards trade, of course there are great possibilities of trade with Chinese Turkistan, but the great difficulty, as Colonel Etherton has pointed out, is getting at the country. From the Indian side you must somehow or other get across the Himalayas. It is true that of recent years the Government of India has improved the road by Kashmir, Ladak, and the Karakoram Pass. There is an excellent road along it, but you cannot get over the fact that you have to cross passes—the first of which is 11,000 feet, and following it three of 13,000 feet, then one of 17,000 feet, one of nearly 18,000 feet, one of more than 18,000 feet, another of 17,000 feet, and another of 10,000 feet—before you get down to Turkistan. There is a solid fact before you, and the best road in the world will not get over that. You cannot have a cart road; everything has to be carried by ponies, mules, camels in certain parts, or yaks. It is anyhow animal transport. Nor can you carry very much by the Hunza route, of which we have had those very remarkable pictures which Colonel Etherton showed. It is shorter, it is true, but a terribly bad road, and I do not think there is much possibility of using that. Of course, the only way to get at the country is through Russian Turkistan, and the chief trade must therefore be mostly in the hands of the Russians. Nevertheless, there are possibilities. Good things will always find their way into Chinese Turkistan. They are more portable than bad. Light muslins and other really good cotton goods might find their way into Chinese Turkistan from India. From Turkistan the chief export is *charas*, which is not a very desirable import—and felts and excellent carpets in addition. I do not know if Colonel Etherton will have any more to say about the carpets; beautiful carpets used to be brought from Yarkand in the old days. They were dyed with vegetable dyes; whether with the aniline dyes of the present day they are as good as in the past I do not know. In conclusion, I would like to express to Colonel Etherton my very great interest in his lecture, and to wish him every possible success in the endeavour which he is making to keep on good terms with the people of the country and to increase our trade with it. (Applause.)

Sir JOHN JORDAN: My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I came here really to hear the lecture, not to contribute any instruction. I would like, however, to associate myself with the tributes which Sir Francis Younghusband has paid to Sir George Macartney and Colonel Etherton. I happen to know a good deal about the situation in Turkistan in the

early beginning. It is quite true that, as Sir Francis Younghusband has stated, Sir George Macartney went there in no official position at all. He really made the position for himself. He was in an entirely different position from a British Consular representative in any other part of China. We had at that time no treaty with China with regard to overland trade, and when Sir George Macartney went there we had to depend upon the Russian treaties—that is to say, to rely upon the favoured nation stipulations of the Russian treaties, and ask the Chinese Government to extend to us the same privileges as to Russia. That was a very difficult position indeed, and it was, thanks to Sir George Macartney, almost entirely that in the end he secured for British trade and British subjects all the privileges granted to Russia. (Applause.) The only lever he had was that the Chinese Government were glad enough to see a British representative there to act as a sort of counterpoise to the Russian influence of Mr. Petrovsky. Colonel Etherton has probably had an even more difficult task than Sir George Macartney had, because since that time we know what has happened in Central Asia and all over the East. Colonel Etherton has really maintained the position with nothing almost behind him at all, thanks to his good relations with the Chinese authorities. (Applause.) The whole situation is, from the political point of view, one of intense interest, owing to the long frontier between China and Russia extending some four thousand miles. Russia was the first to make treaty relations with China; the first was dated about 1689. Since that time China and Russia have had a series of relations by treaties up till 1915, during the war, when the last treaty was made with regard to Mongolia. There is one point on which I do not quite agree with Colonel Etherton—that is, that the Russians would possibly have seized all this part of Central Asia. I always felt—I know the opinion is not generally shared—but I always felt at Peking that the apprehension and fear between the Chinese and Russians was mutual. The Russians feared the Chinese almost as much as the Chinese feared the Russians. You know the Russians had not had an unbroken success in their dealings with the Chinese; they had met with several checks in their long and chequered history. As Colonel Etherton knows, they went into Kuldja in the seventies of the last century, and were obliged to retire. In several other ways they have met with resistance, and I think between the two it was just a question whether China or Russia would get the best. At any rate, what has happened now is that Russia, who held the dominant position in China, has now no position at all. I suppose there are at the present moment 300,000 Russians in Manchuria and different parts of China who enjoy no rights whatever. As you know, foreigners in China have extraterritorial rights, or capitulations, as they are called in Turkey. The Russians are entirely subject to Chinese jurisdiction and suppliants for Chinese

justice ; it is a pathetic instance of what a great Power has come to in the Far East. That is the present position ; what the future will bring I suppose no one will venture to say. At the present moment the Bolsheviks have a representative, a very able man, at Peking, negotiating a new treaty with China. China is proceeding very cautiously, although I see in to-day's paper that a mission is going to Moscow to treat with the Soviet Government. China is very suspicious about the Russian intentions in Mongolia ; and this and other questions will have to be settled before any treaty takes place. That is, roughly speaking, the political situation as it exists between Russia and China at the present moment. I was greatly interested in some other points that Colonel Etherton raised. On the whole, I agree with him that there is no great danger of Mohammedans, or any Pan-Islamic movement in China. I think in China the Mohammedans are about ten millions altogether. They have at different times in history given great trouble to the Chinese Government, and have established separate kingdoms of their own in Yunnan and Chinese Turkistan. As Colonel Etherton knows, Yakoo Beg ruled for about fifteen years—threw off Chinese authority altogether. But the Chinese recovered the country ; they have great staying power and tenacity. I was in China when Tso Tsung-tang, an old Chinese general, marched his troops right across thousands of miles from Central China to Turkistan ; one of those generals, whom Colonel Etherton holds in contempt, marched his troops across the country, settled down, grew his crops, and remained there year after year with this strange commissariat, growing his crops for his own troops, until he reconquered the country. That was something, and I think China will still hold her own in Turkistan. Another matter that Colonel Etherton raised touched me very closely. I have just come from an Opium Conference at Geneva. The opium problem is an interesting one. I do not think this is the place to discuss it, but I was extremely interested in the statistics that Colonel Etherton gave us of smuggling opium into Chinese Turkistan. Chinese Turkistan has an area of some 300,000 square miles ; and a population of about two million, and in that region there is no Chinese opium grown at all. But it is a very mixed population, and these people go into Russian territory and grow opium, and bring it across. The situation in China generally as regards opium is simply this—that from 1907 to 1917 China did her very utmost to suppress opium, and in 1917 opium was suppressed in China for all practical purposes. Unfortunately, there has been a very considerable recrudescence of opium ; there are various estimates, from a tenth to a quarter of what it formerly was, but in China there is, I still hope, enough public opinion to stop that in time. There is an immense amount of opium being smuggled into the country from other parts. I think those are all the remarks I have to make, excepting as to the republic.

China is a republic, and I agree with Colonel Etherton that China is not suited for republican institutions. But I see no alternative; there seems very little chance of China ever reverting to a monarchy. That whole question was thrashed out at the time the Manchu dynasty went down. Unless a successful general arises there is no one likely to take over the responsibility in China again. Yuan-shi-kai—the ablest man China has produced for some generations—tried it, but he failed, and no one else is likely to follow his example. It would not unite China. The south would never have an emperor again, I am afraid. There is a large intelligentsia class who have been educated abroad; they are the people who direct the policy of the country, and no matter what the peasants think it is the intelligentsia that will guide the destinies of China in future. But the republic has certainly not been a success so far. I remember when the republic was introduced into China first there was an American adviser, a man very close with the Government. I asked him one day: "What do you think of this republic, and how is it working?" He replied: "I would rather run an ice-cream factory in the lower regions than a republic in China." (Laughter.)

The CHAIRMAN: I hardly venture to ask, but I should be very grateful if Miss Sykes would kindly give us her experiences.

Miss SYKES: I have really nothing to add to this most interesting lecture. My brother and I were in Chinese Turkistan during 1915, before the Russian Revolution, so we were able to enter the country by a comparatively easy route, travelling from Moscow five days and five nights on a branch of the Siberian railway to its termination at Andijan. We were struck with the immense fertility of Russian Turkistan and with the prosperity of its capital, Tashkent, but I appreciate what Colonel Etherton said about the difficulty of transport to and from Chinese Turkistan. It took us twelve days to ride to Kashgar from the railway, nine of which days were through a mountainous region, the highest part of the way crossing a pass of 12,000 feet. That rocky staircase, strewn at intervals with the skeletons of ponies, mules, and donkeys, was the recognized trade route, and bore witness to a heavy toll of animal suffering. It may give an idea of its difficulty when I say that my brother and I, walking for the most part, reached our halting place at one o'clock, while our unfortunate animals did not arrive with their loads until nine o'clock, so often had they fallen on the track, slippery with melting ice.

The excellent slides which we have seen recalled vividly to my mind Chinese Turkistan and its peoples, and the Russian Pamirs, where I slept in the beehive-like homes of the Kirghiz, and rode on yaks. My brother and I met with the greatest friendliness wherever we went, as we rode through the string of oases from Kashgar to Khotan, and I wish all prosperity to the country. (Applause.)

Sir CHARLES BELL : Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have but one brief remark to make. I should like to confirm what Colonel Etherton said about the extreme unlikelihood of any combination between Buddhists and Mohammedans. I have been connected for many years with the Buddhists of Tibet, and through them with the Buddhists of Mongolia ; and, if there is any religion with which they would not under any circumstances combine, that is, I think, the religion of Islam.

I should like also to add my tribute to the very interesting lecture which Colonel Etherton has given us.

The CHAIRMAN : If nobody else has any remarks to make, I can only ask you to authorize me to convey to Colonel Etherton our best thanks for the excellent lecture he has given us, and I think we are also particularly fortunate in having heard the most interesting observations of such high authorities as Sir Francis Younghusband and Sir John Jordan ; so, with your permission, I will thank Colonel Etherton most sincerely for the most instructive and interesting lecture he has given us. (Applause.)

THE BUSHIRE-SHIRAZ ROAD, 1918-19

BY MAJOR-GENERAL J. A. DOUGLAS, C.M.G., C.I.E.

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., on Thursday, February 8, 1923. An address was given by Major-General J. A. Douglas, C.M.G., C.I.E., on "The Operations on the Bushire-Shiraz Road, 1918-19." General Sir Edmund Barrow presided.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—The lecture this evening is on "The Operations on the Bushire-Shiraz Road," the well-known road that leads up into the heart of Persia; and the lecturer I need hardly introduce to most of you, as I expect all those who have served in the East are well acquainted with the name, at all events, of General Douglas, who commanded on that line during the operations. I will now ask you to give your attention to a lecture which, I am sure, will be both interesting and instructive. (Applause.)

THE LECTURE

Persia during the War was the scene of military operations in four different parts of the country. General Dunsterville has already described before this Society the achievements of the force which he commanded in the North-West; Sir Wilfrid Malleon has told us of the good work done under great difficulties by his Mission on and beyond the North-East frontier, and Major Blacker has added many details of hazardous enterprises and interesting episodes while he was with the Mission. Further south Sir P. Sykes has narrated the vicissitudes and adventures of the forces under him; and I propose now to give a short account of the comparatively humble part taken by the troops in Bushire, and so to complete the tale of the operations of British, or British-led, forces in Persia during those eventful years.

The operations, which form the subject of my remarks, were at a late stage of the War, when all eyes were turned to the momentous events then taking place on the Western front, and I do not think that any reference was ever made to them in the English Press; consequently few people know that they ever took place. They involved no serious fighting, and I cannot claim that they were of any great importance—the interest of these small side-shows in remote countries lies, perhaps, mainly in the fact that they help us to realize how immense was the front occupied, wholly or in part, by the fighting forces of the British Empire, extending as it did from the western

frontiers of India across Persia to Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Egypt, thence carried on by the Navy to Salonika, and so through the north of Italy to France and the shores of Great Britain.

Before I touch on the actual operations, I must give a short account of the events which led up to them. Bushire has, for many years, been the headquarters of our activities in the Persian Gulf. Before the War we had there a Political Resident who was also the Consul-General for Fars, and was provided with a small guard of Indian soldiers; a post which, at the outbreak of war, had been held for more than ten years by Sir Percy Cox. There were also a Russian and a German Consulate-General, and France was represented by a Consul. It will perhaps be remembered that in 1914, before the Turks had definitely declared themselves on the side of our enemies, a brigade was sent from India and landed at Bushire, so as to be ready in case of emergency. When, a few days later, war with Turkey was declared, this force moved on at once towards Basra, leaving behind only a small garrison of one battalion. It was known at this time that the German Consul-General and his staff were actively intriguing against us, and doing all in their power to stir up the tribes in the neighbourhood to attack Bushire, with the object, presumably, of embarrassing us and drawing off troops from the more important theatres. The situation was somewhat delicate, Bushire being neutral territory, but it was finally decided to arrest the German Consul-General and his staff and deport them to India. I need only add that documentary evidence afterwards obtained fully justified this action.

Among the staff was a certain Herr Wassmuss, a dragoman of the Consulate, who, unfortunately, escaped arrest and fled to the mainland, where he took up his residence among the tribesmen near the coast. At first, well provided with funds, wearing Persian dress, and passing himself off as a Mohammedan, he succeeded, by means of liberal payments and still more lavish promises in the name of the German Emperor, in organizing a series of night raids in the peninsula, chiefly in the neighbourhood of Rishahr, a place about five miles south of the town itself, the site of the cable station and the Indo-European Telegraph Department's quarters and offices. Most of the Europeans lived in this neighbourhood, and the headquarters of the garrison were here. Though no serious damage was done, these raids produced a general feeling of insecurity, and necessitated the increase of the garrison to two battalions. To understand the situation, I must explain that the peninsula of Bushire is separated from the mainland by a strip of mud flat, known as the *Mashileh*. This is about ten miles across from east to west, and in its narrowest part about seven miles from sea to sea. The soil is mostly clayey; there is no regular road across it, and though light wheeled traffic can cross it in dry weather, the going is always very heavy in parts. After heavy rain, it is passable

for pack animals only with difficulty, and at certain states of the tide and very high winds it is liable to be completely inundated by the sea. Where the east side of the Bushire peninsula abuts on this neck are low cliffs, precipitous in places and intersected by rocky ravines. The method adopted by the tribesmen was for small parties to cross the *Mashileh* early in the night, and, making their way through our outposts, to attack some European house or military establishment—transport was a favourite target—and after the nearest troops had turned out and much promiscuous firing had taken place, the raiders withdrew. A more ambitious attempt took place in September, 1915, when a force of some 600 tribesmen crossed over at night and concealed themselves in the ravines on the edge of the high ground preparatory to attacking our outpost line. Here they were discovered the following morning by our patrols, and after some fighting, were driven out on to the plain, where they were charged by a handful of cavalry and fled in disorder. After this, though the night raids still continued, the enemy were considerably disheartened by the losses they had suffered, and though Wassmuss still continued his efforts to organize an attack in force, they met with little response from the tribesmen.

It was Wassmuss who had organized the mutiny of the old Swedish Gendarmerie at Shiraz in November, 1915, which resulted in the arrest of our Consul, Colonel O'Connor, and the other British residents. These were kept in captivity at Ahram, a small fort in Tangistan, and the residence of Zair Khidar, the chief of the tribe. It was generally Wassmuss's headquarters. It was only about thirty miles from Bushire, and when I took over command at the latter place in February, 1916, I was anxious to send out a small force, and, by a sudden raid, to effect their release, and possibly the arrest of Wassmuss. It appeared to me quite a feasible project, but I was then under the orders of Sir Stanley Maude, to whom the project did not commend itself. With our hands full as they were in Mesopotamia, he was, perhaps not unnaturally, anxious to avoid the possibility of further complications in South Persia. The prisoners were finally released as the result of negotiations between the political officer and the local chiefs, who were by this time becoming somewhat distrustful of their German adviser, more especially as he was then very short of funds. He stayed on in the country, however, until after the Armistice, when he moved northwards and was captured between Ispahan and Tehran. He was, I believe, deported from Persia.

After the release of the prisoners matters quieted down considerably, but the tribes remained passively hostile; the part of the Indo-European telegraph line, which ran from Bushire to Shiraz, had been entirely destroyed, and we were unable to repair it; the road was nominally open to caravan traffic, but the exactions of the Chiefs on the route were so preposterous as to make the cost of transport almost

prohibitive. I calculated at that time that it amounted to more than £50 a ton—and trade was at a standstill. Thus, though the distance from Bushire to Shiraz direct was only 180 miles by one of the main caravan routes of South Persia, we had no communication with the troops there except *via* Bandar Abbas, and thence by a circuitous route of over 300 miles.

Early in 1917 the troops at Bushire were taken out of the Mesopotamian Command and put directly under India. At the same time the area of the Command. was extended to include all garrisons in the Persian Gulf, and the Gulf of Oman, as far east as Muscat.

Sir P. Sykes has described the events in Shiraz, in June and July, 1918, when the Indian troops there were attacked by a large force of tribesmen, consisting principally of the Qashgais and their allies, and their position was rendered somewhat precarious by the wholesale defection of the South Persian Rifles he had raised. In June, when it appeared as if the attack might develop into a more widespread movement, a move from Bushire was contemplated, but at this, the hottest season of the year, no operations could have been carried out in the low country without entailing very heavy casualties from the climate. The garrison of Bushire was, however, reinforced by two battalions, and as it seemed probable that, unless some strong action was taken, another similar, and perhaps more serious, situation might develop in the autumn when the tribes were moving southwards to their winter quarters, it was decided to make preparations for an advance to open up the road when the weather became cooler. While fully recognizing that the energetic action taken by the troops at Shiraz was the main factor in preventing the movement from spreading, and in bringing about the downfall of the Qashgai Chief and his following, I have no doubt that the arrival of these reinforcements, and the rumours circulated of an intended move from Bushire, had a considerable influence on the result.

The difficulties to be encountered were chiefly physical, and due to the nature of the country to be traversed. No serious opposition was anticipated from the local tribesmen, nor indeed were they capable of opposing an organized advance, but there was some uncertainty as to what the attitude of the Qashgais might be when their country was reached in the neighbourhood of Kazerun, and it was considered advisable to have a brigade available to meet contingencies in that direction.

The first serious obstacle was the *Mashileh*, which, as I have already said, was at all times difficult for wheeled traffic, and rendered quite or almost impassable for days together after heavy rain. Once across that, our route lay over fairly easy and flat country as far as Borazjan, thirty-nine miles from Bushire, and thence over gently undulating ground to Daliki, fifteen miles further on, beyond which the hills were entered.

Daliki is the first place along the road where there is a good supply of sweet water. In the country between it and the coast water is almost everywhere scarce and brackish, and it was difficult to supply at all a large force. The Rud Hilleh river is salt, though animals will drink the water. Daliki stands about 400 feet above sea-level, and from there to the Kazerun valley, 3,000 feet high, the road lies mostly through rocky defiles, with two very steep and rocky ascents, never to be forgotten by those who have travelled over them. These are the Kutal-i-Malu, where the ascent is about 1,200 feet, and the Kutal-i-Kamarij, not quite so high. Beyond Kazerun again another very difficult ascent, the Kutal-i-Dukhtar, led to the Dasht-i-Barm, and a few miles further on there was a final long climb up to the Kutal-i-Pir-i-Zan, the top of which is about 9,000 feet high. Thence the descent to the Shiraz plain, some 5,000 feet above sea-level, is comparatively easy and gradual.

At this stage of the war, the number of mules available in India was small, and quite insufficient for our requirements, and though camels could be used as far as Daliki, only mule transport could negotiate the road beyond that point until it had been greatly improved. To get over the transport difficulty, it was therefore decided to build a light railway as far as Borazjan; originally it was intended to continue it to Daliki, but detailed surveys of the ground showed that the difficulties were greater than we had anticipated, and to avoid the delay which the extension would have entailed, a cart-road was made, and supplies from railhead to the foot of the hills were carried on light Ford lorries. This left all the pack transport free for use beyond Daliki when the railway and road were completed.

Another difficulty was the water supply in Bushire itself, which is not only deficient in quantity, but is so brackish that it has a most trying effect on those who are obliged to drink it. I except the inhabitants of Bushire, who have presumably become inured to it. Before the war, Europeans had always obtained their drinking water from the weekly mail steamers. In 1916 a condenser was erected, but though the output from this was enough for the normal garrison, the water question made any considerable concentration of troops impossible. We had, therefore, to arrange that the additional units from India should not arrive till those in Bushire had moved forward, and Daliki was the first place where they could be concentrated in any force.

By the 24th of September, the preparations at the base had been completed, and the railway constructed to just outside our outpost line. Meanwhile, the Persian Government had agreed to the movement and had sent orders to their officials to co-operate. Needless to say, these orders produced no effect whatever on the tribes, who had for long been independent of all Government control. The three local

chiefs of Tangistan, Chahkutah, and Borazjan, through whose country our route lay, and who in normal times derived their revenue almost entirely from "rahdari," an illegal impost on all caravans passing up the road, had sent an ultimatum saying that they would allow us to repair the telegraph, but that they would oppose the construction of a railway to the last drop of their blood. With some 600 followers, they had entrenched themselves at Chaghadak on the far side of the *Mashileh*, and occupied the date groves in its vicinity. It was necessary to dislodge them before the work of carrying on the railway could be proceeded with. This was done on September 28 by a small column of one battalion of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and two guns, who crossed over very early in the morning. The enemy bolted as soon as their flank was turned and before the guns could get into action, leaving their tents and all they had with them, including 20,000 rounds of ammunition, and after a little skirmishing in the date groves, our columns occupied the wells at Chaghadak and Ali Changi. Our losses in the fight were three killed and two wounded. This action completely quelled all organized opposition, and though afterwards our patrols were sometimes fired on, our camps sniped at night, and though skirmishes between small parties occurred, little damage was done on either side, and they in no way interfered with our progress. Before I go any further, and in case anyone should be disposed to criticize the operations from a purely military aspect, I would again lay emphasis on the fact that this was in no way intended to be a punitive expedition. My instructions were very clear that the object was to open up the trade route to Shiraz and to restore the telegraph line, and that no military operations were to be indulged in except such as were necessary to carry out these objects.

Owing to the treacherous nature of the ground in parts, the construction of a railway across the *Mashileh* was not an easy task, and it was not till the 22nd of October that it reached Ahmadi, twenty-one miles from Bushire. Its construction and all operations were also hampered by a serious outbreak of influenza among the troops early in October. Our hospitals were full to overflowing, and several battalions were practically out of action. Fortunately with us the epidemic was not of a severe type, and the percentage of deaths among the troops was comparatively small, but it was thought advisable to delay the arrival of other units from India until the epidemic declined. It was far more severe among the Persians, especially at Shiraz, and among the Qashgais and other nomad tribes, and also among our troops at Shiraz.

On the arrival of railhead at Ahmadi, the leading troops moved on to Borazjan. There was no opposition; the chief of Borazjan, who was amongst those who fought against us at Chaghadak, after hesitating for some time, finally decided to take to the hills, and a successor

was appointed by the Persian Governor of Bushire. Daliki was occupied a fortnight later, and the troops at once got to work on improving the road beyond Borazjan. The remaining troops from India were now arriving, and were pushed on up the line as they came, and by the middle of November the concentration was completed, and the force was organized as follows:

(1) A striking force of four battalions of infantry, a mountain battery, a machine gun company, and a field company of Sappers and Miners. This force was commanded by Brigadier-General Elsmie.

(2) Two battalions of infantry, including the Pioneer battalion laying the railway, two squadrons of cavalry, and a field company of Sappers and Miners for work on, and defence of, the line of communication. They also had a labour battalion attached.

(3) One battalion of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and an improvised battery of artillery, who formed the garrison of Bushire.

The total strength of this force was about 11,000. The Indian troops with Sir P. Sykes at Shiraz had also been put under me in August.

As soon as the road was fit for wheeled traffic up to Daliki, the striking force got to work on the approaches to the Kutal-i-Malu. At this time we had some trouble with hostile tribesmen in the Filifili Pass, which is the defile where the road first enters the hills. These fired into our posts at night, and made several attempts to ambush the picquets protecting the working parties as they were on their way to their positions on the hill tops. This necessitated our sending out small columns to try and round them up, and though in this we were unsuccessful, the village in the hills where they had their headquarters and where they had collected supplies, was occupied and the supplies destroyed, and after this they ceased to trouble us. By the end of November railhead had reached Borazjan, though the line still required a considerable amount of work to consolidate it, and make it capable of carrying supplies for the whole of the striking force. The latter, working with great energy, had so improved the track through the Filifili Pass and the approaches to the Kutal-i-Malu as to make these easily passable for camels. They were then preparing to tackle the Pass itself. Hereafter the procedure was for the striking force to move slowly on ahead, making a practicable track for camels as they went; the Pioneers, with the other company of Sappers and Miners and the Labour corps, remained behind to consolidate the railway track, complete the bridges, and then to make a well graded and more permanent cart-road from railhead onwards.

It is difficult to convey to anyone with no experience of the roads in Southern Persia what the old track up the Kutal-i-Malu was like. From the bridge over the river an easy track followed the right bank for about two miles, and then turned northwards into the hills and

commenced to ascend. For the first two miles the gradient was in most parts comparatively gentle, and the track, though rocky and narrow in many places, presented no great difficulty to loaded mules. It then turned up a deep depression from the top of the range with a very steep ascent of about a mile. A zigzagged and paved track had at some period been constructed, but the stones had worn smooth with the passage of many caravans and this combined with the steepness of the gradient made it almost impossible for mules and horses to keep their footing on it. It had, therefore, been discarded in favour of a very steep, narrow, and rocky track running up the opposite side of the ravine, often ascending by a series of steps cut or worn in the rock. Though the distance from Daliki to the top is only eleven miles, I find that in 1911, with two squadrons of the C.I. Horse and a convoy of about 600 mules, it took us seven hours—from 6 a.m. to 1 p.m.—before the bulk of the column was at the top, and even then the rear-guard was far behind, looking after animals which had fallen or cast their loads. We found it impossible to make anything of this track, and a complete re-alignment round the far side of the spur which ran on the east of the ravine was necessary. The men of the striking force, however, worked with the greatest keenness, and assisted by the Sappers and Miners, ably directed and inspired by General Elsmie, by the 19th of December they had not only completed a good camel road to the top, but had carried it on some nine miles further across the Khisht plain to Charum, which was at the foot of the Kamarij Pass. When one considers that this work was done entirely by troops with no previous experience of road-making, and that from Daliki to the top of the Pass it entailed much heavy rock-blasting, and that they had also to be constantly on their guard against attack, it will, I think, be admitted that it was a very creditable performance. With the aid of their working parties they had also got a small detachment of Ford lorries up the Pass and these were able to work between the top and Charum.

The next obstacle to be tackled was the Kamarij Pass, the ascent of which, though rather shorter than the Malu, was still steeper and more rocky. This would bring us to the Kamarij Plain, practically on a level with the Kazerun Valley and distant only twenty-two miles from Kazerun itself. The self-appointed ruler of Kazerun at that time was one Nasir Divan, a local chief who, with a following of about 600 men, had taken an active part in the fighting against our troops at Shiraz, and we knew that he was trying to collect men to hold the Pass against us. In the lower part of the Kazerun Plain we should also be in contact with Qashquli branch of the Qashgais, and there was some uncertainty as to what their attitude would be. Reconnaissance showed that the top of the Pass was occupied by riflemen, though not in very great strength, but a good position was found for our mountain guns,

and the day following our arrival at Charum, the Pass was taken with a loss of only one sepoy killed and one Indian officer wounded. This was due largely to the excellent arrangements for covering fire made by General Elsmie, as the troops had to attack up a very steep hill side, and though the enemy were few in numbers, probably not more than 150, many of them held on stubbornly, retiring only when our men reached the top.

Once established in the Kamarij Plain, we were in a position to occupy Kazerun at any time we wished should the political situation render it advisable, but local supplies were scarce and our communications were not yet sufficiently improved to enable me to feed anything but a very small force there. The troops were, therefore, employed as before in making the road passable for camels. The old track up the Kamarij Pass winds up the side of a steep, and in places precipitous, ravine where no decent alignment was possible, and a good deal of reconnaissance was required before a practical alternative route was found, following up the left bank of the Shapur River for four miles and so turning the Pass on the west. The making of this road and the improvement of the track onwards to Kazerun kept the troops busy for several weeks. Meanwhile the Qashquli chiefs had come in to see me, and expressed a desire for friendly relations, and so relieved us of any anxiety on their account. Not that much trust was to be placed in their protestations of friendship, but it was found that the tribe had suffered so severely from the influenza epidemic, losing several of their chiefs and a large proportion (probably not less than 20 per cent.) of their fighting men, that they were in a very humble mood, and incapable of offering any serious opposition to our column. Nasir Divan had fled from Kazerun, though with a small following he was still lurking in the neighbourhood, and a new Governor appointed by the Governor-General of Shiraz had been sent there.

By the 25th of January the advanced troops had completed their road up to Kamarij, and from thence onward to the foot of the Kazerun Plain. It was only a good camel track up the ascent, with no pretensions to being fit for wheeled traffic, but with some assistance from the working parties several light lorries had been brought up it, and could be used in the road beyond Kamarij. By this time the communications in rear had been sufficiently improved to enable us to keep up a constant stream of the necessary supplies, and, on the 27th of January, Kazerun was occupied by the headquarters of the striking force and two battalions without incident. The following day the force from Bushire joined hands with the troops from Shiraz who had advanced to Mian Kutal, a caravanserai situated on a spur some way below the top of the Pir-i-Zan Pass and twenty-one miles distant from Kazerun. We had now completed our task of opening up the road throughout, and it remained only to finish the restoration of the telegraph line.

It must not be supposed that everything was quite plain sailing, and that there were no difficulties to contend with. The influenza epidemic kept many of the troops out of action for some weeks. An outbreak of cholera at Daliki in the earlier part of the operations caused some anxiety, but was fortunately prevented from spreading. The locomotives at first sent from India were not sufficiently powerful for the work required of them, and an extra strain was put on the railway by the necessity of sending a daily supply of drinking water to all detachments along the line between Bushire and Borazjan, as it was found that the brackish water along the route, though drinkable in case of necessity, had an injurious effect on the health of the troops when continued for long. At the end of December and beginning of January heavy rains and the irruption of the sea flooded the *Mashileh* and considerably damaged the railway track. The temporary bridge over the river at Ahmadi was swept away, and all this took some time to repair. Meanwhile there was considerable difficulty in keeping up the supplies for the advanced troops, and Colonel Tytler, who was in charge of the line of communications, had many anxious days.

The restoration of the telegraph line was a somewhat lengthy business. Not only had the offices been completely wrecked, all instruments destroyed, and all wire removed, but the large iron posts which carried the wire had almost everywhere been taken away. Being hollow, the villagers found them very convenient for use as water pipes and for other similar purposes. Beyond Daliki these heavy posts could only be carried on camels, and though a light telegraph line was run through immediately behind our foremost troops, with the many other calls on our transport their conveyance and the completion of the permanent line was slow work. So far as I remember, it reached Kazerun some time in February, and, from thence, parties working from both ends took it on to Shiraz a few weeks later.

By the time we reached Kazerun the troops had become so experienced in road-making, and both officers and men took so much interest in the work that, in order to keep them occupied, it was decided to employ them in improving the road onwards towards Shiraz. The very steep and rocky ascent of the Kutal-i-Dukhtar, the Pass of the Maiden, we could do nothing with, but a practicable line was found by which it could be turned to the south. Beyond the top about five miles of easy and gradual ascent leads to the fort of the last of the Kutals, the Kutal-i-Pir-i-Zan, or Pass of the Old Woman. This, though longer than any of the passes further south, was not quite so difficult in other ways. It was an ascent of something over 4,000 feet in about six miles by a zigzag, rough, and rocky track up a wooded hillside, steep in many parts, especially near the top, but still somewhat less formidable than the obstacles we had already surmounted. The nature of the ground, too, lent itself better to re-alignment. This

kept the troops busy until the beginning of April, by which time the track had been so far improved that General Elsmie, whose brigade had done the work, was able to take a Ford car to the top of the Pass, and thence on into Shiraz, the latter part of the road having been taken in hand by the troops of the Shiraz garrison. General Elsmie was always somewhat reticent as to the amount of assistance from the working parties required on the steeper parts of the ascent, but those who knew the road in its former state will admit that it was something of a feat to have taken a car under its own power from Bushire to Shiraz, even if it did require a little pushing at some of the worst places.

In the early part of the year a second Labour corps had been sent us, and while the troops were busy improving the upper part of the road, the Pioneers and the two Labour corps were engaged in making a good and, as I then hoped, a permanent, cart road from Borazjan onwards. This, of course, entailed a great deal of re-alignment and much heavy rock blasting on the hilly portions, as the camel track made by the troops had gradients as steep as one in ten, while the gradients on the cart road were, I think, nowhere steeper than one in fifteen. By the middle of April I was able to leave Bushire in the morning by train to Borazjan, and with two Ford cars and two light lorries to meet us at rail-head, we reached the top of the Malu Pass by 1 p.m., with no enforced stoppages except those required to fill up our radiators on the long ascent.

A small party from the Survey of India was attached to the force, and was able to make for the first time a detailed map of the whole of the road from Bushire to Shiraz and a good deal of the country on both sides of it, including areas which had never before been explored. When we left, I was able to arrange for them to remain in Shiraz for the summer, where, I have no doubt, they were able to extend their survey considerably. So far as I can ascertain, their work has not yet been published in any form accessible to the public.

After the declaration of the Armistice with Turkey, I had asked that a few aeroplanes might be sent me from Mesopotamia, and a flight arrived early in January, and were very useful in reducing to submission any of the remoter villages which were inclined to give trouble and so avoiding the necessity of small expeditions into the hills. In February I went by aeroplane from Kazerun to Shiraz. The visit was in the nature of an official entry, representatives of the Governor-General and other leading men among the Persians, as well as most of the British officers of the garrison, being assembled on the landing ground to meet me. As a dignified arrival it was hardly a success. My pilot, flying high over the hills north of Kazerun, arrived above Shiraz at an elevation of about 12,000 feet. He then cut off his engine and spiralled down, but, unfortunately, when flattening out near the

landing ground, the engine refused to pick up, with the result that we came down in a very heavily irrigated field some hundreds of yards short of our mark. The aeroplane, after going a few yards, stood on its head with the propeller buried in the mud, and after hovering for a few uncomfortable seconds in a perpendicular position, when we were uncertain whether it was not going to turn a complete somersault, finally subsided into a semi-recumbent attitude, from which we had ignominiously to climb down into the mud.

During the three days I spent in Shiraz, the Governor-General did his best to induce me to persuade our Government to leave a garrison there. Possibly his recommendations were not wholly disinterested, as, taking advantage of the security afforded by the presence of a British garrison, he had carried his exactions far beyond the recognized limits, and was somewhat doubtful what would happen when our protection was withdrawn. He solved the difficulty by returning to Tehran before the last of the troops left, and shortly afterwards, as is not unusual in such cases, he was put in prison, and doubtless made to disgorge a good deal of the riches he was credited with having amassed.

Orders for the withdrawal of the bulk of the troops were received early in March, though, owing to the difficulty of providing the necessary ships to transport them, it was not till the end of April that the move actually commenced. One battalion and a mountain battery remained at Kazerun, and a battalion at Bushire with a detachment at Borazjan. The remainder of the line was taken over by the South Persian Rifles. After the mutiny of the greater portion of this force in 1918, the remainder had been disbanded and an entirely new force raised. These were recruited chiefly, with the assistance of the Persian officials, from the settled tribesmen in the vicinity of Shiraz and from other elements likely to develop into good fighting men; the Persian officers were carefully chosen, and under the able command of Major W. A. K. Fraser, now our military attaché at Kabul, they promised to develop into a very fairly efficient body of men. They were, at any rate, a great advance on any of their predecessors, and I confidently believe that they would in a short time have been able unaided to police the whole road between Shiraz and Bushire. For two years after this their fate hung in the balance, and I cannot but think that the decision finally arrived at, to discontinue the contribution towards their support made by the British and Indian Governments, and so to bring about their disbandment, was a mistaken policy. With some hope that the security of the line would be maintained, I believe that some enterprising firm would have come forward to take over the railway and the road we had with so much labour constructed, and possibly to continue the cart-road through to Shiraz. With the disbandment of the South Persian Rifles, and the consequent almost certain relapse of this part

of Southern Persia into its former state of chaos and anarchy, it is not to be wondered at that no one would risk their money in the country. Compared with the millions we have spent in Mesopotamia, the sum required was almost negligible. Eventually the railway was dismantled and removed, and the road, neglected and never repaired, is no doubt rapidly deteriorating, and will continue to do so until it is in a state little, if any, better than that in which we found it.

It is in the south of Persia, the country south of a line drawn roughly from Seistan on the east to the neighbourhood of Kermanshah, that our interests, both strategical and commercial, lie. It is a tract inhabited mainly by nomad tribes, where the orders of the Tehran Government carry little or no weight, and where it is only by playing off one tribe against another that the Persian officials, unsupported by any armed force, can maintain a semblance of authority. It is a country in which, so long as we hold India, we cannot afford to see any foreign Power predominant.

Lord Curzon, in his book on Persia, written more than thirty years ago, has remarked that "Since Sir John Malcolm first landed at Bushire, in 1800, down to the present day, Persia has alternately advanced and receded in the estimation of British statesmen, occupying now a position of extravagant prominence, anon one of unmerited security. At one time she has been the occasion or the recipient of a lavish and almost wanton prodigality; at another she has been treated with penurious meanness." And so it has been since this was written. So long as the Russian menace to India continued to haunt the minds of statesmen and soldiers, Persia occupied a prominent place in the politics of the Middle East; since the entente with Russia removed anxiety on that score, she has gradually sunk into the background. We have yet to see what the policy of Russia is to be when she emerges from the state of chaos into which she is now plunged; but if Bolshevik activities are any guide, we may expect that Persia may again be made use of to threaten our Indian possessions. We have heard lately of agreements between the Turks and the Soviet Government, and between Angora and Kabul, but an alliance with the Shiah of Persia, "feeble as allies and impotent as foes," as Lord Curzon has described them, is hardly likely to be courted by her Sunni neighbours to the east and west, or the Christian Power to the north.

Her weakness, indeed, invites aggression, and the rich provinces to the north-west and north have before now excited the cupidity of the peoples coterminous with them. Every true friend of Persia must, therefore, view with regret the present attitude of her Government towards Great Britain, inspired as it doubtless is by pressure from outside; for it may well be that before long she may be in need of a powerful friend who, from motives of self-interest if for no other reason, might be ready to come to her help.

The CHAIRMAN : Ladies and Gentlemen,—After an interesting lecture of this kind, which also has been very instructive regarding the nature of the roads of Persia, I hope there are members of this Society who will now join in a discussion, and thus add to the interest of the evening.

Sir ARTHUR HARDING : Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have listened to this lecture with peculiar interest, and for many reasons—one, that General Douglas and myself co-operated together in Persia for a considerable period before the war, and travelled and worked together in many parts of it. I, myself, have in a sense partaken of some of the General's experiences in the rugged and difficult country which he has just been describing to us, for it was my duty to ride from Tehran to Bushire in order to meet the Viceroy of India, then Lord Curzon, who was about to pay a State visit to the coasts of the Persian Gulf, and I remember very vividly those horrible passes—the Pass of the Old Woman, the Pass of the Daughter, and the one that is known as the Accursed Pass—of which it is difficult to say to which we are to assign the palm for discomfort and, sometimes, where a rider is not mounted on a very sure-footed horse, positive peril. I remember, when I was at Shiraz on my way down, calling on a man of great sanctity who lived there, and telling him what apprehensions I had, and the reverend gentleman presented me with a sacred ring which had for a long time belonged to him and had derived additional sanctity from being on his finger, and he assured me it would guarantee me against all possible dangers of the Kutals. I accepted it very gratefully, and I am bound to say that its magic effect was not only instantaneous, but instantaneous and constant ; for at each Kutal I managed to get down, sometimes getting off and leading my horse, but without ever being pitched from his back. I fully share in the admiration with which those of you who have heard General Douglas's lecture must regard the excessively able and successful way in which the troops under his command negotiated this most difficult country. After the wonderfully interesting lecture which he has given—it is scarcely necessary for me to emphasize how difficult and how laborious a task it must have been, and, I think enormous credit attaches to the officers in charge of these complicated and difficult operations. It seems to me that they could hardly have had a more fitting chief than General Douglas, for he is thoroughly accustomed to these wild tribes and their disagreeable ways ; and once, during my own stay in Persia, he was badly wounded during his travels in Luristan. The effects of the wound are no more visible than are the effects of the laborious campaign which he underwent in the hot neighbourhood of Borazjan and Bushire, and which has left him as young as, if not younger than he was when we laboured together at Tehran. (Applause.) Well, ladies and gentlemen, what

he has told us makes him, to a certain extent, an important pioneer, because, as he has told us, Persia was one of the few countries at the time the war broke out, claiming to be civilized, which possessed scarcely any railways—a little single line from Tehran to Shah Abdul-Azim being the only one on which trains could move by steam. All the time we were there, great railway projects were constantly being discussed, but I doubt whether any of the schemes actually embraced the difficult task of a railway junction between Tehran and Bushire through the Kutals. There was talk of lines down to Ahwaz, through a very similar country, or down to Bandar Abbas, or best, and most practicable of all, if the Turks would have allowed it, and they probably would—because of the profits of the corpse traffic—from Baghdad to Basra. All these schemes fell through, largely, I think, because of the jealousies of Great Britain and Russia; whatever was proposed by one would be vetoed by the other, and to this day there are no railways in Persia of any importance. In fact, I presume that Persia, during the last few years, has been in a state of retrogression rather than progress. When we were there, the situation was somewhat different. The struggle with Russia, which, to a certain extent, was terminated by her defeat in the Japanese war, was still at its height. Russia was, in those days, pursuing her path of conquest, by gold rather than by arms, by continual loans to the Persian Government, by acquiring that monopoly of furnishing supplies which has been the secret of the ascendancy of the House of Commons in this country, and, in fact, by reducing the Shah and his rather venal body of surrounding ministers and high functionaries into mere recipients of Russian gold. That state of things could only be met on our part by our financing the Persian Government in our turn. It was difficult to do so, because they had no means of raising an internal loan, and their treaty with Russia precluded them from making any foreign loan except with St. Petersburg. The only way we could get over that was to use the Imperial Bank of Persia, which was an English institution disguised as Persian, to advance certain funds supplied to it by the Government of India. That, to a certain extent, helped to break the power of Russia; and it was completed by the catastrophe in Japan. The Persian Government in those days affected a certain sympathy with Russia; but I remember being told by a Persian prince that, when the news arrived of the final defeat of the Russian fleet, the Heir-Apparent to the throne of Persia, who it was thought was by way of being a strong Russophile, called him back and said, "Is the news really true?" and he added, "It seems too good to be true." Then he hastened, with all his courtiers, to condole with great cheerfulness with the Russian representative. As a mere commentator—a respectful, admiring, and sympathetic commentator—on my old friend General Douglas's most inspiring paper, I had better resume my seat; but

I feel sure that all those who have heard his lecture will have derived much interesting information from it, as well as from the admirable illustrations by which he has rendered it more vivid. These enabled all of us to appreciate far more fully, and in a far more lively manner than we otherwise would have done, the most interesting address which he has given us. (Applause.)

Sir GEORGE KIRKPATRICK : Sir Edmund Barrow, Ladies and Gentlemen,—The operations which General Douglas has described in such an interesting manner were really the closing stage of a series which, when viewed in retrospect from the beginning of the war, have very outstanding characteristics. In the first place, it must be remembered that with operations in a country such as Persia, where whole districts will be affected by the success or the non-success of a small body of troops, then what in the big theatres of war would be regarded as not merely minor, but insignificant, operations become in themselves of great importance. Now when war broke out, to the authorities of India Persia presented a great problem. We soldiers wanted to save all our troops, all our forces, all our material, and all our transport for theatres of major importance, where decisive results would be obtained ; and we looked with disfavour on any proposal for a diversion of force. But, unfortunately for us, owing to Herr Wassmuss, of whom you have heard, we had to deal with the problem of Southern Persia. We were troubled by a series of attacks, minor, but none the less harassing and anxious, on account of the feature which I have mentioned—that the reverse of a small body in those parts would have great political results throughout that region, and would be magnified beyond all measure in the reports that would be circulated. It became apparent that we should have to restore order. That restoration of order was done in Southern Persia in two divisions. After some local operations on the borders of Mekran, the South Persia Rifles, under Sir Percy Sykes, undertook the opening of the roads and restoration of order in the provinces of Kerman and Fars. Then during this period the troops at Bushire had a time of patient waiting. Their patience was sorely tried, not only by the provocation which was put upon them through the local tribesmen, inspired by German agency, but also by the natural desire to rescue their fellow-countrymen and fellow-countrywomen who had been captured at Shiraz, and were in captivity just outside their outposts. At the same time the higher military authorities directing operations could not run the risk of any failure in such an undertaking as that to release the prisoners, nor could they spare the forces to make a certainty of that operation. Therefore, as General Douglas mentioned, we had to wait. Well, after a period, in which these communications were restored, came another time early in May, June, and July, 1918, when, probably largely influenced by German successes in France, the situation in Persia—in Southern

Persia particularly—most distinctly depreciated. It resulted in the rising of Shiraz, against which Sir Percy Sykes made headway, and afterwards he did much to restore order. We had then to consider the question of the restoration of the communications, and it became evident that amongst the communications the most important was the road from Bushire to Shiraz. We had had accounts of its difficulties; we knew that in General Douglas on the spot we had a commander well acquainted with the road, and the tribesmen, and the difficulties to be met. We realized our good fortune in that, and we deliberately then began to make preparations for what we knew must be a very methodical and arduous operation such as General Douglas has described; and we managed to be able to supply him with some railway material and sufficient mules to enable him to advance slowly stage by stage. It is of great significance to note that in this campaign we put to use mechanical appliances in a country where really it was very doubtful whether it could be done. A point General Douglas has not mentioned—very modestly—is that unless the operations were completed as arranged the climatic conditions in a very few weeks would have increased the strain on the troops beyond all measure. He has told you how he carried through the operation, and in doing so he has not, perhaps, done himself full justice—although he has his troops. It was due very largely to his previous knowledge, to his careful foresight, and to his methodical preparation that he was enabled to carry out that work successfully. Remember that Bushire itself is an undeveloped harbour; in fact, it is no harbour. Ships of any size have to lie one or two miles out. There are no proper landing appliances and no proper roads into the port itself. There were no means of handling, when he first got it, the railway material with which to construct his initial railway, and no proper place to store his supplies; and he was faced always with that mud marsh of Mashileh before he could get to dry land. Remembering these things, I think you will agree with me that not only was his lecture exceedingly interesting, but it was a very modest account of his performance. (Applause.)

Mr. DONALD MELLOR: Mr. Chairman, we have listened with very great pleasure to General Douglas's lecture, and to all of us who take an interest in the development of a country like Persia, and the outposts of India, I think we must agree that the work which General Douglas directed will always stand as a monument to his ability and energy. I think with the last speaker that he has certainly underestimated the work that he did himself; for it is very well known that without a good leader the men would not work. In these things also the general public very often forget the energy of the officers and of the men, from the highest down to the lowest, that has to be put through in carrying out such an undertaking. I very much regretted, when reading the other day as regards the railway through Baluchistan

from Quetta, that there was a hint that part of that line, if not all of it, is to be taken up. That was mentioned by one of the papers with regret, which I re-echo myself. That line, although not exactly a gold mine, certainly has developed trade along the route to a remarkable extent; and to those gentlemen like General Douglas, who have done good work in the outposts of the Empire, it must be a galling thing that work which they have carried through so conscientiously, and which, if it had been backed up in England, would have led both to further development and towards the peace of the world, has not been seconded as it should have been.

The CHAIRMAN: If no one else will say anything more, it remains for me to make some comments. To me the most interesting feature of all in this discussion has been the clear conception that has been given to us, both by lantern illustrations on the wall and by the lecture and the discussion, of the immensely difficult road over which General Douglas succeeded in taking his troops. That road is, of course, a historic road. It has been used for hundreds, even thousands, of years, and, I suppose, originally it was fairly well aligned and probably fairly well kept. But you see the results of Asiatic rule during these long ages. When you looked at those pictures that were put before us you could appreciate what is meant in Central Asia by the term "road." A road is nothing like what we are accustomed to in this country, or anywhere in Europe; and some of the so-called roads that I have been over, and which are designated in our maps by beautiful thick lines, have shown me how deceptive our own maps often are when dealing with countries with which we are unacquainted. Once you have been over those roads you know that a map road is of little use to you until you have been over it yourself. Another point I would like to mention is that we were very fortunate during the war in having available for this particular job an officer like General Douglas, who knew the country thoroughly. He had been over that road, I suppose, half-a-dozen times before the war, and therefore was thoroughly acquainted with the difficulties he would have to cope with, and could make previous arrangements which would suffice to overcome them. That, I think, illustrates very clearly the fact that in Asiatic countries the difficulties of warfare must not be measured solely by the fighting. The main difficulties are moving and feeding troops. On that subject General Douglas, if time had permitted, could no doubt have told us a good deal more than he did, but it is evident that his troops largely overcame those difficulties by their own labours. They reconstructed this road; and the road, though bad from our point of view no doubt, was infinitely better than anything that had been seen in that part of Persia for a very long time. I am sure you will all join with me in giving a very cordial vote of thanks to General Douglas for his interesting lecture, and the trouble he has taken in putting

before us the difficulties of his little campaign. (Applause.) One word I would like to add ; it is with reference to remarks made by the last speaker—I am sorry I did not catch his name. He expressed great regret that the labour of those generals and officers in distant lands should be thrown away, and all those roads disappear into the oblivion that their predecessors so justly merited. But I do not think that is the case altogether. I hope in these more civilized times something may happen which will enable Persia in the future to be more readily accessible to trade and commerce, either by railways or by good roads. We have two approaches which may help us in future. One is the approach from Mesopotamia, a good deal of which was improved enormously during the war, and the other is the approach from Quetta, viâ the Nushki line, to Duzd-ab. That railway still exists, and I hope it may continue to do so ; because already the trade by it has enormously increased. Mention of that fact will give some satisfaction to the last speaker. Ladies and gentlemen, in your name I propose a very cordial vote of thanks to General Douglas. (Renewed applause.)

EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CHINA

By H. B. MORSE, LL.D.

At Versailles, in 1919, the Chinese delegates demanded the abrogation of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, as being a derogation from her sovereign status. The claim was rejected; but in 1921 it was again preferred at the Washington Conference. There the claim was admitted to the extent of recognizing that the privilege is a derogation from China's sovereign status, and a Commission has been appointed to proceed to China and examine into the further assertion that the administration of justice in that country has so far improved that foreign jurisdiction may with safety be abolished. The same claim has now been made for the Turkish dominions, and it is advisable to see how the privilege was acquired in China, and what it is.

From the earliest times peregrinating traders have claimed the privilege of carrying with them the law to which they had been born: the Phœnician traders along the coasts of the Mediterranean, the Greek traders following in their steps, and the Arab traders voyaging to China in the seventh and eighth centuries of our era. Foreign conquering invaders have generally left the conquered in the full enjoyment of the law to which they had been accustomed: the Frank in Gaul, the Norman in England, and the various Kitan, Nüchen, Mongol, and Manchu invaders and conquerors of China. In A.D. 824 the Constitution imposed by Lothair on the city of Rome provided that each resident was required to designate the code—Roman, Frankish, or Lombard—under which he wished to live and be judged; the Roman might elect to be hanged for murder, and the Frank to be allowed to compound for it by payment of weregeld.

For traders the privilege endured to a late period. In his *Carta Mercatoria* of 1303 Edward III. of England granted to foreign traders the right to have suits, by or against them, tried by a jury of six citizens of London and six merchants from the same town as the foreigner party to the suit. In 1199 Venice obtained a capitulation from the Emperor at Constantinople granting extraterritoriality to her traders, and in 1207 a treaty in the same terms was negotiated between Venice and France; in 1304 Genoa obtained at Constantinople a similar *privilegium aurea bulla nostra munitum*.

The States of Europe abandoned this practice between themselves as, in each case, the Government came to be based on law and not on the will of the governors; the law of the place then became paramount, and it was not to be set aside for the benefit of a foreign trader. But

when European traders came into relations in the Levant with Asiatic rulers, their respective laws were found to be incompatible : no Venetian or Genoese would willingly, or could in reason be expected to, submit himself to Moslem law, based on the Koran, and no Moslem could obey a law whose chief exponent was the Pope. The Saracens at Alexandria entered into an extraterritorial arrangement with Pisa in 1154 ; and at Constantinople the Turks took over the same procedure from the Greek Empire which they displaced, maintaining it in force until October 1, 1914.

The Europeans coming to China found a vast and well-organized empire, with a reputation for unconquered strength. The first comers, the Portuguese, had had no trade with the Levant and no experience of extraterritoriality ; nor had the next comers, the Spanish ; nor, as an independent State, had the next, the Hollanders ; and none of these claimed the privilege in China. The English had had a grant of extraterritoriality in the Levant since 1583, and the French since 1535 ; but coming to China, the one in 1637, the other in 1660, they both followed the example of the earlier comers.

The absence of extraterritorial protection created no difficulty in matters of trade during the whole of the factory period, which ended in 1842. The Chinese have never in the past brought their own civil cases into court, but, having experience and a wholesome dread of the action of their own magistrates, they have invariably settled them in their gilds. The foreign merchants trading at Canton were in the hands of their "security" merchant, a member of the Co-Hong, or Gild-Merchant, of Canton ; if a dispute arose between the two, it was settled amicably, or, when that was not found possible, the settlement was subject to the dictation of the security merchant. This method worked smoothly, and the foreign traders, engaged in a profitable trade, accepted the situation as a necessary evil, quite dwarfed by the extortion to which they were subjected.

It was the execution of the criminal law which drew their attention to the need of further protection. Against the foreign merchants there was not one charge brought during the whole of the factory period ; but their trade was carried in ships manned by heavy crews, and at Whampoa (the anchorage, ten miles below Canton) there would at times be thousands of sailors, full of life, rejoicing in the touch of land after many weary months of the sea, and bent on pleasure. Bloody murder might have been expected on many occasions ; but during a period of two centuries, from 1637 to 1833, only sixteen cases of violence are recorded committed by foreigners, and during the same period five cases of murderous assault by Chinese on foreigners. The death penalty was inflicted on four foreigners only for the cases in which they were implicated ; but those four brought home to the responsible authorities the necessity for the protection of their own

laws. One (an Englishman) had been tried by the Portuguese court at Macao and acquitted, but was retried by the Chinese and executed; one Frenchman killed a Portuguese in self-defence, but was tried by the Chinese and executed; one, English, was executed as being the gunner on the ship *Lady Hughes* from which a salute had accidentally killed a Chinese; one, American, on the ship *Emily*, had dropped an earthen jar which struck on the head of a woman in a boat and caused her to be drowned, for which he was executed.

The Chinese criminal law had been codified very clearly, and is accessible in Staunton's translation of the *Tatsing Leuli*. The law of homicide may be summarized as follows:

1. Wilful and premeditated murder is punishable by beheading.
2. For homicide during an affray, though without any express desire to kill, or killing another on suspicion of theft, or being accessory to a murder, the penalty is strangulation.
3. Persons who kill or wound another purely by accident (in such way that no previous warning could have been given) may redeem themselves from punishment by paying a fine to the family of the person killed or wounded. The legal amount of this fine, fixed by the Code, was Tls. 12.42 (£4 2s. 9d.).
4. Killing in lawful self-defence is justifiable, and not punishable.

To this law, if justly administered, little objection could be made except on one point; but that was vital. Chinese law judged solely by the result. If a life was lost (except when judged by the court to have been by pure accident) the law took a life in payment. The Chinese carried this to an extreme, and in several recorded cases they demanded a number of lives equal to the number lost, in order to satisfy public opinion among the fellow-villagers of the dead.

The nations of the West adopted a different principle. With them it was the intention which was important. In England (during the period of the factory days at Canton) any attempt at premeditated murder, even if neither death nor wound followed, was punishable by death. By two laws of 1828 and 1837, attempts which did not result in wounds were removed from the category of murder; and in 1861, for the first time, was the death of the victim made a necessary factor. The English (the most numerous element among the merchants and in the shipping) insisted on the necessity of proving intention and premeditation; and, after the surrender of the gunner of the *Lady Hughes* in 1784, refused to surrender any more accused persons for trial in a Chinese court.

The spirit of the Chinese judges was another factor which had to be taken into account. In their opinion, foreigners had no proper understanding of the principles of reason. A truly civilized people, such as

were the Chinese, must understand that "reason is never so feeble that it must needs be reinforced by might"; whereas, during three centuries of common relations, foreigners had shown a facile inclination to resort to force whenever any impediment arose to prevent the attainment of their end. The Chinese then, confident in their monopoly of reason, confident also in the unshaken strength of their universal Empire, held an innate conviction that, *prima facie*, their countrymen, belonging to a civilized race, must be in the right as against those of a rude and unlettered stock. These judges, too, belonged to a class of officials who were notoriously the most corrupt of any then existing in the world; who, even a century later, had made no advance in the direction in which the rest of the nations were moving, to integrity and impartiality in their public officers; who were always ready to prostitute their official position for the sake of gain or for racial prejudice.

Another element was the certainty that torture would be applied to any person under trial in a Chinese court. Torture was not unknown to the nations then represented at Canton, but its use had long before been discarded in the West. Of the three most numerous nationalities, the Americans had never known it, except as applied to them by the Red Indians; the Dutch had abandoned it in their legal procedure; and it was not in common use in England after the time of Elizabeth, or in Scotland after James I. and VI. In England it endured longest to break down the obstinacy of accused persons who "stood mute," refusing to plead; in 1658 Major Strangeways, standing mute, was pressed to death in about ten minutes, "iron being laid on him as much as he could bear and more"; in 1726 one Burnwater, accused of murder and standing mute, was pressed for an hour and three-quarters with 4 cwt. of iron, and then consented to plead; in 1772 it was enacted that standing mute should be taken as equivalent to a plea of guilty, and in 1827 as a plea of not guilty. For extracting evidence from witnesses torture has not been applied for more than three centuries in the more advanced nations of the West; and in England and America an accused person is further protected by being exempted from interrogation, and by the legal presumption that he is innocent until the prosecution has proved him guilty.

In China, the foreigners found, the theory was the same as in the West, but in practice the prisoner was presumed to be guilty until he was clearly proved to be innocent; and his trial was for the purpose of publicly establishing the charge and determining the penalty. In the case of the American ship *Emily*, in 1821, the magistrate conducted a first trial on board; he heard the evidence for the prosecution, refused to allow that evidence to be interpreted, refused to hear argument or testimony for the defence, and adjudged the accused guilty. After this mockery of a trial and farce of a judicial decision, the accused was put in irons on board ship, but was not surrendered. The

trade of all flags had been stopped, and the stoppage continued; and, a week later, the prisoner was surrendered. He was taken into the city, tried again (no one from the ship or the foreign community being present), was again adjudged guilty, was executed by strangulation, and his body returned to the *Emily*, all within twenty-four hours.

China, it was further found, was governed on the doctrine of responsibility; for every unlawful act, someone must be found to accept responsibility—the act of God, *force majeure*, circumstances over which one had no control, were excuses not recognized in Chinese law. Among the Chinese the father is held responsible for every act committed by any member of his family; the whole village for any act committed within it; the magistrate for the detection and punishment of any crime in his district; Governor and Viceroy for the maintenance of order in their jurisdiction. This responsibility is personal; a village elder might be executed (or, perhaps, tortured and ruined in purse) for a murder committed by some person unknown; a Viceroy might be cashiered (or, perhaps, left in his office humiliated by the deprivation of his honours and titles) for failure to suppress brigandage.

The same doctrine of responsibility was applied to the foreigners. In one case (British ship *Neptune*, 1807) fifty-two sailors of the crew were involved in a riotous affray in which one Chinese lost his life. Every effort was made during two months to fix the personal responsibility; twice were investigations conducted on board, but the guilty person could not be found; the supercargo was held personally responsible for producing the guilty man; the responsibility was transferred to the English Headman (the President of the Select Committee of the Honourable East India Company); during the whole of these two months all the English trade was stopped; and finally the Chinese accepted one sailor as guilty of "accidental homicide" (penalty 12.42 taels = £4 2s. 9d.), and the trade was re-opened.

In every case that occurred the foreigners contended that the charge should have been one of accidental homicide or of killing in self defence; while in every case the Chinese held that it was killing in an affray, with or without intent, the penalty for which was strangulation. The English surrendered none of their accused after 1784; but, in several later cases, offered to send their men as prisoners to England, there to be tried and punished according to English law.

The Americans had at that time in their own country laws which were much less ferocious than those of other Western nations; but, in their dealings with the Chinese, they accepted the Chinese standpoint to a date much later than the others. In the case of the *Emily*, in 1821, they declared to the Chinese authorities: "We are bound to submit to your laws while we are in your waters; be they ever so unjust, we will not resist them." This was their public policy; but their personal feelings as expressed in their private correspondence, were the same as those of the English.

The idea of granting extraterritorial jurisdiction to the foreigners was not at first repugnant to the Chinese. In 1687, at Amoy, a sailor of the *London*, being drunk, broke into the Custom House and committed a robbery, involving under Chinese law the penalty of death; all that the authorities demanded was that "a due punishment might be given to him by ourselves according as, in our opinion, y^e crime meritted; w^{ch} was inflicted in Publick view ashore by 100 Stripes wth a Catt of nine Tails & Pickle, to their satisfaction."

In 1729 the supercargoes of four of the English Company's ships, bargaining for admittance to the port of Canton, demanded "that we desire there may be no Punch houses erected at Wampo, that so all quarrells between our Sailors and the Chinese may be prevented, and that we may not at Canton be accountable for any such accidents, it being impossible for us to be answerable for them at such a distance; and that if any of our people should be found to be the Aggressors in any Broils between them and the Chinese, that we ourselves only shall inflict such punishments upon them as they shall deserve and according to the Laws of our Country."

This was extraterritoriality, granted at haphazard, but never acted on for over a hundred years.

The English fought with China the war which was ended by the treaty of Nanking in 1842. In this treaty, imposed on China after her defeat at all points, any terms might have been inflicted; but Lord Palmerston, in his instructions, had directed his plenipotentiary that, if the Chinese Government were willing to cede an island [Hongkong or Chusan] to serve as an entrepot for the trade, then only the national questions, and not those concerning trade, should be definitely settled. Accordingly the treaty provided for the cession of Hongkong, the opening of five staple ports, the appointment of Consuls, a money indemnity, the abolition of monopoly, a uniform and moderate tariff, and equality between the officials of corresponding rank of the two nations; but it made no stipulation for jurisdiction by British courts over British subjects. This was secured by the General Regulations for Trade published in 1843, in which it was declared that "regarding the punishment of English criminals, the English Government will enact the laws necessary to attain that end, and the Consul will be empowered to put them in force; and regarding the punishment of Chinese criminals, these will be tried and punished by their own laws."

The American policy had been to accept Chinese jurisdiction over American citizens; but Mr. Caleb Cushing, Commissioner of the United States to negotiate a treaty, found good reasons for abandoning this attitude of acquiescence. There had been several attacks by Cantonese rowdies on foreigners in the grounds of the foreign factories. On June 16, 1844, a party of Americans was attacked, and they were driven to defend themselves; and, in the affray, a Chinese was killed.

The Chinese soldier guard gave no protection; and the Viceroy Kiyng, a Manchu, declaring that the Cantonese were a turbulent people, warned Mr. Cushing that they would probably demand a life for a life. They did so demand, but Mr. Cushing refused to submit the case to Chinese jurisdiction; and he convened a jury of six Americans, who found that those implicated in the affray had acted strictly in self-defence. During the same period an American was killed by Chinese soldiers, and in this case Mr. Cushing left the offenders to the jurisdiction of the Chinese authorities.

In the American Treaty of 1844, signed two weeks after this affray, the procedure in criminal cases was declared somewhat more explicitly, but in similar terms to that laid down in the British Trade Regulations; but, in his instructions to Consuls, Mr. Cushing declared categorically: "In my opinion, the rule which obtained in favour of Europeans and Americans in the Mohammedan countries of Asia is to be applied to China. Americans are entitled to the protection and subject to the jurisdiction of the officers of their Government." This policy he maintained in later years in his considered opinions as Attorney-General of the United States.

The French Treaty of 1844 was very precise in its assertion of criminal jurisdiction, declaring in addition: "Il en sera de même en toute circonstance analogue et non prévue dans la présente convention, le principe étant que, pour la répression des crimes et délits commis par eux dans les cinq ports, les Français seront constamment régis par la loi française."

Extraterritoriality was now fully established in criminal cases. The need for it in civil cases had, as has been stated, not been felt during the factory period at Canton; but, with the abolition of the monopoly of the Co-Hong, foreign merchants of all nations and of all classes were brought into direct relations with Chinese merchants of all classes. The monopoly had come to an end, but the Chinese merchants continued to work together in their guilds, while the foreigners, always individualistic and self-dependent, were as a flock of sheep in the presence of the united Chinese. Protection in civil cases was felt to be necessary, but the foreign merchants had not yet put into concrete form the best way of supplying their need, when the plenipotentiaries of four Powers (England, France, America, and Russia) negotiated their treaties of 1858. All these treaties provided clearly for consular jurisdiction in criminal cases, but, for civil cases, only provided for the recovery of debts through the courts of the debtor; the French Treaty, however, repeated word for word the clause in the Treaty of 1844:

"Il en sera de même en toute circonstance, etc."

Extraterritoriality in civil cases, to the full extent of present-day practice, grew up through the weakness of China, and the inability of her officials to execute the functions of their offices. Through the first

half of the nineteenth century sporadic risings had been of frequent occurrence in almost all of the provinces, loosening the bonds of obedience to the law, spreading everywhere a feeling of unrest, and interfering seriously with the ordinary emoluments of the officials; and, by 1850, there existed throughout the whole empire a condition almost amounting to anarchy. Order was not maintained, justice was not rendered, the officials were held in contempt; and these last were driven to expedients, beyond those customary, to supplement their emoluments which had been seriously curtailed. Then arose the Taiping rebellion. Starting in the poor and mountainous province of Kwangsi, the rebels marched north through Hunan, conquering, devastating, and increasing their forces, as they advanced; and, by the end of 1852, they made good their footing on the Yangtze, by the capture of the triune cities Wuchang-Hankow-Hanyang. They pushed down the Yangtze, and, on March 19, 1853, took by assault the former capital of the empire, Nanking, having overrun and devastated the major part of six provinces, while other risings gained their footing in other provinces. In the summer of 1853 not one of the eighteen provinces of China proper was free of rebels, and many—even the majority—were dominated by them. The Manchu resident garrisons were massacred to a man, and woman, and child; the Chinese armies were saved by timely withdrawal, the officials saved themselves by flight, and millions of civilian refugees streamed to places which, they hoped, would provide shelter from the devastating hordes, some thousands even as far as Shanghai.

Piracy, of the sea and of the river-ways, is endemic among the Chinese; and during this period sea piracy was rampant along the coast. The authorities, civil and military, were quite incapable of dealing with it, and such check as was imposed on it was imposed by the ships of the British Navy. In 1847 H.M. brig *Scout* brought into Amoy three pirate junks. In 1849 Commander J. C. D. Hay, with 3 ships, the largest mounting 16 guns, destroyed a piratical fleet of 23 junks, carrying 12 to 18 guns each and manned by 1,800 men; in the same year, with 3 ships, he destroyed 58 out of a fleet of 64 pirate junks, carrying 1,224 guns and manned by 3,150 men; and in March, 1850, with one ship, he destroyed a fleet of 13 pirate junks: these three actions were all in Cantonese waters. In 1855 H.M. brig *Bittern*, 12 guns, destroyed on the Chekiang coast a pirate fleet of 23 junks, carrying nearly 200 guns and manned by 1,200 men, the *Bittern's* loss being 2 killed and 15 wounded.* During these years the Chinese authorities were in a constant state of friction with foreign interests; even in May, 1858, when England and China were openly at war, and during the days when the allied British and French forces

* To commemorate this action a memorial window was erected by public subscription in the Parish Church of Bisham-on-Thames.

were taking the Taku forts by assault, H.M.S. *Surprise* destroyed a large piratical fleet at Lintin; and all these operations, including that in 1858, besides many others of less importance, were undertaken at the request of the Chinese authorities, and were carried out with the co-operation, ineffective though it was, of Chinese government ships. During all these years the burden of protecting British merchants and shipping was thrown entirely on the British authorities and the British Navy, and was never assumed by the Chinese authorities.

If any foreign Power was to undertake the duty incumbent on the Chinese, it was obviously England, since the greater part of the trade was British. In 1855 there were resident in Hongkong and the five Treaty ports of China 1,038 adult male civilians, of whom 377 were at Hongkong, 334 at Canton, and 243 at Shanghai; and this total of 1,038 was divided among 111 English firms, 45 British Indian, 23 American, and 31 of all other nationalities. The proportion of the trade may be gauged by the export trade of Shanghai in 1853, when the total value of all exports was 24,000,000 dollars; of this sum, 14,500,000 dollars was the value of shipments by English merchants in British ships, 8,500,000 dollars by American merchants in American ships, and 1,000,000 dollars under all other flags.

These particulars serve to illustrate the extent of the foreign trading interests, and the impotence of the Chinese officials at the time, September 7, 1853, when the administrative city of Shanghai, protected though it was by strong walls, was seized by surprise by a body of Triad rebels, claiming affiliation with, but not recognized by, the Taipings at Nanking. The next day they made an irruption into the foreign settlement, sacking and burning the Custom House which dealt with the foreign trade; but thereafter, for seventeen months, they remained besieged by tens of thousands of Chinese troops, but continuing to hold the city against all assaults. Of the territorial and fiscal officials, some were killed when the city was taken, and others escaped to the foreign settlement, finding there a refuge under the protection of the extraterritoriality enjoyed by the foreign residents.

The foreigners were confronted by a difficult problem. For many years they had not obtained the protection which it was the duty of the Chinese Government to give them; and, after the events of the two days, it was obvious that the Chinese authorities could not offer any resistance to the rebels. On the other hand, the Government had for twenty years been in a state of acute conflict with the foreign interests, and this conflict had been temporarily alleviated, on paper but not in fact, by the Treaties of 1842 and 1844; and the foreign interests, while giving a personal refuge in their settlement to the dispossessed officials, could not agree to their exercising their functions, collecting their revenue, and conducting military operations, under the protection of foreign guns, foreign prestige, and foreign privilege. The foreign

Powers in general were at the moment represented by merchant Consuls—Portugal, the Netherlands, Hamburg, Lübeck and Bremen, Prussia, Denmark, and Siam by English merchants, Spain by a Portuguese, Sweden and Norway, Russia, and the United States by an American (the first official United States Consul arrived in February, 1854); the French (official) Consul had national interests of very small importance; and it fell to the British Consul, Mr. Rutherford Alcock, to take the lead in all matters of common public interest.

Mr. Alcock was a man of marked personality. After a period of distinguished service with the British Legion in Spain, he was appointed one of the first Consuls to China under the Treaty of 1842. At Amoy in 1844, and again at Shanghai in 1854, he upheld the right of the Consul to protect from molestation Chinese subjects in foreign employment; in 1845 he re-established British prestige, which had been impaired, at Foochow; in 1848 at Shanghai, on an occasion in which he conceived that the Chinese authorities had been neglectful of their duty of protecting foreign life, he boldly, with one gun-brig, declared war against the Chinese Government; and, on many occasions, he had shown that he was not afraid to assume responsibility in a time when the monthly mail was slow and telegraphic communication did not exist.

The three foreign Envoys declared for a strict neutrality between the Imperial Government and the rebels—the British and American after the fall of Nanking, and the French after the seizure of Shanghai—but the neutrality was declared to be conditioned by the necessity of directly defending any threatened foreign interest when directly attacked. Under this declaration, Mr. Alcock induced his two colleagues, Consuls of the two Treaty Powers, to join with him in asserting the neutrality of the foreign settlement in the struggle between the rebels within the city and the Imperial authorities and forces outside.

This neutrality produced a threefold effect. While the rebels in the city were hemmed in on three sides by the besieging troops, and on the fourth, the northern side, by the neutral foreign territory, they were at the same time protected from all assaults on that northern side, from which the Imperial troops were excluded. This exclusion was not pleasing to these troops, who found there a degree of personal safety not obtainable elsewhere; and, in the Battle of Muddy Flat, on April 4, 1854, some ten thousand of them, who had drifted in, were forcibly expelled from their coign of safety by a force of 200 sailors from the British and American ships of war, and 200 merchants of Shanghai. The city was evacuated by the rebels in February, 1855, but the neutrality of the foreign settlement was still maintained. In August, 1860, on the days on which the allied British and French forces were engaged in the assault on the Imperial forts

at Taku, other British and French troops were manning the walls of the Imperial city of Shanghai and defending it from an assault in force by a Taiping army; and, in 1862, the two Allies undertook to protect Shanghai and to keep clear of rebels the territory within a radius of thirty miles around it—a duty which, even at that date, the Imperial forces were quite incapable of performing. It is not too much to say that, without this declaration of neutrality, and without this foreign military intervention, the seaport of Shanghai would have been taken by the Taiping army and the course of history changed.

A second effect was that the Chinese Government was debarred from collecting its Customs duties from the foreign trade of Shanghai. The Consuls tried one expedient after another to enable it to obtain this revenue, by some method which would not involve, on the one hand, the entry of armed Chinese guards into the foreign settlement, and, on the other, the giving of armed foreign protection to the Chinese officials engaged in the collection; but in the end it was found expedient, in July, 1854, to introduce a system of mixed Chinese and foreign control of the Customs—leading ultimately to the creation of the Inspectorate-General of Customs, the development of which owed so much to the genius of Sir Robert Hart.

A third effect was that the Consuls were driven to assume jurisdiction over the Chinese resident within the limits of the foreign settlement. In 1852 this territory comprised about 250 acres along the river-front, occupied by the houses and offices of the foreign merchants, and back of this about 400 acres, conceded later and intended primarily for purposes of recreation; within this square mile there were no Chinese resident, except the house and office servants of the foreign merchants. On the fall of Nanking many thousands of refugees fled to the only apparent place of safety, Shanghai; the disturbed state of the vicinity after the seizure of the city drove other thousands to the same refuge; and by the end of 1853 there were over fifty thousand, some with scanty means, some with none, all squatting in the open spaces of the foreign settlement. Year after year more thousands flocked in, and in 1860 the fall of Soochow and the consequent expansion of the area of Taiping domination drove in many myriads more, until, by the end of 1862, there were over a million and a half of Chinese refugees resident in the area reserved for foreigners, finding there under the foreign flags the protection denied them under their own. Policing, sanitation, protection, and feeding had to be provided for this host, and the task, unwelcome though it was, was undertaken with Western thoroughness by the small community of English and American merchants.

Authority, however, did not lie with the merchants. Many attempts were made to throw the burden of police jurisdiction on the Chinese officials; but there was the double difficulty, that Chinese

armed guards could not be admitted to the foreign settlement, and that there were no funds available unless the Chinese could be allowed to exercise the taxing power within the foreign limits. The mercantile community then evolved the plan of making Shanghai a "free city," independent of all Chinese jurisdiction, and existing under the joint protectorate of the three Treaty Powers; but they were promptly called to order by the three Envoys at Peking, who reminded them that "the (English) Concession at Shanghai was neither a transfer nor a lease to the (British) Crown . . . and the land so acquired remains Chinese territory."

With the enormous Chinese population to be administered, some authority had, however, to be exercised, and the task was undertaken by the official Consuls, the British and the American, for what was afterwards the "International Settlement," and the French for his own. They dealt with all ordinary police cases, and the penalties inflicted were fines of moderate amount or imprisonment for a few days; criminals requiring severer punishment were sentenced to be handed over to their own authorities, involving expulsion from the foreign settlement. Mixed civil suits were commonly settled by Gild action or by friendly arbitration, as they had been in the factory days at Canton; but when they came before any Court, it was before a Consular Court. One such case occurred at Hankow as late as May, 1864, when the Oriental Bank brought suit before the British Consul against two Chinese for enforcement of a contract; judgment was given for the plaintiff in the sum of 68,232 taels (£22,000). The Chinese defendants probably regarded the suit as an arbitration, and paid the sum awarded.

After the suppression of the Taiping rebellion in 1864, the foreign authorities at Shanghai took early steps to restore to the Chinese officials their proper jurisdiction over their own subjects; but they had, at the same time, to safeguard the extraterritorial status acquired for the foreign settlement. They accordingly moved the Taotai to establish a Mixed Court for the trial of charges or suits, in which there was a foreign interest, brought against Chinese resident in the foreign settlement, or taking shelter there. The rules were amplified in 1869, and from time to time since, the latest amendment being in 1903; and they are based on the principle laid down in the British Convention of Chafco, 1876, that "cases are tried by the official of the defendant's nationality . . . the law administered will be the law of the nationality of the officer trying the case"—but always with the further proviso that nothing shall be done to impair the extraterritorial status of the settlement.

The Mixed Court is a Chinese Court, presided over by a Chinese official, who is the deputy of the magistrate of the district of which Shanghai is the administrative centre; and this official, with the

rank of sub-magistrate, is assisted in his administration of justice by an assessor deputed by one of the foreign Consulates. Appeals lie to the Taotai, sitting jointly with a member of the judicial committee of the Consular body; and irreconcilable disagreement between the Mixed Court sub-magistrate and the foreign assessor is referred to the diplomatic arm, becoming the subject of correspondence and conference between the Taotai and the senior Consul or the Consul directly concerned. (The appellations of the officials under the Empire are used in this account; their names and their functions have been changed under the Republic, and it is probable that they will again be changed, and not once only.)

We are now in a position to study the working in practice of extraterritoriality at the port at which it has been most fully developed—Shanghai.

The foreigner charged with a criminal offence against a Chinese, whatever the residence of either, is charged before his own Consul at the nearest Treaty port (British and Americans at Shanghai before special Courts not subject to Consular control), and tried and sentenced according to the laws of his own land (British by the law as in London, Americans by common law supplemented by statute law applicable to the District of Columbia). The Chinese have the right to send a delegate to listen to the trial, but have not customarily availed themselves of the privilege.

The Chinese, not resident in the foreign settlement, charged with a criminal offence against a foreigner, is charged, on the application of the Consul to the Taotai, before the magistrate of the district in which he lives, and is tried and sentenced according to Chinese law. The Consul has the right to send a delegate to listen to the trial, and if he dissents from the decision of the magistrate, his report becomes the basis of diplomatic correspondence between the foreign legation and the Chinese Government; in cases of murder, especially of missionaries in the interior, this right has invariably been exercised.

Civil suits brought by Chinese against all foreigners, and by foreigners against Chinese residents outside the foreign settlement, are subject to the same procedure.

Criminal charges (including all police cases) and civil suits, brought by a foreigner against a Chinese resident in the foreign settlement, are brought before the Mixed Court. The foreign assessor is supplied in rotation by the three Consulates—British, American, and (until 1917) German—having adequate staffs with a competent knowledge of the Chinese law and language; but any case in which a foreigner or other nationality is interested as complainant or plaintiff is postponed to await the presence of an assessor from the Consulate of the plaintiff's nationality. The assessor intervenes actively in this Court, assuming the functions of a *puisé* judge. In case of need, he imposes his

judgment on the sub-magistrate, head of the Court; and, in case of disagreement, he may refuse to accept the decision of the latter. This Court decides all cases which may be settled by damages, fine, imprisonment, or the ordinary Chinese punishments of the cangue and the bamboo (flogging); but serious cases, for which, by Chinese law, the penalty is death, the cage, or banishment to the frontier, are remitted to the magistrate of the district for trial and ultimate decision; but in such cases it is the duty of the assessor to assure himself that the charge actually before the Court is fully substantiated, and is not the cloak for ulterior designs on the life and liberty of the accused.

Suits brought by Chinese, whether officials or private persons, against Chinese resident in the foreign settlement are brought before the Mixed Court. These present a real difficulty. No foreign interest has any desire to intervene in purely Chinese cases; but the foreigners hold that the extraterritorial status of the foreign settlement must and shall be maintained, and that this is impossible with two rival and incompatible jurisdictions covering the same field. In these cases the foreign assessor assures himself that the charge before the Court is fully substantiated, and is without ulterior motive; but he does not otherwise interfere with the decision.

At Shanghai the French have always followed a particularist policy, and have refused to consolidate their interests with those of the general mercantile community; there are two settlements, the French under solely French control, and the International under the control of all nations, including the French: and there are two Mixed Courts, one for each section. In criminal cases, the Chinese accused is brought before the Mixed Court of that settlement in which the crime was committed. In mixed civil suits, if the plaintiff is French, the case comes before the French Mixed Court; if a foreigner (not French), it comes before the International Mixed Court. If the Chinese defendant resides in the other settlement, he is brought, by a regulated procedure, to the Court having jurisdiction. Suits between Chinese are brought before the Mixed Court of the settlement in which the defendant resides.

While every foreigner is amenable to the jurisdiction of the officials and the law of his own nationality, certain corporate bodies, notably the Shanghai (International) Municipal Council, are not subject to the jurisdiction of any one nation. Suit may be brought against them, under the general principles of equity, before the Court of Consuls, composed of three members of the Consular body, elected annually by their colleagues.

This is extraterritoriality as practised in China, and specifically at Shanghai. It has been considered a necessary condition, if foreigners were to live and trade in China; and it has been a convenience to

Chinese who, from 1853 on to 1923, have found at Shanghai, under foreign privilege, a shelter from rebels or from their own Government. It is not the object of this paper to consider whether the privilege should be abrogated or modified, or whether it should be retained; but it may serve a useful purpose to examine the points which must be borne in mind when the question comes up for consideration.

First, what is murder? The laws of Western nations require that to justify the death penalty proof of premeditation and intention to kill is essential; Chinese law prescribes the death penalty also for homicide during an affray, even when there is no intention to kill. How can these be reconciled? It would not be sufficient to change the Chinese law, since that is based on Chinese public opinion. No Chinese judge would be bold enough to brave the opinion of his countrymen by refusing to adjudge the death penalty if a Chinese life had been lost; and if the foreigner, charged with murder, were acquitted, the fellow-villagers of the slain man could be trusted to raise a riot, with its concomitant homicide and arson.

Suborned and perjured testimony is met in Western countries by cross-examination, but Anglo-Indians know the difficulty of applying this method to the East. In Eastern countries any evidence required is produced, even to the dead body of a victim still living; it has often happened that a body produced as that of a man murdered by violence has shown on medical examination no sign of external injury. In the East, when the Oriental judge suspects, or wishes to elicit, that evidence is false, torture is the method.

The accused, too, is tortured. The presumption is that he is guilty until he proves his innocence, and a refusal to confess his guilt is treated as contumacy and obstruction of justice. Moreover, by Chinese law an accused may not be condemned save on his confession of his guilt.

Chinese officials have always been corrupt; the best of them in the sense that Surintendant Fouquet was corrupt, while the worst may be likened to Verres in Sicily. The element common to Europe in the past and China in the present is that no suitor might win his just cause nor claimant obtain his just dues without feeling heavily the official who should decide, and all his subordinates. The Foreign Offices of Western nations will require to be well assured, beyond the adoption of a new constitution, that the Republic has improved on the methods of the Empire before they will consent to entrust the interest of their nationals to Chinese officials.

Under the Empire the judicial and administrative functions were combined in one official, while the constitution of the Republic has severed them, and provides for an independent judiciary. This is an improvement, but it remains to be seen if the severance will, automatically and without strenuous effort, secure the impartiality and the

independence which are essential to the proper performance of the judicial function. The judges will still retain their feeling that their Chinese civilization is of a higher type than that of any of the Western nations; they will still be psychologically incapable of offending the public opinion of their countrymen; and they will still entertain the universal Oriental notion that the salary of an office is only a stepping-stone to its actual emoluments. If China should succeed in the great task of reforming its judiciary, and of securing an upright and unbiased Bench, the result will be weak judges; the profits of public office in China are so vast, that those who will consent to accept a judgeship will be the failures in public life.

There is no doubt that China suffers from some remediable abuses of extraterritoriality, abuses more common from the action of protected subjects of the British Empire than of natives of the United Kingdom. To the extent to which these can be remedied China has every claim to our consideration, but before she can claim the abstract restitution of her sovereign rights, before she can obtain the abrogation of extraterritorial privilege, she must first convince the nations enjoying that privilege that she has risen to their level, in practice as well as in theory; and she must remember that extraterritoriality, honestly and impartially administered, is a safeguard to China herself, protecting her from coercion for alleged maladministration.

CURRENT AFFAIRS IN 'IRAQ

FROM A CORRESPONDENT IN BAGHDAD

THE last *résumé* of current affairs in 'Iraq, which appeared in Vol. X., No. 1, of the *Central Asian Society's Journal*, dealt with the attitude of the people of 'Iraq towards the Mandate and the treaty, before the terms of the treaty had officially been made public, and before it had actually been signed, and ended with a reference to events in Southern Kurdistan and Anatolia, which were beginning to bring to the fore the question of the relations between 'Iraq and Turkey. It must be the duty of this article to dwell briefly on the treaty itself and the general trend of internal politics subsequent to its signature, and to trace with some care the important effects on this country of the Turkish successes in Anatolia and the consequent attitude of the Angora Government towards the world in general and towards 'Iraq in particular. If consideration of internal development appears to receive less careful attention than the course of foreign relations, it is only so because of the complete subservience of the former to the latter during the period under review.

Rawanduz, though actually regarded as lying within the frontiers of 'Iraq, has never, since the inception of the State, been effectively occupied by either British or local forces, and has always served as a centre from which the Turks were enabled to disseminate propaganda among the Kurdish tribes on both sides of the frontier. Itself a miserable collection of ruins, captured and recaptured during the last few years by Russians, Turks, and British until but a few habitable houses remain, and difficult of access from whatever direction it is approached, it none the less forms a centre peculiarly suitable for the dissemination of unsettling propaganda throughout the whole of North-Eastern 'Iraq and Southern Kurdistan, and in that alone lies the importance which the Turkish and 'Iraq Governments attach to its occupation.

At about the time of the Turkish defeat of the Greeks in Anatolia, the Turks very greatly intensified their propaganda in that direction, and with the arrival of only a small body of Turks, some of the Kurdish tribes on the 'Iraq side of the frontier were persuaded to join them. Detached posts of Imperial troops and levies, unable to cope with the situation, were withdrawn with a few casualties to the Kifri, Kirkuk, Arbil line, where they could be concentrated, and where the movement of reinforcements from one place to another could be much more easily and expeditiously carried out. This move required the evacuation of

the *qadhas* of Rania and Koi Sanjaq, and left the town and district of Sulaimaniyah uncovered from the north and with its communications with Kirkuk and Iraq seriously threatened if the Kurdish tribes to the south showed any signs of being affected by the efforts of the Turks. There was indeed every reason to fear that these communications would be cut, for on them lay the house of Karim Fattah Beg, the Kurdish Agha, who, it will be remembered, had but a short time previously been responsible for the murders of Captains Bond and Makant, and who was at the time a fugitive from hands of levies and police who had been sent out to try and arrest him. It was therefore decided to evacuate the town and district of Sulaimaniyah, and all British, Indian, and non-Kurdish officials were withdrawn by air in one day, a very creditable performance on the part of the Royal Air Force.

In spite, however, of the somewhat hasty evacuation, Sulaimaniyah was not left open to the Turks nor to the general anarchy which might have been expected. Though nominally included in the State of Iraq, Sulaimaniyah had never been placed under the Arab Government, but had enjoyed a very large measure of local self-government, in that it had been under the supervision of a political officer advised by a local administrative council, and referring direct to the High Commissioner in Baghdad matters requiring the decision of a higher authority. This embryo organization for self-government was made use of when the political officer was removed, a prominent local sheikh being left in charge, assisted by the administrative council, the local levies, and the cash lying in the Treasury at the time. This action gave the sheikh and the administrative council a position which they were unlikely to hold if the Turks returned, and so gave them every reason to oppose the activities of the Turks, and things worked out in every way according to plan. A few days after the evacuation, permission was given to Sheikh Mahmud (who, on the first occupation of Sulaimaniyah by the British had been given considerable powers, but who had in 1919 risen in revolt against the British, been defeated, wounded and captured, and compelled to reside out of the country) to return if he wished. He did so, and set about the organization of local self-government under himself as "Hukumdar" complete with a cabinet and local governors. The immediate result of the establishment of local self-government in Sulaimaniyah, however, was that several of the tribes to the north, who had risen and joined the Turks, declared their intention of siding with Sheikh Mahmud, and dispersed to their home, while the small body of Turks retired shortly afterwards to Rawanduz.

Since that time air operations have been carried out in all places in Iraq territory where the Turks are known to have been, and as a result some of the area evacuated has been reoccupied, while a British officer has been up to Sulaimaniyah to see Sheikh Mahmud, and to advise him in the organization of his Government. No British officer

is, however, remaining permanently in Sulaimaniyah, and communication between Sheikh Mahmud and the High Commissioner in Baghdad is maintained through a British officer stationed at Kirkuk.

Sheikh Mahmud's position in Sulaimaniyah is by no means an easy one. His sway exists only over that *liwa*, and order has to be maintained solely by local forces and the moral support of the British, who are no nearer to him than Kirkuk. Turkish propaganda is intense, and the future of Sulaimaniyah is obscure. There would appear to be only three alternatives—either that the whole of Kurdistan should coalesce into one independent state, which would absorb Sulaimaniyah, and be strong enough to resist encroachments from either Turkey or 'Iraq; or, secondly, that it should be granted a large measure of local autonomy under the suzerainty of 'Iraq; or, thirdly, that it should revert to the Turks, and obtain for itself such freedom as it can from interference on the part of the central government. Developments in this area will be watched with interest. Already attempts are being made to win over to Sheikh Mahmud the Kurdish tribes living in 'Iraq territory, and the mutual dislike of Arabs and Kurds for one another makes it not improbable that these efforts will meet with some success.

Meanwhile, the success of the Turks in Anatolia and their activities on the frontiers of 'Iraq had created a deep impression in 'Iraq. At first the feeling most in evidence was one of satisfaction at the victory of the Mohammedan over the Christian, but this was quickly followed by feelings of anxiety on the part of the more prominent politicians, who had associated themselves openly with the British Government of occupation or later with the Arab Government, lest the Turks, flushed with victory and with their onrush stemmed by the British forces at Chanak, might turn against the British in 'Iraq with a view to forcing their hands at the Straits. At the same time the attitude of certain sections of the Home Press, which loudly demanded the evacuation of 'Iraq, or at any rate of the vilayats of Mosul and Baghdad, made them very doubtful whether, if an attack was made by the Turks on 'Iraq, the British would oppose them, or merely give way to the demands of the evacuation section of the Press, and leave the Arabs to their own devices. These persons saw at once that the independence of 'Iraq was threatened and that the country had not yet the strength to stand by itself, and so it came about that many of those who but a month or two before had been bitterly opposed to the British, as the main obstacle in the way of the independence of the country, now warmly supported them as the country's only defence against the Turkish threat.

Among the more prominent non-political elements of the population, while the same satisfaction was felt at the success of the Mohammedan over the Christian and the prospect of the establishment of an independent Turkish State untrammelled by the interference of foreign

Powers, it was felt none the less that the Kemalists were not to be desired as the rulers of that State. The Young Turks had but few supporters in Iraq, and Kemalist ideas smacked too much of the Young Turk to be palatable. When, therefore, the hand of the Bolshevik began to be more and more clearly seen in the policy of Angora, and especially when the news of the momentous decision regarding the Khalifat was made known, any pro-Turk feeling which this class of person may have entertained gave place to feelings of abhorrence, and to a determination to resist the return of the Turk to Iraq.

In the country as a whole, however, there is little doubt that Turkish propaganda has met with a considerable measure of success. The vernacular Press has indeed been full of anti-Turkish effusions, and has harped much on the national spirit of the Arab, which will not brook any encroachment by the Turks on lands which had been Arab since the days when the Turks were mere savages in the wilds of Central Asia, but the vernacular Press does not necessarily voice public opinion. Little notice is taken of what it says, and the fear that if any of the papers should express opinions which do not accord with those of the Government it will be suspended, limits very considerably the value of the local Press as an organ for expressing the views of the public. Among the mass of the people, and especially among the tribesmen, there exists no such thing as a national spirit, their vision extending no further than their tribe or even in many cases their own subsection of a tribe. Their readiness to listen to the Turkish overtures is accounted for to a large extent by the nature of the present Government. They do not understand it, nor do they know how to deal with it. In Turkish days they knew their position, and knew that they could usually get what they wanted for cash, while in the days of the British Government they knew equally well that bribery was useless. They now see the same officials of the old Turkish days back in office again, but with British advisers somewhere in the offing, and they are mystified. They know the official can be bribed; they have bribed him before, but neither the official nor the Arab knows quite how much the adviser sees or what will happen if he does see. It is this which makes many of them think that the days of the Turks were the best after all, and might be the best thing for the future. Even now that the Turkish menace to Mosul is really serious, the country as a whole is remaining entirely apathetic and there is no idea of national resistance, and indeed the more serious the threat becomes the less likely they are to show any spirit of opposition to it. It is only when they see which side will win in the discussion that they will come off the fence, and then a victorious Turkey will be received with acclamation or an unsuccessful one with scorn and vituperation.

Amid this intrigue from without, the signing of the Anglo-Iraq treaty, which at ordinary times would have been recognized as an

important milestone in the advance of the country towards national independence, has received but scant attention. The treaty, while not of course satisfying the extremist elements, fulfilled the immediate demands of the more moderate sections, though the announcement made at the time of the publication of the treaty that Great Britain would use her good offices to obtain the admission of 'Iraq to the League of Nations as soon as the boundaries of the State had been finally decided, was probably a source of greater satisfaction than the treaty itself.

Shortly after the signature of the treaty the Prime Minister, Sir S. Abdul Rahman, Naqib of Baghdad, handed in his resignation, and retired from the stage of active politics to make room for younger successors. He had held the post of President of Council, and later of Prime Minister, ever since the arrival in this country of Sir Percy Cox to set up an Arab Government after the rising of 1920, and had throughout shown a high sense of duty and patriotism. A very old man, and unable to move from his own house owing to physical disabilities, his mind had retained all the vigour of youth, and his wide knowledge of the country and of the people had always been of the greatest value. On him fell the brunt of the negotiations which led up to the Anglo-'Iraq treaty, and on him the difficult task of holding together a Cabinet in which some of the members were anxious to press for a much more complete measure of Arab control than the treaty actually allowed; and finally, after the treaty had been actually signed and published, on the Naqib fell all the blame for the clauses which did not find general approval, but none of the credit for the parts which gave satisfaction. The Naqib has certainly deserved well of his country for his great services at a time of peculiar difficulty, and there is little doubt that later generations of 'Iraqis will be quick to bestow on him the meed of praise which many of his contemporaries withhold.

The Naqib's place as head of the Government has been taken by Abdul Muhsin Beg as Saadun, a younger man of moderate views and considerable capabilities. Belonging to the famous Saadun clan, he has spent many years in Constantinople, where he sat as one of the deputies for 'Iraq before the War. He had served under the Naqib as Minister of Justice, and later as Minister of the Interior, and it was the ability he showed in those posts which gained him his rapid promotion to the head of the Government.

The treaty signed, it was important that steps should be taken to secure its ratification, and this can only be done by the National Assembly. An electoral law had been promulgated some months before, and within a few days of the publication of the treaty a royal *iradah* ordered that preparations should be made forthwith for the election of the National Assembly, whose principal duties should be the

ratification or rejection of the treaty and the framing of the constitution. To this end committees were appointed to superintend the preparation of the electoral rolls and to scrutinize the credentials of candidates, but little progress has yet been made, owing to opposition which has arisen from two sides, religious and secular. The first blow came from the religious side, where some of the Shiah ulama of Kerbela and Najaf, incited no doubt by the irreconcilable extremists of Baghdad, issued a *fatwah* declaring participation in the elections to be an act of war against God and His prophet. The immediate result of this action was the resignation of the majority of the members of election committees in Kerbela and Najaf, and, no fresh committees having yet been appointed, the elections there are in abeyance. The action of the *ulama* had but little effect outside of the holy cities, and efforts made to persuade the Sunni leaders in Baghdad to issue a similar *fatwah* proved unavailing.

On the secular side the opposition came from a party largely influenced by ex-Ministers who have advocated the boycott of the elections as a protest against the present Government, in whom they declare they have no confidence. Their efforts have met with some success, owing to the Arab nature, which, as in the case of the Irishman, makes him on principle "against the Government," but the attitude adopted is one which has nothing to recommend it, and is rather a confession of weakness on the part of those responsible for it. By adopting it they admit they have not enough supporters to enable them to secure the election of their own candidates and obtain a change in the Government by constitutional means. This party has some support in Baghdad, but little outside. As a rule the people are evincing little or no interest in the elections which appear to be as far off now as they were three months ago. It is improbable that Government will have any time to devote to them until the Mosul question is settled one way or the other, and in the present state of affairs it would certainly be unwise to do anything which might give rise to internal disorders, which might be construed as demonstrations against the existing Government in favour of the Turks.

Internal politics, it will be seen, have been completely subservient to foreign affairs during the period under review, and are bound to remain so until the Turkish threat is removed and the future of Kurdistan finally settled. The path of the 'Iraq Government will be difficult for a long time to come, but many of its immediate obstacles will be cleared away if a satisfactory agreement is reached with Turkey, for with a hostile Turkey without her frontiers 'Iraq can never hope to maintain order and security within.

MAJOR SOANE IN SULAIMANIYAH

MAJOR SOANE, after an absence from Iraq caused by the first attacks of the disease from which he was to die, succeeded Colonel Gordon-Walker as Political Officer at Sulaimaniyah in the spring of 1919. The Division had come under British control immediately after the armistice, and before the Allied Governments had formulated any consistent or feasible Kurdish policy. The regularly organized administration, which in the rest of Iraq had succeeded to the functions of the Turkish Civil Service, was not then extended to South Kurdistan, and the Division, by the enthusiasm of an itinerant English pro-Kurd, had been provided with a native "hukumdar," who was not entitled by education, birth, or character to the respect of his subjects or the immoderate subsidy granted to him from the public purse. Soane, therefore, came to Sulaimaniyah with instructions to regularize the government and to effect economies, a task which led inevitably to friction with Shaikh Mahmud, the native ruler. The rising followed naturally in the summer of 1919. It seems, indeed, that at first Shaikh Mahmud meant little more than to prove his indispensability to the Government, and with this design arranged a demonstration by Persian Kurds from across the border. However, in the resultant confusion, a British motor driver was killed, and the "hukumdar," now irretrievably committed, fought as he thought with a rope round his neck. All officers in Sulaimaniyah town were interned, and as the disorder spread the district officers were compelled to take refuge in Khanikin and Koi Sanjaq. Soane himself was on the way to Baghdad when the trouble began, and so escaped to render valuable services to the forces which suppressed the rising about a month later. The support received by Shaikh Mahmud was neither general nor enthusiastic, nor did the Kurds, except for the notoriously turbulent Hamawand tribe, show much more than their usual degree of constancy and unity of purpose, this in spite of the complete rout of the first relieving force on the Tashlujah Pass.

Unfortunately, the punitive movements which followed the final combat of Bazian were accompanied by more than the customary differences between military and political. It is said that the General Officer in command of the operations demanded from the civil authorities the removal of every Political Officer who accompanied the force, and though no action was taken in consequence, Soane determined, so far as lay with him, to dispense with the support of Imperial troops in

the maintenance of order. Sulaimaniyah town was evacuated in the autumn of 1919, and only two small detachments of Indians at strategic points on the Kirkuk motor road remained to ensure communications with Baghdad. The internal security of the Division was mainly dependent upon Soane's prestige, based upon the fear inspired by his uncanny familiarity with the working of the Kurdish mind. He was, it is true, supported by a force of native levies which, under Captain Fitzgibbon, quickly attained a high standard of smartness and efficiency, but that officer himself assessed the mere presence of Soane in the Division at a brigade of troops.

After the removal of Shaikh Mahmud, the Government of the Division was reorganized with a higher personnel almost entirely British. Besides Soane himself, there were normally in the "merkez" sanjaq three Levy officers, two Assistant Political officers, a customs official, and a doctor. Of the four remaining sanjaqs, Halabjah, Chemchemal, and Rania were under British Assistant Political officers and Shahribazar under a Kurdish officer who had distinguished himself during the rising. At Halabjah the Government was powerfully supported by the Kurdish princess, Adela Khanum, who had entertained Soane in her suite during his journey in disguise before the war.

The succeeding year and a half was perhaps the most prosperous and peaceful in the whole history of Southern Kurdistan. Subject only to the not unsympathetic control of the Acting Civil Commissioner, Soane exercised an almost Eastern despotism. His unique local knowledge, his impatience of red-tape, and his strong anti-Arab sentiments, helped to secure for the province a degree of local autonomy which was not enjoyed by any other part of the occupied territories, and which caused much discontent among certain departmental chiefs in Baghdad. Soane had a short way with intruders into his kingdom. He made no pretence to having graduated at Whitehall, and the considered written expression of his views was not much less vigorous and racy than his private conversation on such topics as Arabs, Indianized officials, and General Officers. His memo's, therefore, sometimes gave offence to those who did not know him personally, or fell within these three antipathetic classes.

Soane was allowed considerable freedom in the selection of his officers, and collected round him a body of assistants who shared his devotion to Kurdish interests. They were all young men who adapted themselves readily to the customs of the country, attained quickly a good knowledge of the languages, and, in some cases, adopted the native dress. The result was an administration remarkably free from formalism, and, despite the nationality of the governors, more in accord with Oriental ideas than with British officialism.

While estimating the work of Soane and his assistants at Sulaimaniyah, it is necessary to form some idea of the state in which we

took over the *liwa* from the Turks. Before the war the town of Sulaimaniyah had been not the Kurdish village that is generally supposed, but an important centre of civilization. It contained an agricultural bank, a secondary school, a primary and several elementary schools. By 1918 all these institutions had disappeared, and a large part of the population had died or fled from famine and disease. The empty houses fell into ruins, as the beams were looted and burnt for fuel by the survivors, and a large part of the land had gone out of cultivation.

Within two years of the armistice the ravages of war were almost effaced. As by mere duration the Government acquired stability, the land was brought again under cultivation, and, with the growth of public confidence, the people began to rebuild the town, which was partly re-planned by Soane. Motor roads were put under construction to Kirkuk, Kifri, Halabjah and Rania. Sulaimaniyah was thus being put into easy and rapid communication both with the outlying parts of the Division and with the Iraq plain. It was in these engineering activities that Soane took most pleasure. Though he was his own Minister of Finance, Director of Education, and Lord High Everything Else, he resented chiefly any interference in his scheme of Public Works. Engineers have been known to appear uninvited at Sulaimaniyah, but they usually retreated immediately in confusion on Kirkuk, to await further instructions from Baghdad.

Soane also gave much time and labour to the revival of the Kurdish language. It was substituted for Persian as the medium of official communications, and a newspaper in Kurdish was edited and largely written by Soane. The unsuitability of the Arabic alphabet to the Kurdish language caused some difficulty. Often only the writer and sometimes not even he is able to read written Kurmanji. Soane therefore assisted to produce an elementary reader in Latin characters for the use of schools in the Division. Time was lacking to prove the success or failure of the experiment.

Soane showed a certain distrust of education in general, for he rightly disliked to turn Kurds into "effendis." There is no doubt that, at least temporarily, Sulaimaniyah in respect of educational facilities was put at a disadvantage by the British connection. The Kurdish language is not yet a suitable medium for any but the most elementary instruction, and owing to the want of teachers no substitute for Turkish as the language of more advanced studies was found. Nevertheless, Soane made reasonable provision for education in his budget, and fairly efficient schools were maintained in Sulaimaniyah town, Halabjah, and Chemchemal. The Turkish school buildings were, however, as usual in Iraq, turned by the British administration to other and more practical uses.

It should be clearly understood that in all these administrative

activities the only charge upon Imperial revenues was the cost of the small garrisons at Bazian and Chemchemal, and that the Sulaimaniyah budget balanced.

Soane never expected the love of his subjects. "Oderint dum metuant" was his motto, and fear him they certainly did. Surprise has sometimes been expressed that no attempt was ever made on his life. His intelligence service was of course excellent, and he was always attended by devoted personal retainers; but his best protection was probably the prosperity of the country, and that respect for efficient administration which, contrary to the general opinion, is usually shown by less civilized Orientals.

During the rising of 1920 the Division remained perfectly tranquil, but the establishment of the Arab government in the autumn of that year opened the door to Turkish intrigue. Anti-Arab feeling was strong among the Kurds, stronger indeed than any positive national sentiment, and uneasiness was not entirely allayed by the new High Commissioner's pledge that South Kurdistan should be allowed to exercise self-determination. Soane, of course, stood strongly for the independence of Suliamaniyah, and he was accordingly held to be an obstacle to the success of a policy which aimed at coaxing the Kurds into full participation in the Arab State. Soane was relieved of his functions in March, 1921, and two of his assistants resigned with him. Of those who remained in the Division the three most experienced have since been murdered.

It is impossible to say whether Soane or any man faced with the present political situation and the continued presence of Turkish filibusters at Rawanduz could have maintained order and prosperity indefinitely without the support of Imperial troops. But the strength of his régime is shown by its duration amid alarms and excursions for a further eighteen months after his departure, and for a year after all British and Indian troops had been withdrawn from Bazian, Chemchemal, and Kirkuk. On the whole it appears that the final collapse at Sulaimaniyah is not attributable to any defect in the internal government of the division. Rawanduz is outside its borders, and it is the central administration which bears the responsibility for neglecting that vital problem from September, 1920, onwards, and for the further mistake of readmitting political exiles to the Division. Granted these errors, all that can be said is that only Soane, if anyone, could have saved the position last summer. As things fell out, he lived in retirement and ill-health long enough to appreciate the disaster, while the failure of his work and the deaths of his friends, whom he felt that he might have been able to save, embittered his own end.

THE ROMANCE OF ADEN

BY MAJOR H. WILBERFORCE-BELL

ASSISTANT-RESIDENT, ADEN

HISTORY and romance are indissolubly bound up the one with the other, and perhaps there is no place or country on earth which, having some sort of history, has not also its romance. The two are handed down from generation to generation, and in Eastern countries in particular we often find the romantic predominate over the historic to such an extent that historical stories become distorted, and apt to be regarded as mythical and imaginative products—even the grain of historical truth which they contain being sometimes entirely hidden. Happy is the country which has its romance and history equally authenticated.

No one seeing Aden for the first time would connect either history or romance with its forbidding-looking rocks. And yet those same rocks contain both these ingredients in full measure, though they have to be sought assiduously. Aden has not got its historian, but there are many travellers' records to tell us something of its past, not least among which are the "Periplus"—that interesting and valuable account by a merchant sailor of the shores he visited sometime during the first century of our era—and the description left us by Marco Polo. For in the days of both these writers Aden was great.

Aden is a peninsula, situated on the south-east coast of the province of Yemen in Arabia. It is formed by a massive ridge, chiefly volcanic in origin, and having numerous small bays at its base. Two or three of these bays on the eastward side of the ridge formerly contained good anchorage for ships, and the ancient town and harbour of Aden were in the crater, of which the open side to seaward made at one time a deep and safe roadstead. This was the Aden of the ancients, and, indeed, until some fifteen years after the British occupied the town, in 1839, it remained what it had ever been. Even now merchant ships are sometimes seen to make for this old harbour, with disastrous results. For where in 1708 there was a depth of from twelve to twenty fathoms of water, there is now scarcely one fathom at high tide, and this silting-up led, in the "sixties" of the last century, to the practical desertion of the ancient roadstead, where, for 2,000 years and more, the ships of all nations had put in to trade, for a more suitable anchorage on the western side of the sandy isthmus which connects Aden with the mainland. Around this new harbour the present Steamer Point was formed, which became the seat of commerce and government. But the unchanging East refused to desert altogether

the old site, and the vast majority of the 50,000 people which compose the population of the peninsula still live in the crater, which also is still the centre of commercial life, as it ever was.

The visitor to Aden may, or may not, be struck by its commercial or architectural attractions. But he cannot fail to be impressed by the lofty peak of Shum-Shum, which commands a view of the whole of the peninsula and of land and sea for miles around; by the fortified island of Seera, should he visit the crater with the idea of seeing some sight other than the Tanks; and by the "dhows" and sailing-ships which fill the port. These ships are only made by certain families of constructors, and they, alas! seem doomed soon to disappear. For the details of their building have been handed down in these families from generation to generation for thousands of years, and when they cease their calling their boat-building secrets will die with them. A utilitarian and mechanical age requires more modern means of collecting wealth, and the coasting steamer will soon leave the "dhow," dependent as it is upon the elements for its means of transit, so far behind in the race that its construction will not "pay."

We English people look nowadays upon Aden as a most unpleasant coal depot. We regard it with feelings of commiseration for those of our race who labour there to uphold the Empire, and we are devotedly thankful when our lot is not cast around that black and unpleasant-looking mass of rocks, and equally devoutly hope it never will be. We may, or may not, go to see the world-famed Tanks; or look for the almost mythical mermaids, which we find to be a couple of nasty-looking brown-coloured "dugongs" kept in an hotel by a tailor from Mauritius as the price of his being fed free; or we tell stories of the place, such as that of the sailor who died in Aden and went in due course to the "nether regions," where he never ceased to bemoan the fact that he had left his blanket behind him, as he had lost considerably in warmth by his change of abode!

For romance connected with Aden there is plenty. Is not Belkis, Queen of Sheba, said to have come from Saba in the Yemen—that "Arabia Felix" of the Romans, which lies to the north and west of the Aden Protectorate—and to have embarked at Aden for her visit to King Solomon, that he might be the father of one of her sons? And as for history—well, we have to go back to the very dawn of time for it. Does not the chronicler Tebrian tell us that Cain, after killing his brother, was tempted by Eblis, the common enemy of mankind, to become a fire-worshipper, such as his brother Abel had been, saying to him, "Be thou also a worshipper of fire, and the sovereignty of the earth of which thou hast been deprived shall be restored to thee and thy progeny," and did not Cain and his progeny erect their first fire table at Aden? And is not the tomb of Cain pointed out to this day high up and hewn out of a rock on the south side of the Main Pass?

To be sure, also, we who live in Aden find the letters "B.C." on our hired furniture, though we suspect this to have not a chronological significance showing the "period" of the furniture, but to be merely an indication of ownership by the Parsee merchant who rents it to us. But let us turn to the Holy Bible, to find in the 23rd verse of the 27th chapter of Ezekiel the first mention of Aden positively known to modern historians. There we see Aden described in equal terms with Sheba in its commercial relations with ancient Tyre. Aden was great when the Western world was unknown. Tyre and Sidon had their day in history and they passed away, but our rocky possession is to-day as important as it ever was. Are not history and romance blended equally in this fact alone? Of geological history little can be said. But there can be seen in one of the rocky bays of Aden a large petrified tree, which is an indication at least of the earth's early years, when life was unknown upon it, and when the greater part of its surface was covered with primeval forest. There are no trees worth mentioning in Aden now, and it would appear that the tree described above had been for many centuries beneath the sea when took place the great volcanic upheaval which made of a portion of the open sea a precipitous peninsula.

The history of the people of Aden is inseparably bound up with that of the people of the Yemen, although on occasion incidents peculiar to the peninsula have not affected that more fertile tract. But the earliest inhabitants of Aden were doubtless those also of the other parts of Southern Arabia bordering the Red Sea and beyond, and the evidence of the Bible and of tradition is that the Cushites were the first known race who peopled those tracts. How long they endured cannot be even conjectured, but Ibn Khaldun, the Arabic historian, tells us that they were succeeded by a tribe who were the descendants of Shem. These people did not remain long in southern Arabia, but migrated northwards along the west coast. But they left behind them the tribe of Uz, of whom Shedad—so says tradition—built, not far from Aden, a wonderful city and a beautiful palace, and a garden stocked with fruit of all descriptions. Arabic romancers have told us that these delights were miraculously hidden from view, excepting from that of those who, with pure hearts and simple faith, take the trouble to walk up to the fort on the top of Seera Island (which commands the old harbour), at midnight exactly, on the night of the full moon. Such will be rewarded by a view of the city of surpassing splendour. But, alas! tradition is silent as to whether the sight has ever been seen by human eyes—and Seera is now known to the Arabs as "Gehenna"!

The next invasion of Southern Arabia differed from previous ones in that it came from the West, when the Amalekites of Scripture, called the Beni Omar, overran the country. It is supposed that in course of

time this people became amalgamated with the Sabæans and formed the Himyarites. But, however evolved, we find a line of Himyaritic rulers of Aden and the Yemen for several hundreds of years before the birth of Christ. The Himyarite power declined and finally disappeared in the destruction wrought by the Roman expedition to the Yemen, under Ælius Gallus, Prefect of Egypt, in the reign of Augustus, in about A.D. 110. With eighty ships of war, 130 transports, and 10,000 Roman infantry did this General make his incursion, and he left traces of Roman civilization behind him, although he did not penetrate as far as Aden, and soon returned to Egypt. For the author has himself seen a beautiful relic of those days in the shape of a gladiator, cast in brass, which was dug up by an Arab recently not very far from Aden, and brought in by him under the impression that it was gold, and that he was going to get for it its weight in that precious metal. But he came too late—no gold has been seen in Aden since 1914. And he went away disappointed, but carrying his gem with him.

It was, perhaps, in the centuries before and after the birth of Christ that Aden attained its second period of greatness. The world was very luxurious at that time, and the civilized peoples of the old world were demanding spices and other precious commodities from the East, for which they paid handsomely. Aden thus became a great entrepôt. Spikenard, alabaster, and frankincense were much in demand not only in Europe, however, but also in India and China, and merchants and their ships crowded the ports of the Red Sea, where these and other luxuries were obtained. The fame of Aden was great. Its harbour was full of ships either passing up the Red Sea with the products of Arabia and Northern Africa or waiting for the favourable monsoon wind which would blow them to the Gulf of Cambay in India—whence also they would be blown back to Aden by the return monsoon. It is difficult for us of the twentieth century to picture the scenes of activity that must have marked the Red Sea in those far-off days. About this time, too, the Three Wise Men pass across the stage of history. They brought to the manger at Bethlehem their gifts from distant countries—gold and frankincense and myrrh. Possibly one of them came from Abyssinia, where gold is found. Another most probably came from Hadhramaut or from Socotra, that island off the coast of Northern Africa which was the centre of the trade in frankincense. This precious commodity was so renowned and sought after that to the ancients the ruler of the regions from which it was obtained was called "the king of the frankincense country." His name, and that of his realm, were probably to most people unknown, and mattered little. Myrrh was also obtained through ports on the Red Sea, and it is pleasing to think that the Three Wise Men began their common journey to Palestine from Aden, which is the most likely port of their first meeting.

It was only about half a century after this pilgrimage that the unknown author of the "Periplus" placed on record the prosperity of Aden in his immortal book of mercantile jottings. He calls the place "Eudæmon Arabia"—which is only the Greek for "Arabia Felix"—and tells us that it "is a village by the shore, having convenient anchorages and watering-places sweeter and better than those at Ocelis (the modern Sheikh Saad, near Perim); it lies at the entrance of a bay, and the land recedes from it. It was called 'Eudæmon' because in the early days of the city, when the voyage was not yet made from India to Egypt, and when they did not dare to sail from Egypt to the ports across this ocean, but all came together at this place, it received the cargoes from both countries, just as Alexandria now receives the things brought both from abroad and from Egypt. But not long before our own time Charibæl (*i.e.*, an Arab ruler) destroyed the place."

After the destruction of the town of Aden, referred to in the "Periplus," we find no historical mention of the place for two or three hundred years, when Christianity had begun to supplant other creeds in Europe. The Emperor Constantine sent Christian embassies to many places, and among them one to Aden, where a church was erected in 342 A.D. But Christianity did not flourish in Aden, although it had a longer run in the Yemen proper, which, however, ended in a disgraceful massacre, which drove out the new religion. A few survivors of this massacre (which is anathematized in chapter lxxxv. of the Koran) fled to Abyssinia, where they induced the king, who was a Christian, to take up arms to avenge the fate of their brethren. The king agreed to the suggestion, and despatched an army of 70,000 men—so says Crichton in his "History of Arabia"—under the command of his son Aryat. This force landed at Aden, and marched into the Yemen, after Aryat had burnt his transports to show his troops that for them the question was one of death or glory. This happened about 525 A.D., and the Abyssinians, after routing the Jew authors of the Christian massacre, and after driving the Himyarite ruler, Dthu Nowas, to his death from a voluntary jump over a cliff to avoid being taken, remained in the land they had captured.

But Seiph, a descendant of the Himyarite kings, seeing the people turning against the Abyssinians by reason of their cruelty and oppression, sought aid to regain the kingdom of his fathers, and applied to Kosroes, King of Persia. There were four Abyssinian kings of the Yemen, and it fell to the last of them, Masruk, to meet the new invaders. At first Kosroes had refused to entertain the request of Seiph, but the latter changed his ground when he saw that his appeal to sympathy was likely to be ineffective. He described the wealth of his lawful possessions, and played upon the cupidity of the Persian with better effect. Finally, the king collected an army of 3,600

men—mainly prisoners and condemned criminals—and despatched them by sea to Aden with the remark: "If they conquer these regions, it will add to my kingdom; if they perish, they but suffer the just punishment of their crimes." Seiph himself led this force, which fought its first battle just outside Aden. Masruk was killed, and the Persians established their dominion over the Yemen, where Seiph ruled as a Persian Viceroy. This was in about the year A.D. 575. Can it be that none of the ruling family of Abyssinia again came to Aden until Ras Tafari, the present heir-apparent, came there on a visit of friendship towards the end of 1922? The last Persian Viceroy, Badan, became a follower of Mohammed, and after his death in A.D. 632 Aden and the Yemen passed into Mohammedan hands, and was governed by the house of Umayyah until A.D. 749, when it passed into the possession of the Abbaside Caliphs, Daud ibn Abdal Majia being then appointed Governor of Aden. In A.D. 932 the Yemen threw off its allegiance, and its rulers became independent under the style and title of Imam. It is a remarkable fact that many of the rulers of the Yemen after Badan bore Persian names.

It is supposed by some that the Tanks at Aden were constructed about the time of the Persian invasion. But some, again, date them back at least 1,500 years B.C. When authorities disagree, who may judge between them? But, at any rate, the more recent date assigned to them would appear to be the more correct. Aden is notoriously a rainless place. Why it should be so is not quite clear. But about once a year only there is a downpour, when the inhabitants of the town have their annual bath. To fashion such stupendous works for one day's rain a year seems wasteful. The population of Aden in those days was something approaching 40,000, and even the filling of all the Tanks would not have ensured the people against thirst for the greater part of the year. The few wells there are contain brackish water. So the climate of Aden must have changed considerably since the days when the Tanks were hewn. A wonderful work they are, cut in tiers in the solid rock, so that when one is full it overflows into the next, and so on. The rain-water collects above the highest one, and they are filled in succession, the total capacity being nearly eight million gallons. In 1839, when we occupied Aden for the first time, these magnificent historical objects were filled in, and even their site was unknown. But in 1856 their excavation was undertaken, and their restoration was completed the next year. On October 23, 1857, a heavy fall of rain filled them for the first time since those distant days when they had been one of the glories of Aden in prosperity.

In 1038 Aden was captured by a petty chief, Ibn Omar of Lahej. It remained the prey of intrigue and local warfare until in A.D. 1325 it was again taken by the Imam of Yemen, in the hands of whose successors it remained until 1454, when it was captured by two brothers, one

of whom was styled "Imam of Aden." He was succeeded by his nephew, who, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, constructed the first aqueduct to Aden across the isthmus from Bir Mahait.

In what may be described as the "middle times," the position of Aden as an entrepôt is seen to be again modified. In place of the frankincense, alabaster, and spikenard of former days, we find the principal trade at Aden consisted of horses and spices. So, at least, Marco Polo tells us. This great traveller, who died in 1323 at the age of seventy, called at Aden in his travels. In his short account of the place he says that "there are despatched from Aden to India a very large number of Arab chargers, and palfreys, and stout nags adapted for all work. For horses fetch very high prices in India, there being none bred there, as I have told you before; insomuch that a charger will sell there for an hundred marks of silver or more. On these also the Sultan of Aden receives heavy payment in port charges, so that it is said that he is one of the richest princes in the world." How strangely the needs of the times are reflected in trade commodities! In these prosaic days Aden's chief commercial interests are in hides and coffee!

It was inevitable that those magnificent navigators the Portuguese should make a bid to possess themselves of Aden, and one of the instructions given to Dom Affonso d'Albuquerque was to capture the fortress. His expedition for the purpose left India in 1513, and consisted of twenty ships, manned by 1,700 Portuguese and 800 Indians. These arrived on Easter Eve, and they proceeded at once to attack. They first took by storm the island of Seera, and here they killed many of the defenders and took thirty-nine guns. Then for four days they attacked the great wall which ran along the front of the harbour. But they were beaten off with heavy loss, and were forced to retire after burning all the shipping in the roadstead. They proceeded up the Red Sea, and established themselves on the island of Kamaran, near Hodeidah, where they built a strong though small fort, which is even now in comparatively good condition. A Portuguese artist, Correira, has left a very interesting picture of the attack on Aden by his countrymen as he saw it from the high poop of a warship. His four days' work with pen and brush has left us an interesting picture of what Aden looked like then. Some of the buildings depicted are even now discernible! Verily the pen is mightier than the sword!

Three years after the Portuguese attempt, Soleiman, an officer of the Mameluke ruler of Egypt, attacked Aden. He met with no more success than had the Portuguese. But the attempt so frightened the inhabitants that when towards the end of 1516 the Portuguese again appeared in the harbour, the Governor of Aden offered them the keys of the town. The Portuguese commander took them, and then left on some other business. But when he came back shortly afterwards, the

defences had been repaired, and the Governor refused to deliver up the place. So the Portuguese did not attack it, but retired discomfited, never again to attempt the capture of the fortress which was in those days so strong.

In 1517 Selim I. of Turkey, after overthrowing the Mamelukes in Egypt, determined to seize Aden, so as to make for himself a base for his attacks upon the Portuguese in the East. His son Suleiman carried out the project, and in August, 1538, the Turkish fleet arrived in Aden harbour. The Sultan was invited on board to do homage to the "Grand Seigneur" through his representative. But as soon as he arrived on board he was hanged, and this was the signal for the seizure of the town by a number of Turkish soldiers, who had been sent ashore lying on beds as if sick. The Turks left a garrison in Aden, and the fleet proceeded to Diu, where it suffered a repulse in the following November. On its return journey, on December 5, 1538, one hundred pieces of artillery were landed, and a further garrison of 500 men. Some years later the inhabitants rose against the Turks and killed all the troops, after which they handed the place over to the Portuguese. But the return of a Turkish fleet and army regained Aden once more for the Islamic power.

It is one of the curious facts of history that Moslems have always preferred Christian to Turkish rule when they were not in a position to wield their own. Aden proved no exception to this, and the Turkish hold on it and on the Yemen was one of the sword alone. In Aden itself we have many evidences of a domination which was entirely military in nature. Possibly, when our Empire has passed away, the same will be said of us. But, at any rate, there will be ample evidence also that the people progressed under our sway, and did not sink to a position little better than that of slavery, as did the people of Aden in the years of Turkish sovereignty. In 1642 the Imam of Yemen drove out the last vestige of Turkish rule, and at some time subsequently the same thing must have happened in Aden, for in 1708 the ruler of Aden was an Imam of its own. It were well to remember the blighting influence of Turkish power when we ask ourselves the explanation of the seizure by the Arabs of the opportunity to rebel when it came to them in 1915.

In December, 1708, a French trading expedition under two noblemen, De Champloret and La Roque, called at Aden. The leaders and officers disembarked to pay their respects to the Governor, and the account of the voyage describes fairly clearly their entry through the great gate of the rampart, which was where the main road to Seera Island now runs. Subsequently it was arranged that the party should spend a day or two ashore as the Governor's guests. They came; they supped; and, as the author describes it, they passed "*Une assez mauvaise nuit*"! The small but troublesome companions of the night

watches were apparently no less plentiful in Aden than they are now. The author (La Roque) goes on to say: "It must be confessed that we have seen nothing so fine of their kind as the baths at Aden. They are lined with marble or jasper, and are covered with a handsome dome, which has a hole at the top to admit the light, and they are decorated inside with galleries supported by magnificent pillars. The whole building is conveniently divided into chambers, closets, and other vaulted rooms, which all adjoin the main domed room. It is unnecessary here to give a more minute description or to speak of what happens in these pleasant places, which is such as one sees in the large cities of Turkey." Further on he writes: "The city is situated at the foot of high mountains, which surround it on nearly every side. There are five or six forts on the summits, with earthworks and other works in large number at the necks of the mountains. A fine aqueduct leads from there the waters in a large canal or reservoir, situated at a quarter of a league's distance from the town, which furnishes all the inhabitants with very good water; for there is no other source of water at Aden, and I do not know why our geographers show a river to pass through the town. Abulfeda says that there is at Aden a gate on the landward side called the 'Gate of the Water Carriers,' and it is by that gate that sweet water is brought in from outside. The place is surrounded by walls, which are to-day in very bad condition on the side facing the sea, where there are, however, several platforms at intervals with five or six batteries of cannon, of which some fire 60-pounder shot. It is believed that this is some of the artillery that Suleiman II. left there after having seized the town and conquered almost all the country, and which the Turks were obliged to abandon to the Arab princes. To reach Aden from the land side there is only a single road on a narrow piece of land, and which stretches to the sea in the form of a peninsula. The head of this road is commanded by a fort with guardrooms at intervals, and at cannon-shot distance below there is another fort, which mounts forty pieces of large cannon in several batteries, and a garrison, so that it would be impossible to attempt a descent upon that side, and to go to the town from this last fort there is yet another fort of twelve pieces of cannon, with a garrison. As regards the sea, from which the town is really accessible, it is a bay with eight or nine openings, and is as if divided into two roadsteads, of which one is very large and at a considerable distance from the town, and the other smaller and nearer, which is called the Port. This is about a league broad, counting from the citadel which commands it, with fifty pieces of cannon, to the advanced point where are the forts of which I have just spoken. I will say nothing of the interior of the town, of which the size is considerable, and where can still be seen several fine two-storeyed houses in terraces, but there are also many ruins. One can easily understand by that which remains, and

by reason of so advantageous a situation, that Aden was formerly a live and important town, a strong place, and the principal 'boule-varde' of Arabia Felix. The country around is very pleasant, although confined, with much verdure at the foot of the sides of the mountains."

Much of what La Roque describes is, of course, traceable to-day. But gone are the marble baths, and to find them would necessitate extensive excavations in the crater, for, like most of the glories of Aden, they lie buried beneath the dust and débris which had already accumulated upon the town when the English took it in 1839, and upon which so much of what they subsequently built stands. In 1916 an excavation, made in the course of digging a foundation for a building, brought to the light of day a house, complete, with its roof. But to a later age than ours must be left the task of unearthing the marble baths and the two-storeyed houses which La Roque describes. Perhaps the newly formed Aden Historical Society may be in a position in the future to direct some of its energies in this direction. The citadel mentioned by La Roque is, of course, Seera Island; the Port is the old harbour. The "Gate of the Water Carriers" is near where "Bell's Battery" stands overlooking the Main Pass; and the fort "at cannon-shot distance below" is Jabal Hadid.

It was a century prior to the Frenchmen's visit that the first English ship, the *Ascension*, under Captain Sharkey, visited Aden, and the visit was not a happy one. Captain Sharkey himself was seized, and it was some weeks before he could procure his release. He was followed the next year by Sir Henry Middleton, who was treated little better than his predecessor.

In 1735 the Abdali Sultan of Lahej seized Aden, and the place remained in the hands of his successors, becoming steadily less important and less prosperous. In 1829, when the East India Company thought of making Aden into a coaling station, they had to abandon the plan because they could not obtain labour. So far had the place deteriorated that the population is said not to have exceeded 400, of which the most part were fishermen. In 1839 Captain Haines writes: "The little village (formerly the great city) of Aden is now reduced to the most exigent condition of poverty and neglect. In the reign of Constantine this town possessed unrivalled celebrity for its impenetrable fortifications, its flourishing commerce, and the glorious haven it offered to vessels from all quarters of the globe. But how lamentable is the present contrast! With scarce a vestige of its former proud superiority, the traveller sees and values it only for its capabilities, and regrets the barbarous cupidity of the government under whose injudicious management it has fallen so low."

In 1835 Lieutenant Wellstead, an officer of the Indian Navy, visited Aden, and he has left us a most interesting account of what he found there in his book, "Travels in Arabia." His description of the

desolation which the place presented is illuminating. "All that remains of the former city," he tells us, "are a few minarets, about a hundred houses, and some disjointed remnants of its walls, the rest being occupied by tombs, mounds, and heaps of rubbish, roofless walls of older dwellings, or the wretched habitations of the present residents." He found only four minarets standing, two of which were then in a dilapidated condition. They have long disappeared, and none may now say where they were situated. A third, which he described as being in tolerable repair, is that tall landmark near the present Treasury. It was in 1513 as it is now, and must be the oldest erection of masonry in Aden—the Tanks excepted. "The fortifications encircling the town," says Lieutenant Wellstead, "and the artillery with which they are mounted, were constructed and furnished by Sultan Selim. . . . The town itself appears to have been walled only on the sea and western sides; it is with difficulty the foundations of the former can be traced, and the face of the latter is covered with a slope of sand reaching to its summit. . . . A battery formerly extended along the whole length of the sea face; and here, mounted on rude and frail carriages, are still seen those enormous guns which have attracted the attention of travellers. They are pierced for a sixty or sixty-eight pound ball, and their dimensions are as follows: Length, 17 ft. 2 in.; circumference at the breech, 6 ft. 2 in.; at the muzzle, 4 ft. 4 in. They are cast in brass, and almost covered in Turkish inscriptions. On the beach to the westward there are some equally large. I am surprised that the Arabs have not procured artificers from Egypt or India to cut them up, as they are now of no use, and the metal of which they are constructed is valuable. I mentioned this to Sultan Mahassan, but he replied, with more feeling than could have been anticipated, that he was unwilling to deprive Aden of the only remaining symbol of its former greatness and strength. He was much pleased when I told him that the fame of those guns had reached England. That which would have proved the most efficient battery, and the most destructive to shipping approaching the harbour, was the one erected on the projecting point Sirah. From thirty to forty guns of various calibre were formerly ranged here, but they now lie dismounted and neglected near their former embrasures. The iron guns have fallen to pieces from age, and the brass pieces only are in a condition to be used."

The fate of the large guns mentioned by Lieutenant Wellstead is now unknown. Doubtless they lie beneath the sand on the seashore in front of the British Infantry barracks. Lieutenant Wellstead mentions the silting up of the old harbour, and when he first saw it he saw the remains of a Turkish ship in the harbour, which was fast disappearing beneath the sand. There is no trace of the ship now, and from that fact we can form some idea of the depth of sand accumulated in 200 years. In 1835 the width of the isthmus was but 200

yards. It is now more than a quarter of a mile, and Lieutenant Wellstead says that Aden was an island until comparatively recent times. As regards the city, we are told "many turbaned pillars of fine marble, very beautifully ornamented, still remain; but the greater number are broken down and destroyed, most probably by the Arabs, who still cherish the most bitter hatred against their former masters. In the seventeenth century Aden contained 30,000 inhabitants; its port was filled with ships freighted with the precious merchandise of the East; and the city was adorned with spacious and stately edifices, which were well calculated to impress the mind of the traveller with a just conception of its splendour and magnificence. But these have now all passed away; its commerce has departed, its harbours are almost empty, the city deserted; and we may exclaim, as of Tyre, in the language of the prophet, 'How are the mighty fallen!'" We can but echo Lieutenant Wellstead's pious sentiment, but we are more fortunate than he in that in our days we can see Aden's prosperity rising, Phoenix-like, from its ashes.

Captain Bettesworth Haines, of the Indian Navy, visited Aden in 1820 and again in 1835, and in 1838 he was placed in charge of the negotiations opened with the intention of obtaining restitution for an outrage committed on the passengers and crew of a "dhow" which was wrecked in the vicinity. Among other measures, it was arranged that Aden be ceded to the British, but treachery was encountered and Captain Haines left. He returned again in January, 1839, with a force of 300 men of the Bombay European Regiment (afterwards the Royal Dublin Fusiliers) and 400 men of the 24th Bombay Infantry, to supplement by arms his powers of negotiation. The place was taken by assault in a very short time with a loss of fifteen killed, who rest in an enclosure opposite the British Infantry guardroom. The defenders, who were 400 Arabs brought from the interior, lost more than one-third of their number, and Aden came permanently under British rule—the first addition to the Empire after Queen Victoria's accession to the throne. The padlock of the Red Sea had passed into our possession. Perim, the key, was not occupied until 1857. Until a few years ago there lay in Aden harbour an old lightship, which, as the *Euphrates*, had been one of the naval ships taking part in the attack.

But we were not to remain long in peace to set about the re-development of Aden's prosperity. In November, 1839, one of the local chieftains attacked the fortress from the land side, and this was followed by similar attempts in 1840 and 1841. In 1844 a new treaty was made with the Lahej Sultan, but two years later a novel form of attack was made by a horde of unarmed fanatics under one Said Ismail. "He had assumed"—I quote Mrs. Burton—"the title of 'Al Mahdi Al Mumtazar' (the expected regenerator), and resolved, before dethroning the Imam of Sanaa (Yemen), to strengthen the sinews

of war by plundering the infidels of Aden; his first step was to promise all his followers (some thousand men lent by Abdali, the Sultan of Lahej) invulnerability against Kafir swords and gunshot wounds. One fine morning, the mob, utterly unarmed, and wearing white shrouds, rushed, in a rude column, shouting 'Allah-hu Akbar!' towards the 'Turkish Wall'; the defenders waited to the last moment, but, seeing that mischief was meant, they fired half a dozen rounds of grape, which had the effect of causing a *sauve qui peut*. The survivors, sorely disappointed, fell upon Fakh Said with threats and reproaches, which that cunning madman silenced by saying, 'True, I told you that the cannon of the *Mushrit* would have no effect upon true *Ghazis*. But your hearts were black, you dogs, as your faces are now. You went, not to purify the faith, but to plunder the goods and to carry off the women of the infidel.' His dexterity saved him this time, but in December of the same year he was defeated and killed by the Imam." Several murders were afterwards committed of soldiers and others by Arabs, but gradually the country around became pacified, and with the return of peace to Aden came also the return of its prosperity and extent of population. It is now more prosperous than ever before in its long and eventful history.

The old Turkish defences were remodelled and new fortifications were made until Aden became the formidable fortress it now is. But the utility of even these is passing away. Some forty years ago the old muzzle-loading fortress guns were removed from Seera and other places. Tradition says that this work of removal was entrusted to an artillery officer named Stewart, who, having thought things out and considered that the guns were obsolete and useless, toppled them over the cliffs and into the sea. For this he was punished by being ordered to spend the remainder of his service in Aden. There is none in Aden who can say whether the story is true. But, at any rate, from Seera Fort can be seen at the foot of the rocks a gun and a number of mountings, which prove at least that it is partly exact.

Even the Great War was not without its romantic side. In 1915 the Turks essayed again to become masters of Aden, and they nearly succeeded in penetrating its defences. But they were driven back eventually, and for the rest of the War a small force, commanded by General Sayed Pasha, kept up its position covering Lahej and threatening Aden. The General made himself both feared and respected. In the cemetery of Sheikh Othman lies the body of an airman, who was brought down by rifle fire. The courteous Turk sent in the body for burial to the British lines, and although the exigencies of warfare had prevented the transfer for some days, even the money in the dead airman's pocket remained untouched. But Sayed Pasha was not a usual man. He made himself respected by the enemy Arabs around him by hanging in the nearest convenient place the head

man of any subtribe who pillaged or made itself otherwise obnoxious. And when, as a prisoner after the Armistice, he was permitted to come to worship at the principal mosque in Aden—which was a Turkish mosque in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and is surrounded by the old Turkish cemetery—the whole town turned out to see him of whom so much had been spoken. He might have been a conqueror instead of a defeated enemy, to judge by his reception!

Aden, for all its unpleasant climate in the summer, is not without its beauty. Watch the bright starlit sky above on a November evening, and see the shooting stars beautifying the night. The Arabs say that God is in the vault of heaven being attacked continually by the Evil One, and that when the latter comes too near, He picks a star from the firmament and throws it at him! Thus they account for an astronomical phenomenon of which Western astronomers have more rational explanations. But does not the Arabic belief add beauty to the fact? Or let him who would appreciate Aden climb to the top of Shum-Shum in the hour of dawn, and from the summit see the one side of the range bathed in the mellow light of breaking day—the other side by contrast being black with the darkness of night. Can such a picture be seen in many such places on earth? Or let him look for the forty-two different kinds of shrubs which are said to exist, or for the “wog-wog,” the animal who lives on Shum-Shum and can only go round the mountain in one direction, not being able to turn on account of its having the two near-side legs shorter than those on the off-side—but this is a story which is told to old ladies on passing ships who ask too many questions, and it is not believed by all! Did not a Pipe-Major of the King’s Own Scottish Borderers compose a “tune” for the pipes known as “The Barren Rocks of Aden”? Perhaps he can tell us whether the “wog-wog” is a myth!

REVIEWS

THE BABUR-NAMAH IN ENGLISH. By A. S. Beveridge. Luzac. 30s. net.

Among the conquerors who loom large on the stage of Central Asia, few can claim the fame won by Zahir-u-Din Mohammed, better known by his surname of Babur, or "Tiger." Descended from Tamerlane, he succeeded to the province of Farghana on the upper reaches of the Sir Daria as a lad of twelve. He loved his home, and he gives a delightful description of it, which strikes the modern traveller as remarkably accurate; indeed, one of the charms of his "Memoirs" is the deep interest taken in flowers, birds, and beasts.

His uncles, at first, were hostile to his accession, but matters were arranged so well that the boy-king was able to gain possession of Samarkand within two years of his accession. At that time the Princes of Tamerlane's family ruled various provinces of his wide empire, and, as lovers and patrons of art and literature, they stand unsurpassed. But as rulers and warriors, they were gradually being driven out by the rising power of the Uzbeks, or Auzbeks, being unable to combine among themselves. Babur was too weak to hold Samarkand, and, after two unsuccessful attempts to do so, he was forced to retire from Transoxiana, and, for a while, his position might well have appeared to be desperate. Fortune, however, proverbially favours the brave, and, hearing that Kabul was in a state of anarchy, Babur made a bold bid for it—and won. Thus, at the age of twenty, he had been driven out of his kingdom of Farghana, but had won another.

Kabul, as the author states, is the centre of traffic between Turkistan and India, and it is little wonder that the warlike Prince soon began to turn his eyes in the direction of the valley of the Indus. At the same time, he kept a watchful eye on Central Asia, and even visited his kinsmen at Herat to concert measures against the Uzbeks. The position of affairs was changed for a while by the rise of the Safavi dynasty in Persia. Shah Ismail, its founder, met Shaybani Khan, or Shaibaq Khan, the great Uzbek, and defeated him, in the vicinity of Merv. The Uzbek monarch was killed, while attempting to escape from the battle, and at first it seemed as if the Uzbeks would disappear off the scene. So promising, indeed, did the situation appear that Babur, in alliance with Persia, marched north, and, defeating the Uzbeks, entered Samarkand once again. The Persians were hated in Central Asia, owing to a difference in religion, and Babur, in spite of his personal popularity, suffered from being allied to the Shia Moslems.

So bitter, indeed, was the feeling that when he was decisively defeated by the Uzbegs and forced to flee, his cousin, Mirza Haider, wrote that "the Uzbegs began to pour forth their arrows, and the claws of Islam twisted the hands of heresy and unbelief, and victory declared for the true faith." Babur accepted this defeat as final, and left Central Asia.

He now turned his entire attention to the conquest of India. For twenty years he made raids, intrigued, and gradually increased his power and influence. Fortunately for him, the ruler of Delhi, Sultan Ibrahim, an Afghan Prince, made himself unpopular, with the result that many of his nobles were inclined to join Babur. At last it was determined to attempt the venture, and Babur, in the spring of 1526, marched on Delhi. He met Sultan Ibrahim on the historical field of Panipat, where the hardy men of the north defeated the softer inhabitants of India.

Babur had won the "wealth of Ind," and his descendants, the Mughul Emperors, were destined to rule over most of the Indian peninsula, until the English finally overthrew their decadent representative. So much for the main facts. But only by a careful study of this work, which for members of the Central Asian Society is their special classic, can its charm and its value be understood. To give an example, Babur's description of Sultan Husayn, the ruling Timurid Prince, showed how shrewd a judge of character he was. He speaks of him as a lively, pleasant man, whose temper was rather hasty, and whose language was in accordance with his temper. He often engaged sword in hand, and no member of the race of Timur equalled him in the use of the scimitar. He had a turn for poetry, and many of his verses were far from bad. Although not without dignity, he was fond of keeping fighting rams, and of amusing himself with cock-fighting and flying pigeons. It will be remembered that Sultan Husayn was the generous patron of the poet Jami and of Behzad the painter, and of many others.

Few characters are more attractive than that of Babur himself. In adversity, he kept up his spirits as well as a British soldier, and was as full of humour. In prosperity, he never lost his head, and was always a great nobleman, and generous. How favourably he compares with Nadir Shah, who, two centuries later, took Delhi from his degenerate descendant. A great soldier, but of mean extraction, the jewels of Delhi converted him into a miser, and he died cursed by the people of Persia, while his hoards were scattered far and wide.

It remains to point out what labour has been spent by Mrs. Beveridge, for, even though it was a labour of love, the task was a very heavy one. She states her regret at the absence of maps, and it is serious, for members of the Central Asian Society who know Asia from Andijan to Delhi are few. With this exception, nothing remains but to advise readers of this review to read the immortal "Memoirs,"

which are now, thanks to the translator and editor, available in a final form, and constitute a mine of valuable and interesting information.

P. M. SYKES.

TURKEY. By S. Lane Poole. Second Edition. Messrs. Fisher Unwin. 1923.

Messrs. Fisher Unwin have produced at an opportune moment a second edition of Stanley Lane Poole's well-known "Turkey," originally published in 1889. As the author himself stated in his preface, it does not profess to be a history of Turkey, but it tells in a popular and picturesque form the wonderful story of the rise and decline of a great empire, which was built up in the course of two or three centuries by a small tribe of Central Asian barbarians on the ruins of earlier Mohammedan states in Western Asia, as well as of Christian kingdoms and principalities in South-Eastern Europe. There is a peculiar piquancy to-day in the picture of the splendid court held at Constantinople by the haughty Sultans of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when they barely condescended to acknowledge the humble salutations of ambassadors even from the most powerful Western nations. Then, just as in our own times, and indeed throughout the whole intervening period, it was the rivalry and disunion of Christendom that were Turkey's greatest assets. The original work closes with a very slender sketch of the events in Turkey during the nineteenth century, from the massacre of the Janissaries in 1826 to the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Slighter still is the "Postscript," which only brings the story down to the Treaty of Sèvres. Considering how much has happened since then, and that the Treaty of Sèvres was finally scrapped when the Mudania Convention was concluded between the Allied and Turkish generals on October 11 of last year, one surely might have expected this "Postscript" to break off rather less prematurely.

VALENTINE CHIROL.

THE SPIRIT OF ISLAM. By the Right Hon. Syed Ameer Ali, P.C. LL.D., D.L., C.I.E.

If I venture to put into print a few remarks suggested by the perusal of Mr. Ameer Ali's "Spirit of Islam," it is not because I deem them worthy of being regarded as a "Review." I have no qualifications for such a "Review," but as the qualified men will not come forward, I will do my best to acknowledge the author's courtesy in sending for the use of the Society a volume which it values, and it is in that "spirit" that we, the members of the Society, all, I feel sure, welcome it.

The Introduction to the volume is a sketch of "religious progress

among mankind," so replete with recondite learning, and embodying so concise a summary of historical, geographical, social, and doctrinal fact, that it is out of the question to undertake any analysis of it in detail. It may surprise the orthodox Christian to see "the Emperor Julian" (the so-called Apostate) styled "the greatest and most sincere of the Roman Emperors"; but anyone who has read his satirical monograph on his predecessors on the empyreal throne of Rome will credit him with a very charming vein of humour, and as they read of his death in his campaign against the Persians (?) will credit him with being a brave man and capable general. One and the same page of this Introduction sets before us the "Hypatia" of Charles Kingsley and the "Theodora" of Gibbon, and we are invited to weigh in the balance the moral worth of a Christianity which could sacrifice the one and bow down before the other. From this picture of the imperfections of Christianity we pass to a descriptive, geographical, and racial account of Arabia, and we find that a great desert land, which of recent times has been mainly independent; or at most recognizing the somewhat precarious rule of the Turk, was from time to time subject to Assyrians, Babylonians, Greeks, Persians, and even Abyssinians. The last-named "had even gone so far as to invade Hejâj, with the intention of destroying the national temple (the Kaaba). But their power was broken before Mecca by the sturdy patriotism of Abd-ul-Muttalib. After twenty years of oppression, they were driven out of Yemen, with the assistance of Persia, by a native Prince, the son of the celebrated Saif-zu'l-Yezen. On his assassination by the Christians, the sovereignty he had enjoyed under the auspices of the great Anûshirvân passed entirely into Persian hands, and Yemen became tributary to Persia."

The first chapter of "The Life and Ministry of the Prophet" opens with a clear account of the Prophet's family and parentage, and a detailed definition of the methods of the administration of Mecca. We are given a vivid picture of the life of the time. It is most interesting reading. In the midst of this life, overshadowed by the "sacrilegious wars," and often the scene of orgy and debauchery, gambling, and bloodshed, "silently and humbly, with many thoughts in his mind, the solitary orphan boy (Mohammed) grew from childhood to youth and from youth to manhood." That period of his life is traced and followed by the author, as might be naturally supposed, with the keenest sympathy up to the time of his marriage with Khadija, a kinswoman of his own, the mother by him of seven children, and his companion and, so to speak, colleague in the early days of his ministry. She was his first disciple, as his cousin, and later son-in-law, Ali, was the second, and to the latter's father, Abû Tâlib, he was mainly indebted for protection from the persecution of the Koreish during the years that led on to the Hejira. The ingenuity of his persecutors,

foremost among whom was an aunt by marriage, Umm-ul-Tamīl, is pictured, and earned for the lady the sobriquet of *hammālat-ul-hatab*—i.e., "bearer of faggots" [to hell].

And so we are brought to "The Year of Mourning," in which Abū Talīb and Khadiya "followed each other to the grave at a short interval." The first chapter closes with a touching tribute to the devotion shown by these two—the woman a disciple, the man no disciple, but who had been "the guardian of the Prophet's youth," and "who had stood between him and his enemies."

Chapter II. tells the well-known story of the Hegira, and, curiously enough, records that the first man to welcome Mohammed to neutral soil was a Jew, who thus fulfilled the words of the Koran: "They to whom the Scriptures have been given, recognize him as they do their own children."

The remaining chapters (III. to X.) of the First Part of "The Spirit of Islam" cannot be summarized here. They must be read. Islām becomes a power which triumphs alike over Koreish and Jew, and sent envoys to Heraclius, the Emperor of the Greeks, to Khusein Parvīz, the Kesrā of Persia, and to the Ghassanide Prince at Busra, near Damascus. "The King of Kings was amazed at the audacity of the fugitive of Mecca in addressing him, the great Chosroes, on terms of equality," and tore his letter to pieces. "When the news of this treatment was brought to the Prophet, he quietly observed: 'Thus will the Empire of Kesrā be torn to pieces.' The fulfilment of this prophecy is engraved on the page of history. Heraclius, more polite and more reverential, treated the messenger with great respect, and returned a gracious and careful reply." Subsequent inquiries convinced him that Mohammed's doctrine was sound, and that his cult was winning the hearts of men. The third envoy to the Ghassanide Prince was murdered.

In view of the keen controversy which has of late been carried on regarding the Caliphate, the chapter (X.) on "The Apostolical Succession" should be carefully read. We have read the writers of our own Faith, who have most consistently and convincingly proved that no Ottoman Sultan ever had the smallest right to call himself, or to be called by Islām, "Caliph"; while, on the other hand, we see Islām, or the most absolute and dogmatic of its votaries, lay down the law who is to be Caliph, and we note that the Mohammedan world bows to their dictation. That point then is settled, and Islām itself has settled it. The ex-Caliph has repaired to the Court of the King of the Hejāz, and if Islām chooses to veer round, why the ex-Caliph, or even the King of the Hejāz himself, may be the Caliph of the future. According to orthodoxy, as understood by many, the Caliph should be of the Koreish, but Syed Ameer Ali (pp. 126-7) points out that "the great jurist and historian, Ibn Khaldūn, a contemporary of Tamerlane,

who died in the year 1406 A.D., long before the House of Ottoman attained the Caliphate, has dealt at length with this condition —viz., “that the Caliph-Imâm should be a Koreish by birth.” Syed Ameer Ali states that the modern doctors (the Mutâkherin) accept the decision of Ibn Khaldûn, that “the law imposes no tribal or racial restriction in the choice of an Imâm.”

With the subject-matter of the first three chapters of Part II.—viz., “The Ideal of Islâm,” “The Religious Spirit of Islâm,” and “The Idea of Future Life in Islâm,” though replete with interest, I am content to pass over without comment. But, as Chapter IV., entitled “The Church Militant of Islâm,” devotes itself to invidious comparisons between the aims of Islâm and the aims of Christendom in the pursuit of their ambitions and in the conduct of wars, why! as a Christian reviewer, I must tell my Mohammedan author that I do not agree with him. To embark upon detail in such a controversy is quite out of the question, and therefore I can but counsel the Christian student to read this chapter with due attention, and to temper it by his own knowledge. The subject of the next chapter, “The Status of Women in Islâm,” is one that we can approach with a more kindly sympathy, for “the fair sex” is a theme which is fettered by no barrier, either of race, faith, or feature.

How many years have passed by since an experienced old Mussulman said to me: “When your wives are not on good terms, it is all very well, but when they form a league look out for squalls!” And, I take it, that has something to say to the conviction that is forcing itself even on Mussulmans, that monogamy is the surest path to comfort and happiness. I am, personally, of opinion that this contrasting of women of different races and religions is a purely invidious exercise; and if I feel that the author of this book is distinctly inclined to favour his own race and faith I fully sympathize with him, but at the same time I think that, in order to justify his views, he has had recourse to some measure of special pleading. We admit the Prophet’s devotion and loyalty to his first wife, Khadjja, but when, after her death, we are invited to recognize that Mohammed took unto himself some ten or twelve wives from motives of “generosity and humanity” (p. 233), and to “provide helpless and widowed women with subsistence,” we may imagine, indeed we may even hope, that somewhat warmer sentiment animated him. Syed Ameer Ali pursues this topic into the realms of celibacy and divorce, and I gather that he sees merit in the seclusion, and in the veiling, when abroad, of women. Intrigue, it is well known, veils itself under the *burka*.

Syed Ameer Ali concludes his chapter on “The Status of Women in Islâm” in the following words: “Her (*i.e.*, the Moslem woman’s) comparatively backward condition is the result of a want of culture among the community generally, rather than of any special feature in the laws of the fathers.” Very recently I had the pleasure of listening to

a lecture by Sahibzada Aftab Ahmed Khan on "The Improvement of Education in Islām," the chair on the occasion being taken by Syed Ameer Ali. The lecture was well thought out and most instructive, and I take it that the "improvement" which Islām desires in its men will not be denied to the women. The "seclusion" of women in Eastern countries will also, I conceive, in process of time, die a natural death. It is but the other day that I met the first Eastern lady to be called to the English Bar, and Portia, I imagine, will not, any more than the famous Phryne or Lais, fail to use the charm of "expression" upon the Judges.

Can I venture further to follow the author through the maze of Islamic politics, art, literature, science, philosophy, spiritualism, and mysticism? It is more than forty years since I visited Shiraz, and was then for the first time told the story of "The Bāb." (See pp. 357-9.) I was then told that when The Bāb was led out to be shot, a vast concourse looked on. The first volley did not touch him, but so cut his bonds that he was free. Had he realized his freedom and rushed into the crowd, my informant added, his escape would have been regarded as a Divine miracle, and that crowd would have saved him at all hazards. However, he stood still and was re-secured, and the second volley did its work. I tell this story as it was told me in 1881. In later years I met Americans who were followers of The Bāb. Syed Ameer Ali (p. 359 note) says: "Bahāism, its latest phase, which flourishes chiefly in the United States of America, appears to have largely assimilated the doctrines of Christian science." As far as I remember, Abd-ul-Bahā and Bahā-Ullah, the successors of The Bāb, settled at Haifa, on the Palestine coast, and, as I understand, are visited there by people—travellers—of varied race and religion.

The Rev. E. Sell, in his very interesting work "The Faith of Islām" (1896), tells us the story of "three lads, playfellows in the city of Nishapur, in Khurāsān, each destined to become famous. One became the Wazir of Alp Arslan under the title of "Nizam-ul-Mulk," the second was the familiar Umar Khayyām, and the third Hasan Sabbāh. I have Von Hemmer's "History of the Assassins," but I must confess that I rose from the perusal of it completely confused. It was a pleasure to find the theme treated concisely and clearly in the pages of "The Spirit of Islām." There they are summed up as "The Nihilists of Islām," and the Khojas of India are defined as "Hindus by origin, converted to Isma'ilism by one Pir Sadr-ud-din, an Isma'ilian Dā'i." I certainly was told in India that the Aga Khan was descended from "The Old Man of the Mountains," but I could only myself trace him to a Persian great-grandfather, who, having married a daughter of Fath-Ali Shah, King of Persia, rebelled, and then found it advisable to take refuge in India. Umar Khayyām, whom most English people know only as the author of the "Quatrains," was a very accomplished astronomer, as Mr. Sell and Syed Ameer Ali alike inform us.

It is startling to find certain European institutions traced by the latter author to these Isma'īliās, whom he has classed as "The Nihilists of Islām." However, I quote his words: "From the Isma'īliās the Crusaders borrowed the conception which led to the formation of all the secret societies, religious and secular, of Europe. The institutions of Templars and Hospitallers; the Society of Jesus, founded by Ignatius Loyola, composed of a body of men whose spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion to their cause can hardly be surpassed in our times; the ferocious Dominicans, the milder Franciscans—may all be traced to either Cairo or to Alamūt (the stronghold of the Assassins, situated in the mountains near Kazvīn)." It is but natural that in the eyes of a Mohammedan the Crusader should be but a "Christian marauder" (p. 381); but if "the intellectual life of Syria has remained dead from that day (the day of Saladin and the Crusaders) to this," it is not the Crusaders that have delayed the resurrection. What has put life and learning and education into many a Muslim country during the last two centuries has been a rule and training and guidance for which the Near and Middle East has been in the main indebted to Great Britain and its daughter nations.

A. C. YATE.

OBITUARIES

SIR HAROLD STUART

SIR HAROLD ARTHUR STUART, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., whose death was announced on March 1, was one of the ablest and most resourceful Indian administrators of his day, and rounded off his years of devotion to the public service as British High Commissioner on the Rhineland, and subsequently in Silesia. He came home from the Continent in poor health last summer, and never recovered his old vigour.

Born at York on July 29, 1860, he was educated at Bishop's Stortford School and at King's College, Cambridge. Passing the Indian Civil Service Examination of 1879, he was posted to Madras, where an elder brother was serving in the Education Department and in due course became its head. Stuart's ability and enthusiasm marked him out for early promotion, and after both district and secretariat experience he was selected by Lord Connemara to be his private secretary.

His next post, that of Inspector-General of Police, Madras, was the stepping-stone to an important part in the development and improvement of the Indian police services. Lord Curzon, ever on the look-out for capable men, chose him as Secretary of the Police Commission which toured the country in 1902, and made the first thorough examination of the problem as a whole. The setting up of a Criminal Intelligence Department was recommended, and after a period of furlough Stuart was selected to be the first director. It was well that its organization was completed before the emergence of the wave of anarchist crime which followed the partition of Bengal. Though often the subject of bitter political attack, the C.I.D. under his direction did

invaluable service in thwarting the subversive movement. It fell to Stuart to make all the police arrangements when their Majesties, then Prince and Princess of Wales, visited India in 1905-6, and it was for this that he was created K.C.V.O.

Next he became Home Secretary to the Government of India, in which post he had a large share in framing the regulations under the Minto-Morley Reforms. A man of liberal views, he is known to have put forward the first authoritative suggestion for the appointment of an Indian to each of the Executive Councils in India.

Stuart, who had received the K.C.S.I. in 1914, came home in 1916, before the expiry of his five years' tenure, to work in the Ministry of Food. After the peace Lord Curzon, as Foreign Minister, took care to avail himself of Stuart's many-sided capacity. At the beginning of 1920, on the final deposit of ratifications of the Versailles Treaty, he was appointed British High Commissioner on the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission. In this difficult position he showed his usual tact and judgment, and in the following year he was selected to be British Commissioner in the Allied Administration for the plebiscite in Upper Silesia. For these services he was made K.C.M.G. in 1921, and G.C.M.G. a year later.*

MAJOR E. B. SOANE

It is with the deepest regret that his friends will learn of the death of Major E. B. Soane, C.B.E. He had been in bad health (contracted on active service) for some time, and was recommended a change of climate to the north coast of Africa. His death occurred at sea on February 24. Major Soane was probably the greatest authority of the day on Persian and Kurdish languages and customs, and had written several books on these subjects, one of particular interest being that entitled "To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise." Mr. Soane's first acquaintance with the East was in 1903, in which year he was appointed Accountant of the Imperial Bank of Persia in Yezd, whereafter he held appointments in Bushire, Shiraz, and Kermanshah. Upon the outbreak of war he was in commercial employment in Baghdad, but as soon as he returned home he at once applied for and obtained employment with the Mesopotamian Political Department. Space does not permit of our recording in any detail the unique and varied activities of Major Soane during this period—how, after a brief term of tuition in the Intelligence Department, he was appointed editor of *The Bazarah Times*, a Government organ, and the only English-cum-Arabic daily in Mesopotamia, indispensable to British propaganda, but at the time enjoying only a trifling circulation, which, however, under his able management, quickly attained not only political but financial success. But Major Soane's great gifts and ability could not long be afforded for this comparatively unimportant work, and he was despatched into Bakhtiari country on the particularly difficult and risky task of tracking down certain German and Persian seditionists (followers of the famous Wassmuss), who were endeavouring to stir up trouble in Arabistan and Bakhtiaristan by preaching a holy *jehad*. Disguised as a Persian, travelling the desert, living in a black tent, with a bodyguard of six cut-throat but faithful Kurds, it was some two months before his patient efforts were rewarded, and the ring-leaders captured. Major Soane's greatest achievement, however, was

* By kind permission of *The Times*, March 2, 1923.

his administration of Dizful, a town of some 30,000 inhabitants (an unruly admixture of Lurish tribesmen, Bakhtiaris, Arabs, and Persians), over which he was appointed Governor on behalf of the British in the spring of 1916. With his aforementioned bodyguard of Kurds—six only in number, but, as already stated, all good men and true—Dizful was entered unpretentiously early one morning, the native Governor interviewed, it would seem satisfactorily, as within a few days the complete control of the town—one which, before the war, was rarely visited by any European—had been usurped by Major Soane. His rule continued undisputedly for some eight months (when he was transferred elsewhere by the British Government), and although essentially of an absolute and autocratic nature, being just and fair, was supremely successful. Major Soane's final appointment was that of Political Officer at Sulaimanya, next to Mosul and perhaps Kirkuk the largest and most important town in the villayet of that name. In closer touch with headquarters (Baghdad), his hands were not so free as was the case in Dizful, but he, nevertheless, pursued his usual policy—i.e., of ruling the native on native lines in so far as these were compatible with British justice and honesty—which policy was again proved to be completely successful. It may not be generally known that at the outbreak of war Mr. Soane was the representative of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in Baghdad, was made prisoner by the Turks, and, with some twenty other European Baghdad residents, was marched across the Syrian desert to Mersina, where he remained in prison for some weeks. Previous to his appointment in Baghdad, he had represented the Oil Company at Kasr-i-Shirin, where he also held the post of H.B.M.'s Vice-Consul.

Major Soane's activities in Persia and Mesopotamia can be classed as almost if not quite unique, and are only comparable with the work of Colonel Leachman and Captain Shakespear, two other members of the Mesopotamian Political Department, both of whom, unhappily, met their deaths during the war.

C. A. W.

E.I.U.S. CLUB,
March 6, 1923.

At a meeting of the Central Asian Society on October 21, 1920, Dr. W. A. Wigram spoke of the work done by Major Soane at Sulaimanya as follows: "Captain Sheppard has spoken of our good fortune in that the unruly Kurds of Central Kurdistan had given no trouble of late, or taken any part in the recent troubles. I should like to bear testimony to the services of one particular officer, the man in charge of Sulaimanya, the key and capital of the whole district of Kurdistan. Major Soane, as political officer there, being left practically alone, merely by means of his personal influence and his knowledge of the turbulent people whom he knew so well, had been able to keep control of the situation."* And it may also be remarked that during Major Soane's régime in Southern Kurdistan no officer of the Civil Administration lost his life, no insignificant fact in that district in those days of unrest.

G. C. S.

* *Journal of the Central Asian Society*, Vol. VIII., Part i., p. 26.

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NOTICES

THE following books have been added to the library :

For review : "Life and Letters of Sir Mark Sykes," by Shane Leslie.

"Lands of the Thunderbolt," by the Earl of Ronaldshay.

By gift : "The Persian Revolution, 1905-1909," by E. G. Browne.

By purchase : Doughty's "Arabia."

Contributors only are responsible for their statements in the Journal.

CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held on February 22, 1923, at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, when a lecture was given by Major Holt, R.E., on "Some Journeys in the Syrian Desert." Colonel Sir Charles Yate was in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have to introduce to you to-night Major Holt, who has been, I understand, surveying across the Syrian desert for a proposed railway. It will be a most interesting address, for we shall hear a great deal about a new country. But I will not detain you now; I will ask Major Holt to commence his lecture at once.

SOME JOURNEYS IN THE SYRIAN DESERT

By MAJOR HOLT, M.B.E., M.C., R.E.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—The subject of my lecture this evening is "Some Journeys in the Syrian Desert." These journeys were carried out by me as a railway engineer for reconnaissance purposes, with a view to discovering a possible alignment for a railway across the desert from Baghdad to the Mediterranean, so it is from a railway standpoint that I propose speaking to you to-day. I hope at the same time to show you, not only the possibilities of the railway as an engineering proposition, but its superiority over the existing means of transport and the important part it would play in the future development of the Middle East.

The desert about which I am speaking is somewhat triangular in shape. The Western boundary runs from the Gulf of Akaba past Amman and Damascus to Aleppo. The Euphrates is the Eastern boundary. The Southern one is the base of the triangle, and it runs along the southern edge of the Nafud right to the Persian Gulf.

For desert travel and for reconnaissance two important factors have to be considered: Firstly, the means of transport; secondly, that vital necessity, water-supplies. If we exclude walking, which is impractical for extensive work, there are three forms of desert transport—camel, aeroplane, and car. As I have tried them all—camel from Amman to Jauf and across to Karbala, in Iraq, a forty-one days' trip, and then again from Amman to Burqa; by car three times across the desert

between Baghdad and Amman, and by air three times—my criticisms of the various methods are made from experience, and I believe I am the only person to have sampled all these three means of going right across the desert. I hope some day to try a fourth—namely, a train.

The camel has one great advantage in that it can travel almost anywhere in the desert, and as a proof of this I can mention the Harrat, or lava country. It is a great area, south of Damascus and east of the Jordan basin, of a continuous volcanic nature, of some 2,000 square miles. You can imagine the awful difficulties of travelling through a country whose surface is closely strewn with lumps of lava upwards of a cubic yard in size. As the camel passes along it pushes the lava boulders from side to side, and on occasions when they are round one is apt to come over. You can realize right away that nothing but a camel can go through that. For a motor-car it is quite impassable. But that is the only advantage of camel transport, that it can go anywhere. Its disadvantages are the way in which one is limited. For instance, a camel in daylight can travel a maximum of about forty miles. Now, in the summer, as we found in the journey to Jauf, and from Jauf to Karbala, forty miles was very good going for one day, and two days of such was the limit that our camels could go without water. On one occasion we were rather more than two days, and in the evening the camels were so done up that they were licking the water-bags in which were the few remaining drops of water that we had for ourselves. Thus, when carrying out summer reconnaissance on a camel you are limited to eighty miles between watering-places, and even that distance necessitates continuous hard travelling from daylight to nightfall, except for a couple of hours in the middle of the day, when the camel must graze. For reconnaissance work it is often necessary to deviate from the line of march in order to make minor investigations, and this is impossible when waterholes are some distance apart, and the most direct route has to be taken. You will see, therefore, that the camel is not a good means of travelling for reconnaissance work.

The next means of transport is the aeroplane, and it is the most valuable means of preliminary work. I never realized its importance until I chanced to go up in a machine in connection with the laying-out of the Royal Air Force route; and later, when I was about to do the reconnaissance through the lava country, I asked for aeroplanes for the work. I had found in travelling by car through the lava country along the air route that a car was quite useless, and I realized that it would take me weeks and weeks of camel work—that in parts I could not even take a camel; so I asked, rather tentatively, for the assistance of the air. In ten hours' flying I was able to discover the drainage of the country, and to get a clear idea of where to find a suitable alignment through the lava country. In ten hours I was able to do what would have taken me months of groundwork.

During these flights I made some rather interesting discoveries. I discovered, first, the remains of ancient habitations, in the form of a series of stone formations, originally built, I imagine, up to a height of five feet. They are five-, six-, or even eight-sided in shape, and at each corner there is a strong point—what we should regard as a machine-gun post now. Radiating from the corners you see long walls, extending, perhaps, three or four miles, with occasional small fortifications. These remains are sometimes as much as 300 yards across. I had no knowledge of them until I flew over the lava country, and I do not think they would ever have been discovered otherwise. On a subsequent flight I noticed a remarkable depression in the desert. It is some three hundred and fifty miles from Baghdad, and looks like a crater when seen from the air. I made notes of its whereabouts, and was subsequently able to visit the place when doing some more work for the Air Force. It is about 2,300 yards across, and the bottom is a sort of mud flat, 130 feet below the surrounding plain. It is particularly interesting, because along its southern and western slopes (those are the sheltered sides) you see regular villages of these circles of stones, as if the place had been very much inhabited at some period.

But suitable as the aeroplane is for trans-desert travel, with its comparative comfort and immunity from hostile raids, it fails as a final factor in reconnaissance work, because it only enables one to get a surface impression, instead of a true idea of the ground, or the thorough and exact knowledge necessary for railway work.

For railway reconnaissance in the Syrian-Arabian desert the best form of transport is the motor-car, but I do not mean an ordinary motor-car, such as you have in the street. For our desert work a condenser was specially designed, in which the steam was conveyed through a rubber pipe from the radiator cap to a condenser over the dashboard. The condensed water returned to circulation through another pipe. From the condenser there was a small escape pipe, leading to a box which held about a quart of water, and every few hours the box would be taken out and its contents emptied into the radiator. The result of that was that our daily water consumption per Ford was only about $1\frac{1}{2}$ pints, representing two or three pounds additional weight to the amount of motor supplies that we were obliged to carry for each day out in the desert.

The great feature of the motor-car is that, although it will not go everywhere in the desert—it will not go in the lava country—it will go round almost every obstacle, and it has an extraordinary radius. Instead of being compelled to go to water every eighty miles, I have been as much as 350 miles without touching water. On one occasion I started out from Hit for the desert with four Fords, and arrived back, after travelling 503 miles, with sufficient petrol and water for another ninety miles. You can realize the value of any form of transport which

will take you nearly 600 miles and is self-supporting. But even a motor-car is not perfect; it has its drawbacks, and one of the things we were up against was occasional wet weather. In places the desert is so flat that a storm of forty minutes' rain turns the surface into a series of small lakes, through which all our Fords had to be man-handled. In connection with our car work, I would rather like to mention that one of the principal reasons why we were able to make such continuous, I might say very hard, journeys was because of the drivers. We had selected Indian drivers, and the way they hung together, and their loyalty to work, which was not really of great interest to them, were astonishing. They never failed us on any occasion.

The other and more important factor—in fact, the most vital thing in desert travel and reconnaissance—is water. I want just to mention some of the principal watering-places in this extraordinarily large area of some quarter of a million square miles. Leaving Ramadi, and travelling along the air route in a westerly direction, the first permanent water is at Rutba, just about 200 miles away. This is a very great distance. Continuing along the air route, water is found about 35 miles farther on at El Jidd. There is no other permanent supply till one arrives at Qasr Azraq, some 250 miles away. If one follows the Damascus route, the old trade route between Baghdad and the west, there is plenty of water between Baghdad and Hit, and a good supply at Muhaiwir, distant 96 miles. There is a small place, about ten miles from Hit, which does not affect the situation much. The next permanent water is at Bir Mulissa, 200 miles from Hit, after which water is fairly frequent as one nears Damascus. Going from north to south the distance from El Jidd to Jauf is over 160 miles, and there is no water that I know of between these places; while, on the other hand, from Amman by Jauf to Karbala water is fairly frequent. It occurs at Azraq, Amari, Kaf, Minwa, Ghatti, Qaraqar, Maasir, Qasr Nabaq, and other places on the way to Jauf; thence towards Karbala at Sakaka, Suwair, Ab al Dufuf, Judaidar al Arar, Judaidar al Hamir, Nukhaid, and Ukhaidir, where there is a remarkable old Arab palace. I do not think that there are many other permanent watering-places in the part of the desert of which I am speaking. Burqa practically always has a water-supply, but it is what you might call "last resource" water, very frequently not fit to use at all.

In a general way there are two types of life to be found in the desert. In winter, when there is a fairly plentiful supply of grass, sheep grazing is a common scene. When the grass is dried up in summer the Bedouin move their flocks to the well-watered areas of the Jordan basin or east to the Euphrates. The other form of Bedouin life, not quite so pleasant, met with in the desert is the raiding party. These Bedouin swoop down on any party considerably smaller than, say, one fifth the size of their own, for the purpose of acquiring sheep,

goods, or arms. On one occasion a party tried to rob Flying Officer Wynne and me, but we got away without anything more than a show of arms. I was anxious to take the arms of all the Bedouin there, but was persuaded by Captain Williams, the Political Officer with me, that it would be an injudicious thing to do, and I have no doubt he was right.

Before leaving the water question I want to make some suggestion about the railway. I do not think that water will be required for locomotive purposes, because the engines will be oil-driven; but we shall undoubtedly need it for the personnel who are going to operate the railway—I mean the little station staffs tucked out in the desert there, so for them we shall endeavour to conserve rain-water. The stations with a little care could become quite pleasing oases with the planting of date palms and ithl trees. The latter, after careful watering during the first two years, flourish on the most barren ground without any further attention. The ithl resembles the tamarisk and grows to a height of 35 feet. I saw many at Jauf.

And now about my journeys. They began in 1920. I very much wanted to accompany Major Burton on a journey to Muhaiwir, but I did not get back from leave in time. He had a most unfortunate experience, for he was raided in the night; three of the Bedouin with him were slain, and the officers were very lucky to escape with their lives. I visited Muhaiwir in 1920, a little later on, with Ford cars, and observed that a very heavy car had been there within a few hours of my arrival. Talking to a few Bedouin who were there, they said first of all that it was a car from the Shereef, and had come in the early hours of the morning. When I tried to get more information, they said there was a large noise about four o'clock in the morning, and they thought perhaps it was cars. It was a very interesting thing to have found that that car had come all the way from Damascus—I presume along the desert route to Muhaiwir—but it had not ventured further east. That was the beginning of my journeys. You must understand that we were seeking as direct a line from Hit to Azraq as we could find, and the whole of the country was unexplored. There were a few travellers' reports, but very naturally these travellers had kept as near to water as possible, so that the greater portion of the country in which we were interested was quite unknown. Our theory was that we could get a line somewhere up a watershed north or south of the Wadi Amej. During one of these journeys I went 350 miles without seeing water. One other journey in 1920 I made with Colonel Leachman, and to a hill which is now known as Tel Leachman.

My next journey and many others were all in connection with laying out the Royal Air Force route. It was during one flight from Hit past Qasr Khubbaz to the Wadi Amej that we flew over a remarkable feature as seen from the air. It was a huge mud flat some

six miles by four, and we eventually used it for a landing ground. One interesting landmark is Jidr wa Jidrain. The name means "a cooking-pot and two cooking-pots." There are three hills. When flying you can see this natural feature for forty miles; it lies black on the surface. In one of our journeys we reached the highest part of the desert, and took the cars to the top of the Jabel Anaiza at an elevation of about 3,400 feet. I believe we were the first Europeans there.

On several of my journeys I came across lava boulders up to three feet long with inscriptions and quaint drawings on them. In some cases there are rude but distinct drawings of camels, in others of the human form. I took many photos, some of which have come out clearly, and these I am having examined.

Going west we came to the pools of Azraq. Azraq is always going to be a point of interest from a railway point of view. During the war it was a place of considerable interest, because Colonel Lawrence made it the base of his operations against Damascus. There you get beautiful pools, absolutely transparent, up to 15 feet in depth, and if you happen to be so inclined you can go and fish there. The pools are said to have been stocked by the Romans, and I have seen a fish weighing six pounds taken out. On the way from Qasr Azraq to Amman is Qasr Hallabat, an old hunting-box. It is interesting because, while most of it is of limestone, it has several courses of black lava which have been brought from some other building. On many of the stones there are Greek inscriptions. Near by are the remains of the reservoir. Hammam Es Sara is another place close to Hallabat. It is cruciform in shape, and has been comparatively recently converted into a small mosque, I should think perhaps a mosque for the hunting-box at Qasr Hallabat. There is another interesting circumstance about Hallabat. When flying over the lava country, I twice observed a long wall extending, I should imagine, about sixteen miles in a north-easterly direction. On my return to Baghdad with the Fords I came past Qasr Hallabat and Hammam Es Sara, and going about a mile or so out of our route we came across this wall. Still returning towards Baghdad through the lava country with our Fords we went towards Burqa. Once we had left the lava country we started to make direct for Burqa, a place I had observed from the air. It is important from the railway point of view as we must cross the desert somewhere between the Air Force route at El Jidd and Burqa. Flying Officer Wynne accompanied me on most of my journeys, as did the Solubi sheik Faraj, my guide (and a favourite one of the late Colonel Leachman).

My last journey right across the desert was from Amman with Mr. Philby. We went on camels along the Wadi Sirhan to Jauf and thence of necessity to Karbala. On the way we passed Kaf, with its salt-pans, and finally reached Fort Marid, at Jauf al Amir, which has

been the scene of many a conflict in tribal life. After leaving Jauf we went to Sakaka, a number of hamlets forming a town of some importance with perhaps 8,000 inhabitants. At Sakaka we were detained as guests by Sultan ibn Shalan—in somewhat similar manner to the King's guests at Dartmoor. From Sakaka we travelled via Suwair and the Wadi Arar and thence through Nukhaid to Ukhaider—three hundred miles of desert. Then on to Karbala, near the Euphrates.

When we returned from the Jauf journey I had still another expedition to make to Burqa across the lava country. You must understand that the work I had done flying and by motor-cars in the lava country was of great value, but not final. We had discovered where not to go, but had not found a way across the lava.

When we were travelling to Burqa one of our Bedouin slew a lizard. I had never realized before that a lizard could provide good food. But they opened it and extracted about a dozen eggs, from which they made an omelette for us, and afterwards they ate the lizard themselves.

I now want to get back to the railway. I have done a great deal of reconnaissance work, and have come to the conclusion that we can put a railway across the desert without a great deal of difficulty. I would like to give you an idea of the route the railway will follow.

Leaving Baghdad you would pass through some forty miles of very fertile country, which would already justify the construction of a railway, and reach the Euphrates at Dhibban, where you have to put a bridge across the river about 1,000 feet in length. From rail level to the bottom of the piers will be at least 60 feet; that is the most serious single undertaking in the whole of the trans-desert railway.

Crossing the Euphrates you run up through Ramadi to Hit, striking off into the desert past Qasr Khubbaz and Qasr Amej to Rutba. From Rutba you cross the desert most probably to Burqa. From Burqa to Qasr Azraq, and from Azraq to a place called Samra, about 22 miles north of Amman. You cannot get the railway to Amman, for that town is in the centre of a very hilly country, and quite unapproachable for a railway which is to be as economical in cost as a trans-desert railway can be. Before you reach Hit, between it and the bridge that crosses the Euphrates, there is one rather serious piece of work. This is a rock cutting half a mile long, with a maximum depth of about 50 feet.

After leaving Hit our first important stop would be Qasr Khubbaz. Although we shall not want water for the locomotives, we must make watering arrangements for the station staff, and here there are the remains of a very fine reservoir. Qasr Khubbaz was a fort on the old Damascus trade route. I was lucky enough to be there after rain, when there was a considerable stream of water flowing down the wadi. The rain must have come down in torrents, for there were new watermarks showing a depth of 18 inches of water over the dam.

The next place which the railway will touch on the desert route is Qasr Amej. That also was a water station on the old Damascus caravan route, and it will be so again I expect. Here the tank is about 220 yards in length, and is of engineering interest, for it was very well constructed indeed, and I have no doubt that until it was neglected and burst its sides it was very efficient. The walls of the tank are about 3 feet deep and 3 feet thick at the base. Travelling across the desert you come to Rutba. Rutba is a watering-place on the Wadi Hauran, which is the largest watercourse in the desert, leading from the top of the Jabel Aneiza to the Euphrates, some 300 miles distant. The Hauran bridge is the biggest piece of engineering work we have to do in the desert; it will be 300 feet long and about 30 feet high. The wadis in the desert only run water immediately after rains, but there are occasions when they are impassable for two or three days, as I found to my cost in May, 1920, when we were laying out the air route, and we got stranded on one side of one of these wadis for two and a half days. It is most indiscreet to be in one place in the desert for a long period, but if we could not move, neither could the raiding camel riders, so we were not too anxious.

Rutba is one of the summer camping-grounds of the Solubi tribe. They are a very interesting people, quite distinct from the Bedouin. Instead of depending on camels, they have a special breed of donkeys, which are said to be able to go five days without water. Their tents are not more than about 4 feet high. The Solubi use these tents to maintain their reputation for extreme poverty; but as a matter of fact you live better in a Solubi camp than if you stay any length of time with the Bedouin, for the Solubi are great hunters and good shots, while the Bedouin are very poor marksmen. The chief peculiarity of the Solubi tribe is their immunity from all raids; tradition has it that when the world was parcelled out among the tribes the Solubi got no portion as their Sheikh was asleep at the time, but as compensation Allah promised that they should be free to roam the world without molestation. They are the gipsies of the desert, and work as tinsmiths and doctors. They are also said to be descended from the Crusaders; the Arabic word for cross is *saleb*.

Crossing the Wadi Hauran, you come up to a depression known as the Wadi Abailie. There are one or two rather striking features as you pass; some witty fellow in the winter of 1921 called one of them Champagne Cork Hill.

The next point of interest is El Jidd, a rather remarkable place; it is 250 miles from Baghdad, and very nearly on the summit of the desert. Here the ancients did a great deal of work. There are many wells, two of them over 160 feet deep; that is an extraordinary depth to cut through solid limestone, and I may say that the top of these wells is not 3 feet in diameter. Once you leave El Jidd you go across

140 miles of desert. When I got to Burqa in 1921 with the Fords we took an observation that night and worked out roughly where we were, and then we took a compass course right across to El Jidd. It was quite a new journey; I do not think any European had ever been across that part of the world before. We hit the place in a remarkable fashion; we were only two or three miles out at the end of our day's journey. This Burqa is of particular interest from a railway point of view, as it is almost certain to be an obligatory point. There is a large ruined fort or Kasr there and a reservoir, which was constructed in some remote period. I do not know the date of Burqa. There is a Kufic inscription on a door lintel, but I never heard what its date is. The wall which formed the tank at Burqa is a piece of fine masonry about 5 feet high. Originally it extended across the depression for about 200 yards, and the total length of the water held up would have been about 600 yards to a depth of 8 feet. Even now, with the reservoir silted up, I have actually seen it contain a million gallons of water.

When you leave Burqa, which is on the western edge of the smoother desert, you come at once into the rough lava country. Here are found lava boulders with sometimes blown sand between them. The Jebel Umm al Ithm is a series of volcanic cones, which probably account for the lava you see there so extensively.

Travelling for 80 miles across the lava country you come to Qasr Azraq, rather an interesting place, with its wonderful blue pools of water and the date palms that are the only trees I have seen in the desert proper. The Qasr is built of lava and basalt, and near it are mounds of lava blocks piled up into cairns, like graves. At Azraq there is a door of stone about 8 feet high, 5 feet across, and 18 inches thick, and made out of a solid lump of basalt. I suppose it weighs two or three tons. Above the archway is an Arabic inscription.

Continuing along towards the Hajaz railway, which the trans-desert railway would cross, you pass Qasr Hallabat, where there is the reservoir which I should think the Arabs must have built. It is quite dry now, and the place is of course no longer inhabited. We find another tank at Samra, a place of great interest to us, because it is the most southerly point at which we can cross the Hajaz railway. Any further south you get to the hilly country, and to go further north is only adding to the length of the line. The reservoir is of basalt blocks, and the place is known as Khirb es Samra from the ruins which are a little to the north. In the early days of the trans-desert railway you will complete your journey by going along the Hajaz railway to Haifa, and will pass en route the Yamuk Falls, a feature in a very big electric light concession in Palestine—actually they are in Trans-Jordan. Amman is the principal town of Trans-Jordan, a very interesting little town, the Rabboth Ammon of the Old Testament and the flourish-

ing Philadelphia of the Romans, and was for a very great length of time quite uninhabited. Some forty years ago the Turks sent down a colony of Circassians from the north, who have built the place up. They have destroyed practically all the magnificent old Roman ruins, and used the material to put up their own houses.

Now I have explained to you about the route, perhaps I had better tell you a little about the railway itself. The reconnaissance showed us quite clearly that the railway is possible. The engineering works are quite easy. There is sufficient water for us, and there is ample opportunity to conserve water in necessary places. I do not want to name the places at which we could get the water for maintenance purposes, but they are there; some of them have no names. You may ask what are the purposes of this railway. Its principal purpose is the development of Mesopotamia and the shortening of the journey to India through Persia: Mesopotamia will never arrive at a full measure of prosperity until a railway runs to it from the Mediterranean. What there is to come out of Mesopotamia is a question frequently heard and easily answered by those who have studied the past history and future possibilities of the country. Its claims to wealth and importance are twofold: first agricultural, and secondly as a centre of commerce for the Middle East. Mesopotamia was once the granary of the world, as its splendid irrigation works show, and it can be so again, but its chief importance to us is as a cotton-growing area. Experiments have shown that Iraq cotton is as good as any the world can produce for length and fineness of staple. The importance of this and the advantage of conveying the bales by the quickest and cheapest route to the Mediterranean need not be emphasized.

Another purpose of the railway, and one which I think is of very great importance, will be its use as a pilgrim route. Thousands and thousands of pilgrims will travel over that railway to Mecca. It will be the cheapest journey from the East to the Mediterranean, and at the same time Baghdad will become, more than ever before, the commercial centre and clearing-house for the Persian trade.

Now I have frequently been asked what is the security of the railway. By its security I presume is meant security against the Bedouin. Why does the Bedouin carry out his raids at all? Simply with the idea of getting something out of them that will be of use to him. But a locomotive is of no use to him. He makes his tribal raids for camels and sheep. He does not raid with the purpose of taking life; that is one of the last things he wants to do. The reason that these people live in the desert at all is simply that they have nowhere else to go. They have no means of existence except that of the desert. They would farm if they had the chance, and once you open up a country like Iraq these people will flock to it and cultivate the lands—and when they are doing that the Bedouin who might have raided the

railway will have gone, so the problem of the security of the railway rather solves itself. Another consideration is that the Bedouin must have water for his raids. It is a singular coincidence that the best alignment for the railway, and the one which we propose to follow, touches at the principal watering-places. To show you the extraordinary necessity of water to the Bedouin in his raids, I may say that in July, 1921, a very big party of Bedouin, several hundred strong, came across from Trans-Jordania to raid the Amarat tribe in the Wadi Hauran. They arrived there, raided a big camp, and got away with five or six hundred camels. They had been two days without water, and their next watering-place was El Jidd. But when they got there they found our big motor-car party of twelve cars encamped on the spot, and though there were at least 500 raiders, they did not venture near the water. We came across this party on two occasions afterwards, and I believe that as many as eighty of these Bedouins perished from thirst. If the railway sits on the watering-places, raids from the Bedouin point of view become difficult, if not impossible. One other thing I would like to mention about these raids. I have been told that the railway in Mesopotamia was cut in 1920 on account of the value to the tribesmen of its innumerable sleepers. They got away with a quarter of a million sleepers, but on the trans-desert railway that reason for raiding would be gone, because I do not suppose that wooden sleepers would be used; they will be concrete or steel. For myself, I have little doubt about the security of the railway. I do not deny that there may be a certain amount of "fees" to be paid in the manner of bribes to the tribes on the way, but it will be a very small amount compared with the operating expenses.

The last feature of the railway is whether it is going to be an economical and commercial success. Those who have dealt with the matter believe that after the railway has been working for four or five years it will more than pay its way. No one pretends that the line is going to pay its way from the day it is opened—no railway can ever do so; but when it has been working for four or five years, and has had the chance to open up the country, both Mesopotamia and Persia, we have little doubt that it will not only pay its working expenses, but good dividends as well. Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you very much for listening to me.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—We have had a very interesting lecture, and I daresay many of us have got quite a new idea of what the desert is. I believe that General Lubbock promised to come and speak to us this evening.

General G. LUBBOCK: I think I have only very little to add to Major Holt's lecture. Probably everybody is asking himself, What is the object of this railway? Major Holt has given an explanation. I

think he might have pointed out the importance of Baghdad as a great trading centre, apart from the actual development of Iraq itself. In old days Baghdad was the distributing centre for the trade of Western Persia, a great part of Kurdistan, and most of what we now call Iraq. It is the natural centre and I think always will be, so that when conditions in that part of the world become more settled, as we think they will do in time, Baghdad will become again a great trading centre. In time to come the trade between Baghdad and Europe will grow, and it is obvious that whereas it is 350 miles by land and nearly 4,000 miles by sea, to get from Baghdad to the Mediterranean by the sea route, it is only about 700 miles by the route that Major Holt is describing. Therefore the railway short-circuits a very long détour. Nowadays one is not supposed to mention oil. (Laughter.) Well, there may be oil there, and it is obvious that if there is oil there it will have to get to the sea. That is another point for the railway, for I imagine that to get oil from the northern part of that country to the sea it will have to go across the desert, and whether you take it in trucks or by a pipe-line I do not think it can be done without the assistance of a railway. There is one other point in favour of the railway, but if any Air Force officer is here to-night, I hope he will take up that point. I believe I am right in saying that the present air route as a commercial proposition is not feasible without the railway. The Air Force does carry mails to and from Baghdad at present, but I believe the amount they carry is very limited and the expense is considerable. With the assistance of a railway to form the dépôts of the desert, I believe that the utility of the air route would be very much increased. The other day I heard Major Holt stigmatized by the chairman at the lecture he was giving as an optimist. He said that all engineers were optimists. I do not think that is anything to be ashamed of. Probably the world would not be so advanced in civilization to-day if engineers had not been optimists. (Applause.) Certainly anybody who talks about a scheme of this sort is apt to be regarded as an optimist and a visionary. But sometimes these things come off. (Applause.)

JAFAR PASHA: I am not prepared to say anything, but what Major Holt talked about was really very interesting to me. Certainly, I have been in Arabia, and I am an Arab myself, but I could not give so exactly the details about everything. But I say, as His Excellency the General has also said, that this railway will be a big benefit for the whole world and not only for Mesopotamia. (Applause.)

Colonel LEVESON-GOWER: I would like to ask a question or two. I conclude that the railway has been projected by the Government, and that the route has been provisionally surveyed by Government officials. In the first place, has the scheme got far enough for the lecturer to tell us if the railway is to be eventually built by the

Government, or if a concession is to be given to a company or syndicate? If it is to be built by Government, is the cost to fall on the *English* taxpayer again? (Laughter.) I am also interested to know what gauge it is proposed to utilize for the railway.

Mrs. WOOD-PAYNE: You say you caught a six-pound fish. What was it?

The LECTURER: The fish in the ponds are trout and bream.

Lieut.-General Sir AYLMER HUNTER-WESTON: I think it would be of interest to a good number of us to know what the green patch is on the map. Does it represent cultivated land or land which will be cultivated later? Also, upon the green patch there is a whitish line. Does that represent that projected waterworks or anything of that sort?

Major BURTON: May I add a few words. I am very much interested to see Major Holt on this platform, because we have had dealings before, and I regard him as the successful man, and myself as the failure; Major Thomas, Major Yetts and myself formed the party which was referred to by him as that which was raided and practically left for dead, so I envy him his journey, which was more or less the journey we set out to do. We started on this railway job, to look for the air route, and an oil pipe-line, and also to go down to visit Ibn Raschid with an enormous sum of money, which may have been the attraction to the raiding party. The last time but one that I saw Major Holt, I borrowed a complete outfit of clothes from him, and came all the way home in them because I had nothing but Bedouin kit. The clothes fitted me very well, but I must join issue with him about camelling. I am much keener on camels than on cars, and have never been in an aeroplane in my life. I have done a good deal of reconnaissance on the desert, not only the Syrian desert, where I was only about a month, but on the Libyan Desert, where I once spent twelve months reconnoitring for a line which is now built to Khargeh. There we found that—in all excepting the two hottest months of the year—camels would go for six or seven days without water; on our way to Muhaiwir and beyond, the camels had to go six days. In the two hottest months I think camels will not go for six days, but for week after week and month after month on the Libyan Desert our camels went the full seven days. They were doing a round trip of 200 miles every week. I tried reconnaissance in cars in Kurdistan. Those cars were inflicted upon me by the Government—including General Lubbock—only I don't think it was his fault. (Laughter.) I found that one crossed the country much too quickly to be able to get a real impression of any gradients that were other than easy. I speak with great diffidence before the successful lecturer up there, and I can only say how it appeared to me, for although I crossed and recrossed the whole stretch of country three or four times in cars,

I eventually had to go back to the wretched old business of going on horseback and even on foot in several parts. In ten years spent in different countries, I always found that my best reconnaissance was done on foot. Of course, you cannot go on the Syrian desert on foot, but the slowest means of transport is the most satisfactory from the railway point of view. Next to that, horses and mules—of course, camels are in the same category, though taking on a very big stretch of desert it is very tedious to do it on camel-back, and the Government first of all arranged a scheme for taking out a top-heavy agglomeration of thirty-three cars for the Syrian desert work. I was very glad when, owing to trouble on the Euphrates, all these cars got despatched to other parts, and we were allowed to choose camels. Although, of course, the expedition failed, it was not for that reason, particularly so because the raid was made about midnight, and if we had had cars it would have happened just the same. I personally regard cars as a desecration of the desert, and in that I merely quote Miss Gertrude Bell, who has done a good many thousand miles on camel-back. I think that was her expression to me. I think I have joined issue long enough, so I will just raise one point—that is, I did not notice mention of Bir Molussa as a watering place. I got within two or three miles of this point, but had to turn back because the country was altogether too unpleasant. There was no cover and I was single-handed, for my companions were *hors de combat* and could not come on with me; the Bedouin allege that there are three good wells there. Half-way between Molussa and Muhaiwir I personally saw three wells north of Major Holt's route, not very far away, and I actually saw the Bedouin getting water there. I drank it, but it was not very good. Another question in connection with water is as to how long these wells would be likely to hold up against pumping for railway purposes. I got a good deal of data from the Bedouin there, and they told me how quickly the water disappears when there is a constant drain even by a portion of the tribe of Bedouin. They very soon get away with the water, and I am under the impression that if one began to pump for railway purposes the water would disappear very quickly, and might take some time to filter in again. My recommendation was that there appeared to be so little to be gained by locating the railway near any of the wells I saw, that it would be better, for topographical reasons, to try the watershed south of Wadi Hauran, and I am much interested to find that this forecast has proved to be a sound one.

The CHAIRMAN: I have done a good many miles on a camel in my life, but generally on good trotting camels, and I think we can all sympathize with the last speaker when he says that camel travelling in the Syrian desert is tedious work. To do forty miles a day on a camel that only goes at a walk is a very tedious business, and it shows the hardihood of our men that they can go through it. I was

glad to hear what good service the Indian motor drivers did in crossing the desert. Major Burton says a motor is a desecration of the desert, but I think it is a great thing that our Indian drivers should have done so well as they did in carrying out such work. One of the things that most struck me in the lecture to-day was the extraordinary remains of those ancient buildings that we saw on the screen; those huge blocks of limestone that have been cut and worked in some ancient time. Nobody seems to know what date they belong to. They are really an extraordinary feature in the desert; they astonished me very much indeed, and I think they must have astonished all of us. Also, when we hear of wells 160 feet in depth, all lined with stone, and only three feet in diameter, we see what wonderful work the ancients did. Every day we live we seem to realize more and more what extraordinary work the ancients did at any time up to three thousand years ago or more, and these works excite our admiration. The lecturer told us that this railway, whoever it is projected by, is destined to work out the salvation of Mesopotamia. The question of Mesopotamia, as you all know, at the present time, is one of very serious import. We had a debate on it in the House of Commons, as you may have read in the papers, within the last day or two. The question is of great interest at the present time, but none of us can say anything about Mesopotamia until we know whether peace with Turkey is going to be obtained or not. Everything hinges on peace with Turkey at the present moment. Oil has been mentioned, and, as General Lubbock said, if oil is found a railway will be necessary for the carriage of that oil; or, if a pipe-line is made, a railway will be necessary to carry the pipes and deposit them along the route. Oil, as far as we know, has not been proved to exist in Mesopotamia yet; that is to say, there are indications of oil, but nobody knows at what depth it will be found, or whether any really workable oil strata will be found or not. We know that the indications of oil stretch down from opposite Basra along the eastern shores of the Persian Gulf, but whether the oil-bearing strata commence at Mosul or where we cannot tell. One of the principal things on which I think the future of Mesopotamia will depend is cotton. If long-stapled cotton can be produced there in good quantity you may say that the whole future of Lancashire may depend on it. If it can produce long-stapled cotton it will be one of the most valuable countries for us to have an influence in. I think the possibility of things of that sort ought to be borne in mind. We have a great outcry in various newspapers at the present time for the immediate evacuation of Mesopotamia, bag and baggage. I think we must consider very deeply whether with all the possibilities there may be in Mesopotamia—and the lecturer has touched on some of them—that bag-and-baggage policy of immediate evacuation is really the right one, or whether we should be given a little time to consider what Mesopotamia may bring

forth. As to the question of the carriage of cotton or oil—viz., whether seven hundred miles of railway would be a cheaper mode of transit than four thousand miles by sea—is a question between railway rates and sea freights that will require elucidation in the future. Whether the railway will be able to compete with the cheaper sea carriage or not, no one can say at the present moment. Ladies and gentlemen, I will not detain you longer. I would just like to ask our lecturer to-day if he would now reply to the various questions put to him, and if anybody else has any question that comes to mind, I hope they will ask the lecturer to give them the benefit of his experience on the subject. (Applause.)

The LECTURER: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—After the enormous number of questions that have been fired at me I feel like asking for "Lights Out." I will deal with them one by one. "Who did the railway reconnaissance, and who paid for it?" It was done in the course of the laying out of the Royal Air Force Baghdad-Cairo route. Undoubtedly H.M.G. bore the cost of it. As regards the building of the railway, and who is to bear the cost, the time is far too early to say. A decision is not even arrived at whether we are going to stay in Mesopotamia. I do not now whether, if we evacuated, a railway might still be required, but certainly its coming would be postponed. Another question was as to the gauge: the nature of the desert is such that there is no physical feature which limits gauge at all. The obvious thing to do, then, is to fix the gauge to the country which would be subsequently linked up with Mesopotamia—I refer to Persia. A very extensive, detailed railway survey has been carried on in Persia, and the result is a decision in favour of the metre gauge. The railway through the desert would be of metre gauge also, conforming to the existing gauge of the major portion of the railways now in Mesopotamia. As to the green colour on the map, that ensnared me also: I always pictured the Wadi Sirhan as a fertile country; but the green is merely a colouring distinction to show elevation. It is below five hundred metres. That is the only reason. The white line I do not recollect; it may have been a scratch on the plate. We come to the controversy Camels versus Motor-cars. (Laughter.) My cars in 1920 were some of the original thirty fitted out for Major Burton's expedition; but we had one extra attachment which I regard as an essential—a mileage recorder, registering up to one-tenth of a mile. This for reconnaissance work is immeasurably superior to the approximate distances estimated from the varying pace of a camel, mule, or horse, or even of a man walking. I am afraid I have not the sentiment that attaches oneself to the camel at all. (Renewed laughter.) The most awful agony I ever endured in my life was during the first four days of the expedition. I had never been on a camel, and the only way to do the expedition was on a camel. Rowing is alleged to stir

up every muscle, but there are a million other muscles which the camel finds out. But of course our personal discomfort is a very small thing; my point about the camel is this, that, working in the summer as we were, we could not do more than two days without water. You must realize that we travelled from dawn to dark—reconnaissance after dark is utterly useless: if you cannot see the surface features you might as well not do the work. I agree that car reconnaissance in Kurdistan and such places is not very effectual unless you combine it with a great deal of walking—I have no great use for riding a horse in reconnaissance; I find it impossible to make the notes I want. The final point as regards the camels and motors is this: the camels would never have accomplished the laying out of the Royal Air Force route. The only way it could ever have been done is by car. The sentimental question of the desecration of the desert is entirely a personal equation. If the desert was desecrated by motor-cars, still more so was it desecrated by the empty whisky bottles and tins that once contained bully beef, that I have seen lying about there. (Laughter.) I am sorry if I omitted reference to Bir Molussa; it was a fault on my part if I did, but I thought I had mentioned it. There are one or two intermediate supplies which are not permanent—the supplies I have mentioned are supplies that we can rely on. As regards the quantity of water, it has interested me deeply. On both camel journeys and motor journeys it has been one of the things I have enquired into very much. At Rutba and El Mat, where the railway would come to on the Wadi Hauran, it is alleged that fifteen thousand camels can water day after day, and that the water replenishes itself as fast as it is drawn. I have watched them water at El Mat, and can bear out as to the speed at which the water replenishes. That was in July and August, 1921. As regards El Jidd, it is not a feature of railway importance for water. I do not think there are any further cross-examinations that have been thrown at me; if there are, would someone remind me.

Major BURTON: One more question: when those tanks are reconstructed, can you count on any rainfall to fill them?

The LECTURER: I surmise between six and eight inches of rain in the part of the desert where I was working. That would provide a great supply of water. In the old days of the pilgrim route from Damascus to Mecca, the water-supply was entirely dependent on what fell—and if there is sufficient water in that part of the desert I think you will find sufficient in the Syrian desert where the railway would go. Thank you for your patience.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I am sure you will join in giving a hearty vote of thanks to our lecturer. (Applause.)

LECTURER'S NOTE.—Since giving the lecture I have learned that the inscription on the door lintel at Burga mentions that the building was erected by the Prince Al-Walid in the year 81 or about A.D. 700.—A. L. H.

CHINA AND THE POWERS

At a meeting of the Central Asian Society held on Thursday, March 8, at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, a paper was read by the Right Hon. Sir John Jordan, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., on "China and the Powers." General Sir Charles C. Monro was in the chair.

Prior to the reading of the lecture, the Hon. Secretary, Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate, made the following statement :

"Since our last meeting we have elected thirteen new members, viz. : The Lord Raglan, Sir Claude Hill, K.C.S.I., Mr. R. Mitchell Banks, M.P., Colonel A. J. Turner, C.B., Lieut.-Colonel E. C. Bayley, C.I.E., Lieut.-Colonel J. H. M. Cornwall, C.B.E., Lieut.-Colonel W. F. Shakespear, I.A. (ret.), Mr. S. F. Stewart, C.I.E., Mr. F. E. Whittall, Mr. E. R. T. Lyall, Major F. J. Collas, O.B.E., Major R. D. Furse, D.S.O., Captain J. M. Mackenzie, M.C.

"We have recently added to our library the following books :

"(a) By gift: From Mr. Moon, 'The Causes of the Afghan War,' by McColl (autograph copy).

"(b) For review: 'The Heart of Arabia,' by H. S. J. Philby; 'The Turkish Empire,' by Lord Eversley and Sir Valentine Chirol; 'Travels in Eastern Tibet,' by Eric Teichman; 'The Spirit of Islam,' by Syed Ameer Ali; 'The Ins and Outs in Mesopotamia, 1920,' by E. R. T. Lyall; 'Turkey,' by S. Lane-Poole; 'The Insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920,' by Lieut.-General Sir A. Haldane; 'Siwa: The Oasis of Jupiter Ammon,' by C. Dalrymple Belgrave; 'The Babur-Nama in English,' by Mrs. A. S. Beveridge.

"(c) By purchase: 'New World of Islam,' by Lothrop Stoddard; 'Three Years in Tibet,' by E. Kawaguchi; 'Lhasa and its Mysteries,' by Waddell; 'Exploits of Asaf Khan,' by Afghan; 'Recent Happenings in Persia,' by J. Balfour; 'The Caliphate,' by Muir; 'Bolchevisme et Islam,' from the *Revue du Monde Musulman*.

"The Council of the Society is desirous of gradually forming a library which in process of time will become worthy of, and, moreover, a great help to, the Society. That library now consists of some 400 to 500 volumes, which we mainly owe to the generosity of Lady Trotter, Miss Tanner, Sir Percy and Miss Ella Sykes, Mr. Moon, and some other members. We are indebted also to authors and publishers who have sent books for review in our Journal. The Council further wishes it to be known that books can be borrowed from the library by members under conditions which have been framed by the Hon. Librarian, Mr. Roland Michell."

The CHAIRMAN : It is my good fortune to introduce to your notice as our lecturer to-day Sir John Jordan, and it is my equally good fortune to find it perfectly unnecessary for me to say anything further in reference to Sir John Jordan, with whose knowledge and experience in respect to China we are all well conversant. Without further ado I will ask him now if he will kindly read his paper. (Applause.)

Sir JOHN JORDAN then read his paper :

The problems which confront China and the Powers are so numerous that it is difficult to know where to begin. For their proper understanding it will perhaps be best to give a short account of the events which have led up to the present political situation in China. It is not necessary to go back more than a quarter of a century or so. The China-Japan War of 1894 was the first rude shock which China experienced in recent times, and it was followed in the next few years by a bewildering succession of similar awakenings. A year or so later Russia, anxious to link up her remote possessions in Eastern Asia with her European system, obtained a concession to build the line which is now known as the Chinese Eastern Railway, through the heart of Manchuria, and saved the long detour which going round the River Amur would have involved. That was the first concession of the kind granted by China, and it was the ominous precursor of the many subsequent complications which befel the country. Shortly afterwards the German Emperor, after sounding, as his recent book explains, his imperial colleague in Russia, seized the port of Kiaochow, and obtained the lease of a large slice of territory with extensive railway and mining concessions, which converted the province of Shantung into a German preserve. England and France followed suit. We took Wei Hai Wei and the Kowloon extension opposite Hong Kong on a similar lease, and Kuang Chou Wan opposite the island of Hainan in the south fell to France. For a time it seemed as if China, which had survived Mongol invasions by land and Japanese attacks by sea all through the ages, was at last to fall a prey to Western aggression, and appropriately enough a British Admiral appeared on the scene and gravely warned the world of the imminent break-up of China. Then came the Boxer movement, which made confusion still worse confounded, and completed the tale of Chinese misfortunes. But in some ways all these troubles were a blessing in disguise. They served to disabuse China of her innate feeling of superiority and dislike of foreigners, and marked the beginning of a new outlook. The Manchu dynasty had exhausted its mandate, and although the Empress Dowager, in spite of advanced age and failing health, made a gallant effort to retrieve the fortunes of her house, it was morally certain that she would be the last of her race to rule China. In the ten years which followed despairing efforts were made to give China a brand-new Constitution on foreign lines, and to prop up a tottering fabric by buttressing it

with supports borrowed from the West. But all was in vain, and in 1911 the collapse came. A revolutionary movement in Hankow, which could easily have been crushed had there been any support for the Manchu cause, brought down the age-long monarchy, and China became the latest and, in many respects, the strangest addition to the ranks of Republican Governments. That she was not fitted for such an advanced form of government is beyond all question. It is true that there has always been a marked democratic spirit amongst the people, and that there was a certain amount of self-government of a crude description in the village communities. But education was still very limited, and a very large proportion of the population could neither read nor write. To foist representative institutions upon a people who had no political training was the rash experiment of a comparatively small group of men who had been educated abroad, and it carried with it the certainty of failure. The Parliament which assembled in due course in Peking offered an interesting study in political science. One thing in particular impressed an observer who knew the Chinese of old. It was amazing to see how easily men drawn from all parts of the country—some coming from a distance of 2,000 miles—adapted themselves to the new order of things, how rapidly they acquired all the technique of Parliamentary procedure, and with what facility and total absence of all self-consciousness they expressed themselves, although the majority had probably never before addressed an audience in their lives. But the material for practical constructive statesmanship was wanting. They had no force of public opinion to sustain or check their action, no principles to guide them, and, as was only natural in the circumstances, split into partisan cliques, with little cohesion to cement a common policy. It is only fair, however, to say that they had never a fair trial. China was a Republic with a Dictator as President. Yuan Shih-Kai had no faith in Republican institutions for China, and did not conceal his contempt for the chattering youngsters who tried to curb his authority by the new-fangled Parliamentary restraints. In the end he dissolved the Assembly, and for two years China presented the spectacle of a Republic under the absolute rule of a President-Dictator. Much progress was made in consolidating and unifying the provinces under one central authority, and had not Yuan been so ill-advised as to launch his monarchical project, it is probable that the country might have enjoyed a period of comparative tranquillity under his benevolent despotism. But his untimely death in 1916 deprived China of the only really strong man it has produced in recent times, and the last six years have witnessed the growth of a pseudo-militarism which has made all China the prey of warring factions. The military governors, or *tuchuns* as they are called, are mostly old subordinates of Yuan Shih-Kai, whom he had stationed at various centres to strengthen his

hold over the provinces. The system worked well while he lived, but on his death the *tuchuns* became a law unto themselves. They recruited and maintained their own armies and formed combinations amongst themselves, either to overawe the Central Government at Peking or to secure ascendancy in the provinces. The Government at Peking exercised little authority over the country, and was only recognized by the *tuchuns* so far as it suited their own interests. Exact statistics are not available, but it is estimated that over a million of men are on the pay-rolls of these provincial satraps, and that about 65 per cent. of the total revenue is absorbed in the support of useless troops. There are, however, some noteworthy exceptions to this state of general maladministration. The province of Shansi, west of Peking, is admirably governed by a most active and energetic man, a veritable hustler and a drastic reformer. Yen Hsi-han was an obscure military officer when the revolution of 1911 broke out, but he at once came to the front and took supreme control of his native province, which he has ruled so well ever since that it has justly gained the reputation of being the model province in China. I paid a visit to Governor Yen some four years ago, and was amazed at his boundless energy and the range of his activities. There was nothing from athletics to foot-binding in which he did not seem to take an intelligent interest. He makes frequent tours of the province, is in telephonic communication with all his district officers, delivers lectures on the work of administration, and takes care to select subordinates who share his enthusiasm. He insisted, amongst other things, on all his subordinates riding bicycles, and on finding that the suggestion was coolly received, challenged them all to a bicycle race, in which he proved an easy winner. He neither smokes nor drinks, and is a drastic opponent of opium in every form. Shansi used to be a large producer of opium, but there is not a stalk of the poppy to be found in the province.

Another noted reformer is the Christian General Fêng Yü-hsiang, who seems to be a sort of Eastern Cromwell. He is now in command of some 30,000 men at Peking, who have received no pay for over a year, but do not falter in their allegiance to their chief. Some 10 per cent. of them are Christians, and both he and his officers carry on evangelization work in the ranks. The presence of such a large force of trained troops in the capital suggests, however, grave misgivings and the possibility of renewed conflict for the control of the governing machinery at Peking.

But these are only exceptions which prove the rule, and generally speaking, China, as a whole, fell into a state of confusion after Yuan Shih-Kai's death, and the Great War in Europe reacted to the serious detriment of her interests. Yuan Shih-Kai had made an effort to bring China into the war on the side of the Allies, but the attempt was frustrated by outside influences. A year before his death he had

been obliged to make important political concessions to Japan as the result of the Twenty-one Demands of 1915, and in subsequently entering into the war in 1917 at the invitation of the American Government, China was doubtless largely actuated by the hope of retrieving the ground she had then lost. But as the war continued, China's position gradually became worse. She suffered not only from increased internal confusion, but the successive Governments at Peking, deprived of all the customary sources of revenue, borrowed immense sums of money from Japanese financiers, all of which was spent on futile military preparations and other unproductive objects, with the result that the country's resources were pledged to the hilt, and that the breach between Peking and the South was widened beyond repair. Early in the war the Germans had been dislodged from Kiaochow by the Japanese, aided by a British contingent, and Japan had thus fallen heir to the great inheritance which had been built up by Germany during her fifteen years' occupation of the leased territory. The other Allied Powers, with the exception of America, had given Japan assurances of their support in the assertion of these rights when the terms of peace came to be considered, and in conformity with this pledge, the Treaty of Versailles transferred to Japan all German rights, title, and privileges in Shantung. China had, it is true, undertaken, as part of the Twenty-one Demands, to consent to any settlement which Japan might make with Germany, but her main object in entering the war was to evade this obligation, which had, she contended, been forced upon her. The Treaty of Versailles has been described on high authority as a "human charter." The human side, which it assumed in Chinese eyes, was that it handed over the interests of 35 millions of Chinese to a foreign Power. China refused to sign it, and the Paris decision raised a storm of protest throughout the country. For the first time in its history Chinese public opinion became a potent influence, and an outcry went up from all parts of the country against what was loudly denounced as a cynical instance of Western injustice. Mobilized public opinion organized a boycott of unparalleled severity and intensity, and proved itself a very formidable weapon of defence. Fortunately for us the Americans had to bear their share of the blame for a transaction to which their President, on whose support the Chinese had placed special reliance, had given the full weight of his authority. The rejection of the Versailles Treaty by the United States Senate was hailed by the Chinese as a justification of their attitude, and strengthened their determination to accept no compromise short of the restoration of the territory which had been filched from them by Germany twenty years before. Things dragged on for a year or two until the Washington Conference, which will always form a great landmark in the history of the East, undertook the solution of this and other Chinese problems. The Conference was primarily convened for the purpose of considering

what measures might be taken for the reduction of armaments, but as it was obvious that a removal of existing causes of misunderstanding was a necessary preliminary to the success of any scheme of the kind, it was suggested that the Conference should embrace in the scope of its work an examination of Pacific and Far Eastern questions. The whole situation in China was full of danger to the world's peace, and there was urgent need of something being done to straighten it out. A quarter of a century's competition in securing leased territories, spheres of influence, railway concessions, and all the other numerous privileges regarded as useful levers for territorial absorption or economic exploitation, had tied China and the Powers up in knots which it seemed better to unloose by peaceful means than to leave them to be cut some day by more forceful measures. The time was opportune for taking stock of all the circumstances. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which had been the dominant factor in Far Eastern politics for nearly twenty years, was due for renewal. That Alliance had never been liked by China, and had in recent years become very unpopular in America. China regarded it as derogatory to her dignity that an arrangement which had originally applied to Corea, her quondam vassal State, should, without her consent, have been extended to her, and the fate of Corea was the measure of the confidence she was disposed to place in the Alliance as a means of securing her independence. The Shantung decision had further weakened her belief in the efficacy of the instrument as helpful to China. In America the Alliance was regarded as a barrier to Anglo-American friendship, and it was felt both in Great Britain and Japan that with the disappearance of Russian and German aggression it had no longer any reason for existence. The first step, therefore, at Washington was to merge the Alliance into a wider compact, which comprised the four Powers chiefly interested in the region of the Pacific—viz., Great Britain, Japan, the United States, and France. In the quadruple Pacific Treaty each of these Powers agrees to respect the rights of the others in that region. Should any controversy arise between them as regards these rights, a joint Conference is to be called to adjust the dispute, and if the rights in question are threatened by the action of any other Power, the signatory Powers are to consult together fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to how they are to deal with it. Senator Lodge, in reporting the conclusion of this Treaty to the Conference, dwelt upon its essentially pacific character—in contrast with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which it superseded, it contained no provision for the use of force to give effect to its terms. The surest way to prevent war is, as he said, to remove the causes of war, and this was an attempt to remove the causes of war over a great area of the globe's surface by relying upon the good faith and honest intentions of the Powers who had attached their signatures to the agreement. Probably no document

of such vast importance and covering such immense and widely separated regions as Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, and Honolulu, was ever compressed into fewer words—only four short and simple clauses which are to test this great experiment in Treaty-making for the next ten years.

Three other Treaties dealing exclusively with the problems of China were signed at Washington, and these require some examination. First in importance comes the nine-Power Treaty signed by the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal, defining the principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China. As already stated, China had been carved into spheres of influences and leased territories, and had been so enmeshed in railway and other concessions that the Powers found it as much in their own interests as in those of China to arrive at some understanding which would minimize points of friction and obviate the possibility of a world conflict. China, with its teeming population and great natural resources, is perhaps the most promising potential market in the world of to-day, and its importance has been immensely enhanced by the severe restrictions which the Great War imposed on the producing and consuming capacity of the nations of Europe. At Washington the Powers realized, as they had never done before, the necessity of conserving China for the common trade of the world at the cost of sacrificing, in some measure at least, their special rights and privileges. In times past some of them had entered into agreements between themselves recognizing the sovereignty and independence of China and accepting the principle of equal opportunity as the basis of their action, but China had never been made a party to any of these transactions, the fine professions of which had too often been disregarded in practice. Now for the first time the Powers associate China with them and make a joint and solemn declaration that they will respect her sovereignty and independence, both territorial and administrative; that they will uphold the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations; that they will refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China to seek special privileges. As a means of giving effect to the principle of equality of opportunity—the principle which is known as the "Open Door" policy—all monopolies and preferences are forbidden, and by way of abolishing spheres of influence, no Power is permitted to acquire a general superiority of commercial or economic rights in special regions of China. Full publicity is hereafter to be given to all matters affecting the political and other international obligations of China, and detailed arrangements are to be made for having existing commitments and all future contracts recorded with the Secretariat-General of the Conference.

It may seem strange that the Powers should have found it neces-

sary to make such elaborate arrangements, to regularize their action in China, but it must be remembered that China had become the happy hunting-ground of concessionnaires, and that foreign exploitation, encouraged by the corruption of Chinese officialdom, had brought things to a pass where collective self-denial and common action became an imperative duty.

There was hardly a province in all that vast country in which the Powers themselves and their nationals were not in acute conflict on questions arising out of their special interests, accruing from Treaties and agreements dating back in some cases 20 or 30 years. In the case of Great Britain spheres of influence had ceased to have much operative effect, but some other Powers were rapidly converting them into close preserves, from which British and American trade was gradually being excluded. We opened China to the commerce of the world, and we opened it on terms of perfect equality to all nations. The early Treaties left nothing to be desired in that respect, and, had they been observed in practice, there would have been no necessity for the Washington Conference. But as China gradually weakened under the impact of foreign aggressiveness, and her own gross maladministration, a whole series of Treaties, agreements, and other documents of a still more dubious origin, the text of which fills two large volumes published by the State Department at Washington, came to be overlaid on, and to supplement, the early Treaties. These dealt almost exclusively with concessions, and rights granted to particular Powers, and as the same rights were often granted to two or more Powers, the confusion which ensued can be readily imagined.

The Washington Conference made an earnest effort to find a way out of this morass, and to prevent China and the Powers from slipping back into it in the future. That the attempt will wholly succeed can hardly be expected so long as human nature remains what it is. Only those who have lived in a great undeveloped country of immense potentialities to the commerce of the world can realize the temptation which China offers to the restless and enterprising foreigner. He chafes daily at seeing human beings straining under burdens which ought to be conveyed by railways, at seeing carts struggling axle deep in roadless tracks, at seeing the hills stripped bare of every vestige of grass for fuel, where there are some of the richest coal seams in the world—in short, at witnessing all the hundred and one disabilities under which a splendid people labour through lack of organized government. And so the foreigner, impatient of Chinese ways, wants to make railways and roads, to open mines, and to develop the country generally, and for fully a quarter of a century Peking has become a second Constantinople where the atmosphere is heavily charged with loans and concessions, and where hosts of foreign promoters live handsomely on funds subscribed by guileless people at home. Washington swept a

good many of them away, and did as much as the varied interests at stake permitted to substitute for the fierce and sordid competition of the past a spirit of fair co-operation and equal opportunity. As one who has had to deal practically with these matters, and has, indeed, been in the thick of this competition for many years, I realize only too well that mere verbal formulæ are a weak barrier to resist or restrain the onset of rival national ambitions, but the fact that the Powers themselves have recognized the danger of continuing to exploit the weakness and corruption of Chinese officialdom, and have entered into this self-denying ordinance, furnishes some evidence of their desire to make it effective. China had asked that she should be freed from the danger or threat of foreign aggression, and from the limitations which prevented her solving her problems in her own way, and at Washington she obtained at least an instalment of these requirements.

The next Treaty signed at Washington related to the Customs Tariff, and is too technical to be noticed in detail. The Chinese Tariff was fixed by treaty sixty years ago on the basis of 5 per cent. *ad valorem* duty on imports and exports. The arrangement is admittedly a one-sided one which requires modification. But the fiscal conditions obtaining in China are of a very primitive and cumbrous nature, and the whole system requires overhauling in the interests of Chinese and foreign trade alike. Shortly after the conclusion of the early Treaties, the whole country was devastated by the great Taiping rebellion, and to recoup their shattered finances, the Chinese instituted new inland taxes known as *likin*, which are collected at barrier stations dotted thickly all over the country. These exactions, from the uncertainty of their incidence as much as by their amount, constitute a great burden upon trade, and both Chinese and foreigners have always regarded their abolition as an essential condition of commercial expansion. By Treaties concluded in 1902 and 1903 the British, American, and Japanese Governments had undertaken to increase the Customs duties to 12½ per cent. in return for the abolition of *likin* and other inland dues. This arrangement has never been put into effect, and at Washington the Chinese practically put forward a claim for Tariff autonomy. But to have conceded such a request irrespective of the reduction of the inland dues would, in the present state of the country, have been a very doubtful blessing. Recognizing that the question was one which could be best settled on the spot, the Conference decided to appoint a Commission, to meet in the near future in China, whose main duties will be to pave the way for the abolition of *likin*, and arrange, in the meantime, for the levying of a surtax that will raise the import duty to 7½ per cent. *ad valorem*, with an increase to 10 per cent. on articles of luxury.

Before any practical steps are taken to give effect to this provision of the Washington Treaties, it is, in my opinion, essential that the whole political situation in China should be submitted to careful study.

The provision is, it will be observed, contingent upon some arrangement being made for the abolition of inland dues. Any such arrangement presupposes the existence of a Government exercising control over the country. At present there is no such Government nor the prospect of any in the near future. China should be frankly told that the Powers are willing, and even anxious, to grant the increased duties the moment she is in a position to perform her part of the contract, but not sooner. To give the proceeds of the increased duties to Peking or to any of the numerous Governments which are striving for mastery of the country would be a disservice to the Chinese people and would only perpetuate the vicious system of financial extravagance which Peking has practised for years. Crude suggestions that the money should be utilized for the disbandment of superfluous troops under foreign supervision seem hardly to call for serious consideration. Equally unsound is the idea of using it to meet the service of a loan to fund the unsecured debts which now amount to close upon £100,000,000. All loans should be taboo until China is in a position to carry on productive enterprises—in other words, until she has a Government.

Extra-territoriality was another problem which received consideration at Washington. In the early days of foreign intercourse China, like the Ottoman Empire, accepted the principle that aliens within her borders should remain subject to the laws and customs of their own country, and this principle became a recognized Treaty right. Foreign residence was confined to the Treaty Ports, and as the residents were comparatively few in number and drawn from the law-abiding classes, Consular Courts had little difficulty in controlling their nationals. Great Britain made her judicial system effective more than fifty years ago by establishing a Supreme Court in Shanghai, and this example was followed more recently by the United States. But, as a rule, the judicial procedure of the other Powers leaves much to be desired. At first there were only five Treaty Ports, now there are nearly fifty, and the number of Japanese and Russians in China must not be far below half a million.

The first breach in the extra-territorial structure, which had remained intact for over seventy years, occurred during the Great War. When China declared war against Germany, she assumed jurisdiction over the persons and property of enemy subjects, and Germans and Austrians are now amenable in all things to Chinese jurisdiction. The next step was the assertion of jurisdiction over the nationals of all Powers which had no Treaty with China. This applied principally to the new States created by the Treaty of Versailles. Then came the most important case of all, that of Russia. As early as 1889 Russia had concluded a Treaty with China stipulating for extraterritorial treatment for her people, and this had been exacted with drastic severity for nearly 250 years. The Russian upheaval brought

China's opportunity, and in September, 1920, China denounced the Russian Treaties and cancelled their extraterritorial privileges. The Russian Consulates, nineteen in number, were handed over to the Chinese authorities, and the Russian Concessions at Hankow and Tientsin came under Chinese administration. Some 200,000 Russians living in different parts of China, who had enjoyed an exceptional measure of protection under the Czarist régime, have fallen from their high estate and are now entirely at the mercy of the Chinese authorities, whose treatment of them has been severely criticized by the foreign press in China. It will be seen from the foregoing that a large part of Europe no longer occupies an extraterritorialized position in China. But that only renders the importance of the question all the greater to a nation like Great Britain, whose subjects have many millions of money invested in the country and whose immense trade requires protection from the unbridled licence of militant *tuchuns*. In accordance with a resolution passed at Washington, it was agreed that a commission, in which China would be represented, should be appointed to examine the question in all its bearings and report.

The importance of the whole question of extraterritoriality is accentuated by the recent negotiations for the abolition of the much older system of capitulations in Turkey. According to press reports, the Allies consented to their abolition on the sole condition apparently that during a period of five years the Turkish judiciary should be assisted by a body of "Legal Councillors" appointed by Turkey herself. Whatever may be the case in Turkey, it is safe to say that no such substitute for extraterritoriality could be accepted as a sufficient safeguard for foreign rights in China. China has produced numerous Codes of Laws, but her judiciary, such as it is, is powerless in the face of military adventurers who recognize no law. It will be a generation at least before China is in a position to assert her claim to judicial equality with more civilized Powers. Shanghai may be cited as an example of the magnitude of the foreign interests at stake. It is rapidly becoming the most important and prosperous commercial centre East of Suez, and is a self-governing community which has no parallel elsewhere in the world. Some 800,000 Chinese and over 20,000 Europeans live under the benevolent rule of a municipal council composed of nine men, seven of whom are British, which administers a revenue almost equal to that of a small European State and is a model efficient Government. For Chinese and foreigners alike in these large commercial centres extraterritoriality is, in the present state of China, the sheet anchor on which all their vast business relations depend.

Far the most important result of the Washington Conference was the rendition of Shantung to China. On this the whole success of the Conference depended, for without it the U.S. Senate would not have ratified the Washington Agreements and China would not have signed

them. In England nobody seemed to know or care much about Shantung, but in America, where public opinion was much better informed, it became a very live question. It was felt that a great public wrong had been done which had to be rectified. There were, however, great difficulties in submitting the question directly to the Conference. Seven of the Powers sitting at the Conference table were signatories to the Treaty of Versailles handing over all German rights in Shantung to Japan, and were already committed. No favourable result could therefore be expected from a direct appeal. The Conference, however, offered an admirable opportunity for bringing Japan and China together and letting them thresh out their differences under its auspices. To facilitate this, the good offices of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour were offered to both sides and gratefully accepted. Representatives of both these statesmen were to be present at all the interviews and were to have the right to interpose with friendly suggestions. The delegates on both sides were admirably equipped for their task, and had the advantage of foreign expert advice of the highest order. A long duel was fought, extending over thirty-six meetings of three hours each, in which every foot of the ground was contested with courteous patience, great dialectical skill, and firm tenacity of purpose. Time and again there was a deadlock which necessitated reference to Peking or Tokio and threatened to end in a rupture. The proceedings were conducted entirely in English, and offered a striking example of the use which can be made of the English tongue in the hands of highly trained Oriental diplomatists. If the spoils of victory went to the Chinese, the palm for moral courage must be awarded to the Japanese delegates for shouldering the responsibility of a great unpopular act of self-denial. China not only regained all she had been obliged to cede to Germany twenty years before, but became the reversionary legatee of valuable public works which Germany and Japan had constructed during the long term of their occupation. During the fifteen years of their tenure of Kiaochow the Germans spent millions of money in developing the port of Tsingtao, in building fortifications, in constructing excellent roads throughout the leased territory, and in afforestation schemes in which the Emperor took a keen personal interest. The whole territory, embracing an area of 190 square miles, was a veritable piece of Germany transported to China. Their greatest achievement was the construction of a first-class railway, 265 miles in length, which connected the port with the capital of the province and opened up a rich country in which they carried on large mining enterprises. The whole of the leased territory was restored to China, who undertook to have it opened to foreign trade and residence. The railway was transferred to China on her agreeing to pay its assessed value. All Japanese troops were to be withdrawn from the railway and the port of Tsingtao, and thereafter no Japanese troops of any kind were to remain in any part of

Shantung. The Custom House at Tsingtao, which, under the German régime, was exclusively staffed by Germans, was to be made an integral part of the Chinese Maritime Customs under the British Inspector-General at Peking. The submarine cables, wireless stations, public buildings, etc., were taken over by China on payment of fair compensation. During the year which has elapsed since the Washington Conference, the Japanese have carried out all these engagements with scrupulous exactness, and China is now in full possession of her ancient province. Her best friends feel grave misgivings as to the use she will make of the port, the railway, and all the other numerous gifts she received at Washington.

I have given a very brief outline of some of the problems between China and the Powers which were solved at Washington, but there are other problems almost as important which await solution by China herself. Of these there is only time to notice one or two. In the forefront, perhaps, stands the reunification of the country under a Central Government. It would be an unprofitable task to attempt to describe the factional struggles which have kept China in a constant ferment during the past few years. The fundamental fact is that there is no longer any Government which can claim control over more than a very limited area of the country. There is a Government at Peking which is recognized by the Powers, but which has little authority outside the walls of the capital, and receives hardly any revenue from the provinces. It lives largely upon the surplus that remains over from the customs and salt revenue after meeting the service of the foreign loans, and is at the mercy of warring *tuchuns*. Then there is a Government at Canton, which administers two or three provinces, and has again entrusted its fortunes to the idealist visionary, Sun Yat-sên. In Manchuria the so-called war lord, Chang Tso-lin, smarting under his defeat by General Wu Pei Fu, threatens to proclaim his independence, and to make the three eastern provinces a separate State, presumably under the protection of some foreign Power, as Manchuria is in no position to stand alone. Yunnan and Kueichow, both poor provinces, maintain their independence by growing opium and raiding their richer neighbours; while in the far west a great and rich province like Szechuan passes through such bewildering and kaleidoscopic changes of government that it is futile to attempt to follow them. All this confusion is the work of ambitious militarists seeking their own selfish ends, with no regard for the interests of the country. There is absolutely no reason why China should be disunited. The Chinese are a homogeneous race, with a common language, a common literature, and common traditions, and left to themselves would only be too glad to live together in harmony. It says much for them that, in spite of the political confusion, they sow and reap and carry on much as usual. Such is the wonderful vitality of the people that it surmounts

all obstacles, and that the trade of the country goes on increasing, *tuchuns* and other pests notwithstanding.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the unification of the country is the lack of communications. There are less than 7,000 miles of railway in China as against some 35,000 in India and 250,000 in the United States. Vast regions are cut off from all communication, not only with the outer world, but with other parts of China. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that had Canton been linked by railway to Peking, the breach which has kept the North and South apart during the last few years would have been closed before now, and that remote provinces like Yunnan and Kueichow would not have developed such separatist tendencies if they had been accessible by through railway communication. In railway construction the Chinese have only a few hundred miles to their credit, all the rest being foreign built. The foreign-built railways are of two kinds—those constructed, financed, owned, and controlled by certain Powers as a possible means of economic and territorial penetration, and those built as Chinese Government railways by British and other European financiers on terms designed to safeguard the service of the loans and the efficient working of the lines. Railways of the former class are purely national undertakings, in which China has no part or lot—in fact, foreign railways on Chinese soil—and it is quite natural that China should refuse to grant any further concessions of the kind. But China is now going to the other extreme, and declines to give terms which will attract foreign capital to the railways of the second category. The result is a complete deadlock and the virtual stoppage of all railway construction. In spite of defective management and *tuchun* obstruction, railways pay handsomely everywhere, and the one crying need of the country is for better means of transportation. Efforts have from time to time been made to attract Chinese capital, but although there is an abundant supply in the country, the Chinese are much too shrewd to entrust their money to a Government in which they have little confidence. The potentialities of Chinese trade are boundless, but to turn them into realities the first requisite is railways.

Probably in most minds China is closely associated with opium. The controversies which ranged round the opium question for over a century are now happily laid at rest, but there is still an opium problem in China. For ten years—from 1907 to 1917—Great Britain and China co-operated in a great policy of suppression, with the result that in the latter year China was declared to be practically free from cultivation of the poppy, and the import of Indian opium, which had gone on for more than a century, ceased for all time. The Indian Government sacrificed a revenue of £4,000,000, and all through the campaign China showed a spirit of splendid self-denial. Unfortunately, there has been a grave relapse, owing primarily to the political con-

fusion, and China is again fast becoming an opium-ridden country. The *tuchuns* encourage the cultivation of the poppy, which forms the chief source of revenue for the support of their troops. In the absence of statistics, it is impossible to give exact figures, but it is probable that the present cultivation is as much as 20 or 25 per cent. of what it was when we started the work of suppression. India still sends opium to our own Far Eastern colonies and those of European Powers, generally for the consumption of Chinese settlers, and large quantities of morphia have, since the import of foreign opium ceased, been smuggled into China through Japan from England, the Continent of Europe, and America. The whole question of narcotic drugs has been handed over to the League of Nations, but that body can do little more than skate round the fringe of the question. The real remedy lies in the limitation of production to the medicinal requirements of the world, but with China, Turkey, Persia, and India all producing opium, that seems a counsel of perfection.

Time will only permit me to affix a note of interrogation to another question which involves grave issues for the future of China. What will be the future relations of Russia and China, and how far, if at all, will Bolshevism make itself felt among the Chinese? One could not help feeling that there was a vacant seat at the Washington Conference that would some day have an occupant who would again make his voice heard on Far Eastern questions. This feeling found expression in some of the Washington resolutions, which dwelt upon the necessity of avoiding all action in Siberia which might tend to compromise the interests of a future Russian Government. Before the European War all Chinese Turkestan, with an area of 400,000 square miles and a population of less than two millions, the whole of Outer Mongolia, and the vast regions of Northern Manchuria lay at the mercy of Russia, and it seemed to be only a question of time before she would make an immense addition to her far-flung Empire in the East. The Chinese Eastern Railway was entirely under Russian control, and Harbin, in the heart of Manchuria, with a population of 50,000 Russians, was practically a Russian town. Now all this is changed. The treaties and agreements which had grown up during an intercourse extending over two centuries, and which regulated their relations on a common frontier of 4,000 miles, have all been denounced. Representatives of the Soviet Government have been carrying on intermittent negotiations at Peking for the renewal of relations, and occasional newspaper paragraphs inform us that the Soviet authorities are prepared to make a clean slate of all the concessions granted to the Czarist régime in impairment of Chinese sovereignty. But these professions are not accepted at their face value, and are in marked contrast with the action of the "Reds" in Outer Mongolia, the evacuation

of which would, as the Chinese suggest, form a desirable preliminary to the negotiation of a treaty.

An American bishop, who has lived long in China, uttered a warning the other day about the alarming spread of Bolshevism, which was, he said, undermining the home and family life of the whole country. There can be no doubt that Bolshevik propaganda is a very active influence, especially amongst a certain section of the student class, but although a few advanced politicians have been coquetting with it and advocating a *rapprochement* between Russia, Germany, and China, I have sufficient confidence in the stability and good sense of the Chinese people to believe that they will never look for their regeneration in that quarter.

One word in conclusion. The picture I have drawn of China may seem a sombre one, but I would not have you think that I despond of the future. To get the proper perspective, one must sketch in the past and compare it with the present. A lifetime is not much in the history of a nation like China, and a survey of the immense changes which have taken place there in my time would leave a large balance to the credit of progress, both material and intellectual. When I first knew the country it was practically in the state in which the old Venetian traveller, Marco Polo, had found it six centuries before. There were no telegraphs, no railways, no postal facilities worth mentioning, and now one is no more immune from all those things in Peking than he is in London. In those days there was only one newspaper in the country, if the *Peking Gazette*, the oldest and surely the oddest news sheet that was ever published, could be dignified by such a name, and now there are over a hundred newspapers in the Peking district alone and probably several thousands in all China. The old literary style of composition which was a monopoly of the educated few has been discarded, and tons of literature are now being published in the vernacular or the new phonetic script, both of which are intelligible to the masses of the people. The old examination system was still in full force at the time of which I am speaking, and not a man in any Government department spoke a word of English. Now the modern Chinese official is at home in four or five languages, and is well read in all the current literature of the day. And yet, with all these advantages, and all this mental equipment, young China has, so far, failed to make good against the forces of reaction. But there are at least some hopeful signs. Public opinion is gradually becoming a force with which militarists and politicians will alike have to reckon some day. The mercantile classes, which comprise the cream and common sense of this nation, are beginning to scrutinise public expenditure and to call a halt to the reckless borrowing of Peking. Another significant movement is the issue of manifestos by the National Chambers of Commerce denouncing the evils of militarism and demanding the abolition

of the *tuchun* system. This is probably only the beginning of a campaign which is likely to be a hotly contested and protracted struggle. It is one in which foreigners can reasonably join forces with the Chinese in demanding security for life and property, and there are not wanting indications that foreign assistance, especially British and American, will be warmly appreciated. Already the British and Chinese Chambers of Commerce at Hankow and Shanghai have taken the initiative in mobilizing public opinion for the removal of the military incubus which is now paralyzing their common interests, and this is likely to prove far more effectual than any form of Government intervention.

China is passing through a tremendous evolution which, whether we like it or not, cannot be stayed in its progress. Personally, I think that the feverish activity of the present, in spite of all its depressing features, is more healthy than the stagnation of the past, and I still cling to the belief that, given time and patience, the Chinese will work out their own salvation and earn for themselves the place in the family of nations to which their number, intelligence, and industry so fully entitle them.

Mr. ARTHUR S. JELF (Malayan Civil Service): Mr. Chairman, Sir John Jordan, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I feel great diffidence in speaking, first of all because I am a very junior member of the Society, and secondly and more important, because, although I have been to China, I have not had the long residence in that country which alone produces the first-hand knowledge that Sir John Jordan, as we all know, possesses. But I have had the honour of working for twenty-three years in the Government Service of British Malaya, which, as I dare say most of you know, was built up very largely upon the industry of the Chinese, and in Malaya we are nowadays more and more interested in, affected by, and sensitive to, Chinese politics. It also so happens that in recent years circumstances have turned my attention very particularly to what is going on in China, but I hope that nobody here will think that I am claiming to be an expert in Chinese affairs: I speak merely as a looker-on who perhaps sees something of the game.

We have all listened with the greatest interest to what Sir John Jordan has said. His knowledge of the subject is, of course, colossal, and perhaps unrivalled in England to-day. What he said about the situation in Shanghai was particularly interesting, because there Britishers still seem to be rather in charge; and his account of Shantung specially claims attention. The present position in China is certainly unique in the eyes of the world: whether it is unique in the eyes of the Chinese I do not know, because they seem to have been oppressed by dynasty after dynasty for centuries. Perhaps it is

rather worse now. In China at the moment there is the ex-Emperor, in Peking, and there is the Peking Government, which, as Sir John Jordan said, is the only Government recognized by the Powers; there is a self-styled, but not recognized, Republic in Canton; and there is in China itself a number of bandits, for that is what they really are, some large and some small. There are five principal bandits. There is the man in Yunnan, whose name I have forgotten for the moment. In Canton there is Sun Yat-sên, facing Cheng Chiung Ming. What has happened there recently is somewhat obscure, but Sun Yat-sên seems to have got the better of it at present. In Northern China there is Chan Tso Lin back at Mukden, and there is Wu Pei Fu. Throughout the country, we gather from Sir John Jordan, there are bandits robbing each other and the people, and yet through it all the great trade of China, centuries old, goes on, with silk and tea and the hundreds of other things that the country produces, flowing out, and millions of people toiling, quite regardless, as Sir John Jordan said, of political parties. It is a most extraordinary spectacle.

Now, the subject of the lecture is "China and the Powers," and I suppose we are all agreed that the record of the Powers in China during the last thirty or forty years is not very creditable. The British went there in the first instance, doubtless with the best of motives, and did very well out of it! America and Japan have gone there, also doubtless with the best of motives, and they too have done very well out of it! A Chinese gentleman wrote a letter not so long ago, in which he said: "The Chinese political ship has been boarded by the pirates of the world, and in their dark rivalries they may scuttle it and all sink together, but not until they have first plundered and burnt civilization as we know it." That seems rather a good picture of China during the last three decades; and what are the Powers doing now? Are they playing the game? Sir John Jordan gave us a most interesting account of the Washington Conference, but whether China is going to be permitted to start with a clean slate or not is not very clear. What, for instance, has happened to the loans made by Japan? Have they all been wiped out, or has Japan still got a stranglehold? Have, indeed, any loans that have been made by the various Powers been cancelled? Which of the Powers is really most interested? Perhaps it may fairly be said that we are, with America and Japan almost as much. Russia is, or was, exceedingly interested, but rather seems to have passed out at the moment, and really Great Britain, America, and Japan seem the principal Powers concerned. Portugal, at Macao, and France, are also interested, but if only the three Powers, Great Britain, America, and Japan, could agree on some common policy, it might be very beneficial to China. In the old days there was the local financing by single exploiting Powers in

spheres protected by European influence. That, we hope, was ended by the Washington Conference. I say "we hope," but we do not know that it was. Is it now possible to get any international control of the financial situation with a real desire to help, and not to make money out of it? There was recently a very interesting article in the *Quarterly Review*, which Sir John Jordan has doubtless read, in which the writer thought that the solution of the problem was international control and policing of the railways. That does seem a solution, but are the Powers ever going to come together and police them without fighting among themselves? There are all these miles and miles of railways, and many more thousand miles to be made; but, human nature being what it is, it is difficult to imagine British, American, Japanese, French, Portuguese, and Russian soldiers and policemen working very well together at the moment. If that could be done, and if we could get control of, and guard, the railways, so as to let the great stream of commerce flow out of China without hindrance, that might be the solution, as Sir John Jordan evidently thinks.

Another thing that seems very important, to-day, is to get on good terms with "Young China." I have the honour of knowing several "Young Chinese" in Singapore, and very good fellows they are too—exceedingly keen and very intelligent. If "Young China" could make common cause with the great Chinese merchants, whose word is a bond all over the world, and get the "bandits" to sink their enmities, then progress might be made. In this connection, the expert, and devoted, "Chinese Protectorates" (as they are called) in Hong Kong and Singapore and the principal towns of the Malay States, and the British Consular representatives all over China, can do, and are doing, a great deal of good by thus getting into touch with "Young China." Sir John Jordan's account of the action taken by the Chambers of Commerce at Hankow and Shanghai was of great interest. That seems the right policy, and a much better way than any attempt by the British Government, as such, to do anything. Whether the League of Nations will ever be asked by China to lend a hand can scarcely be said yet, and anyway we can hardly suggest it.

The restoration of the Empire might be a solution of the difficulties of China. The present ex-Emperor is a boy of seventeen. He lives in Peking, and as he is being looked after by an Oxford man he is sure to be all right. (Laughter.) He is reported to be of great intelligence, and as wanting to come to Europe and so on, and if that figurehead, or whatever you like to call it, was restored to China, the millions and millions of people would feel that, as in the old days, they had something to look up to. I am not a great believer in republics, especially for a comparatively primitive people like the peasantry of China, and I think Sir John Jordan agrees.

One more point. From the British point of view, a great improvement and extension of our Consular Service seems highly desirable. I know several members of that Service, and if I may be permitted to say so, they do very good work, but a great deal more might be done by them, and by the newly created department which works with the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade—the Department of Overseas Trade, in the way of what used to be called “Peaceful Penetration.” If we can only get on better with the Chinese we can do something for them, but if we get their backs up they can make it extremely unpleasant, if not entirely impossible, for the foreigners in the various Treaty Ports of the country, and indeed, as was seen recently, in Hong Kong.

Sir John Jordan spoke about opium. Perhaps there will never be agreement on this very vexed subject. Personally, I venture to think that the moderate use of opium, like the moderate use of anything else, is not harmful, and the price of opium, at any rate in Malaya, is so high that only a moderate consumption is possible to the average man. There seems something inconsistent between the reputation that the opium-smoking Chinese have for being the hardest-working nation in the world and the theory that opium is harmful. In the Straits Settlements, some years ago, we had a Commission on the subject, and some very striking evidence was given in direct contradiction of the common theory. And the alternatives, brandy, morphia, and cocaine, are having results too dreadful to contemplate.

I do not think that I have anything more to say, except to thank you very much for listening to me so patiently. (Applause.)

Lieut.-Colonel A. C. YATE: I have myself only touched the fringe of China, but I have in mind one or two reminiscences which may be interesting. The first time I visited China was in the winter of 1887-88, when, starting from Mandalay, we annexed the Shan States. That brought the British frontier to the Salwin River. The officer commanding the Expedition and I, being his Intelligence Officer, crossed the river and had an interview with the Chinese official at Kunlon. An important trade-route crosses the Salwin at this point, which is marked on our maps as “Kunlon Ferry.” At that time the construction of a railway from Mandalay to Kunlon and onward into Yunnan was thought of, but I believe I am right in saying that that railway stops at Lashio, and does not reach China.

My next visit was in March, 1898, to Peking, at a very interesting time. The Russians were on the point of occupying Port Arthur, and, as you will imagine, excitement ran high. If I remember rightly, British, Russian, and Japanese squadrons were all cruising round or lying off there. We British travellers visited our own squadron from Chefoo. At the Astor House at Tientsin, to my surprise, I ran across an old German friend who had played a very prominent part indeed

in the annexation of German East Africa, a man of the name of Eugen Wolff, the right-hand man and commercial adviser of Major Von Wissmann. I had met him originally at Aden, coming back extremely ill from East Africa, so ill that I thought there was no hope for his life. He came to India for an operation, and I was of some help to him. He was very much alive when I met him again at Tientsin. He had been in the interior of China,* closely watched, naturally, by the British Legation, and when I was found to be a friend of his, the British Legation were almost equally inclined to closely watch me. Eugen Wolff said to me, "I am starting across Shantung to-morrow." I fancy Kiaochow was his destination. Anyway, about that time Germany occupied Kiaochow. He was a curious fellow, and in some way offended his own missionaries. I was extremely surprised a little later to take up *The Times* and see that my friend was charged by his own German missionaries with having gone into a Chinese court, turned the magistrate out of the seat, occupied it himself with his dog—a very characteristic dog, hight "Herr von Schuster," of which I have a photograph still—tried the criminals, who were charged, if I mistake not, with the murder of German missionaries, and acquitted them. I never got to the bottom of that story. I wrote to my friend and said, "What is the meaning of all this?" and he wrote back in German, "Er ist ein Lump der keine Feinde hat" ("He is a very poor fellow who has got no enemies"). More than that I never got out of him. My son being at Hanover recently studying German, I took the opportunity to try and find out through him what had become of Wolff. His fellow-countrymen understood him well. The pith of the reply that reached me was, "Had Wolff been alive, we should have known it. His light hides under no bushel." Early in the twentieth century he was up in a Zeppelin at Lake Constance. I have not heard of him since.

In April, 1905, I again made a journey homeward from India via China and Japan, and that was an equally interesting moment. We watched from the verandah of the Singapore Club Rodjestvensky's fleet coming through the Malay Straits to its doom, and then I passed on to Japan. Port Arthur had surrendered, and we carried home a number of Russian prisoners who had been released from Port Arthur; among others a young Count Keller, a somewhat rabid Russian. He was on parole. A curious thing happened to him on the voyage. His uncle, General Count Keller, had been killed in one of the battles of the Russo-Japanese war in Manchuria, and when his body was found, his dog was beside it and would not leave it. The dog was removed finally and brought to Yokohama. There it was brought on board and handed over to young Count Keller. It travelled with us to Vancouver, and the Customs officials of Canada and the United States were so

* I have his book "Im Innern Chinas."—A. C. Y.

affected by the story that they gave that dog very special treatment. I believe there was a six months' quarantine in the United States for dogs, but they at once saw it right through to New York, and it went away home with young Keller. Another point about that journey. I happened quite accidentally to take up the other day an old magazine article that I had written in 1905, and there I found it recorded that I had met during the journey from Vancouver to Ottawa a certain Lieutenant Kolchak of the Russian Navy, and had several most interesting conversations with him. I had forgotten that we had ever met, but there was the record in the article. Lieutenant Kolchak told me that he had been sent from Russia in 1903 to try and trace the fate of a Russian expedition to the "New Siberia" group of islands, headed by Baron Toll. He discovered in Bennett Island that the entire expedition had perished. He then came to the mainland of Siberia and worked his way up the Lena River to Yakutsk, and so had found his way to Manchuria and Port Arthur, where again, in due course, he had become a prisoner. I am not perfectly certain whether that Kolchak is the man we all so highly respect as having fought Bolshevism in Siberia until he himself fell a victim to an ill-fortune which was too strong for him, but I am inclined to think that he was. He was a quiet man of very nice manners, rather a contrast to some of his fellow-countrymen and women who travelled with us. Well, ladies and gentlemen, it occurred to me to mention some of these reminiscences, which I hope you will accept for what they are worth. (Applause.)

The LECTURER: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen—I have really very little to say in reply to the very kind criticisms that have been made. The gentleman who spoke about the Malay States indicated one or two questions with regard to loans. I think that the position as regards the loans in China is that the loans secured on the Customs and salt are perfectly safe—so far as anything financial can be safe. The others, the unsecured loans, are not, and those loans amount to about £100,000,000. Nothing has been done with regard to those loans at all, and I do not see much possibility of anything being done. About half of them are Japanese loans made during the war on conditions which no one knows. As a matter of fact the only sound policy now is to give China no money at all; loans will certainly be misspent, and I have not much sympathy with people who give loans to China under present conditions. As regards international control of police and railways, it is a panacea not likely to be of much practical effect. It is easy to use such expressions as "International Control," "Intervention," and all those terms, but putting them into practice is very difficult. I have had some experience of international work at Peking, and it is not the remedy that I would suggest. I think that what has been done in trying to work up Chinese public opinion may

be of some assistance: at any rate it is the only lever apparently that one can use. There is a certain amount of control at the moment: the Customs revenue is entirely under a British Inspector-General, and is practically an international asset, and the salt was placed in 1913 under Sir Richard Dane from India. Those are the two great sources of revenue which go to Peking—hardly anything else. But for these two sources of revenue under foreign control the Peking Government could not live six months—it lives upon them and upon nothing else. The Provinces have fiscal autonomy, and the position now is, that Peking simply lives upon those two sources of revenue, both of which are under foreign control. The Customs money is handed over to the banks in the first instance, who use it to meet the service of the foreign loans, and only the remainder is passed on to the Chinese Government—the surplus is released, in fact, by the diplomatic body at Peking. That is pretty close control, but all that close control does not do much good in one way; it does not interest the Chinese in their own affairs, and until you can get the Chinese to work out their own salvation, I am afraid that foreigners can only assist them and cannot initiate. As regards the restoration of the Emperor, I am afraid that is very unlikely. I think the Manchu Dynasty is finished. I know the young Emperor's tutor, who is an excellent man. The Emperor is a very intelligent lad indeed, but I do not think the South of China would ever have a Manchu Emperor again, or that a Manchu Emperor could reunite China. A republic is the last thing that China is suited for, but I do not know the alternative. As regards the Consular Service, I am an old Consular man, and I venture to say that no service in the world is better than the Consular Service in China. It does excellent service. (Applause.) As regards the commercial work, when the Department of Overseas Trade was first established it could do no better than take men from the Consular Service in China. So far as that department is concerned, it has made no difference in China at all. It has simply utilized the Consular men to do the commercial work that they were doing before. I entirely agree with regard to the Hong Kong strike, but it is a very delicate question. I think Hong Kong should be run in very close co-operation with China. It is an extremely difficult situation; China is always in a position to organize a strike, and, in fact, almost starve out Hong Kong. The relations between the two have to be carefully adjusted. On opium we must agree to differ, though I have no doubt if I were in the Malay Straits I should hold exactly the same view as Mr. Jelf. I think Singapore derives nearly fifty per cent. of its whole revenue from opium, and that in itself is a very strong argument from the colony's point of view. I agree that opium is better than morphia. I was exceedingly interested in what Colonel Yate said about Kolchak, and I imagine he is right. I knew Kolchak well for some time in Peking, and often saw him and

had many talks with him, and my impression is that he had been in that part of the country before. I saw him just before he started on his ill-fated expedition, and talked over his project with him. He was an extremely patriotic man. I never thought he would succeed, but he was an absolutely fearless man who faced a hopeless business. As regards the railways, that railway never materialized.

It never went further than Lashio. I think Lord Curzon did not favour the proposal, and looking back, I feel that he was right. At the time a great many of us in China were disappointed with the attitude of the Indian Government, for, as you know, France had made a railway from Hanoi up to Yun-nan-foo. That was a purely national railway, a French railway in every respect. Looking back on the whole thing, I think that Lord Curzon was decidedly wise in not sanctioning the expenditure of public money on the construction of a British railway on Chinese soil. I thank you for your kind reception. (Applause.)

CASPIAN NAVAL EXPEDITION, 1918-1919

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held on Thursday, April 12, 1923, at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., General Sir Charles Munro presiding, when Captain David Norris, C.B., R.N., gave a lecture on "The British Navy in the Caspian, 1918-19."

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—It is my pleasure to introduce to you this afternoon Captain Norris, our lecturer, who has been kind enough to give us a lecture to-day on the "British Fleet in the Caspian during the years 1918 and 1919."

Captain NORRIS: In the spring of 1918 those in Mesopotamia heard of a "hush hush" force going up to Persia. This was Dunsterforce. Its object was to raise local levies against the Turks. Its composition was a small staff and a number of junior officers and N.C.O.'s. Probably few such forces were so carefully picked for fighting men or had a higher percentage of decorations among their members.

Dunsterforce never gained its object, for the Russian collapse and the Persian famine put an end to the idea for the time, but it remained in Persia as a Famine Relief Force, as also a force of some great military potentiality.

As events in Russia moved and the wave of Bolshevism started to spread east and south, the value of Persia flanking the railway line from Krasnovodsk to Turkistan—with the port of Enzeli on the Caspian as a means of reaching Baku, and Baku itself as an important link in the chain to Merv—came more and more to the front. Two railway lines lead to Turkistan and India from Russia: the northern one from Samarra passes over the head of the Sea of Aral, and, turning clockwise through Tashkent, Samarcand, Bokhara, and Charjui, reaches Merv; the other runs through Northern Caucasia, down the west coast of the Caspian to Baku. On the east coast it runs from Krasnovodsk to Merv; from Merv the line runs south to Afghanistan. The northern line was in the domain of Kolchak and "Malmis," and it need only be said that as Kolchak retreated, so the Red Army moved down to Turkistan. The question of sea-transport did not enter into the matter at all as regards the northern railway. With the southern line it was different, for if Baku or Krasnovodsk could be held, or the sea between them controlled, or the means of sea-transport removed, then no threat along this line could mature. It seems im-

portant that this point should be kept in mind, for it appears to be the real reason why we were sent to the Caspian. So long as we maintained control of the gap between Baku and Krasnovodsk, so long we prevented any Bolshevik Army which might be organized in Turkistan being transported to Russia, and also we prevented any munitions such as cotton, of which the Germans were in need, being transported via Russia to Germany.

A clear idea of this is necessary to understand the reason for some 1,000 officers and men of the Royal Navy finding themselves on an inland sea, hundreds of miles from blue water.

The first idea we in the navy had of any movement touching us was in June, 1918, when G.H.Q., Baghdad, asked if a *Fly* class gunboat could be taken to pieces, put on lorries, and thus transported to the Caspian. The gun was limited to a 12-pounder; the maximum weight on any lorry not to exceed two tons. Workshops were to be provided at the other end to reassemble the ships. The reply was against the idea. It was, however, proposed that certain 4-inch guns might be transported to the Caspian and mounted on whatever craft were found there. Our knowledge of the Caspian was very limited. We had little idea of what ships might be found on that sea, but we knew that the Russians had four gunboats, two fairly modern. It was known that there was a fishing trade, so there might be fishing-boats, sail, steam, or motor.

Nothing more was heard until July 11, when orders were received that it was "desired to obtain control of the ships on the Caspian," and a consultation was held at Baghdad as to:

- (a) Removing the gunboats and as many other ships as possible from Baku to Enzeli;
- (b) To mount 4·7-inch guns in merchant ships;
- (c) To set up a seaplane base at Enzeli; and
- (d) A naval officer was to start off and see what was available at Enzeli and what was required.

Here was a fairly ambitious plan. It included:

1. A visit to Baku to obtain possession of the gunboats, but they were to be removed. We were not to remain at Baku and retain control of the gunboats there, but we were to take them away—*i.e.*, we were to deny sea-power to others.
2. To remove as many ships as possible—*i.e.*, to deny sea-transport to others.
3. To mount guns and start a seaplane base—*i.e.*, to gain sea-power for ourselves and provide for local defence by aircraft.

No general command of the Caspian was mentioned. It was to be a dash to Baku, get the ships, and prevent the enemy from spreading oversea to Trans-Caspia, not by holding the terminal ports, but by removing the ships which he would need for this purpose.

The East India Station was ill adapted to meet the call of providing a naval expedition. The cruisers manned by the Royal Navy were required for commerce protection, while the majority of the remainder were manned largely by Lascars, men not suited for such an enterprise. There were but a few guns in reserve, and these were of an old pattern, so a start had to be made with what was available on the Tigris. There were two gunboats, *Moth* and *Mantis*, from which certain men could be drafted, and there were a certain number of 4-inch ex-*Fly* class gunboats, which could be made available.

A party of two naval officers and twenty-two seamen were equipped by the military for shore service, and the 4-inch guns were dismounted from the gunboats and prepared for loading on lorries.

On July 23 the naval Commander-in-Chief ordered that a party was to start for the Caspian as soon as the conference with G.H.Q. was over, and he was sending all available white ratings and officers and guns to Baghdad. These did not, however, arrive for some time. On the morning of July 27 our party left Baghdad with one 4-inch gun and two 12-pounders.

The transport difficulties were very great. The distance from Baghdad to Enzeli is about 700 miles. West of Hamadan there was no metalled road, but from that town the Russian road ran to Kazvin and Enzeli. What happened was that we followed the camel and mule track, one car behind the other; but the going was dreadful, and with heavy weights, such as 4-inch guns, the wear of the transport was deadly. Over and above this was the question of petrol. Until we were assured that we could obtain petrol from Baku, each gallon had to be carried up the line by lorries, which practically ate their cargo as they went. There was a famine of tins, and the tins had to be brought back to Baghdad. Our route lay through Baquba, Qasr-i-Shirin, Karind, Kermanshah, and Hamadan, to Kazvin.

Apart from the difficulties of the road, there was the question of the famine. Three armies had been through Persia in two years, and there was a famine in the land, so it will be understood that the advent of the British Army in large numbers was not very popular; for while we paid, the merchants profited, and the poor went without food. It is actually a fact that in July, 1918, two women were stoned to death in Hamadan, just as one hears described in the Bible, their offence being that they caught children and sold their flesh in the market for food.

The towns I have mentioned will be familiar to you all. There were the old bridges and the villages perched on the side of the hills. We climbed Pi-Tak Pass and saw Alexander's Arch, and reached Kazvin on August 2.

Here was General Dunsterville, seeing Dunsterforce become a real force as regards numbers.

The news was :

1. The Russian General Bicherakov, who had fought his way out of Persia to the sea, had gone to Baku, but being convinced that the place could not be held, and not wishing to be trapped, had left Baku and gone on to Derbent.

2. A few weeks before Baku had overthrown the Bolsheviks. The town was besieged by Turks and Tartars ; the defence was in the hands of Russians and Armenians. British help had been asked for, and petrol had been promised.

3. A set of bandits, called Junglies, who lived in the jungle near Resht, had attacked our troops in the town. The Hampshire Regiment had lost about eighty men, and the Gurkhas had wiped out the Junglies.

4. It seemed that the Turks were none too friendly with the Tartars. The Tartars wanted revenge on the Armenians. The gentle Armenian had in the previous March massacred about 9,000 Tartars. The Turk was being driven by the Hun, who wanted oil.

It was clear that the success of the naval effort depended on the fate of Baku. No Baku meant no ships, no oil fuel, no petrol.

On August 4 we started from Kazvin to the Caspian—a most wonderful ride, for we passed from the bare uplands of Persia to Manjil, which is reputed to be the windiest place on earth, but at least is green, and then down through every sort of scenery that might be—Scotch mountains, then an English park, then through green valleys, like Japan, down to muggy swamps. We expected to be attacked by the Junglies, and the road was one very easy to block, but nothing occurred. We passed many signs of the Russian retreat, where lorries, vans, and cars had gone over the edge, and as we neared Resht we saw where the Gurkhas had destroyed the houses from which they had been sniped. It was quite clear that the Gurkhas had put the fear of heaven into the local inhabitants.

Enzeli produces a particularly virulent brand of mosquito.

Pending the time we were to sail to Baku, we set to work to dig ourselves in. We found some steamers, borrowed their charts, and got some Russian ex-naval officers to translate their names. We examined the oil storage, and put out feelers for the tank to be filled. We "took over the port," paying a month's rent in advance, thereby driving a wedge between the Enzeli folk and the Baku folk. The people at Enzeli got the money and the people at Baku wanted it. We prospected for a seaplane base and took stock of things generally.

On August 14 the party of two officers and twenty-two seamen and their three guns arrived. They had done very well, and we went to live on board s.s. *Kruger*.

On August 16 we left for Baku, and reached there on the 17th. You will know of Baku, of a town that is Tartar and Russian ; of

the confusion, intrigue, and double-dealing; of the many Generals and the still greater number of Committees; and now when once the British came to Baku the Armenians were well content to eat the food we collected and paid for, and to leave us to do the fighting while they obstructed in every possible way. It is notable of the mistrust with which we were looked upon by the people at Baku that such simple things as putting up notice boards and numbers on the pier were at once declared to be a proof that we were trying to annex the place.

Talking of the food question, food was scarce, and a ration of excellent caviare was served out to the troops. This strange food was not appreciated, and a portion of caviare which would probably have cost five or seven shillings at the Carlton was thrown away with the remark that they "did not like this — fish jam."

Another incident showing our difficulties was, that by means of their friends inside the town the headquarters of the besieging General was lit by the power-station inside Baku.

We found in the harbour a number of steamers, including thirteen which had been seized by the local Bolsheviks, who had endeavoured to clear out with most of the guns and ammunition from the arsenal. These had been chased and brought back by a force which we came to know very well—the Centro-Caspi Flotilla. This force consisted of the ex-Russian naval gunboats and some armed steamers. The crews were to all intents and purposes Bolshevik to a man, and they quite understood their own power. They were the only force with heavy guns or with any sort of discipline. They had bombarded the town, they could control all the shipping, and they were quite determined that the British should not share their power; and we had no means of enforcing our wishes. However they were short of ammunition, and hoped to get our guns and ammunition, with British crews serving under their control.

From the start efforts were made to get merchant ships and arm them, but so complete were the nationalization and the determination to obstruct us that nothing could be bought or exported; and, added to this, the largest shipyard, Nobel's, was Swedish, a country which had anti-British ideas.

Of the siege you have heard; of the fine work of our troops; of the way in which those for whom we were fighting left their posts; and of the repeated warnings given by the British General that the town could not be held if this went on, but all to no effect.

The enemy had excellent information as to what was going on in the town, and our ship *Kruger* was shelled from pier to pier.

As time went on the situation seemed to get worse. We heard that the Turks were coming down from Tabriz to cut our road lines of communication from Baghdad, moving down to Zenjan, Bijar, and Sehneh, so reinforcements were held up. The "powers that be" decided that if

we were to be captured in Baku the numbers there were quite enough to lose.

On September 1 a big pow-wow was held ashore, and General Dunsterville pointed out that the place could not be held, and that unless the Armenians did more, the Turks could walk into the town when they liked; that the British had not been sent to Baku to be captured, but to assist in the defence; and that if the inhabitants could not or would not do their share, then they must make the best terms they could and the British would evacuate. This was taken very badly, and the Tartar revenge seemed close. They talked and they raved. One man rushed to the telephone, rang up the dockyard, and warned the Centro-Caspi Flotilla to fire on us if we went to sea; and they said that the Armenians were very brave and could defeat any number of Turks. After this the Committees eased up their opposition a little as regards their co-operation.

A gunboat did go out with the idea of bombarding the railway by which the Turks drew their supplies, but the ship's Committee came on the forebridge, and having looked at the chart (which they did not understand) decided that the ship was too close in, and they steamed away.

Suggestions were made that the British should arm two ships with their guns, these ships to be under the control of the Russians. There was no idea of allowing this last, but the opportunity was taken to start preparing the ships.

September 4 was a memorable day. At breakfast General Dunsterville said: "Commodore, I am going to rate you a Rear-Admiral; I think it will increase your prestige with the Russians." The reply was made that he could not rate the Commodore a Rear-Admiral—only the Admiralty could do that. However, Stalky-like, he persisted, and finally the Commodore clinched the matter by saying: "Very good, sir; if you make me a Rear-Admiral, I'll make you a Bishop." And the subject was then dropped.

The bombardment eased up for a few days, and we were told that the Turks were getting their heavy guns into position, and spies told us of an intended attack.

On the 13th we got definite news that the attack was to be made next day. A Tartar schoolmaster, who had been badly thrashed by the Turks, came in and said the attack would start at 4 a.m. next morning. His information was quite correct. At four o'clock on the 14th the attack commenced, with a feint on our right and centre, the real attack being on our left. We on board could do little except to prepare to receive the wounded, and the troops if they had to retire. We found a number of bales of cotton, and with these we rigged traverses on the pier and made protection for engine-room and steering gear. The pass up the cliffs at Volche-Vorota, or Wolfgate, was forced and our troops driven

back, and by 4 p.m. the heights above the town were taken, and it was just a question of time, and also if the Turks would press into the town that night. This they did not do, for the Armenian is a good street-fighter, and the attacking forces were worn out.

Gloucesters, Worcesters, Staffords, all did well, and we were told that they could hold their line until 8 or 9 p.m.

At 6.30 p.m. one ship was sent away with women, wounded, and various small parties. No movement was made by the C.-C. Flotilla, and it was noticed that the guard-ship had her guns covered. All the craft that could move got up steam, and the smoke and a southerly wind combined to hide the ships. Other parties and wounded were got into s.s. *Kursk* and *Kruger* without difficulty, but when guns, carts, and wagons began to arrive matters were difficult. It was dark; there were no working parties, and there was ever a chance of a stampede. However, bit by bit they were got on board. It was very hard to refuse the gunners to take their mules which had come all the way from Baghdad, or a man who said he had had his charger for three years, but there was no room, and the men just fell asleep as they got aboard.

Meanwhile messages and deputations were coming from the Armenians, who said that the town could be held and the British must stay; but the General was firm. He said that he had pointed out what would happen. The British had done all possible, and now they must go. One Armenian was more insistent than the others. He said that we *must* stay, and that if we attempted to go the gunboats would sink us; and *still* he was told that the troops were going. Finally he said to the General: "Tell me, are you determined to go?" and being told "Yes," he said: "Then will you give me a passage for myself and my family?"

Except for odd rifle shots the firing ceased towards 11 p.m., and having waited till we thought all who could possibly come in had come, the engines of the armoured and other cars were smashed, the animals turned loose, and in *Kruger*, the last ship, we left the pier.

We were nearly caught owing to the action of a suspect Russian on board, who switched on the charthouse lights just as we passed the guard-boat, which opened fire on us. However we went full speed at it, and having nearly come to grief over a large barge floating in the harbour, reached the open sea. We brought away between eleven and twelve hundred folk, including refugees, and Colonel Rawlinson brought away the pick of the arsenal. The men lost all their kit; they just had what they stood up in, and most of the officers were the same.

We reached Enzeli about 9 p.m. on the 15th, finding there many ships, including the two we had sent ahead. The menace from Tabriz was so great that orders had come to evacuate Enzeli and fall back on Kazvin, but these orders had not been complied with.

Here ended the first stage of our expedition. Baku had been held for six weeks; Turkish troops needed elsewhere had been forced to

remain at Baku, and thus some help was perhaps given to General Allenby, whose victories were shortly to relieve the pressure on Persia. It is not easy to say if it was wise for us to go there, or the opposite, for one does not know the inner political side. Was it a gamble, or was it a dash? Did we want to keep Baku, or only to stop oversea traffic? Or was Krasnovodsk more important? But it seems fair to put forward this point:—

The British force as sent was itself too weak to defend Baku. The poor fighting qualities of the Armenians might have been foreseen. The extraordinarily obstructive tactics of the Committees could not have been so well foreseen. Perhaps our principal difficulty was the help given to the Turk by the Tartar as a fellow-Mohammedan, but anyhow it was quite certain that the people in Baku, whether Armenian, or Russian, or Mohammedan, had no idea of allowing us to destroy the oil wells, or the port, or the dockyard, as part of a war scheme in which they were not interested, or of allowing us to take their ships away. Lastly, it may be added, we were far from the sea, our line of communication was long and liable to be cut, and nobody knew very much about Baku or the Caspian.

The fall of Baku finished the first phase of our time on the Caspian, and at one period it seemed that we were a great deal further off doing what we had been sent to do, but after a bit it seemed clearer. So far, we had been merely defending Baku, and while Baku remained, so the Committees remained to thwart all naval efforts. Now Baku had fallen we were free to start on our own.

We risked that the Turks would not come oversea to Enzeli, and the first thing to do was to take stock of what we had in hand.

1. A number of ships had run from Baku to Enzeli: some might be suitable.

2. S.s. *Ventuir* was one of these, and work had been started on her with a view to fitting guns; she could be carried on with.

3. The army might lend us craftsmen.

4. We might get some help from among the refugees.

But after a deal of hunting we could get neither a suitable workshop nor material at Enzeli, and so we had to go elsewhere to look for it.

Kruger was armed with four field guns bedded on the bales of cotton that we had used to protect her machinery when evacuating Baku; and on September 20, less than a week after we left Baku, we put to sea an armed ship with a British crew of R.F.A. gunners, and sailed for Krasnovodsk. This was a railway terminus, and we might find workshops and material. We reached there about midnight on September 21, and were received with a large brass band—and the Committee. Here we did find machine shops and material (though the main workshops were at Kizil-Arvat, further up the line), and a very

keen helper in the shape of Mr. Khun, late a ticket collector on the railway, and now President of the local Committee. He was pro-English and anti-Bolo. The workshops were put at our disposal, and it was arranged that we should shift from Enzeli to Krasnovodsk, and make that our fitting-out base. As more men and guns came from Baghdad, so more ships were taken up. Enzeli was organized and some sort of discipline re-established among the mercantile Russian crews. The Enzeli garrison gave us valuable help, and by the end of October—six weeks after the fall of Baku—there were five British armed ships on the Caspian. They were small, not in good condition, and their guns were old-fashioned ; but there they were.

On October 31 came the news of the Armistice with Turkey, which changed the situation very materially. Early in November five armed ships went north to Petrovsk, and one went on as far as Guriev to get in touch with the Ural Cossacks, who were acting under Kolchak.

Thus we started to stretch out oversea to the north. At Petrovsk Bicherakov was being besieged by the Turk. He eventually left there and came to Enzeli. Here a meeting was held between the British, Russians, and certain representatives from Baku. These last were willing that the British should re-occupy the town, but did not want the Russians back.

On November 17—two months after our evacuation—a fleet of transports organized by the British, convoyed by the armed ships manned and gunned by the British, anchored off Baku, and the town was re-occupied.

The Turks were encamped outside the town, and it was a job to get them away owing to the large amount of loot they had collected. They were compelled to disgorge a good deal, but they certainly did not go empty away.

So here we were back again at Baku, with five armed ships and three more arming. We were certain of our oil ; touch was being opened with the Mediterranean via Batum and the Dardanelles, and we had our base at Krasnovodsk. But our troubles were only just starting again. The confusion at Baku was no better. The Tartar had had his revenge on the Armenians and had murdered some 16,000—this, of course, in return for the Armenians having massacred Tartars in the previous March ; the Tartar was cross at having lost control of the city ; the C.-C. Flotilla was notoriously Bolshevik, and up north the Bolsheviks were bringing ships down the Volga and arming them at Astrakhan. So the same routine had to be started as for Enzeli. First a squadron started to cruise for the north, and we had eight ships in the early part of December. Next, the base was shifted from Krasnovodsk over to Baku. The docks were cleared of mud. Tact and Irish humour got the right side of the workers, who were given their back pay and steady wages. Better guns came by rail, and a fair

supply of ammunition, this last being most important, for previously everything had to come up through Persia on camel-back.

But difficulties were very great; the Bolshevik element was very strong and anti-British. There was only paper money to deal with; food was scarce, and there was a general unrest. We heard that the Bolsheviks from Astrakhan were endeavouring to form a base on the mainland near Chechin Island.

Early in December two of our ships were attacked at anchor by three Bolshevik armed ships convoying three transports. The British ships weighed and gave battle; the enemy ran and got away. The expenditure of ammunition was serious, as there were no reserves, but the moral gain was there. Three Bolsheviks had run away from two British, and the transports had been prevented from bringing troops.

Another anxiety was that of the intercepted signals from the C.-C. Flotilla in Baku, showing that they were in touch with the Bolsheviks at Astrakhan; so we had an actual enemy to the north and a possible enemy to the south.

However, at the end of December a squadron of five of our ships closed in on the enemy's base, bombarded it, and burnt it to the ground. All that we could do now was to wait and see if the enemy would make any further attempt before the ice came. They had failed to reinforce their friends on the mainland; their ships had run; their base was destroyed; and they did nothing more.

By the middle of January the northern part of the Caspian was frozen over, and we were free to go on with our reorganization. One of the first things to do was to try and make the ships more habitable, for they were only tankers, and not adapted to carrying the large number of men required. Their engines were in poor condition, and our guns were still inferior to those of the enemy. Labour troubles increased, and the rouble, which was worth 2s. 3d. in time of peace, fell to 3d. in January, 1919, and was only two-thirds of a penny in September, 1919. Twelve C.M.B.'s—*i.e.* small wooden torpedo-boats—came over by rail; a base was formed at Baku and at Petrovsk, and two ships were adapted to carry two boats each. The Air Force arrived; they started their base at Petrovsk, and one ship was adapted to carry two seaplanes. This Air Force was under the command of an ex-R.N.R. officer, a real seaman as well as a very competent airman, and it was of the utmost value to us that we were co-operating with a force commanded by a seaman who understood our needs. Two 6-in. guns were mounted for coast defence at Baku and two at Petrovsk. Naval barracks were commissioned at Baku, and a small dépôt at Petrovsk. A further advanced base was started at Chechin for the Air Force—this to be their jumping-off ground when bombing Astrakhan. The type of aircraft was improved and the numbers grew.

Ever our difficulty was with discontented workmen, Bolshevik

propaganda, and strikes, and it was a very anxious time. We wondered if we should be ready before the end of the winter, when the ice would break up and the Volga would be open.

The question of the Russian forces at Baku gave rise to a great deal of anxiety. Nominally they were under General Denekin, actually they were playing for their own hand, and it became clear that we should have to deal with them. Denekin did not care to pay the C.-C. Flotilla, who were not very loyal to him, and whose work was done by the British. He sent a General to pay off the Flotilla; unfortunately the General brought no money, but appealed, as usual, to the British. The Flotilla, rather like the executioner in "Alice in Wonderland," said it was impossible to be paid off if there was nothing to pay them with, and declined to move. Finally an ultimatum was given to the Russians that the Russian Volunteer Army was to leave the town, and that the Russian crews were to leave their ships.

This was on February 28. We were a very weak force from the naval point of view. The ships actually at Baku were refitting, but we had the C.M.B.'s.

Part of the C.-C. Flotilla—some five ships—broke out of harbour and anchored outside, where they thought we could not reach them; part remained inside the harbour. Nothing could have been better from our point of view, for the enemy had divided his forces. The Fleet Commissar, one Vorensky, a cavalry officer, was summoned to G.H.Q., and was told that if his ships did not surrender they would be sunk. His reply was to ask for a special train to Batum; he said he could do nothing.

The C.M.B.'s then appeared. Such ships as had remained in harbour were shepherded to certain piers; the essential parts of guns and engines were removed, and the crews made prisoners.

Then we dealt with those outside. The C.M.B.'s went out carrying an interpreter and a representative of the Commissar. They were told that if they did not surrender ten minutes after the last ship had been visited they would be torpedoed. Two torpedoes were actually fired; luckily they ran deep, but the effect had been obtained—they thought it had been done on purpose, and in one of the ship's logs we found the following:

3.25—They fired a torpedo.

3.28—Decided to surrender.

The five ships weighed and returned to Baku. As they reached the piers the friends of the crews went off in their boats and took away their pals, who apparently all expected to be shot. The same routine was carried out: breech-blocks and essentials of engines were removed, British guards put on board, and by 8 p.m. the teeth of the C.-C. Flotilla had been finally drawn. The Russian crews were kept on board for a while and then disbanded.

We heard news that the Bolsheviks had got T.B.D.'s down the Volga and were preparing a number of ships, and there were numerous local troubles round Petrovsk; but the removal of the Russian forces from Baku meant the easing up of a great deal of anxiety.

Early in April the Volga was reported free from ice, and the state of the squadron was four ships fairly efficient, and nine ships at Baku in various stages of fitting and re-arming.

We now come to the third stage of our time in the Caspian—*i.e.*, the events after the breaking up of the ice.

We knew that the Bolsheviks were very short of oil fuel; that they intended to make efforts to join hands with their friends at Baku. Practically they could only come by sea. It was a race who could get their ships ready first and who would be top-dog on the water.

On April 19 *Asia* had a long-range action with two T.B.D.'s. She chased them into shallow water and the enemy retired.

Towards the end of April we got a very welcome addition in the shape of improved wireless gear, but unfortunately we remained short of wireless ratings.

At the end of April and early in May there were various small scraps with the Bolsheviks, who kept in shallow water and were evidently seeing what forces we had and what lines we were going on.

Fog was very prevalent, and so were boiler troubles. Our four ships could only do 4 to 5 knots, but at that speed at least we *did* keep at sea.

On April 21 the first raid was carried out on the Bolshevik fleet bases, and these went on continuously during our time. It is worthy of notice that the airmen were actually flying as long distances over sea as had been flown over land in France.

The result of the air reconnaissance showed that the enemy had six to twelve torpedo craft, six large armed merchantmen, and a number of small armed ships.

Early in May various Russian naval officers arrived from Denekin, bringing proposals for combined operations with the Russian Volunteer Army. Their presence was a little bit awkward, for we could not allow another Russian flotilla to grow up, and they had nothing themselves and could only start their navy by borrowing from us, who were none too strong. In addition the plans they brought up were wild to a degree. The Russian G.H.Q. apparently had no charts of the Caspian, and their proposals included ships covering troops from positions where there was only four feet of water, or landing troops where ships could not get within twenty miles of the shore.

The whole atmosphere was one of expectation as to when the Bolshevik would come out. On May 12 we heard that a party of Bolsheviks had landed at Alexandrovsk. On the 15th, whilst recon-

noitring the place, we sighted a Bolshevik convoy of three armed ships, two C.M.B. ~~carriers~~, and one ~~seaplane~~ carrier. The weather was bad, too bad to hoist out our C.M.B.'s. We gave chase, the enemy slipped the two barges and escaped into the fog. However, the capture of the two barges was important, for one was full of coal and the other full of wood. Each had a crew of about twenty. The coal was of importance because the enemy T.B.D. were coal-burners. There is no coal at the Caspian, and if we could cut off their fuel they could not move. The two craft were set on fire and sunk. One was flying a flag of truce, which was ordered to be hauled down before we opened fire on her.

There was something interesting about this flag of truce. You will all remember that Mr. Midshipman Easy, on one of his numerous cruises, when wishing to make a signal to a frigate, could find nothing better to hoist than an Arabella coloured petticoat. Well, when we hauled down the flag of truce, we found that it was not a flag at all, but a pair of unmentionable undergarments belonging to an old lady of sixty, who was one of the crew of the barge. It was proposed to send it to the War Museum. This was not done. An examination of the prisoners showed that practically the whole of the Bolshevik squadron was in Alexandrovsk, and consisted of eight T.B.D.'s, six to eight armed merchantmen, two submarines, ten motor-boats, a mine carrier, a workshop ship, and two depôt ships.

With the force in hand we could not attack these ships. Owing to the difficulty in fixing our position (all lights were extinguished in the lighthouses) it was not easy to make a torpedo attack. So we started to bomb them with the seaplanes. The weather turned against us and the seaplanes were damaged, and the carrier had to go back to Petrovsk to get others.

The next few days we had very thick weather. On May 20 a bombing attack was carried out. Two more armed ships joined up, giving a total of five. On the 21st the weather was fine, the first really fine day we had had, and we closed in on Alexandrovsk to see what was to be seen. Outside the harbour we saw a number of craft. There were two or three T.B.D.'s, and one or two big ships, and more torpedo craft near the entrance. As we closed we saw more ships in the harbour. Now our real object was to reconnoitre. As far as was known the whole of the Bolshevik squadron was in Alexandrovsk, and it would have been preferable to have waited for the three other ships which were completing at Baku, but as we steamed past there seemed a chance of cutting off some of the torpedo craft outside the harbour, so the course was altered to the east. The torpedo craft to the north vanished. Those to the south opened fire and then retreated up harbour. The risk of attacking seemed very great, but the risk of not attacking seemed still greater, for if the enemy once got an idea into their heads that we were afraid of them, then they might make use of their superiority

in numbers, guns, and men to attack us. It was all-important that we should grasp the initiative and keep it, so we stood across the harbour's mouth and then turned south into Alexandrovsk.*

Nobel with her 6-inch guns was the only ship that could reach the enemy. Later *Ventuir*, with a modern 4-inch gun, was able to do so, but the remainder of us were outranged. *Nobel* got a shell in her engine-room—she was a Diesel engine ship; she lost several men, and reported she would not be able to steam much longer.

After steaming down the harbour some way, we deployed to starboard, bringing our broadsides to bear. The enemy retreated still further down the harbour. Clouds of smoke began to come up; it was seen that either they were setting their ships on fire or else that we had done it.

The situation was not an easy one. All navigational marks had been removed; the harbour was rather too narrow to manoeuvre in; and the long-range guns of the enemy kept us under fire, while we could not reach them. Also, it became clear that we were only dealing with a portion of the Bolshevik fleet, and one had to consider where the remainder was and what they might do. The enemy's fire slackened; there were some more explosions; and it was determined to break off the action and finish the enemy craft off with the torpedo-boats next morning. *Kruger* was hit by a shell, which destroyed the engine-room communications. We circled round to the north and then out of harbour.

Whether or no it was wise to have broken off the action then still seems a moot point. On one hand it might have been wiser to have gone close in on the enemy and have made certain of finishing them off. On the other hand, the impression was that they were well beaten; they would be a certain target for a torpedo attack; there was no point in shooting at dead meat; there was a large number of Bolshevik ships still to be accounted for, and we had but three ships in reserve.

As we cleared the harbour so the clouds of smoke increased, and we saw more explosions. There appeared to be no doubt that the detachment we had been dealing with was finished.

* Alexandrovsk is a V-shaped harbour lying on the north and south line, with its opening to the north, about six miles long and four miles broad at the entrance. The western side is bounded by a number of shoals, the eastern side is formed by high cliffs. About halfway down the eastern shore is a lighthouse called the High Light. At the southern side is the town of Alexandrovsk—a fort and fishing village. The coast round is not an easy one to recognise; there are few outstanding marks which can be picked up at any distance, certainly not by those who are unacquainted with that part of the coast. The water is about seven fathoms in the middle of the harbour and shoals towards the south.

It was this very peculiar shape of the harbour, narrowing rapidly as it did as one got closer in, which as the mark-buoys on the shoals had been removed, made manoeuvring so difficult.

The next idea was to remain on the line between Astrakhan and Fort Alexandrovsk to prevent any ships coming down as reinforcements, or any ships which could still move from escaping. But the state of *Nobel* forbade this; she could barely move, and it was not safe to risk another action with a lame duck tacked on.

We tried to get wireless telegraphic communication with the three carriers—*i.e.*, the two C.M.B. ships and the seaplane ship—to carry out a torpedo attack next morning, but here our lack of wireless telegraphic operators hit us hard, and signals could not be got through, so the opportunity of finishing off what was left in Alexandrovsk, as also of creating a great moral effect by the use of torpedoes, was lost. It was nobody's fault; it was just our bad luck that we had not got enough wireless ratings.

Early next morning, May 22, we heard more explosions, and it was queer to see the clouds of smoke coming up and then opening like mushrooms. During the day we gained touch with the 3rd Division, the C.M.B., and seaplane carriers—the latter reported they were bombing Alexandrovsk. *Nobel* was sent into harbour under escort, and we had news that two other ships were joining which were complete with ammunition. We had to wait for these, and then others were sent into harbour to complete. Again bad luck hit us: one of the fresh ships—another Diesel engine—broke down. She had to be sent into harbour under escort, and, like the Little Nigger Boys, there were only two of us left.

However, it was determined to go back to Alexandrovsk and risk it, to see what was going on. We arrived off there in thick weather on the morning of the 23rd, and were very nearly cut out by two large Bolshevik destroyers. Their speed was something like 20 knots to our 9, and they were dropping shells round us at a range of 17,000 yards—a most uncomfortable position. Touch had been got with the C.M.B. carriers, and as our course was leading direct on to them, they were told to clear away. However, the senior officer of the 3rd Division, a V.C. of the Dardanelles, who had a grievance that he had been out of the fun, was afflicted with a Nelson blind eye. He hoisted out two torpedo-boats, sent off his one remaining seaplane, made all the smoke he could, and waited to see what would happen. The enemy appeared to think that we were leading them into a trap; they turned round and departed. When it is added that within five minutes of this one of our engines broke down and we were reduced to something like 4 knots, you will understand that their departure was a great relief. We then went into a dense fog, and remained in it till early next morning. The C.M.B.'s were hoisted in, but the seaplane had to come down through the fog, land on the water, and could, of course, see nothing. The sea got up, and the framework began to break. In the morning (24th) five ships came out from Petrovsk, having completed

with ammunition and fuel. They were spread on the line to search for the seaplane, as the fog had now cleared, and late that evening, when all hope had been given up, an officer low down in one of the ships saw something against the skyline. It was the last float of the plane, to which the two officers were clinging; they had been something like thirty-six hours away from their ship, and about twenty-four hours in the water. On the previous day—i.e., 22nd—in their flight they had carried out five bombing raids with that one plane at Alexandrovsk, and when one thinks that for each trip the plane had to be hoisted out, fly off, carry out the attack, return, land on the water, be hoisted in to obtain fresh bombs, and then start off again, it will be understood what a fine lot of airmen we had with us.

On the 28th Alexandrovsk was entered by a squadron of eight ships. The harbour had been reported clear; it was found that a total of twelve enemy craft had been sunk or otherwise destroyed; and fishermen told us that two other Bolshevik destroyers had fought between themselves, one of which had sunk—this, however, was never verified. Summing it up, although it was not the complete knock-out that we had hoped, still it was a serious blow to the enemy, and except for *Nobel*, we were in sufficient strength to hope to deal with the remainder if they cared to attack us; but the extraordinary long range of their guns compared with ours made it quite clear that we could only do so on our own terms, not on theirs.

We set to work to re-arm our ships as new guns arrived, and about this time we received a welcome addition of twenty lieutenants, sub-lieutenants, and watchkeepers. Before we had been deplorably short.

In the action on May 21, in the senior officers' ship the Officers of Quarters were the Secretary and the Secretary's clerk, whilst in the *Windsor Castle*, the ship of the second senior officer, there was no officer at all in the ship except himself.

The next few days was a time of waiting to see if the enemy would come out of the Volga. We were up to our full strength of eight ships, and felt that we had kept our end up. The Air Force carried out persistent bombing raids on Astrakhan. Reports showed that there were a number of ships lying at the mouth of the river, but gradually they went further and further up beyond Astrakhan and out of range. We got news that the enemy had decided to have no more fighting; that the Commander-in-Chief had been shot, and that a new Commander-in-Chief, one Rascelnikoff, had been appointed. He was a man in whom the Bolsheviks had great belief; he had been a prisoner in the hands of the British forces in the Baltic, and was exchanged for, I believe, over a dozen British officers. His wife also arrived, and took command of a flotilla of motor-boats.

As things seemed quieter we could carry on our convoys to the Ural Cossacks, who were badly in need of ammunition.

General Denekin began a rather aggressive policy towards the Azerbaijan State. The people at Baku got rather frightened that he would invade them, and there was considerable unrest. This was increased by rumours that started of the coming departure of the British Army. There were rumours of the Italians taking over the Mandate for Caucasia. Another party of Russian naval officers arrived, and hearing of the possibility of the Italians coming in, they were very anxious to start their own navy again. Thus the political situation was very difficult. The Tartar Government in Baku seemed quite satisfied that the British Navy and Army should remain, because they knew that so long as we were there General Denekin would not worry them. They had no wish to see a Russian Navy start afresh. General Denekin's party were anxious to start a Russian Navy so as to have their claim pegged out when we left and before the Italians took over. The Italian representatives, who had no further direct orders, were probably not keen on seeing a revival of the Russian Navy in a sea for which they themselves would be responsible.

In June we got further news of Denekin's success in the recapture of Tzaritzyn, a very important town on the Volga, and it seemed that Astrakhan must shortly be taken. Anyhow, the enemy fleet could not go far up the river, and if they came out they would have to fight us. We heard that their discipline was getting very bad, food was very scarce, and they had very little fuel left.

In the middle of June they sent out a flying-boat to attack us. It had a crew of two: Comrade A sat in front and worked the machine; Comrade B sat behind with a revolver to see that Comrade A did his work. When well away from Astrakhan, Comrades A and B formed a little Soviet of their own; they decided that Astrakhan was a poor place, and they did not want to go back; so the Soviet decided to surrender. When they sighted the squadron they came down on the water and gave themselves up. The flying-boat was hoisted in by one of the carriers, sent to Petrovsk, repaired by the flying crew, and within a week was working with the Volunteer Army, bombing her former owners.

A visit was made to Guriev, and the Commodore was made an honorary Ural Cossack. It is believed that he was one of a dozen people who ever had this distinction, and of the only two Englishmen.

The Volunteer Army was organizing a sea attack on Astrakhan, and used the small craft we had turned over to them with certain guns. The attack came to utter grief; the Bolsheviks developed a defensive force of armed barges, and the whole expedition was a failure. This was a pity, as there seemed to be an idea among the Russians, with whom we were really very good friends, that having defeated the Bolsheviks on sea the English did not care to do anything more. They could not, or would not, understand that our job was to try to keep

command of the sea, and that we were not fit to go into shallow water and try and force our way up the Volga.

At the end of June and in July things were quiet and very dull. We went on re-arming; we could do a bit of boiler-cleaning and cruise; but there was a feeling of uncertainty in the air as to whether the navy would evacuate or not, though nobody wanted to go until either Astrakhan was taken or the Bolshevik squadron accounted for. It was very wearying; mails were few, and we hated the sight of mutton.

Then things began to go badly on the eastern side. Kolchak had retreated; Malmiss had been withdrawn, and the enemy were working along the line from Merv to Krasnovodsk; in fact, that side was turned. There was an outbreak of piracy down to Ashurada, and several merchant ships were captured. All this meant demands made upon the squadron, but it was felt that we must never let go of the mouth of the Volga, for if the enemy got to sea it would be hard to deal with him.

We come back to our old friend the Baku-Krasnovodsk Gap. Just because the enemy were gaining ground on the east side of the Caspian, so it was all the more important that they should not be able to bridge that gap. They could only do it by sea, and the place to meet them was at the mouth of the Volga.

It is of interest to consider the state of things existing at this, the closing period of our time in the Caspian, for it gives an excellent illustration of the interworking of the three arms.

First, the Army.—The Army held the line from Batum to Baku; it guarded the communications for the Navy, it occupied and garrisoned the naval base, and thus allowed the Navy freedom of action to carry out its job and keep at sea without any anxiety as regards that base. A sufficient amount of local defence had been given in the shape of the two 6-inch guns already mentioned, and four C.M.B.'s kept in reserve, to allow of resistance being maintained in the event of a single raider escaping from the Volga till the Navy could move south.

Secondly, the Navy.—The Navy, in its watch off the Volga, prevented the Army being attacked at Baku. It had its advanced base at Petrovsk with a small garrison, and a flying base at Chechen with a guard for the aircraft. In all three cases the Navy covered the Army from attack oversea.

Lastly, the Air Force.—In this case its functions were more to assist the Navy than the Army. The Army guarded its camp, the Navy carried its supplies.

The Air Force gave information by its oversea flights, and by bombing the enemy in those positions at which the Navy could not arrive, forced the enemy to one of two lines of action. Either—

(a) It must come further up the Volga, and thus give up all hope of assisting the Bolsheviks to the south, or

(b) It must come out and fight, and take its chance.

Finally, on June 20, we got definite orders to turn the squadron over to the Russians—lock, stock, and barrel. The situation was that there were practically no men-of-war below Astrakhan; the Volunteer Army was starting another offensive, and was very hopeful of capturing the place, so much so that they asked us to stop bombing; and so it seemed that we could turn over with a clear mind. At the same time one was rather doubtful of the morale of the Russian seamen, and we all of us hated to clear out before the job was really finished. Added to this there was the situation at Baku. The Tartars were really frightened that if we left and the Russians had a navy, the latter would be certain to come back and occupy Baku. They thought they could meet the Russians on land, but they had nothing to meet them with at sea, and they said clearly that the British were not playing the game in turning over all the ships to the Russians. There did seem a possibility that as our troops evacuated the Tartars might turn nasty. So it was arranged that the crews of the ships turned over first should leave the Caspian via Baku and Batum, and that certain other ships should see the army clear of the town and then come up to Petrovsk, their crews leaving via Petrovsk and Novorossisk.

The first ship, *Asia*, was turned over at Petrovsk with all ceremony on July 28, one year to the day since the original party left Baghdad. All stores were moved up from Baku and turned over at Petrovsk. The Russians, who appeared to have a love of little commissions and of signing papers, were very particular at the start about mustering everything. Shot and shell left them cold; bully beef and such like were rather more interesting; flannel shirts and white trousers were very interesting; but when they saw a pile of about twenty pairs of boots the Commissar gave one whoop, each man grabbed a pair of boots for himself and one for his pal, and the work stopped while they put them on.

Ship by ship was turned over; we gave the Russians a day's instruction in our guns, and they went out and fired a few rounds. The men were extraordinarily quick in picking up the breech mechanism although the guns were quite different from their own, and they proved very good shots, but some of the folk we had to deal with were rather too good to learn anything.

When it was quite clear that there was no immediate move from the Volga, and the Russians had got some six ships to go on with, we turned our attention to Ashurada. This port, which is really in Persian territory, had been grabbed by Russia many years ago, and although the Russian gunboat there had turned Bolshevik and pirated, yet there had been a sort of indirect pressure on us not to do anything because the Russians still hoped they would be able to reoccupy the place—*i.e.*, they did not want to give up a bit of old

Russia, even though it was in Persia. The other side was that we did not want the Russians in Persia; we did not want to leave a black spot of pirates behind us, but rather to clear up the job properly. Also, the merchants looked to us to recapture their ships. So two armed ships, which had not had a look in before, were sent down to Ashurada, one being a seaplane carrier. They gave it a thorough good clear up, capturing a gunboat, releasing two steamers, and came away with some half-dozen barges, two hundred prisoners, and a large quantity of munitions. The prisoners were brought up to Petrovsk, the merchant craft returned to their owners, who forgot to say "Thank you," and the gunboat was brought to Enzeli.

At Baku there was considerable unrest when the evacuation actually started. The Tartar Government put in a request that an equal number of ships should be given to them as were given to the Russians, and a suggestion was put forward to the Commodore that he should state his terms to become Commander-in-Chief of the Tartar Navy. The terms he suggested were £5,000 a year and a fresh carpet every week. Nothing more was heard. The Tartar Government threatened and prayed in turn, asking that the British should remain in the town, promising to pay for the troops and the squadron, to give important commercial concessions, and so on. But eventually, when they saw it was no good, they stiffened their backs, and showed some determination to come to terms with the Georgian Republic, and run their show themselves.

Two 6-inch guns that we had mounted at Baku were rather a bone of contention. The orders were that they were to be removed, but as this would have taken too long, and the military wanted to have them ready to turn on the town in case of necessity, we could not do this, so about four days before the date fixed for the end of the evacuation, a party went up and removed the breech-blocks, sights, etc., and the guns were allowed to run back on to the ground. We knew we had been watched, and two days after, the Military Governor at Baku—a very pleasing Tartar, who had been besieging us last year—came on board *Kruger*, and after the usual remarks about the weather, offered us a million roubles for the breech-blocks. He was told that there was nothing doing.

Then, just before we left, the Shah of Persia passed through, and there was the unique experience of his being escorted from Enzeli to Baku by a British man-of-war. This was the more necessary as there were many rumours concerning the pirates at Ashurada.

As the day of the final evacuation drew near, a large number of Russian steamers left Baku for Petrovsk, for no Russian knew how he would fare under the Tartar Government.

August 24 came, the day when the last echelon of British troops were to leave. The arrangements were that G.H.Q. were to leave

the station at midnight, and the navy, having seen everything clear, were then to leave the harbour.

The Tartar Government put up a big dinner, to which the British officers were invited, and where we met various Georgian officials. There were, of course, a lot of speeches, all much in the same tone: that the British had not been welcomed at the start, but that now, after nine months, they understood and trusted us, and were very sorry we were going; that the Tartar Republic saw that it had to prove itself capable of keeping law and order and of managing its own affairs. They hoped to have an alliance with Georgia, which would embrace most of Trans-Caucasia. They did not want to be entirely independent of Russia, but they wanted local autonomy.

Soon after eleven o'clock we started to go, and the "good-byes" commenced. Our old friend the Military Governor asked the Commodore if he was not glad to leave Baku. The Commodore replied "No," that he liked Baku, but that lately he had developed "carpet fever," and he found it too expensive. "How queer!" replied the Military Governor. "I have lately developed 'breech-block fever,' and found it too expensive."

Finally, we all went off to the station in cars. The band played the Engleski March—i.e., "Tipperary." The train pulled out punctually at midnight, and we went back to the ships.

We cleared at 12.30 and steamed out of the harbour, looking back on the blaze of lights from the Russian Summer Club, and here ended the second occupation of Baku by the British.

The remaining ships were turned over at Petrovsk. There were enthusiastic send-offs, a lot of bunting, and bands. We travelled in trucks, well scrubbed and whitewashed, for it is better to travel in a clean truck than in an infested first-class carriage.

Kruger, the last ship turned over, hoisted the Russian ensign on September 2, and the British Caspian flotilla ceased to exist.

It may be said that the Russian naval officers were grateful for what we had done—were glad to have ships turned over to them in running condition, with ammunition and stores; but, with that idea of a new Russia ever in their minds, they were glad to see the White Ensign disappear from the Caspian Sea, which they always regarded as a Russian lake.

Then came an interesting journey to Taganrog, where we met General Denekin. He expressed himself as being very grateful for all we had done; he struck one as being an honest man, and his worst enemies were those representatives of the old régime by whom he was surrounded, and whose actions nullified all his good intentions. Denekin himself was beset with numberless applications from local bodies to recognize various little republics—the Don Republic, the Crimean Republic, the Ukraine Republic, and so on—and to each he

replied that he was not able to give away—*i.e.*, to give local autonomy to any part of Russia. His whole argument was, First finish the Bolsheviks, and then we can decide what is to happen.

We left Taganrog on September 8 and reached Constantinople, and the Commodore's broad pennant was finally struck at sunset on September 11.

It had been a wonderful fourteen months, and the results obtained, although we were not able to see the final finish of our work, were due to the cheeriness and good work given by all hands.

We started with a small party of twenty-two men. We were besieged in Baku and had to evacuate. We started afresh to arm the ships. The army was convoyed back to Baku, which place was re-occupied. The Bolsheviks were prevented from reinforcing their base south of the winter ice, and that base was bombarded and burnt. The squadron grew to nine armed ships, four carriers, and twelve C.M.B.'s, and our numbers were about twelve hundred officers and men of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. We gradually got better guns, though these did not come until nearly the end. We never got over the boiler troubles, but we did manage to keep at sea.

Baku was never threatened. The Bolsheviks, when they came out of the Volga, were given a good thumping, and had to go home again. If only we could have got the C.M.B.'s up in time for May 22 we should have finished off several more. Finally, we covered the evacuation from Baku, and came away ourselves.

The last part of our time was tedious, unsettled, and uncomfortable, for war conditions had to be maintained, but perhaps the real regret that was shown when we left made up for this.

In this lecture as few names as possible have been mentioned. You have heard General Dunsterville, and the chance is taken here of saying how much we owe to the army, especially the Supply and Medical branches. From our start at Baghdad, when General Gillman was Chief of the Staff, we received from the Sister Service all help, and very often they were hard put to it to make both ends meet for themselves. General Dunsterville, General Thomson, General Shuttleworth, who were in succession in command of the troops—to each of these must the Navy give its thanks. To the airmen under Captain Bowhill, who, I would repeat, as an ex-F.N.R. officer, so fully understood our needs, and to his officers, we owe a great deal. They gave information of what was going on up the river; they did splendidly at Alexandrovsk. To those of the Royal Navy—Captain Washington, second in command, Captain Parnell, in charge of the base, and Engineer-Commander O'Dogherty, who acted as naval constructor and chief engineer, and whose tact in dealing with the Russian workmen enabled the fitting of the ships to be carried out—to the P.M.O., who had much experience in Mesopotamia, and the chief of the

Accountant Branch, also Commander Harrison, R.N.R., who came up with the first party--to all these and to all others, officers and men, who were my comrades in the Caspian, I give my best thanks.

THE CHAIRMAN: Would any gentleman like to make any observation in respect of this extremely interesting lecture we have just heard from Captain Norris?

Major-General Sir WEBB GILLMAN: Sir Charles Monro, Ladies and Gentlemen,—The Commodore has frequently alluded to what we did at Baghdad to help him at the beginning of his expedition, and I can only speak for the later months of 1918, because we handed over the Caspian Sea to General Milne on January 1, 1919. I think one of the points that stand out in these distant expeditions is that people at home, who order them, use a very small scale map, which is often a delusion as regards distances. In Mesopotamia we had to supply by river from Basra to Baghdad, and from thence on by road to Enzeli. It was much the same as if you had to supply by a river the size of the Thames at Staines, going at six miles an hour as far as the Firth of Forth, and thence by Ford vans to Christiania. The Commodore had a photograph of masses of motor-lorries: I do not know where he collected them. We had, I know, eighty, but there were always one-third undergoing repairs due to the rough roads; and they were strung out over the road backwards and forwards, so that I never saw more than three together. I am afraid he has been too kind in referring to our help, because I know full well that our ability to do so was considerably hampered by lack of transport. A Ford van carried six hundred pounds; it could go to Enzeli and back with the petrol that it carried inside it. It could go to Enzeli with half a load of petrol, and the rest would be stores; you can imagine how little got there! He started out with three officers and twenty-two men, and when you see what he did eventually you realize what a colossal task it was at the outset. As regards his mission, he very mildly said that he had to keep the gap open between Baku and Krasnovodsk—a very easy thing to say, but a very difficult thing to do. He had many instructions sent him, and I know one was fairly comprehensive: “Go and command the Caspian Sea; seize all the shipping that is hostile; destroy all the oil wells in Baku; and capture anything you can and arm it.” It was an easy thing to say, but when he got to Enzeli he had to get unarmed ships and screw steel plates into the decks before he could get a gun fixed on. He had to get crews; he got twenty-five men from the army and twenty-five of his own, which does not make much of a crew; so you will realize what wonderful things he and the officers under him did. Speaking from the military point of view, I can only express my thanks for the extraordinary co-operation we soldiers always received from the Commodore. I cannot speak too strongly of this, and I know I shall be backed up by my then Com-

mander-in-Chief, Sir William Marshall, now in India, when I say that the work done by Commodore Norris and by Captain Washington, when the Commodore met with his accident, was beyond all praise. (Applause.)

Mr. FRANCIS SKRINE : I should like to ask Captain Norris what he thinks of the strategy of this movement on the Caspian. What did our Admiralty think was going to happen? It seems to me from his interesting lecture—of course, I speak as a layman—but it seems to me to have been the most wild-cat expedition in Asiatic warfare. I know the Caspian intimately, and I should be the very last man to anticipate that such an expedition would be started at an enormous distance from our base, and with huge physical difficulties to face. Only steadfastness, courage, and the co-operation of all three branches saved us from disaster. It might have been a real catastrophe, and I should like to know Captain Norris's opinion regarding this. Was there anything in it at all? Could it possibly spell success of any kind?

Mr. DONALD MELLOR : Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—The last speaker wonders why our lecturer was sent to the Caspian. I do not pretend to know much about such matters, but I think it is very often lost sight of that an expedition sent to a part like the Caspian serves a purpose. I think Sir Michael O'Dwyer said a little while back that they might seem wild-cat schemes, but that the chief thing was to keep the enemy at bay, and prevent him getting through behind our backs and making mischief. In my own opinion the principal reply to the question about the Caspian was India—the safety of India; as there is no doubt, I think, that if Commodore Norris and his men had not done the work they did on the Caspian, there would have been certain mischief in India done by the people working in European quarters. With others, I must re-echo the last speaker on the admirable work the Commodore and his men did with small forces and inadequate means on the Caspian.

The CHAIRMAN : Ladies and Gentlemen,—The time is late, and I think it would be your wish that in the first place we should join together in expressing our very cordial thanks to Captain Norris for his extraordinarily interesting lecture. (Applause.) One does not like to say it is a fairy tale, because it is not; but still it reads like one, this wonderful achievement in the Caspian. All difficulties overcome—difficulties only created to be overcome by him; and I feel certain that I am permitted by you to express to him our very cordial thanks for really a most delightful hour in listening to this wonderful story. (Renewed applause.)

The LECTURER : Ladies and Gentlemen,—I am very grateful for the kind way in which you have received my lecture. I very much regret I have kept you so long. (Cries of "No.") But I would ask you to understand that, with all the good-will in the world, it is very hard

to squash fourteen months' hard work into an hour's lecture and make anything of it. As regards your question, sir, I think the answer has been given by General Gillman. We were sent there, as we understand, to keep that gap open; whether it was right to send us there or not I do not know. There is among the audience an officer of high rank then on the Naval Staff—perhaps he can answer; but in so far as, rightly or wrongly, we were sent there, then I think it may be fairly said that what we were sent to do we did. (Renewed applause.)

THE ASSYRO-CHALDEANS

By MAJOR F. F. RYND, D.S.O.

THE Assyrian mountaineers were perhaps the smallest nation to be drawn into the vortex of the Great War. They have considerable claim to our interest and sympathy by virtue of their ancient origin and the part they took on our side against the Turco-German forces in the Middle East during the war. They are the remnants of a people who centuries ago had their headquarters at Ctesiphon, until they were driven into the mountains by the invasion of the Islamic hordes at the time of Tamerlane.

The Assyrians eventually migrated into Kurdistan, and formed a "millet" in the Ottoman Empire. In the course of time they became split up into three main ecclesiastical divisions:

1. The Nestorians, inhabiting the Kurdistan mountains north of Mosul.

2. The Chaldeans, scattered throughout Iraq, but predominating in the Mosul province.

3. The Jacobites, prevailing in the provinces of Diabekr and Syria.

They also claim kinship with that peculiar people, the Yezidees, who early left the Christian fold and relapsed into Paganism. The Nestorian Assyrians formed an "ashiret" or tribal government of their own within the Turkish Empire, as owing to the inaccessible nature of the country they inhabited, the Turks were only able to exercise a shadowy control over them.

Only a brief reference will be made here to the part these people took in the war, as this has been fully described in a little book by Dr. Wigram.* After the Russians entered Persia and before the declaration of war by the Turks, the latter sent emissaries to Mar Shimun, the Patriarch of the Nestorians, to endeavour to bribe the Assyrians to remain neutral. The German Consul at Mosul also guaranteed their absolute security on condition of neutrality. In the spring of 1915 the Russians advanced into Asia Minor. Van fell into their hands, and they sent a deputation to the mountaineers to rise up and fight for the Christians against the Mussulmans. In May, 1915, the Assyrians decided to throw in their lot with the Entente, and declared war against the Turks. After considerable vicissitudes, the Assyrians were forced to flee to Urmia in Persia, and when the Russians collapsed at the end of 1917 the Christians in Urmia endeavoured to hold the Persian frontier against the Turks. In this they were unsuccessful, and were eventually overwhelmed and forced to fly and take refuge with the British in Mesopotamia. The Assyro-Chaldeans now view with considerable concern recent political

* "Our Smallest Ally," by W. A. Wigram, D.D. S.P.C.K.

events in Iraq. The sudden revival of Turkish nationalism combined with anti-Christian sentiment and the Turkish threat against Mosul has raised apprehensions as to what will be their fate if the British withdraw from Iraq. A number of them have returned to their homes in the mountains north of Mosul, and have good reasons to fear reprisals for the part they took in the war against the Turks. They consider the Arabs would be unable to afford them the necessary protection.

The Assyro-Chaldeans have laid their case before the Conference at Lausanne, and a deputation headed by General Agha Petros has recently been in this country to try and obtain for their people recognition as "a Christian autonomy under British mandate." They ask to have the country north and north-west of Mosul between the Zob and Tigris set aside as a home for their nation. This territory is peopled only with Assyrians, Yezidees, and Kurds, who are for the most part friendly. They do not expect financial or military assistance, but claim that if armed and given the autonomy they ask for, they could hold their own against their enemies, and would further British interests by acting as a Christian buffer State on the northern frontier of Iraq. From a military point of view the Nestorian or mountaineer Assyrians are no doubt capable of defending themselves. The writer was in Baquba during the rebellion of 1920, when the Assyrians showed themselves more than a match for the Arabs.* A large number are now serving under us as Levies, and it is on them the brunt of the attack would fall in the event of a Turkish advance on Mosul. The future of this little nation is no doubt a difficult problem. The Turks, with whom we are now endeavouring to conclude a peace, have resisted, and will no doubt continue to resist, the granting of an Assyrian autonomy on their frontiers. The Arabs, it is believed, are more favourable to the idea, and it is perhaps through an understanding with King Feisal supported by British influence that the Assyrians have the best chance of obtaining their object. But beneath the surface in Central Asia religious antipathies are always smouldering and liable to break out into the flame of fanaticism, and the position of a small Christian nation in the middle of a vast Moslem population might not be an enviable one were the British forces ultimately withdrawn from Iraq.

It must be remembered that these people fought on our side during the war, in the Arab rebellion of 1920, and are fighting on our side now. They also state definite promises of autonomy and protection were made when they were asked to support our cause in the war.

If it is found impossible to grant the Assyrians their dearest wish—autonomy under our King and flag—it is hoped the safety of these people will be adequately guarded when the political status of Iraq is finally decided.

* *Vide* article by Lieut.-Colonel Cunliffe-Owen in the *Journal*, vol. ix., part ii.

THE BAGHDAD-ALEPPO MOTOR ROUTE

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. C. BAILWARD

I AM asked to write some account of my recent drive from Baghdad to Aleppo.

I should, first of all, explain that it was undertaken merely as a convenient return route from India and as an alternative to the usual sea journey from Bombay, and not at all with the object of making notes and observations, which would, in fact, under the conditions have been impossible. My camera having broken down, I was also unable to obtain any photographs.

I had already travelled over that part of the road lying between Deir-ez-Zor on the Euphrates and Aleppo by caravan, in 1909, but the track followed by motor-cars does not now at all coincide with that which I followed on the former occasion, and lies in a general sense further from the river and more across the uplands.

Before leaving India, on March 23, I had endeavoured, without much success, to obtain information regarding the practicability of the route. I was, however, lucky in meeting at Delhi Mr. Menzies Ferguson, late manager of the Anglo-Persia Bank, and who had returned recently from Baghdad. He was able at least to tell me that at the time he left motor-cars were running between that city and Aleppo. I also obtained, through the Foreign Department at Delhi, the official sanction of the High Commissioner of Iraq to my proposed journey, with the information that the route to Aleppo was then open, and might be expected to remain so for the present, but none regarding the means of transport.

I eventually started, relying as a last resource on the possibility of obtaining a lift by aeroplane across the desert to Palestine, and this I believe would have been possible by the ordinary air mail, which leaves Baghdad for Cairo fortnightly, calling on the way at Amman in Transjordan, but as the charge is very high (I believe £120 to Cairo) and only about 20 pounds of baggage are allowed, this cannot be considered a convenient or even an interesting mode of travel.

On arriving at Bombay I had considerable difficulty in obtaining a passage on the B.I.S.S. *Varela*, nearly all the accommodation having been reserved at the last moment by the Government for Air Force reinforcements. This, however, proved to be a blessing in disguise, as in addition to the pleasant company of the officers on board I had the great advantage of their kind assistance in various ways, at Basra on arrival, and afterwards at Baghdad.

Thanks to this I was able to catch the fast mail train, which runs only in connection with the mail steamers at Basra, two hours after arrival there at 11 a.m., and reached Baghdad at 11 a.m. next morning, a twenty-four hours' journey by rail; the railway line keeps to the west of the Euphrates, and the train passed Shuaiba, the scene of much fighting during the war, at about 2 p.m., and Ur (of the Chaldees) at about 7 p.m., reaching Hilla, where the river is crossed, at about 6 a.m. the following morning, Babylon soon afterwards, and Baghdad at 11 a.m. The carriages, built I believe in Indian workshops, are very comfortable, and a restaurant car is attached.

At Baghdad I found the High Commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, and Lady Cox, as always, most kind and hospitable and anxious to be of assistance to me, and fear that as they themselves were much occupied necessarily with preparations for their own approaching departure I must have been a great nuisance to them. It was through the assistance of the Air Marshal commanding the troops in Iraq, Sir John Salmond, and his staff that I got into touch with the Baghdad-Aleppo Garage, who engaged to supply me with a good Ford car to Aleppo for the sum of L.T.30, including all expenses connected with the actual journey; which, considering the distance of about 1,100 miles, including the return, appeared a very reasonable charge.

It was, of course, necessary for me to obtain the visa of the French Consul at Baghdad for my further journey, and my time there from March 31 to April 5, when I started for Aleppo, was fairly well occupied with this and other small engagements. The Maude Hotel, at which I stayed, is a large Arab house with the usual drawback of there being no *outside* windows, but the rooms were comfortable and well furnished. The hotel is lighted throughout with electric light, and the food is excellent.

There are, as is well known, no antiquities or buildings of architectural importance in the town, but I paid several visits to the bazaars, which are always full of interest from the cosmopolitan nature of the crowd with which they are thronged and the variety of merchandise of all sorts, Eastern and Western, which they display.

The local products most sought after by visitors are the silk *abas* (cloaks) and *kufiyas* (headkerchiefs), of beautiful colours and richly embroidered in gold and silver, worn by Arab ladies and gentlemen.

One of the principal bridges, known as the Maude Bridge, had been washed away shortly before my arrival by the spring flood of snow-water from the mountains, which necessitated a long detour in order to visit the Residency or railway station on the right bank of the river; the hotels and military offices being, as well as the city, on the left bank. It is, however, possible to hire a boat for the crossing at almost any point.

I was quite unable to identify any part of Baghdad from my former

visit thirty-seven years ago. A fairly wide street had been driven by the Turks, either just before or during the war, through a large portion of the city and running parallel with the river; and buildings and gardens appeared to me to have extended much further away from the banks than formerly. I failed to recognize the old Residency, where I stayed on the occasion of my former visit, and which was, I believe, still earlier the residence of one of the Nawabs of Oudh, but believe it is now used as a mess by the R.A.F.

The *gufas* or coracles, so much used as ferries in former days, are now much scarcer, and I saw very few on the river banks. There appear to be many more large fishing-nets in use than formerly.

The inhabitants of Baghdad have taken very kindly to motoring. There are many garages, and the streets are at all hours full of cars, mostly of American make, with a preponderance of Fords. The drivers, mostly Arabs, are quite up to the standard of other towns. During my visit perfect harmony appeared to exist amongst the various classes of the population, and a very large amount of trade appeared to be going forward. The Arab police of King Feisul were everywhere in evidence, and the traffic was, generally speaking, well regulated. The "Palace" of the High Commissioner, of which so much has been heard, is a fine building, about equivalent to the average Residency in British India, with a few good reception-rooms and a beautiful garden shaded by palm-trees and abundantly irrigated. I understood, however, that unnecessarily large sums had been expended upon its adaptation and improvement. In the garden, which was full of charming English flowers of all sorts, I saw the pair of Arabian ostriches which have lately arrived in England and are on view at the Zoological Gardens, besides other interesting birds and beasts, the ex-High Commissioner being an ardent and accomplished naturalist. The weather during my stay at Baghdad was, I believe, unusually cool for the season, with occasional showers of rain, of which there was luckily very little on the two days preceding my departure on April 5.

After paying the hire of the motor, thirty pounds, in Turkish gold, of which there appeared to be plenty available in the bazaars, I succeeded in getting started by 10 a.m. and traversing the irrigated country between the rivers, which would probably be impassable after heavy rain, arrived at the boat bridge over the Euphrates at Falluja at about forty miles. Here I was delayed for about half an hour whilst part of the roadway which had been taken up for some reason was relaid. I arrived at Ramadi (about sixty-five miles) at 1 p.m., where there were certain formalities to be observed at the Arab police post. With the assistance of the English officer-in-charge of the post these were completed, and I was able to proceed again after about an hour's delay in the Serai. From Ramadi to Hit, about thirty-five miles, the track was indifferent, and I did not reach the latter place till 5 p.m.

I had been unable in Baghdad to meet with any European who had made the journey, but understood from the garage proprietor and others that I should have no difficulty in procuring food and decent accommodation at the regular stages on the road. I had therefore provided myself only with some biscuits and chocolates and a box of insect powder, for use in emergencies, and had no kind of camp furniture beyond a moderate amount of bedding.

I now found that at Hit the only accommodation available was the usual unfurnished cell in the old Turkish caravanserai, and that no food of any kind appeared to be procurable.

The Arab police superintendent of the post did his best to assist me, and managed to procure a wooden bench for a bed, a jug of water, and some sort of lantern. He also sent me later on in the evening a tray of mixed food from which I managed to extract some fragments of egg for my dinner.

The same officer entertained me at tea in a garden on the river bank, and later conducted me to the celebrated pitch-wells west of the town. We passed many sulphur springs *en route*, and the air reeked of sulphuretted hydrogen. It is possible that these springs may turn out some day to have valuable medicinal properties, but at present they do not appear to be utilized. The well which I inspected and from which bitumen is taken was at the bottom of a pit and about 9 feet in diameter. Gas constantly bubbles up in the centre, and when ignited burns with a red flame for twenty minutes to half an hour. I was told that borings were being made in the neighbourhood for oil, and the surroundings certainly reminded me of other oil-bearing localities which I have visited. I had no time to visit the town of Hit, a venerable but dilapidated pile of buildings crowning the hill on the river bank.

The inhabitants make use of the bitumen to waterproof wicker vessels used for domestic purposes. I believe that there is a considerable export of the pitch by river transport. I received a visit from a Baghdad Christian, who informed me that he had been sent by the Arab Government as schoolmaster and teacher of the English language, in which, however, he was only moderately proficient. He complained, no doubt with reason, of the lonely life which he was condemned to lead amongst bigoted Mohammedans, and I could do little to console him.

After a very restless and uncomfortable night I started at 7 a.m. on April 6, in dull threatening weather, and at first over a much worse track than I had hitherto met with. On the previous day I had been introduced by the police superintendent to an Arab who, he informed me, had lately been engaged in road-making. From him I received some imperfectly understood instructions, and it was not long before we reached some specimens of his engineering skill in the form of

rough causeways, not more than 6 feet wide and built of huge rough boulders, across boggy places. My Arab driver managed to negotiate them with great skill and strength of wrist, but I confess that the prospect, which at times seemed imminent, of turning turtle into the quagmires on either side was unpleasant! As we proceeded, however, the road improved and the skies cleared, and we reached Ana (ninety-five miles) at twelve o'clock, where we were again held up for about two hours for a police visa (the inspector was absent when we arrived, and his representative inclined to be rather truculent), but got on the road again, after a light lunch of biscuits and chocolate, at 2 p.m., and had an easy run of about sixty miles to Abu Kemal, the frontier part of French Syria, where we arrived at 6 p.m. I had omitted to mention that the police superintendent at Ana had insisted in providing us with an escort of one (negro) policeman with a gun, who perched himself very uncomfortably on the top of my luggage in the tonneau.

We, however, got rid of him at the French frontier, and this was the only occasion on which I was accompanied by any sort of escort during the journey.

I was delighted with the clean and well-kept appearance of the little town of Abu Kemal, and was received most kindly and hospitably by the French *commandant de poste* who insisted on giving up to me a most comfortable and well-furnished room in his house, and provided me with an excellent dinner, including some of the truffles found in the neighbourhood as a vegetable. There appears to be plenty of game in the vicinity, and he gets plenty of sport and exercise in coursing hares, etc., with the three handsome Arab greyhounds which he keeps in the house. He showed me also the skin of a hyæna, shot the day before with his revolver when out for a ride. By his advice I decided not to attempt to get beyond Deir-ez-Zor (about eighty miles) on the following day, April 7, and it was not therefore necessary to make a very early start. Constantinople time is kept by the French in Syria; it was therefore necessary to put back my watch an hour, and I started at 7 a.m. as before. The track lay for great part of the way across rolling-down country, and was for the most part excellent going, and we reached Deir-ez-Zor at 10.30 a.m.

Here I was again received with the greatest courtesy and hospitality by the French authorities. Deir-ez-Zor is the principal French military station on their Eastern Syrian frontier, and is held by a strong garrison.

It is a town of considerable size, surrounded by gardens and cultivation, and the fruit orchards on the river banks and islands, with their spring blossom and foliage, were very delightful to the eye. The streets also are clean and well kept in contrast to their condition during my former visit in 1909, under Turkish rule, with a Governor of pro-German sympathies, from whom I met with little civility.

I was allotted a comfortable room in a house occupied by the French staff, and dined and spent a very pleasant evening with the *commandant de section* and his staff.

My passport having been adorned with yet another visa, I started again at 5.30 a.m. on April 8 over a very bad and rocky track for the first twenty miles or so.

The weather was much colder, and showers of rain were threatening, though little fell. Later on the sky cleared somewhat, and the track lay away from the river across rolling down-country covered with a considerable amount of vegetation and many wild flowers, chiefly dark crimson poppies and anemones. The black tents of the Bedawin were to be seen in every direction, and we met many large parties on the move with their camels, donkeys, sheep, and goats.

It was the delight of my Arab driver, over whom I could exercise no control, to dash into the thick of these parties, scattering them in all directions, but fortunately they seemed usually quite to enter into the spirit of this pleasantry!

I was interested also to notice large flocks of swallows on their northward migration, which were frequently resting on the track, and rose in clouds in front of the car.

On one long stretch of, I should think, about forty miles, which we must have covered within the hour, we saw myriads of the pin-tailed sandgrouse in flocks of ten to fifty or more. We reached the village of Meskeneh, where the road turns west from the river, at 1 p.m., and after half an hour for refreshment continued our journey across much irrigated corn land and over a bad road towards Aleppo. Our one and only casualty to the car occurred, in the form of a punctured tyre, about forty miles from that town, but the driver was equal to the occasion, and utilizing at last one of the many part-worn tubes with which the front of the car was garlanded, we were able to proceed with very little delay. Most of the nuts connecting the hood having departed, the latter was now hanging behind in a forlorn and dejected manner, but was just kept off the ground by a series of complicated lashings connecting it with the front lamps, etc. The weather was again threatening, and I was truly thankful when we arrived at the Hotel Baron, at about 5 p.m., without having had occasion to use it!

We had accomplished the distance from Deir-ez-Zor to Aleppo, 188 miles on the map, and I should think that at least 200 miles by road, in twelve running hours, which, considering that the first and last portions of the track were exceedingly bad, the first from rock and the last from mud, reflects the greatest possible credit on the Ford car and its inventor!

A few hours after our arrival at Aleppo the rain, which had been threatening, came down in torrents and lasted for much of the follow-

ing day. This must have rendered the track from Meskeneh practically impossible for a car, and I had again to congratulate myself on my good fortune in having got through so successfully.

These notes are written in the hope that they may be of use to any intending traveller by this route, and I should like to emphasize the point that I myself was badly equipped, and, as subsequent events proved, took considerable risks of a very unpleasant time.

Within the last few days I have seen it stated in the papers that the river Euphrates has burst its banks, and that the country between Baghdad and Falluja is for the most part under water. Needless to say this might involve a very uncomfortable situation for anyone travelling, as I was, without provisions, and I would strongly recommend a Primus stove and some tins of soup, etc., to be taken. Something of the nature of a camp-bed or valise and some washing equipment (rubber basin, etc.) might also prove invaluable in case of a breakdown or other delay. There is a great and sudden change in the climate in going northward to be guarded against, and I was glad to make use of a thick suit of clothes and winter underclothing at Aleppo on arrival.

I met large numbers of Ford cars on the road full of Arabs, but did not see a single European traveller, and the old Turkish serais or *khan*s on the road provide no furniture and little in the way of food. Moreover, in many cases they are twenty or thirty miles apart. I travelled myself unarmed, but in case of a breakdown in an out-of-the-way part of the road it would be, at all events, a moral support to have a revolver.

As regards scenery there is, I think, little on this route deserving of the name in the ordinary sense. The valley of the Euphrates is generally bounded by cliffs at varying distances from the river itself—sometimes of chalk, sometimes of fantastically woven limestone and conglomerate (I am no geologist!). The high down country of which I have spoken at the top of these cliffs has a fascination of its own, often with ridge after ridge of distant hills visible to the west. The effects of cloud and sunshine, sunrise and sunset, over this country are often very beautiful. Between Meskeneh and Aleppo the numerous Syrian villages of large beehive-shaped mud houses closely clustered together, surrounded by fields of green corn, were a feature in the landscape.

Before quitting the subject of the motor route from Baghdad to Aleppo, I ought to make some reference to the alternate route across the desert direct from Baghdad to Damascus, described in an article contributed to *The Times* of May 31.

This route had already been traversed by motor-cars before my own arrival at Baghdad; I had made some inquiry about it, and decided that it was impracticable for a single car. Mr. Palmer, the

British Consul at Damascus, with Major McCullum and a lady, arrived at the Maude Hotel on the evening before my departure after their very successful reconnaissance trip, with, I believe, two or three specially equipped cars, and I was able to have some conversation with them after dinner. There can be no doubt that if it is possible to establish some kind of intermediate depôts west of the Euphrates, and to make arrangements with tribal chiefs for the security of passengers and mails, this will be the route of the future from this country to Baghdad; always supposing that after our evacuation of Iraq, lately announced by Sir Percy Cox to be at the end of four years, the necessity for such a route continues to exist!

It is hardly necessary for me to attempt a description of the picturesque old city of Aleppo, which I had already visited three times. The Hotel Baron, where I stayed, is a fine new building not far from the railway station, where the food and accommodation are sufficiently good, but the attendance leaves much to be desired. Owing to an "Armenian" Bank Holiday I had some trouble in making my financial arrangements. I parted very amicably with my Arab chauffeur, an excellent fellow, and entrusted him with letters of thanks to the various friends whom I had made *en route*, which I hope reached their destination.

After a stay of one day only, I left Aleppo by rail at 6.30 a.m. on April 10, and reached Damascus at 10 p.m. the same day, lunching in the refreshment room at Homs, and dining at Rayak on the way, a journey very inferior in comfort to that between Basra and Baghdad! This line was originally constructed by a European company, under a kilometric guarantee, for the Turks, and in former days its meanderings over the plain conveyed the distant effect of a forest of telegraph poles. I am not sure whether it has been straightened out since the French occupation.

I remained at Damascus for one day only, as it was imperatively necessary for me to go on to Beyrout as early as possible with a view to securing a passage by the Messageries steamer of April 14, said to be fully booked up. I stayed at the Hotel Oriental Khawam, which has a charming garden full of Banksia roses and other familiar flowers. General Sir H. H. Tudor, commanding troops in Palestine, and staff, arrived on a return visit to the French staff, and for some inter-Allied football matches.

I left Damascus at 7.30 a.m. on April 12, having secured a seat in one of the motor-cars which proceed daily to Beyrout across the Lebanon ranges, sitting in front with the driver, whilst the body of the car was filled with a varying number of Arabs, with their belongings, as we proceeded. The motor journey is usually accomplished in four hours, whereas the train, over what is in part a mountain railway, takes from six to eight hours over it. Unfortunately it

was a very wet day, and the view was entirely obscured by rain and clouds.

I reached Beyrout at 12.30 p.m. and stayed at the Hotel Palace Khawam, near the Quays, which, however, I am unable to recommend, the accommodation and attendance being indifferent and the charges very high, as they are, in fact, everywhere in Syria, with more justification. The old-established hotel (of which I forget the name) near Cook's office is probably better.

After many vicissitudes I at last succeeded in getting a second-class berth on the *Sphinx* of the M.M., a very fine ship in every way, which was exchanged for a first-class after I got on board on April 14, and stopping two days at Alexandria for cargo, reached Marseilles on April 23.

REVIEWS

THE TURKISH EMPIRE. By Lord Eversley and Sir Valentine Chirol.
T. Fisher Unwin.

Perhaps the greatest surprise the world has experienced since the Armistice has been the revival, almost the resurrection, of Turkey and of the Turkish Empire—not, it is true, of the Empire even as it was before the Great War, but of a not inconsiderable Empire, at least in terms of territory. This absolutely unexpected resuscitation, accompanied as it has been by equally unexpected developments, such as the democratization of Turkey, has naturally excited universal interest, and makes the publication of such a book as this singularly opportune, and this all the more because the work is of the high class we expect from such authors.

This important book presents a continuous history of the Ottoman Empire from its small beginnings in Asia Minor under Othman, or Osman, up to so recent a date as that of the Mudania Convention. It is the work, however, of two hands. Much the longer part is written by Lord Eversley; it takes the story of the Turks as far as 1914, and first appeared as a separate volume in 1917, when it was at once accepted as an excellent, if somewhat condensed, history, and became, having regard to its limits, a standard work. What we have in the present book is a new edition of that history, to which have been added several chapters by Sir Valentine Chirol, carrying the narrative from 1914 to 1922. In his Second Preface, Lord Eversley tells us he thought it most desirable, in view of the Great War and what had since occurred, that the story should be brought up to date as much as possible, but that increasing infirmities of age prevented him from attempting himself to do this. Everyone will feel sympathy with Lord Eversley, and all will agree that his choice of a coadjutor could not well be bettered.

It is quite unnecessary to say anything further about Lord Eversley's part of the book, except perhaps to note there are still some trifling inaccuracies in details which might be corrected in a third edition. For instance, the correct date of the second Siege of Rhodes is 1522, but on p. 96 it is given as 1520, on p. 112 as 1524, and on p. 117 as 1523. (I am indebted to Colonel Yate for calling my attention to these *errata*.) Most of those who are really interested in this subject

are already acquainted with what Lord Eversley has written, and their attention, as my own has been, will be concentrated on the fresh matter supplied by Sir Valentine. He has the pen of a ready writer, as everybody knows; he is the master of a style at once lucid and persuasive. Besides, he has a most profound knowledge of Foreign Affairs, especially as regards the East.

But it may be urged without offence that we are all too near the events of the past eight years to see them in anything like their proper perspective, and that we are far from being in full possession of the relevant facts, though that is essential for forming a thoroughly sound judgment. It may be doubted whether any man of our generation, or even of the next generation, will be sufficiently removed from the impact and pressure of these formidable times to be able to give an unbiased, inexpugnable historical account, far less a history, of these stupendous years.

What I have just said may seem rather trite, but what is in my mind is rather what has happened to myself respecting opinions I had held, and have now been compelled to modify or discard altogether, on further consideration of what may be called the facts of the case, apart from predilection or prejudice. The world has been saturated with propaganda, and nothing is more genuinely obscurantist. In each country there has been established a certain orthodoxy of opinion, as well as of facts, respecting the war and what has happened since, but based largely on one-sided national and nationalizing readings of recent history. Thus have emerged a British, a French, a German orthodoxy, and so on, each seeing, of course, everything from its particular point of view, and, equally of course, not seeing everything or much from the other points of view. In these chapters of his, Sir Valentine presents the story quite admirably from the orthodox British standpoint. My trouble is that I have ceased to be a believer in this orthodoxy—that is, as regards some of its tenets.

To pass from the general to the particular. And here I shall confine myself to three things, all of which figure in these chapters. I have come to think that the usual British view of King Constantine is grossly unfair, nor do I agree with the usual British estimate of M. Venizelos. I am not going to state my reasons, for to do so would occupy much space, but I may be permitted to refer my readers to Mr. G. E. Abbott's book which was published towards the close of last year under the title of "Greece and the Allies." No one can study that work without coming to the conclusion that the usual orthodox British view is, to say the least, open to the gravest suspicions. The third thing with respect to which I differ from Sir Valentine is his view—again the orthodox British view—of the importance of the co-operation of the Arabs, under Feisal, with the British in the conquest of Palestine and Syria. I am sure that the value of the services of the

Arabs was greatly exaggerated—for political reasons that I believe were entirely wrong. The curious manner in which Feisal was hustled into Damascus gave the whole show away. R. M.

TRAVELS IN EASTERN TIBET. By Eric Teichman, H.M. Consular Service. Maps and illustrations. Cambridge Press.

This book, with its excellent photographs and historical and topographical notes, is a valuable addition to the literature on Tibet. The writer had exceptional opportunities for studying the Chino-Tibetan question, inasmuch as he was holding a consular appointment in Western China when hostilities broke out between China and Tibet on the frontier in 1918. Mainly as the result of the world war, and the general spirit of unrest prevailing, the internal affairs of China were in disorder, the authority of the Central Government did not extend far beyond Peking, and was quite exhausted before reaching the outlying provinces. It therefore devolved upon the author to mediate between the warring elements on the border, pending a definite settlement of the boundary question by direct negotiation with the Peking Government, when the latter should be in a position to deal with Tibetan affairs. This responsible duty necessitated long and arduous journeys through unexplored regions of Eastern Tibet, and the observations made should prove of considerable value to the more complete mapping and surveying of this little-known area.

It cannot be said that Tibet comes strictly within the geographical limits of Central Asia, but its political and economic relations with the States beyond its borders, its religious connection with Mongolia, and the intercourse that is carried on between the Kalmuks, or Torgut Mongols, of the Thian Shan districts of Chinese Turkistan, are such that we cannot in certain matters speak of the one without referring to the other. The Chino-Tibetan question is of absorbing interest, for it concerns us very closely in that our Indian frontier marches with that of Tibet in the south and west, and we cannot, therefore, be indifferent to the fate of that country.

Tibet aims at complete independence and freedom from interference on the part of China or any other Power, and wishes to extend her boundaries to embrace those parts of Asia contiguous to her borders which are inhabited by races of Tibetan origin. This claim, it should be noted, is based on the history of Tibet as an autonomous State from the earliest days, while the Tibetans also contend that with the fall of the dynasty at the revolution of 1911 they ceased to owe even nominal allegiance to China, but became entirely independent, or at any rate equal partners in the new Commonwealth and other constituent elements of the former Manchu Empire.

Experience has taught us in India that we can only maintain satis-

factory relations with Tibet by dealing direct with a recognized Tibetan Government, and India has consequently supported the claim to internal autonomy, while fully recognizing the status of Tibet as an integral, though self-governing, portion of China. The exact demarcation of the Chino-Tibetan frontier is a matter that does not directly concern India, but we seek to promote a friendly settlement of the boundary dispute in the interests of trans-frontier trade, and the peace and tranquillity of the north-eastern border of India. The latter issues are important, since hostilities between China and Tibet would have their repercussion on the Indian frontier, with resultant unrest and turmoil. India has no territorial or other designs against the integrity of Tibet, and since the British expedition of 1904 the Tibetans appear to have realized this fact by their desire for more friendly relations with her neighbour.

The Chinese recognize in principle the justice of the Tibetan demand for autonomy, yet they seek to assert their authority in Tibet, and to restrict the boundaries by incorporating in China proper frontier districts inhabited by Tibetan races. This policy has resulted in a general dislike and mistrust of China. The Tibetans seem quite capable of controlling their internal affairs, and in this connection it is somewhat paradoxical that the Chinese, who have failed to establish law and order and to initiate a stable government in their own country, should claim to govern Tibet.

The book contains many interesting observations on the colonization of Tibet by the Chinese, and an interesting point in connection with the expansion of Chinese into Tibet and Mongolia is the fact that whereas in Mongolia the second generation of the Chinese immigrant's half-caste family is usually to all intents and purposes Chinese, in Tibet the reverse is the case.

The author has some commercial notes to offer concerning the wool trade of Eastern Tibet; the region is a great wool-producing area, and the article is exported through Kansu to Tientsin or to Szechuan, and so to Shanghai via Hankow, according as it is purchased by traders along the Kansu border or by those on the Szechuan side. Throughout Eastern Tibet the wool is woven by the women in their homes, and such is the quality that its reputation extends to Peking and beyond.

This many-sided book gives us notes on Buddhism and the progress of mission work in Tibet. It is known that there are points of similarity between the ritual of Buddhism and Catholicism, and to one who has travelled in Tibet and Mongolia the resemblance between the monastic life of Europe and that of the lamas is apparent. In mediæval times the monasteries of Europe were the centres of wealth and learning, and such is the case in Tibet to-day, where all educated laymen have received their instruction in a monastery.

The Chinese have always shown great religious toleration so long as it did not aim at the fundamental principles of their policy, or bring foreign domination in its wake, and their attitude in Tibet towards mission work was passive. They are a materialistic people with the innate religious feeling of ancestor worship, whereas the Tibetans, on the contrary, preserve an active hostility towards Christian missionary effort. It is, however, open to question whether Buddhism should be supplanted, since its doctrines approach closely to those of Christianity, and it might be more advantageous to study Buddhism and endeavour to influence it with Christian principles. The whole subject is one meriting study, the more so from the belief that the early Buddhists came into contact with Nestorian Christians. It is known that in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries Nestorian Christianity was a strong rival to Islam and Buddhism in Asia.

To future travellers in Tibet, Chapter VIII. and the remarks on servants are commended. The majority of explorers have been accompanied by Chinese domestics, and have, thereby, increased their difficulties. The Chinese dislike Tibet, the climate, and the hardships of travel in that country, and they are as strangers to the land as the traveller they accompany. The successful outcome of a journey in Tibet would therefore appear to devolve largely on the choice of Tibetan followers.

There is some valuable information on the big game of Eastern Tibet that will appeal to the hunter, and altogether the composition and scope of the book are such that it cannot fail to be of interest and value from whatever point of view it is regarded.

There is a complete table of contents, a good index, and some well-drawn maps.

P. T. ETHERTON.

MARK SYKES: HIS LIFE AND LETTERS. By Shane Leslie. With an Introduction by the Right Hon. Winston Churchill. Cassell. 16s. net.

In writing the life of Sir Mark Sykes, an engaging and original character, Shane Leslie found a congenial task and one well suited to his descriptive methods. In the manner of its composition the book is out of the ordinary, for a summary makes up the first chapter, while religious ideas and literary tastes are interwoven with accounts of Sir Mark's experiences in South Africa and in the Near and Middle East. It must be allowed that this summary serves to engage the reader's attention and excite his curiosity, while the quick change from serious to grotesque and from grotesque to serious in the chapters which follow admit of no moment of flagging interest.

Those who had the good fortune to meet Mark Sykes were attracted by his warm-hearted good-nature, by a certain whimsical bluntness of speech, and by an originality of outlook which was often as surprising

as it was brilliant. His somewhat untidy appearance and rough exterior were as pleasing as similar traits in a young and undeveloped animal.

As the author of the book makes clear, Mark Sykes had the outlook on life of a man when still at the age of boyhood; but, on the other hand, in manhood he retained in great measure the inconsequence, strong prejudices, and spontaneity of a boy. The education he received was uniquely unorthodox, and in this it would appear to combat argument in favour of the necessity for the usual curriculum of the public school. Short spells at Beaumont and at Cambridge and a period spent at a Jesuit college in Monaco were continually interrupted by his parents' habit of whisking him off, at any time in the term, to Assouan or India or the Arabian desert. "Lady Sykes's cheques for her annual children's tea-party at Hull used to arrive from Jerusalem, South Africa, Brazil, Cairo, and Mexico. From which we may deduce the wanderings of the infant Mark." The knowledge he imbibed on his own account was as varied as it was unusual. Among the books of which at an early age he had made a complete and understanding study may be instanced Sir Richard Burton's notes to the "Arabian Nights" and Marshal Saxe's treatise on fortification. At the same time his mind, though of an original and inquiring turn, was singularly simple and morally without tarnish. And if "his education followed original lines he was far from uneducated, and the reverse of uncultured. While his father gave him his taste for travel, his mother gave him no slight enthusiasm for literature." As his tutor, Mr. Egerton Beck, wrote of him: "The net result of his mixed education, besides his Arabic, was a love of English literature, a good working knowledge of French, an extensive knowledge of men and affairs, and a first-hand acquaintance with other lands. The books he published as a result of his travels are now mostly out of print; but it will surely happen that those who become acquainted with Mark Sykes through the book now under review will desire to increase their knowledge of a man whose short life was spent doing the most unexpected things in more unexpected places, and whose powers of observation were only exceeded by his command of expressive phrase with which to record the results of his journeyings in the unmapped spaces of the Middle East. The two best known of his books—"Through Five Turkish Provinces" and "The Caliph's Last Heritage"—can doubtless be found in many public and private libraries.

Possibly the least interesting chapter is that which details his service in South Africa during the Boer War. If it were needed, this furnishes evidence of the enthralling interest of the rest of his life. Mark Sykes was an enthusiastic Militia officer, and the Boer War gave him the chance of active service with his battalion; and though he hated the restraint of life with a small post at Barkley

West, and his letters were full of pungent criticism of all and sundry, his sense of humour kept him cheerful and his small but varied library gave him mental relaxation. At any rate, his experiences during those years probably helped the man to discipline his naturally undisciplined nature, and were a valuable corrective of the impulsiveness which was wont to show itself even in his maturer years.

No attempt is made here to quote from the mass of humorous stories and sayings, mostly in Sykes's own words, which enliven the book throughout, and which in several cases are illustrated by his original cartoons, thirty of which are reproduced.

Of the part played by Mark Sykes during the late war and in the complicated political situation which succeeded it the author writes with knowledge and acumen. Perhaps the best description of the former part is contained in Sykes's own indignant reply, wired from Cairo, to the attacks of his political opponent in the General Election of November, 1918. Of particular interest is the author's lucid account of the real part played by Sykes in the arrangement with France, which came to be generally referred to as the "Sykes-Picot" agreement. If he failed to unravel the tangle brought about by an attempt to weave into one skein the diverse interests of the Zionists, the Armenians, the Pan-Arabs, the Syrians, the Egyptians, and make it acceptable to the individual Governments of the lately allied Powers, it may be surmised that no lesser man could have tried to do it and still have retained the trust and friendship of each and all the interested parties.

In producing such a lovable book, Shane Leslie has earned the gratitude of all those who knew his captivating and romantic hero, who graced a part in contemporary world-drama for all too short a period, and passed out at the moment when "he had, in fact, reached that point and situation in life when all the years of preparation are over and when the promise of mature action has begun."

E. J. B.

EXPLORATIONS IN THE EASTERN KARAKORAM AND THE UPPER YARKAND VALLEY. (Report of the Survey of India Party with the De Filippi Expedition, 1914.)

In this Report we are given an account of the work carried out by the Survey of India during 1914, acting in conjunction with the Italian Expedition under De Filippi, in the little-known Karakoram range.

The Karakoram numbers some of the highest peaks in the world, and is of great interest, as much from its commercial as from its geographical aspect. It lies on the route from India to the markets of Central Asia, and the commercial highway over it is the loftiest in the universe. Owing to the physical obstacles, trade is carried on at a considerable disadvantage, and every summer during the period when the passes are open a heavy mortality in baggage animals results.

The Karakoram opens up a wide field for exploratory enterprise, for our knowledge of the topography of that important range is limited, and much yet remains to be done from a geophysical and geographical standpoint.

The detachment from the Survey of India was primarily concerned with the geographical exploration of the Karakoram and its glaciers, as well as the source and tributaries of the Yarkand River. The preliminary surveys of the region in question, carried out under Government auspices in the sixties of last century, the subsequent explorations of Shaw and Hayward, and more recently those of Sir Francis Younghusband and the Duke of the Abruzzi, had raised many interesting geographical questions, and the Report under review details the extent to which these problems have been solved.

An exhaustive survey was made of the Remo Glacier, the two branches of which unite to form a front two miles broad; the western branch having at its head a group of peaks, the highest of which is 24,190 feet. The Remo Glacier is just off the Leh-Yarkand trade route, and the surveyors made the interesting discovery that the Shyok, one of the main tributaries of the Indus, and the Yarkand River have a common origin in the glacier.

In the Yarkand Valley it was found that existing maps of the ground between Aktagh and Suget were in error, and the country had evidently been sketched from a distance. There is, apparently, only one range, and the southern one is non-existent.

The source of the Oprang River has always been a debatable question; indeed, the area of this valley is open to thorough exploration and survey. The conclusion was arrived at that the Oprang must rise much further west than the point where Sir Francis Younghusband placed its source. The observations made in this connection are important for the future exploration of the Oprang. So far the only practicable entrance to the valley has been the Aghil Pass, entailing the crossing of the Yarkand River below Bazar Dara. The writer, who traversed the region in 1909, found this to be most difficult without boats, which should be placed there before the end of October, owing to the volume of water in the river. Exploration work would have to be carried out in the late autumn and winter, although, if the conclusions arrived at by the surveyors are correct, the valley could be entered early in summer, and its survey carried out in the open season.

The Report under review deals with the material available concerning unexplored passes from the Indian side to the Oprang in the vicinity of peak K. 2. As to the practicability of these passes, from the personal experience of the writer, everything depends upon the constantly changing condition of the glaciers, which may render passage a matter of ease until glacial movements bar the route, a barrier that

may be removed by further change. If a pass is impracticable now it does not necessarily follow that it will not be open at some future date.

The Report contains a list of co-ordinates, with heights of stations and points, whilst the maps and plans accompanying it have been prepared in the manner characteristic of the Survey of India.

P. T. ETHERTON.

SIWA: THE OASIS OF JUPITER AMMON. By C. Dalrymple Belgrave, with an Introduction by Sir Reginald Wingate. John Lane, London. 15s. net.

Siwa is the largest and richest of the group of oases that lie to the west of Egypt in the Libyan desert. The word *oasis* is the Greek form of the old Egyptian word *Wah*, and is given to the fertile spots which are irrigated by springs from subterranean water believed to traverse argillaceous beds from the Nile. From what one heard of these "islands" in the parched desert, there has been hitherto little inducement to incur the expense and risk of a visit; though travellers sometimes penetrate to the monasteries and lakes of the Wady Natrûn. Mr. W. Scawen Blunt, who ventured to Siwa in 1897, had a very unpleasant experience, and nearly lost his life at the hands of the Siwans. But the rise of the Senussi and the adventurous journey of Mrs. Rosita Forbes with Hasaneyn Bey have brought this part of the Sahara into prominence. The oases are briefly but well described in Murray's and Baedeker's handbooks to Egypt. Mr. Belgrave has now given us an excellent record of his observations in 1920-1921, when in command of a section of the Camel Corps of the Frontier Defence Administration and for some time District Officer. It is a valuable contribution to our knowledge respecting an oasis which once contained the renowned temple and oracle of Jupiter Ammon. It seems to have been first visited by an Englishman in 1792.

The oasis lies in a depression about thirty miles long by six wide, about seventy-two feet below the Mediterranean level, and is some 200 miles from Mersi Matruh, or Barâtûn (*Paratorium*) on the coast. An interesting account of Siwan history is given. The oasis was colonised by Rameses III. in the twelfth century B.C. When Alexander visited it he was received with divine honours as son of Zeus. An army of Cambyses on the march to it was lost in the pitiless desert. Its fame began to decline in the second century B.C., and it soon relapsed into barbarism. Christianity was introduced in the fourth century A.D., but took no strong root. Islam was introduced in the eleventh century at the point of the sword. The founder of the Senussi settled there in 1838, and the people became his ardent partisans, though another fraternity, that of the Medinieh, founded a century earlier, has numerous adherents.

The chief products and exports are dates, renowned for their excellence, and olive oil. An abundance of other fruits includes figs, peaches, plums, pears, apples, limes, and sweet lemons. When lorries supersede camels exports should increase. The climate is trying in summer, but for six months of the year it is good.

The town of Siwa, built on a rock in mid-oasis, is of a very quaint character and construction. The people, who are of Berber origin, number about 4,000, and are insufficient to cultivate the whole of the oasis. Their character, little affected by world changes, seems to be of a low type. They are described as lazy and unenterprising, bigoted, secretive, and extremely superstitious. They are not immoral, but simply "without morals." They despise both Arabs and Sudanese, and dislike foreigners. Their food includes puppies, rats, cats, and mice. The women, who largely predominate, speak but little Arabic. A woman (whose dowry, for rich and poor alike, is £1 4s.) is worth less than a goat, and much less than a donkey. Most men divorce dozens of wives—*i.e.*, "as soon as they are bored." Boys marry at sixteen, and girls at from nine to twelve. A girl of eleven has often been married and divorced several times. The author attended a festival of an old inhabitant (reputed to be 102) who was celebrating his thirty-sixth wedding. One can quite imagine that the Siwans take life easily. They are fond of all the jollifications that go under the Arabic word *fantasia*, and of music, which is of the usual African or Eastern character. Life amongst most peoples comes to exercise its peculiar fascination, and so, just as those who drink Nile water desire to return and drink it again, Mr. Belgrave found that he left this abode of lotus-eaters with regret.

Sir Reginald Wingate, who has contributed an interesting Foreword, observes that the good work which is done by British officers and officials like the author helps to foster feelings of confidence and goodwill, which go far to prepare the way for a better era of development.

Some excellent photographs and sketches by the author are reproduced. Of the few slips observed only one need be mentioned—*viz.*, that the Festival which succeeds Ramadan, the month of the Fast, is given as the Kurban Bairam (in Turkish), which is celebrated about seventy days later. It should be given as the Ramadan Bairam, or lesser of the two great Moslem festivals.

R. L. M.

OBITUARY

SIR JOSEPH WALTON

By the death of Sir Joseph Walton, the Society has lost one of its original members. Born in 1849, in the North of England, Sir Joseph started on a business career at the age of twenty-one. He very soon foresaw the great future that awaited the development of the north-country coal and allied trades, and centred all his energies on this particular phase of his work with characteristic foresight and with great success, so that each year steady progress was made and new fields opened up.

In 1897 he turned his attention to politics, and was elected as Liberal M.P. for Barnsley, a seat he held for twenty-three years. The ramifications of his business had extended by now all over the civilized globe, and he decided that it would be both to his own interest and to the interest of the country generally, that he should study the opportunities of foreign trade on the spot. The result was that he travelled extensively, became, in fact, one of the greatest of British "globe-trotters"; but he had a method in his scheme, it was to foster British exports. He went to Persia, India, Japan, China, South Africa, North and South America, wrote a great deal about his travels, and became somewhat of an authority on many of the countries he visited. He was a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, an original member of the Central Asian Society, and was also Deputy-Lieutenant for the North Riding of Yorkshire.

CORRESPONDENCE

MAJOR SOANE IN SULAIMANIYAH

TO THE HON. SECRETARY CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.

BEXHILL-ON-SEA,
April 24, 1923.

SIR,

My attention has been directed to an anonymous article on "Major Soane in Sulaimaniyah," which appears in Part II., Vol. X., of the JOURNAL OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, and I am very glad to find in it an attempt to do justice to his most valuable work in Kurdistan in 1919-20-21.

The article is, however, marred by the passage on pp. 145-46 commencing with "Unfortunately, the punitive movements . . .," and ending with ". . . the maintenance of order."

The matter is hardly one of general interest to your members, but I should like to assure the writer of the article that he has been entirely misinformed as to the "more than customary differences between military and political," and as to the "demands" of the General Officer in command of the operations.

By order of the G.O.C.-in-C., Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, I was in supreme military and political charge in the theatre of operations in Southern Kurdistan from May to August, 1919, and I know that there was no friction between my military and political subordinates during that time, and that Major Soane, as my chief Political Staff Officer, was always loyal. . . .

I am, yours truly,

THEODORE FRASER,
(Major-General).

LIST OF MEMBERS ELECTED IN APRIL,
MAY, AND JUNE, 1923.

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Christie, Captain L. D.
Coghill, Captain Sir Patrick, Bart., R.F.A.
Cooper, W. H.
Corbyn, E. N.
Croft, W. D.
Ellis, Captain C. H., O.B.E.
French, Lieut.-Colonel W., D.S.O., M.C.
Graham, Lieut.-Colonel, J. D., C.I.E., I.M.S.
Greenhouse, Major F. S.
Gibbon, Colonel W. H., C.B., C.M.G.
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Hadow, D. S.
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Hooper, H. G. V.
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Jacks, T. L.
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Millar, Captain A. B., 2nd Frontier Force Rifles, I.A.
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O'Leary, Rev. de L.
Reilly, Major B. R.
Robert, Captain V. G., M.B.E., M.C.
Saunders, G.

Sinderson, Dr. H. C.
Skinner, Major-General Sir Cyriac, K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O.
Smith, W. Donald.
Stilwell, J. G.
Stone, Sir J. H., C.I.E.
Vivian, Major V., C.B.E.
Wakely, L. D.
Wallis, Captain C., I.A.
Wanklyn, Mrs.
Wheeler, Captain G. E., I.A.
Williamson, R. H., I.C.S.
Wright, John Laird.
Yetts, L. M., M.C.

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
1923. GENERAL SIR EDMUND BARROW, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY ACCOUNTS, 1922

RECEIPTS.			EXPENDITURE.		
	£	s. d.		£	s. d.
557 subscriptions at £1	557 0 0	Rent and water rate	88 18 2
10 " at 16s.	8 0 0	General rate	14 6 0
7 " in arrears	7 0 0	Salary	68 15 0
18 " in advance	18 0 0			121 19 2
Journal subscriptions	590 0 0	Journal: Printing	216 14 9
Journal sales	5 14 7	Reporting	23 7 6
	...	6 1 11	Postage	12 8 8
Annual Dinner receipts	74 3 6	Meetings: Lecture Rooms	19 18 0
Miscellaneous receipts	2 7 1	Lantern	12 12 0
	Slides	1 14 6
Interest on War Loan	5 0 0	Lecture cards and general printing	26 18 0
Interest on Deposit	3 8 0	Typing	8 6 6
	Annual Dinner expenditure	57 8 0
Donation	25 0 0	Temporary advance to Dinner Club	1 4 8
			128 1 8
Balance at bank, January 1, 1922	711 10 1	Office: Furnishing	26 2 6
Deposit	18 15 4	Binding Journals	1 12 6
Balance of Petty Cash, January 1, 1922	70 0 0	Stationery	6 16 6½
	Telephone	6 1 8
	Office assistant	6 1 0
	Postage	42 0 6½
	Petty cash	30 12 3
			119 7 0
	Royal Geographical Society	1 1 0
	Bank charges	1 0 7
			624 0 4
	Purchase of £100 5 per cent. War Loan	97 0 6
	Balance at bank, December 31, 1922	80 12 9
	Deposit, December 31, 1922	50 0 0
	Balance of Petty Cash, December 31, 1922	2 4 0
			82 16 9
			£808 17 7

We have examined the above statement with the books and vouchers, and certify it to be in accordance therewith.

E. BONHAM-CARTER.
C. B. STOKES, COLONEL.
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
1923

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PALESTINE

A MEETING of the Central Asian Society was held on May 17, 1923, at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., when Sir Wyndham Deedes gave a lecture on "Palestine." Lord Carnock presided.

In opening the proceedings, the CHAIRMAN said: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I am sorry to say that our Joint Honorary Secretary, Colonel Yate, has been seriously ill, and though he is now convalescent he is not able to be present to-day. I may mention that since the last meeting seventeen new members have been elected. It is now my pleasing duty to introduce Sir Wyndham Deedes, who is going to give us an address this afternoon on "Palestine." I dare say you all know that he held an important post in the Administration of the country, and I am sure we will listen to the address he is giving us with great interest. (Applause.)

SIR WYNDHAM DEEDES: Before beginning my lecture, I wish to warn you that my treatment of my subject will be most inadequate; I am beset by two limitations—the time at my disposal and my own shortcomings as a lecturer. If, therefore, the lecture lacks interest, it must be ascribed to the manner in which I deal with the material, rather than to the matter itself. I do not propose to touch on the history or the geography of Palestine, nor its agricultural and mineral resources or suchlike subjects; for textbooks and official documents can treat of these matters far better than I can. But I propose to deal with the hopes and aspirations of the peoples who are now directly interested in the country—the British, the Jews, and the Arabs. I hope to be able to show you that worthy and noble aims animate both the Arabs and the Jews; and, further, I would wish to arouse your interest in the great task we have undertaken, first in reconciling the apparently conflicting ideals of each—I say "apparently," for I do not think their ideals really conflict—and, secondly, in enlisting the co-operation of both peoples to make of Palestine a land holy in fact as well as in name. If their aims are great, ours are greater still, for our aims include both of theirs. I have no need, therefore, to speak from any but a pro-British point of view; in doing that I firmly believe I shall be speaking from a pro-Arab and a pro-Jewish point of view as well.

But I am going to make one demand of you: not to ask me what we are going to "get out of" our venture—what the

material advantages, in pounds, shillings, and pence, will amount to. I do not say that there may not be material advantages some day—strategic and commercial advantages, a short route to Iraq, oil, mineral wealth from the Dead Sea, and so on. I am little disposed and have not time, were I disposed, to go into all that. But what I do promise you is great moral and spiritual advantages to be derived from our guardianship of the Holy Land. I conceive that the recent war disposed of the idea (I hope once and for all) that the search after material wealth and possessions brought with it any advantage to the Powers engaged. It brought, and can bring, nothing but ruin and chaos. I conceive rather that the Power that will be great in the future is the Power that shall seek to acquire spiritual and moral wealth. I can see by the faces of some of my audience that they believe themselves now to be addressed by an idealistic fanatic—idealistic, yes; fanatic, no. I should like to see this country a little more idealistic and a little less material in its outlook. But my point of view is an eminently practical one really; for I believe that it is only by the means which I indicate that real greatness can be achieved, and I wish to see my country great. Let us see now how Palestine and its people can help us towards the attainment of that ideal.

ZIONISM.

What is it that the Jews desire to do in Palestine? Before answering that question it is well to inquire, "What Jews?" For you may be inclined to say that you do not believe that the Jews are at all unanimous on the question of Zionism, and that there is a great number of them who do not wish to have anything to do with it. If you believe that, I cannot agree with you. The vast majority of Jews are Zionists in the full sense of the term, and as understood by His Majesty's Government and the Zionist Organization. Some of them, I admit, would like to go much further; but with the lapse of time they are coming to see that Zionism as by us interpreted will give them much, if not all, that they desire. Perhaps those most immediately interested are the Jewish masses of Poland, Eastern Europe, and South Russia, where Zionism was born, and where the Jews always have been, and still are, oppressed and persecuted. But there are great numbers of Zionists in other lands as well. The minority, those who do not at present profess and practise Zionism, consists of Jews who are content to live in the countries of their adoption, and who for the most part are not satisfied that by becoming Zionists they will not have to forgo the benefits which they at present enjoy. In this minority must be included those who for reasons into which I have not time to enter are against Zionism altogether. They consist mostly of Orthodox Jews. But, as you will see, the great

majority of the Jews are in favour of the movement. And what is meant by establishing a National Home in Palestine? On this subject there has been much controversy and many views have been expressed, ranging from a purely spiritual conception on the one hand to the idea of a Jewish State on the other. His Majesty's Government have recently expressed in very clear terms what they intend, and an authoritative explanation is to be found in the White Paper issued in 1922, to which the Zionist Organization have given their assent. I will not, however, read you extracts from that and other official documents, but will give you an explanation in my own words which I believe to accord with that given by His Majesty's Government and the Zionist Organization. I said just now that extreme views had been expressed by some Jews as to the meaning of the establishment in Palestine of a National Home. This is hardly to be wondered at. If someone came and told you that he intended to build you a house, and published it far and wide, and made much ado about it, you might naturally suppose that the house he was going to build you would be a fairly substantial structure. Indeed, from the advertisement given to it by your friend you might reasonably expect him to build you a castle. Imagine, then, your disappointment, not to say indignation, when your friend, having kept silence during three or four years, and having done little more than collect a few bricks and mortar and consult his architects, invited you down one day to see your home and showed you the plan, not of a castle, but of a cottage! I do not say that you ought not to have had more than a cottage, but I do think your friend ought to have made his intentions rather clearer when he made you his offer! That is somewhat the position between His Majesty's Government and the Zionists. However, be that as it may, and keeping to the analogy of house-building, let me put my idea of a National Home to you in this manner. Let us assume that I wish to build myself a home in England after many years' residence abroad—as indeed I do after twenty-three years' absence—I should go down to the country, and without buying up all my neighbour's property or asking the Government to make me a large grant of lands, I should acquire a nice-sized property, build myself a house on it, and then set about to make the place as typically English as I could. I should surround myself with just those things that go to make an Englishman feel he's at home. I should have a nice fruit and flower garden, a bit of land and a farm, some shooting, fishing and golf, and all those things in which we English like to live and move and have our being. I should want, too, to be within easy reach of London, the heart of the Empire. When I had carried out these plans, I should go and live in that house as an Englishman in his castle—lord of all I survey; but, at the same time, owing to the moderation of my demands and my preten-

sions, on good terms with my neighbours; indeed, I should hope to show them a bit how things should be run after my long experience abroad and the savings I have put by (this latter part of the case must not be held to apply to me!). In this connection a friend of mine said to me the other day: "I took a little place on the Continent (where life is so much cheaper), and I tried to make it as English as I could, but I gave it up after a time." I asked him why. "Well," he said, "I had much that I wanted, but it lacked the English atmosphere."

Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, that is exactly the case with the Jews. After, not 23 but more like 2,300 years of Dispersion, they want again to have a home in their own land.

Of course, there are Jewish communities all the world over, and some of them live in comparative and some of them in complete happiness. But they are all strangers in a strange land, and they feel what my friend felt when he said that somehow or other living abroad was not the same thing as living at home. This, then, disposes of that point sometimes raised—"Oh yes, let them have a home by all means, but not in Palestine." Read Jewish history and study the Bible, and there you will find the answer to the question, "Why must it be in Palestine?" The word "Jerusalem" is writ large across the Jews' history, and is bound up with their religion. And then there is a still larger issue involved; that by giving the Jews a home, we shall again make of them a nation in deed as well as in word. Now I conceive that there are, at all events, three requisites for the making of a nation. A nation must have a religion, a language, and a culture. With regard to the first point, I do not propose to say much, for it would be presumptuous on my part to do so. I can, anyhow, tell you this, that the Jews have no intention of building a synagogue on the Haram es Shrief, where the Moslem Mosque of El Aqsa stands; and I shall allude to the question of religion again when I come to speak of the Jewish immigrants. But I feel sure that the Jews on their return to Palestine will not neglect the religious aspect of the question. Indeed, I do not see that they can. Their national life is too closely bound up with the religious. I will permit myself to say (and trust that no offence will be taken at my words) that I hope it may be found possible to bring their religion into somewhat closer touch with the times in which we live, and that it will be made more of a real thing to all than it is to some to-day. For if the ideals for the future of Palestine to which I shall allude later are to be attained, it is essential that the Jewish religion should be a real and live force, able and willing to co-operate with the other great religions of the country and of the world in working for the aim which they all have in common—the spiritual welfare of mankind.

A National Language.—This also is an essential attribute of nationality, and the revival of Hebrew is therefore an important part of the Zionist programme; 95 per cent. of the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine speak Hebrew, and all those who are arriving do so. The criticism which has been levelled against a Hebrew revival is, I think, misplaced and, if I may say so, ignorant. The world will be the richer for the moral and intellectual wealth of the Jews which that language will convey. The more numerous the means which exist for the expression of men's thoughts, the better. And how can the Jews sing their songs in a strange language? Too long have they had to hang up their harps.

Culture.—The word "Culture" may be offensive to you, but it is conveniently short, and that is why I shall use it. I mean by it, the traditions and customs and all that represents the distinctive Life of a People. By saying that the Jews desire to establish a Jewish Culture in Palestine, I state in a few words the chief aim of the Zionist Movement. Let me illustrate this in somewhat greater detail.

No one will, I suppose, deny that the Jewish people is possessed of great religious, moral, scientific, and artistic wealth. Jews play a distinguished part in all the activities in which men engage. But in order that they as a Nation and the world at large may benefit by this wealth, it is necessary that they have a repository for it, a place where they may concentrate and safeguard it. Dispersed, it can be of no value to anyone. It is to this end that they desire to establish in Palestine religious, educational, scientific, agricultural, social and suchlike institutions which shall be models of what can be achieved in each particular sphere of activity. One can then picture to oneself in the future the Jews of the world sending their children to be educated in the homeland in a Jewish atmosphere; Jewish men of letters repairing, for a certain time, at all events, to the Hebrew University and places of learning at Jerusalem, there to pursue their inquiries and researches for the benefit of their Nation and of the world. I see also that it will become a regular custom for Jews all the world over to effect once in their lives, if not annually, a pilgrimage, probably in the spring, at the season of Passover, to the Holy Land, there to spend a few weeks or months in one of their beautiful colonies, to live a Jewish life, to hear nothing but Hebrew spoken, returning at the end of their sojourn there to the land of their adoption, spiritually recharged, better Jews, and bearing a message of hope and encouragement to their co-nationalists in the Diaspora. This I believe to be a great idea and one worthy of working for. Hence it is that in considering the question of the National Home we should not, in my opinion, concentrate our attention solely on the Palestine aspect of it, but primarily we should

consider what it will mean to the 15,000,000 Jews scattered throughout the world, once again members of a living Nation and possessors of a home of their own. And those privileged to settle in Palestine should regard themselves as the "elect of the Nation" on whom falls the honour and responsibility of showing to the world what contribution the Jews are able to make to its progress. Thus, too, it is most important that those who are making their way there should be carefully selected in order that they may be worthy representatives of their people. But you may still say that I have not yet been sufficiently explicit, and that you wish to know in somewhat greater detail what the size of this home will be, how many Jews will inhabit it, and how much land they will require for habitation and cultivation. Let me, then, put it to you in this way. I have indicated to you the end in view. It is not the establishment in Palestine of a political or numerical predominance: it is the establishment there of a Jewish Culture (as the word has been interpreted above). To what extent that Culture itself will become predominant, I cannot say. It will be predominant, at all events, throughout the Jewish community, and it will be open to the Arabs to adopt as much or as little of it as they like. That, then, being the end, the means to that end will be to establish just a sufficiently broad and deep material basis as to admit of the growth of that Culture and of those institutions and activities to which I have called attention. How broad and deep it will require to be, I cannot say; I leave that to your imagination, or, better still, if you will allow me, to Providence, which is undoubtedly on the side of the movement. This surely is the most wonderful and interesting enterprise that any People have ever undertaken. And, moreover, you will observe that there is nothing in the carrying out of this programme which will prejudice in any respect whatever the interests of the other members of the community. But before leaving the Jewish aspect of this question, you will no doubt wish to know something of the human material with which the National Home is being built up, and something about the Jewish immigrants. By some they have been called Bolsheviks, by some irreligious, and various other uncomplimentary terms have been applied to them by persons who for the most part have never set eyes on them. If by Bolsheviks you mean people who think that the social conditions obtaining in Europe and Asia can be improved upon, and who desire to establish better conditions in Palestine, then indeed they are Bolsheviks. If by irreligious you mean people who attach more value to the spirit than the letter of their faith, to the substance than to the form, then indeed they are irreligious. I suppose finer material never went to any land to colonize it. Physically they will stand comparison with any set of young men and women to be found elsewhere: 98 per cent.

are passed physically fit upon arrival, 1½ per cent. acquire the necessary standard after recuperation from the sufferings they have undergone in the countries they have left and on the journey. The great majority of them are young men and women, and most of them have University Diplomas or educational certificates. And yet they one and all set to work on whatever task is allotted to them with a spirit that nothing can daunt, neither heat nor cold, neither discomforts nor danger. Time does not permit of my telling you more about these interesting people. I would only add two points. It is sometimes said that we are establishing a Russian community in Palestine with these immigrants, the majority of whom come from Poland, the Ukraine, and South Russia; and, as such, a Bolshevist State. Well, in answer to that, I would remind you that these people are Jews, not Russians; what Russian culture they may superficially have acquired they will very soon lose: in their children it will have entirely disappeared. In the second place, and as I have already said, they are out to flee from, not to establish, Bolshevism. If you are in any doubt on this point, I would direct your attention to the persecution of Jews under the Bolshevist régime during the last five years. Then the second point is this: It is said that they are irreligious. I hesitate to speak much of the religious affairs of non-Christians, but I have frequently spoken to Zionists on this subject, and the replies I have received entirely allay my apprehensions; for I should feel apprehensive did I think we were introducing people into the Holy Land who knew not God. In the first place, it has been pointed out to me that they are young people who have been brought up in the strictest Orthodoxy, which they have found ill suited to their modern way of life. Their first inclination has therefore been (and we have surely witnessed the same thing among other people in other places) to throw off what they regard as the bonds of their somewhat exacting religion. But I am assured that the influence of their homeland will before long bring them and their children back to the religion of their forefathers, although possibly to a form of it more adapted to the present times. I firmly believe all that I have been told on this point, and my experience goes to confirm it. I only regret that time prevents my dilating further on this interesting subject. But make no mistake about one thing, and that is, that the code of ethics, and the practical morality of these people is an extremely high one. Crime is absolutely unknown among them, and as a friend of mine (a Christian) said to me after a visit to one of their new settlements, "Well, after all, you know, we with all our church-going cannot improve on the way of life that we have seen in this colony, can we? and some of us fall very short of it." I agreed. One final word in answer to a question which I am sure you will ask, and rightly so:

"Yes," you will say, "all that is very fine and well, but will the thing succeed? Is it economically sound? Will the people make a living out of the land? We never knew that Jews made good agriculturists." Here again I can only deal with these points briefly. To take the last point first. These immigrants come for the most part from agricultural districts, and both do and will make good farmers. In appearance and when on their farms they remind one forcibly of the Boers, going about as they do on horseback in breeches and shirt sleeves and wideawake hats, or sitting in the verandahs of their farmhouses. As to whether they can farm, I can only ask any of you who are farmers to go and look at the Jewish colonies and form your own opinion. I know something about farming myself, and know good land and a good beast when I see it. The colonies were a pleasure to visit. They farm scientifically, and I am told that it is recognized even by that conservative class, the farmer, that science can do much to improve agriculture. Will it pay? Now, on this I have two things to say. In the first place, where it is a case of reclaiming land, whether mountain-side or bog-land, I do not suppose it will be possible for many years to pay off the capital sunk to make the land fit for agriculture. But then, remember this—the capital comes from Jewish sources; this class of land is unused and lying waste. If the Jews choose to use their national funds in this way to re-establish their people on the land and do not expect to get much of a return on their capital, well and good; it is certain that no one else will be willing to sink the money. It increases the prosperity of the country and its people. But once the land has been reclaimed and is being scientifically treated, then those who cultivate it will certainly earn a living, and will not be paupers living on subsidies. I hope I have made this point quite clear, and let me add this: These people do not expect or wish to make fortunes in Palestine. To live in the land of their fathers, to bring their children up to be good Jews, is enough for them. An income in "terms of moral values" is to their mind better than a large income in cash. Nevertheless, the Jews are going to do much for agriculture in Palestine, and by their efforts and example the face of the country will be changed. And how do they get on with their Arab neighbours? If left alone, very well. Many learn Arabic, and there is much come and go between Arab villages and Arab colonies. Several thousand Arabs attended in the course of six months the medical clinic of a new Jewish settlement. Eradicate the politician, whether Arab or Jew, and the two communities will get on well enough without any difficulties. There is much more to be said about the Jews in Palestine, but I must pass on to other questions.

ARAB ASPECT OF THE QUESTION.

As I have been dealing with Zionism, I will proceed at once to discuss the Arab attitude towards that question. The majority of the Arabs are opposed to Zionism. There is, indeed, a small number that accepts it. They are those who have come to understand what it means and not to fear it. But I shall in this lecture, in speaking of the Arabs, be considering the views of those who claim (and on the whole with justice) to represent the views of the majority; although here I would remind you that the majority of the inhabitants of the country are illiterate and simple-minded agriculturists who are but passive and not very intelligent followers of their leaders, and in no position to examine very closely the views expressed on their behalf. The leaders oppose Zionism on the grounds that it is potentially, if not actually, prejudicial to Arab interests. Now this attitude is, I think, intelligible, if not always very intelligent. For (and I wish to emphasize this point) the Zionism which they oppose is not the Zionism of His Majesty's Government and the accredited representatives of the Zionist Organization, but is the Zionism preached by the extremists to-day and the professed Zionists leaders some three or four years ago, and never contradicted until the other day by His Majesty's Government. They believe, therefore, that they are opposing a Jewish State, the flooding of the country by Jewish immigrants, the wresting from them of their lands by the Jews, and the competition in trade and business of a people whom they believe (to a great extent wrongly) to be more intelligent than themselves. If this were indeed our Zionist policy, my sympathies would be entirely with them; that they still believe it to be so is not altogether inexcusable. You may ask how this comes to be so. How is it that His Majesty's Government have not yet made their policy clear to the people of the country? His Majesty's Government have recently made it quite clear in an official statement, and the local British Administration never ceases to do so, not in word only, but in deed. But years of exaggeration and misrepresentation as to Zionism take a lot of living down, and the more recent and moderate statements of policy are simply not as yet believed. Moreover, some misguided Zionists and Zionist organs still continue their extremist form of propaganda; and although they speak without any authority, the Arabs can hardly be expected to discriminate between one Zionist statement and another. And furthermore (and to this I particularly invite your attention), there is nothing that contributes more to hardening Arab opposition than the attitude of certain organs of the British Press. Much of the misleading and inaccurate information on the subject of Zionism and His Majesty's Government's intentions that is current in Arab circles has been derived from these

British papers. I prefer not to say more here on this subject; I could quote you a number of examples to support my contention had I time to do so. I would only advise you to read with great caution what some organs of the Press say about conditions in Palestine, and occasionally to inquire into the motives that actuate them. For these and other reasons, then, the Arab opposition continues, and it will only be overcome by most sympathetic treatment and just and plain dealing. But, as they will themselves admit, it is a question rather of apprehensions than actualities. There are no really serious causes of complaint against the Palestine Administration of to-day. No Government can escape some criticism, most Governments deserve it, and the British Administration in Palestine claims to be no exception; but when the Arabs say that the Administration is a Zionist one and is trampling their rights underfoot, it is worth while remembering that the local Jews are saying that the Administration gives way on all points to the Arabs, and is doing nothing to help carry out the policy of a National Home. For that is the case, both sides complain. Some people say that proves our impartiality; it would seem to do so; but as a recent member of the Administration I had better keep silent on this point. Of course, while there are still many Arabs who fail to understand our policy, one must admit there are not a few who do not want to understand it. For if they represented to their followers the policy as it really is, the opposition would very soon cease. But this is the way, I believe, with politicians everywhere. For example, it was part of the Arab propaganda during the recent elections held for the Legislative Council to represent to the Fellaheen that if they voted for a secondary elector and if the Council were formed, they would immediately lose their lands to the Jews—that sort of propaganda is very taking. I do not, however, underrate the strength and sincerity of the Arab opposition, yet I am so confident in the justice of our policy that I firmly believe that with time and with the example set by a just and fair Administration this opposition will gradually be overcome. After all, they cannot be expected to know the good intentions of His Majesty's Government towards them in the same way as those who have access to official information are able to. It is clearly our duty to prove our good faith by our deeds, and that, I believe, we are doing and shall continue to do. Before leaving this point, I should like to pay a tribute to the honesty and sincerity of most of the Arab political leaders. I know them all intimately, and have a great regard for most of them. With but few exceptions, they have conducted their opposition in a fair and gentlemanly fashion. But let us assume for a moment that Arab apprehensions are well founded, and that there are good reasons to fear the arrival in the country of the Jews. I should like to remind you of one or two facts in this connection. In

the first place, you should note the figures of the recent census, which show 589,600 Moslems, 73,000 Christians (making 662,600 *Arabs*), and 83,000 *Jews*. Not only, then, are the Arabs in a big majority, but they start with immense advantages. They are already in the country; they are well acquainted with the language most widely spoken; they know the local conditions; they are acclimatized; they have all the industrial and commercial reins in their hands. All these advantages they possess over the Jewish immigrants. They are an intelligent and industrious people, and all that they lack is education and other benefits of like nature of which they have been deprived under the Turkish régime. I feel confident that if they were now to organize themselves they could hold their own with the Jews, and engage with them in trade and business in a spirit of healthy emulation, and I am thankful that, to a certain and an increasing extent, this is already being done. And then there is this further point: Is not the mandatory Power there to see that they (and all other sections of the community) get fair play? You may say, That is to beg the question. But that point I cannot admit from a British audience. You at all events cannot doubt the integrity and impartiality of a British Administration. And what has the British Administration done? Let me give you a few examples. Recognizing that the Arabs of the country are for the reasons given placed somewhat at a disadvantage in the matter of education, the Administration has devoted the whole of the revenue allotted to this item in the Budget—some £80,000—to Arab schools. Only a few thousand pounds go in the form of grants in aid to Jewish private schools. Jewish money thus pays for almost the whole of Jewish education. Then as to land policy, a large area of land, and that a most fertile one, in the Jordan Valley has recently been made over by the Government to Arab landowners. They held this land from the Government on a most uncertain tenure, but the Government, as much concerned with their moral as with their legal rights, has enabled them to become owners on very easy terms. There was no question here, then, of giving their land to the Jews! And in the few cases which have hitherto occurred of the purchase of large tracts of land by the Jews, whether from private persons or from the Government, the transaction has not been carried through until the Administration has satisfied itself that proper provision of land or other means of livelihood has been made for Arabs resident on the properties sold. And this will continue to be the policy. The welfare of the Fellaheen is a constant concern of the local administration. Then as to the immigration policy. Immigration is strictly limited by the economic capacity of the country to absorb it, and no Jews other than those able to support themselves can enter the country unless specific employment awaits them. The safeguards as to immigration are

ample, and by many people regarded as too stringent. But time will not permit my going further into this question. Then, again, it is since the inauguration of a civil Administration that a supreme Moslem Council (for the management of Moslem religious affairs, Moslem Pious Foundations and Religious Courts) has been set up, and the Administration co-operates most cordially with its able and industrious President in the various measures—religious, social, and philanthropic—that he, with his council is undertaking for the welfare of the Moslem community. And the same good feeling is manifested by the Administration towards the Arab Christian community.

From these examples you will see how carefully the Government assists the Arabs in their development. So much, then, for the Arab attitude toward Zionism and toward the British Administration in respect of that question.

But there is another most interesting and important aspect of the Arab question that must be mentioned, although briefly. The attitude of the Arabs is not a purely negative one of opposition to Zionism, but they actively pursue ambitions and ideals of their own. There is a young Arab movement to establish an Arab culture and to form an Arab kingdom—a very live movement, led by some able and patriotic men. I cannot go into the subject at length, and will confine myself to calling your attention to two aspects of it—an internal and an external one. The form which the movement takes internally is a demand for self-government or, at all events, a greater measure of control than that accorded by His Majesty's Government. Some force, not to say bitterness, is added to this demand by the belief that, were it not for the Zionist policy, His Majesty's Government would be willing to grant their demands. Now, in this there is some truth. But in the present frame of mind of the Arabs, His Majesty's Government's reluctance to give them more control than that accorded in the constitution for Palestine is fully justified. So long as the Arab leaders say, "Away with the Balfour Declaration," it is not possible even to consider their demands. But, apart from this, it is my personal view that they have not yet reached the stage when more power in the Council should be accorded to them. When they say as they do, "Oh, but what about the Arabs of Syria, Iraq, and Trans-Jordania, and what about the Egyptians?" I can but reply (and invariably do) that I would not willingly live under the administration of those countries for the next few years, and would not advise Palestinians to do so either. Administration is an art which requires long practice and experience. For this reason I believe that the reply to this demand for more control in the Legislative Council is: "Please wait a bit longer; firstly, until you have got over your opposition to Zionism; and, secondly, until you have

served a longer apprenticeship in the art of government." I do feel that their demand for a larger representation in the Executive of Government is a proper one. It is true that it is not easy to find the right men, but I know that it is the policy of the High Commissioner to increase the number of Palestinians in the Administration, even if there should be some resulting loss of efficiency. The form which the Arab Nationalist Movement takes externally is the desire to link up in some manner with the Arabs in Trans-Jordania, Iraq, and the Hedjaz. In furthering this idea His Majesty's Government's support can be relied upon, and they have already shown at different times and in many places their desire to forward the growth of an Arab Nation.

Having now heard the Arab and Jewish sides of the question, you must surely see that there is no reason why they should necessarily come into conflict with each other in attempting to attain their respective ideals. There is room within the country for both; each stands in need of the other. And in order that the Arabs may develop their vast hinterland to the east of Palestine, could not Jewish brains and money render them invaluable assistance?

Before coming to the final aspect of the question—namely, the British—I wish to deal very summarily with one or two points that are continually being brought forward by those who oppose, for one reason or another, our policy in Palestine.

(1) "That we have no legal status and have been governing unconstitutionally." The reply to this is that our authority and responsibility for the administration of Palestine originates in the military occupation of the country by His Majesty's Forces. The terms of the Draft Mandate were approved by the Council of the League in July, 1922, and we have been requested by the Council of the League of Nations "to carry on the administration of Palestine in the spirit of the Mandate."

(2) "That as a result of our policy in Palestine the British Administration is unpopular and British prestige waning." There is but little truth in this. Despite a policy in some respects admittedly unpopular amongst the Arabs, British prestige and the good name of the British Administration stand, I believe, as high as ever. This is in very large measure due to the justness and honesty of the High Commissioner. With regard to Sir Herbert Samuel, it may be permitted to say that while three years ago he went to Palestine a much disliked man as a stranger, he is to-day respected and admired from one end of the country to the other.

(3) "That the Rutenburg Concession has been unfairly granted to Mr. Rutenburg." There can be no unfairness where there is only one party concerned; and I never heard of anyone else who was

willing to do what Mr. Rutenburg is proposing to do without any cost to the country. It is a fine and most useful project, but there is probably little money in it, and I do not think there are many people in these days who are prepared to work for no profits, or, if there be any profits, to surrender a part of them (if they exceed a certain proportion) to the local administration, as by the terms of the Concession Mr. Rutenburg is bound to do.

(4) "That the Zionist Organization dictates the policy of the local administration." I think the quickest way to deal with this allegation is to say there is not a word of truth in it, and I trust you to believe me.

(5) "That Palestine is costing the British taxpayer a lot of money." The administration of Palestine never has cost the British taxpayer a penny. It is the garrison alone that costs. That has been reduced from many millions to one and a half millions this financial year, and is a diminishing quantity. But Zionism or no Zionism, there is no time up to the present when in my opinion you could safely have dispensed with troops in Palestine owing to the most disturbed state of affairs in the Near and Middle East. I leave it to you to judge whether what you will be called upon to pay for the next few years is much in return for the privilege of administering the Holy Land.

There remains (No. 6) the question of the so-called "Arab Pledges." So many official statements have been issued on this subject that there is no occasion for me to repeat them here at length. At the same time, I cannot wholly ignore a point to which such constant reference is being made. Suffice it to say that the reservation made by His Majesty's Government has always been regarded as governing the villayet of Beyrout and the Sanjak of Jerusalem; it was also stipulated that the undertaking applied only to those portions of the territories concerned in which His Majesty's Government was free to act without detriment to Allied interests; in January, 1921, King Faisal accepted His Majesty's Government's view; Sir Henry McMahon's promise was not made to the Arabs of Palestine, but to King Hosain, and, unlike the Balfour Declaration, it was not made public until after the war; there was then no question of having induced the Arabs of Palestine to fight for us on false promises. With regard to the "Allenby Proclamation" of November, 1918, this did not mention Palestine, and only refers to Syria and Iraq. In any case, it was issued after the Armistice and could not annul the Balfour Declaration which preceded it.

THE BRITISH ASPECT OF THE QUESTION.

It is well first to ask what is our concern with Zionism, and how we came to make what is known as the "Balfour Declaration."

By some it is suggested that this was a policy of "war-time expediency!" that we wished "to catch the votes of the Jews," and bring them in on the side of the Allies. I have not had access to the official documents of that time, but I think that a knowledge of the history of the Zionist Movement and certain other considerations effectively disposes of that suggestion.

Jews have ever found an asylum in this country, and Great Britain has for years taken an intimate interest in Zionism. At one time representations were made to the Sublime Porte on the subject, and many other efforts have been made by British statesmen and other distinguished people to obtain a Home for the Jews. But it was not until the war came that what had been the earnest expectation of many could become a reality. The idea of the return of the Jews to Palestine appeals, I believe, to many Englishmen for a variety of reasons. There are still some people, I suppose, in England who read their Bibles, and for these the return of the Jews is a fulfilment of prophecy; for them the Jews are also the "people of the Book." To a still larger number of Englishmen the idea appeals of giving a people their home again; to us a home means so much. Then, has it not ever been our policy to support the small nations? And in this case we are helping to remake one of the oldest Nations of the world.

Finally, there is a reason that appeals to me and may well appeal to others. In helping the Jews to return to Palestine, I feel we are "righting the wrong"—righting the wrong done to the Jews by Christian Nations for an event which occurred in Palestine some 2,000 years ago. If the Jews have spread all over the world, and been driven to make a livelihood which has sometimes been at our expense, non-Jews have only themselves to thank for it; it is they who have made the conditions in which the Jews live, not the Jews themselves. I regard it, therefore, as an honour that it has fallen to our lot to discharge this debt owed to the Jews by Christianity. But British interests in Palestine are not confined to Zionism.

An opportunity unique in the history of the world has been presented to us. Palestine is the birthplace of Christianity and of Judaism, and Jerusalem is the third Holy City in Islam. The Holy Places of the world's three great religions have been entrusted to our guardianship. If now we can prove to the world that the leaders and followers of the three great religions are willing and able to live together in peace and happiness, and further, if, under our guidance, these three religions can be led to co-operate for the spiritual welfare of mankind—then indeed we shall, I think, have made more progress towards a world peace than has yet been made. And could there be a more fitting place in which to consummate these ideals than in the Holy Land? Thus it is, you see, that the return of the Jews is

an essential factor. To Great Britain has fallen the guardianship of the Holy City—a City whose spiritual citizens number hundreds of millions.

To the care of Great Britain, a Christian Nation, has been entrusted the “Capital of the Christian Empire.” And this at a time when Christian communities and institutions in other places in the Near East are threatened with oppression and even expulsion. Much interest has been aroused in the tomb of an Egyptian King, and thousands have recently flocked to see it. Is it nothing to have the guardianship of the Tomb of One who was greater than any earthly King? Do not these considerations give you pause to think when you hear men talk of “clearing out of Palestine”? I have heard our Indian Empire called the Fairest Jewel in the Crown of the British Sovereign, and it seems to me that a jewel of no mean value was added to the crown of our responsibilities when we assumed the Mandate for Palestine. Palestine belongs to the world, not to any particular people, and I venture to think no nation is more worthy to hold it under Providence in trust for the world, than is the British Nation.

The CHAIRMAN then asked Sir Charles Yate, M.P., to say a few words.

Sir CHARLES YATE said he felt diffident in addressing an assembly like that, because he was perfectly sure not one of his friends had ever called him an idealist, and he could not follow the lecturer who had spoken to them in such an idealistic strain that afternoon. Sir Wyndham Deedes had commenced his lecture by saying that he was going to address them about the British, the Arabs, and the Jews. He (Sir Charles Yate) had listened to him for an hour and a quarter, and fully two-thirds of that time had been taken up by the Jews—they had heard very little about the British or the Arabs. The lecturer had told them that the immigrants going into Palestine were from Russia, Poland, the Ukraine, and other places of that character, and though he had tried to explain to them that those immigrants into Palestine were not Bolsheviks, he (Sir Charles) did not think his description of them was very satisfactory. He had had the advantage of listening, not only to Sir Wyndham Deedes's lecture of that day, but he had also heard him deliver a lecture a few days previously and had read the report of his address to the English Zionist Federation of the evening before. When he came to look at all that the lecturer had said, considering that he had been the Chief Secretary of the Government of Palestine for the last three years, he could not help thinking that if the lecturer carried out all the things he had told them, he (Sir Charles) could only say to himself, “God help the Arabs!” It had been reported,

as they all knew, that one of the first actions of those Jewish immigrants into Palestine from South Russia was to try to smuggle in a lot of arms and ammunition; a plot which was only found out by accident, if he remembered right. They had caused riots at Jaffa and elsewhere, and had raised a lot of trouble throughout the country, and he did not think he could accept the lecturer's definition of those immigrants as "spiritually-minded idealists." He thought the lecturer's description of them hardly tallied with the facts. The question now, as the lecturer had told them, was that the Arabs were anxious to have a greater share in the government of their own country, and he (Sir Charles) thought all would acknowledge that the Arabs had a right to greater representation on the Legislative Council. We had seen the Government of Palestine perpetrating one of the greatest election scandals ever known under British Rule. We, in this country, now had our elections all on one day. In Palestine the elections for the Legislative Council had been fixed for a certain time, but the Arabs refused to accept the terms and boycotted the election; they refused to vote. What did the Chief Secretary and the Government do? The time for voting was actually prolonged for three months in the hopes apparently of inducing them to vote. The Arabs, however, declined to take any part in the election at all, and thus the whole thing was hung up. Everything had been done to try to persuade the Arabs to give their votes, but it had been unavailing. The lecturer had told them they had said to the Arabs, "It is impossible for us to deal with you," and that the Arabs were not yet sufficiently educated to be given greater control; but he (Sir Charles) was of opinion that they—the Arabs—were just as capable of governing themselves as the Ukrainians and the Galicians and the other Jewish immigrants. The lecturer had told them that there was the utmost impartiality to all, and he had also told them that the pledges to the Arabs were not broken. These pledges he had described as mere conversations; a description that had been objected to. He had finished up by saying that the Zionists were the people of the Book. Were not the Arabs people of the Book? They were all people of the Book. He (Sir Charles) must say he was not an idealist, and he did not believe that idealism would lead to the pacification of Palestine.

Sir MARTIN CONWAY said he had been frequently in the company of the leading Arabs in Palestine, and from them all, without a single exception, he had heard nothing but the highest praise of, and the greatest confidence expressed in, Sir Wyndham Deedes. He (Sir Martin) sympathized cordially with the high ideals which their lecturer had held up to them, and the vision that he had endeavoured to raise in their minds. At the same time, he (Sir Martin) would not follow him on those lofty heights. He would ask them to descend

to mere geography. Geography was more important than nationality or racial distribution in the regulation of the affairs of men. Palestine, by its geographical position, was on the overlapping borderland of East and West. There, East and West met. To the end of time, such time as they could look forward to in the present condition of mankind, there would always be an incoming from the East over land into Palestine, and an incoming from the West over sea into Palestine, and those incoming peoples would have to live together side by side, men of different ideals, different habits, different civilizations, and differing in almost every respect; but, somehow or another, they had to get along together. At the present the West was represented by the incoming Jews. Men from the North, men from the East, had always poured into Palestine, and they had mingled together. Now the inroad was from the sea, and it happened to take the form of the Jews. If it had not taken that form, it would have taken another form. There would always be the West and the East struggling together in that little country no bigger than Wales. It was our duty—Providence had put us there—it was our business there to hold the balance evenly between the old Arab race with its conservative ways, and the incoming Western civilization with its science, knowledge, capital, and enterprise. Well, so it had to be. That contest of races was the fate of Palestine. They could not alter it. They might push back the incoming Jew, they might do what they pleased, but the forces of the world were so set, and the thing had got to be; we were there to see that a good life was made possible both for the Arabs and for the Jews. He (Sir Martin) thought we should see, in due time, the two races, not exactly mingling, but living together side by side in peace, and that when that time came Palestine would be a prosperous and useful member of the family of Nations.

Miss M. A. BROADHURST said she had listened with the greatest interest to the lecture of Sir Wyndham Deedes. No statement made, however, had turned her from the firm resolve to uphold the struggle of the Arabs for freedom to develop their nationality. The Government was imposing against this country's most cherished traditions an alien race, alien ideas, and alien culture on an unwilling people. She pointed out that it was not, to her, a question of anti-Semitism. She had sympathy with the aspirations of the Zionists, who were justified in working towards their fulfilment. It was their present policy and methods that roused the keenest opposition. Palestine belonged by natural rights to its present people, 93 per cent. of whom were Arabs who had occupied the country for centuries both before and after the comparatively short Jewish occupation. The Zionists were claiming possession, not as a result of any strong effort of their own, but behind British money and British swords, and claiming as

a right British help. The fundamental principles of right dealing were set aside. There was no precedent in the history of our Empire for the perpetration of so grave an injustice on a native race committed to its guidance.

The lecturer had tried to defend the "legality" of the present position, but it was a fact that the Mandate had not been confirmed. The League of Nations had been requested by the Allied Powers to draw up the terms of the Mandate in accordance with the policy of the Palestine "Zionist Home." Why had the League assented to this in violation of Article 22—its most fundamental principle. By doing so it had seriously undermined its influence as a body acting justly in the interests of Mandated peoples, since it was pledged not to impose any form of government without consulting the people concerned, or against their wishes. Had the Arabs been consulted? They actually heard for the first time of the "Zionist Home" policy from the Turks. The lecturer had admitted that the majority of the Arabs were in opposition at that moment, but the whole population, Muslim and Christian, had rightly boycotted the proposed Legislative Council, which would have placed them in an ineffective and hopeless minority, and signed their political death-warrant.

MISS PULLEN-BURRY wished to draw attention to two aspects of the subject which no one had mentioned:

The first was relative to the position of orthodox Jews towards Zionists. Whilst visiting Jerusalem in 1922 she had talked with Jews coming from Rabbinical families, had been struck by their antagonistic attitude to Zionist immigrants; one of them remarked that the leaders of this Movement had violated every tenet of Judaism.

The second was the feeling of the Christian communities towards Zionism: they complained of the great rise in cost of living, that house rents were up from 300 to 500 per cent. She had been impressed at their uneasy and disturbed mental attitude, due to their not having the key to a policy which placed Jews in the vice-regal and proconsular positions of the British Empire.

SIR MICHAEL O'DWYER said there was one remark he wished to make on one aspect of the question—viz., the position of the British Government in that matter. They had been told on the highest authority—that of the lecturer—that the administration imposed on Palestine was contrary to the wishes of the majority of the people. That admission was the most damning indictment of the policy pursued. There was an authoritative proclamation issued by Lord Allenby on behalf of the French and British Governments in November, 1918, after he had cleared the Turks out of Palestine in a brilliant campaign. That might be taken as the starting-point of our obligations, leaving aside the conflicting terms of the promises to King Hosain and the Balfour Declaration, which were of earlier date. He

would like to quote the material words of that proclamation to them. They ran as follows :

“ The war is to assure the complete and final liberation of the people so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of National Governments and Administrations which shall derive their authority from the initiative and franchise of the peoples themselves. . . . They [the Allies] are far from wishing to impose any form of government on the people against their will.”

That was a very momentous declaration. That was a message of freedom and deliverance from oppression which had been scattered broadcast over the length and breadth of Palestine. How far had we redeemed those pledges? In the case of those other Arab peoples in Iraq and Trans-Jordania we had redeemed our pledges, and given them independence subject to certain necessary safeguards. Yet we had refused, in the face of this proclamation, the freedom and independence we had promised to the people of Palestine, who were much more advanced socially and politically. He did not mind what the people of Palestine were—Jews or Arabs, Muslims or Christians—we had made that promise to them in a most solemn manner, and we had not kept it. The reason we had not kept it was that the Balfour Declaration of 1917 blocked the way. But that was no adequate reason, for Lord Allenby's proclamation was made with full knowledge of the existence of the Balfour Declaration, and therefore overrode it in so far as the two were incompatible. Our failure to keep our word was the cause of the strained situation in Palestine to-day. In spite of the friends we had made there, in spite of the excellent officials we had sent there, we had aroused the suspicions of the people. He (Sir Michael) had been in Palestine a few years ago and discussed the question with the Latin Patriarch and a leading Mufti of the Mohammedans, and, widely as these two gentlemen differed, they both agreed in saying this: “ What would be the good of expelling the Turks, if you put us under the heel of another people?” The sooner we give effect to Lord Allenby's proclamation, the better for our good name and the interests of the people of Palestine.

The CHAIRMAN: I think at this late hour we will not call upon anybody else in the audience to make any observations; and I think that the complexities of the Palestine problem have been sufficiently illustrated by the divers views that have been so ably expounded during the afternoon. I do not venture to express any personal opinion, as it is over forty years ago since my last visit to Palestine. I will not detain you any longer, except to express on your behalf our thanks to those who have taken part in the discussion, and also for the very forcible and lucid address which Sir Wyndham Deedes has been kind enough to deliver to us.

CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

THE Anniversary Meeting of the Central Asian Society was held at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W., on Thursday, June 14, 1923. During the earlier part of the proceedings the Right Hon. Lord Carnock presided; later the chair was occupied by the Right Hon. Sir Maurice de Bunsen.

The CHAIRMAN opened the proceedings, saying: I am sorry to say that Colonel Yate, owing to ill-health, is unable to be present; but I will ask Mr. Stephenson, the other Joint Honorary Secretary, to read the report which Colonel Yate has prepared.

Mr. G. C. STEPHENSON: The following is Colonel Yate's report:

ANNUAL REPORT

Owing to my severe illness in the spring of this year, I feel I have not been able to maintain that close touch with the affairs of the Society that I think I may say I have had in past years. But in my opinion the Society has throughout the year made steady progress. One excellent test to apply is that of growth: this year we have had 156 new members—not a record performance, but a very creditable one.

There have been thirteen lectures held during the session. We have not, as in other years, offended the geographers by extending the bounds of Central Asia to include North-West Africa, but as those who have read the *Journal* will know, our lectures and articles have taken us to Arabia and the Hedjaz, China, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Persia, Palestine, Iraq, and Aden in the present days, and back to the old monuments of the knights of St. John in Rhodes and Asia Minor.

To-day Mr. Woolley, who has been excavating in Ur of the Chaldees, has kindly promised to give us a lecture which we may regard as the complement of that given by Mr. Hall in 1922. Our acknowledgments for both are due to the British Museum.

We distinctly owe a debt of gratitude this year to authors and publishers, and to members of the Society who have made gifts of books to the Library. To authors and publishers we have tried to repay our debt by reviewing their books in the pages of our *Journal*.

We bring to a close to-day a quinquennial period of no slight importance in the annals of this Society. It is the period during which Lord Carnock has filled the office of Chairman of the Council. On the 2nd of April, 1918, this Society numbered 133 members. To-day it numbers 700. This increase is simply providential. It has enabled us to face enhanced expenses and carry on, instead of having to draw in our horns and possibly put up the shutters. In fact, the Near and Middle East are at this moment such a tempting field of enterprise, that two rivals have sprung up—the Persia Society and the Middle East Association. It would seem that there is need for all of us.

By resignation this year we have lost thirteen members, and the following six by death: Sir Alexander McRobert, Sir Harold Stuart, Sir William Meyer, Sir Joseph Walton, Major E. B. Soane, and Captain R. K. Makant—all men of mark, the first four of whom had made and the last two were making their reputations. Major Soane was a frequent contributor to the *Journal* of the Society, and his book on Kurdistan is a standard work.

The meetings of the Society's Dinner Club, held on the first Thursday of each month, have been a very great success, and have been thoroughly enjoyed. At each dinner a special subject is set for discussion and entrusted for initial exposition to an expert. When he has had his say, general debate is invited. The success of these meetings is due to Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Sir Edmund Barrow, and the other members of the Dinner Club Committee of which Sir Michael is the first Head. The Club is to be congratulated on having secured him as the first Chairman.

The Library now consists of 485 volumes and 78 pamphlets, and is open for the use of members.

The services of Miss Kennedy during the past year have been invaluable, and I would warmly thank my colleague, Mr. Stephenson, for the support which he has given, especially during the last three months of the session, when I was temporarily put "out of action."

Considerable changes among the officers of the Society take place this year. The Honorary President's term of five years has expired; he is eligible for re-election. Lord Carnock, to the regret of all, resigns the Chairmanship of Council; Sir Maurice de Bunsen has expressed his willingness to succeed him. Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate resigns the post of Honorary Secretary; Lieut.-General Sir Raleigh Egerton is prepared to become an Honorary Secretary. Sir Francis Younghusband and Sir Edmund Barrow retire from the post of Vice-Presidents and are eligible for re-election to the Council. Lord Carnock and General Sir Reginald Wingate are willing to be nominated as Vice-Presidents. Miss Ella Sykes finds herself obliged, owing to pressure of other work, to resign the membership of the Council.

There are two vacancies on the Council. and Lieut.-Colonel Sir F. E. Younghusband and General Sir Edmund Barrow are willing, if elected, to fill them.

The CHAIRMAN: I think the report is very good evidence that the Society is now entering on a path of satisfactory and, I hope, continuous progress, and I think the encouraging result is very largely due to the untiring efforts of Colonel Yate, assisted, as he has been, by his able and active coadjutor, Mr. Stephenson; to whom our best thanks are due. (Applause.) I am extremely sorry to have to announce that Colonel Yate is resigning his post as Honorary Secretary, as I am sure all of you will fully endorse me when I say that it is due to his devoted and self-sacrificing efforts that the Society has been able to make the progress that it has. I hope you will allow me to convey to him an expression of our high appreciation of his devoted services to the interests of this Society. (Hear, hear.) I endorse fully what Colonel Yate says as to the admirable services rendered by Miss Kennedy, for I know very well the indefatigable efforts she has made in the discharge of her duties. Also I am glad to say we are in a very good financial position, owing to the careful supervision Sir Edward Penton devotes to our finances, and to the watchful interest he takes in our financial stability. The Library, I hope, will be of increasing utility to the members, and our Honorary Librarian, I am sure, will do all that lies in his power to promote it. I have been in communication with Lord Curzon, and I am happy to say that he willingly agrees to continue as our President; and I think we ought to consider ourselves very fortunate in having so distinguished a statesman to preside over our Society. (Applause.) I am sorry that I have to give up the Chairmanship of the Council, but Sir Maurice de Bunsen, whom the Council has nominated to succeed me, subject to your sanction, will, I am sure, devote all his powers to promoting and assisting this Society. I will now vacate the chair, so that our new Chairman will be able to complete the business of the meeting.

Lord Carnock then vacated the chair, and it was taken by Sir MAURICE DE BUNSEN, who said:

Ladies and Gentlemen,—I feel that this is the end of an epoch and the beginning of another, and I am full of pride at having had my name brought forward by the Council for your approval as Chairman. Before saying any word about myself I must add a few words to what our outgoing Chairman has said. He has spoken not a word too much about the enormous services of Colonel Yate, whose departure from the office of Honorary Secretary I am sure we all deplore. We know how much he has done for the Society. It has been always in his thoughts. He seems to have had it in his mind

at all times, and the result has been the great accession to membership and the prosperous position to which Lord Carnock has referred. But I should like to add to that, that of course, in at least an equal degree, the prosperity of the Society and the estimation in which it is now generally held, is due to its outgoing Chairman. (Applause.) I am sure all of us feel that that is so, and especially those who have been brought into close contact with him at our Council meetings, and who are so well aware of his unfailing courtesy and tact, and the consideration for all points of view which he has displayed during our meetings—which have had the result that we have been an extremely harmonious body—and I consider that the position occupied by the Society is very largely due to the esteem in which his name is held, and to the efforts which he has devoted to the services of the Society. (Applause.) I am sure we all thank him very much indeed. I am glad to feel—and he has promised—that he will continue to be at hand, and he is willing to help us with his advice in any matters that may arise; and I believe his interest in the future of the Society will not be diminished by his leaving the Chair. As for myself, I can only say that I will do my best to take the place. I have deep interest in the Society. In my diplomatic life it is true that I have not been brought into immediate contact with Central Asia; but ten years of my career have been spent on the fringes of Asia—in Constantinople, and in Japan, and in Siam—so that interest in the subject of our proceedings is not lacking in me. I can only promise that I will do my best, and I thank you very much for your patient hearing. Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have merely to proceed with the formal business of the day, which is to announce to you for your approval—as indeed has already been mentioned at the end of Colonel Yate's address, which has been read to us—that the retiring Vice-Presidents are Lieut.-Colonel Sir Francis Younghusband, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., and General Sir Edmund Barrow, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.; and the proposal is that there should be elected as Vice-Presidents the Right Hon. Lord Carnock, G.C.B., and General Sir Reginald Wingate, Baronet, G.C.B. The retiring Members of the Council are General Sir Reginald Wingate, who becomes a Vice-President; myself, who become Chairman of the Council; and Miss Ella Sykes; and those to be elected to the Council include Sir Francis Younghusband and Sir Edmund Barrow, and as Joint Honorary Secretaries, Lieut.-General Sir Raleigh Egerton and Mr. G. C. Stephenson. I believe I may take it that these appointments and changes meet with your approval, and, if so, we will take them as accepted. (Applause.) Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, there is just a little time before our lecture begins. It will begin at five o'clock, when we shall meet again here.

Sir PERCY SYKES: May I, before we break up, raise one point?

The Society is in a most flourishing condition, and Lord Carnock has spoken in most eulogistic terms of Miss Kennedy. I beg to propose that she be appointed the Secretary of the Society. I think it is derogatory to Miss Kennedy to remain Assistant-Secretary, and I think it is also derogatory to the Society in its present prosperous state. All other Societies of this standing have Honorary Secretaries and Secretaries, and I am sure that it is merely by an oversight that Miss Kennedy remains as Assistant Secretary, and not as Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN: I can only say for myself that I fully agree with the proposal. I think it is very reasonable and only right that it should be so. I am very glad if those present agree. I hope we may take that as settled. I think it will be a very good move.

The meeting then adjourned for tea. Later it reassembled to hear and discuss an address by Mr. C. Leonard Woolley on "The Excavations at Ur of the Chaldees, 1922-23." Sir Maurice de Bunsen was again presiding.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—Before beginning the proceedings that we are met for this afternoon, I should like to announce to you that the Council has just elected twenty-nine new members; which is a satisfactory increase of our members. Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my privilege and pleasure to introduce to you to-day—to such as need the introduction—Mr. Woolley, who has been exploring ancient Ur. It has been the custom of our Society, as a general rule, to keep our gaze fixed on the present conditions of the countries of Central Asia, and their future prospects, rather than dive into the past; and decidedly those who consult the pages of our *Journal* will see that most of the papers contained in the *Journal* deal with the present or recent times. But those who have contributed those papers will be the first to recognize that if we are to understand the present we must study the past, and now many of our members have given proof that they do so most assiduously. Our President, Lord Curzon, in writing about the Near and Far East, has dived deep into history, and so have many of our members. Take Sir Percy Sykes' book about Persia. The whole of the first volume is taken up with the very early history, to remotest antiquity, of Persia and Mesopotamia; and so it is not at all contrary, really, to our habits to have a lecture on the subject of the very early history of Mesopotamia and ancient Babylonia. Indeed, last year we had a most interesting lecture on that subject from Dr. Hall, who really is the predecessor of Mr. Woolley in the task of excavations at Ur. It has been carried on almost uninterruptedly, I believe, since the end of the war; for Mr. Campbell Thomson for some time was engaged in those investigations under

the British Museum, and then followed Dr. Hall, who has given us the interesting account to which I have referred of what he did—which we can all read, and most of us I am sure have read, in the *Journal*. Now these investigations have been carried on by Mr. Woolley with, I understand, very fruitful results; and of that he will tell us to-day. It will be most interesting to hear what he has done from his own lips, and I have also been most glad to hear from him that there will be an opportunity given to some of us to see some of the objects which he has succeeded in finding—which will be on exhibition, I believe, in the British Museum. It is a particular pleasure to be brought into contact with the British Museum in connection with this lecture; and it gives us all, I am sure, great pleasure to see Sir Frederic Kenyon amongst us to-day, and, I hope and believe, other people connected with the British Museum. The early history, the very remote antiquity of those countries cannot fail to be of the deepest interest to us, not only because the subject itself is so engrossing—to have some idea of how those great civilizations of the past, which have almost disappeared from sight, lived and had their being—but also I think we may feel that it is of practical importance; because how was it that those great populations in the past could sustain life on what appears to be such a desert plain at present, where you see only mounds, I believe, emerging—I do not speak from my own knowledge—on the site of the great cities of which we know, and of which we shall hear this afternoon? There must have been a vast population: one wonders how they lived, and what was the system of irrigation and agriculture which enabled them to keep alive in those desert regions. Well, Ladies and Gentlemen, I will not stand between you and Mr. Woolley a moment longer, but I will ask him to be kind enough to read his paper. But allow me to say what I have omitted to say—that these excavations have been carried on under the direction of the British Museum, and jointly under the authority also of the University of Pennsylvania; and Dr. Gordon, of the University of Pennsylvania, has made it possible for this work to be carried on by his great munificence and the great interest he takes in these excavations; so that his name should be mentioned with all honour at this meeting. As I understand, it is a joint enterprise between the British Museum and the University of Pennsylvania. I believe I am right in saying that, and I now ask Mr. Woolley to be kind enough to give us his paper. (Applause.)

THE EXCAVATIONS AT UR OF THE CHALDEES, 1922-23

By C. LEONARD WOOLLEY.

Sir Maurice, Ladies and Gentlemen,—The excavations carried on at Ur of the Chaldees were in continuation of those started by Dr. Hall for the British Museum in the year 1918. Dr. Hall worked under all the disadvantages of what was still a state of war, and was single-handed. This year the expedition jointly financed by the British Museum and the Museum of the University of Pennsylvania had the advantage of a well-organized and thoroughly efficient staff. I had with me Mr. Newton, who of all English architects is most experienced in archaeological work, and Mr. Sidney Smith, of the British Museum, as expert cuneiformist. Later in the season I was joined by Mr. Lawrence, who assisted me with photographic and other work. The main object of the season's work was to obtain as clear a knowledge as possible of the geography of the site. Dr. Hall had already identified part of the wall enclosing the Temenos, or sacred precinct, and had cleared part of the sanctuary of the great temple of Nannar. The Ziggurat, or temple tower, part of which also Dr. Hall had cleared, stands up as a prominent feature amongst the ruins, and gave us from the outset a useful point of departure. Actually we have traced the Temenos wall for the greater part of its course. The precinct is found to be a rough rectangle some four hundred yards long by two hundred across. The wall which encloses it is a double one containing intramural chambers. Each component wall is some nine feet thick, and the total structure has a width of over thirty feet. The outer and the inner face were decorated with shallow vertical recesses. The foundation cones discovered in numbers along the line of the wall show that it was built originally by Ur-Engur, the first king of the third dynasty, about 2,300 B.C. But the wall itself bore many signs of rebuilding and repair. Thus, in one gateway alone the hingestone of the gate bore the name of Bur-Sin, the grandson of the original builder; and the brick box in which the stone was set contained bricks both contemporary with the stone, and also some of Nebuchadrezzar, Nabonidus, and Cyrus, King of Persia. For the first time we have tangible evidence that Cyrus, for reasons of policy, continued to honour the traditional gods of Babylonia, and actually rebuilt their shrines. On the Nannar temple discovered by Dr. Hall we did very little work, and that at the close of the season; but we were able to ascertain that the building in its present form was begun by Ur-Engur and completed by his son

Dungi: the bricks of the wall bore the former's name, the tiles of the pavement that of the latter king. In one corner of the masonry we found the foundation-deposit of Ur-Engur, consisting of a bronze statue showing the king carrying a basket of mortar on his head, and of a steatite tablet which unfortunately did not bear the expected inscription. One can only conclude that the scribe commissioned to write the record had shirked his job. Our work, apart from the tracing of the Temenos wall, consisted of the thorough excavation of a second and smaller temple within the enclosure called E-Nun-Makh, and dedicated to the Moon God and his consort. The building originally consisted of a small shrine containing five chambers, and approached by a winding corridor. The rest of the temple area was taken up by a series of long and narrow chambers, presumably storerooms or lodgings for the priests attached to the building. The whole was enclosed by a heavily buttressed wall of brick, outside which lay to the south a paved courtyard defended by double gates. The northern end of the original building had unfortunately been destroyed by Nebuchadrezzar, who in laying down a deep drain had cut away all that remained of the early masonry; but the surrounding wall was complete on three sides. In the masonry both of this outer wall and of the inner chambers, there were signs of rebuilding so numerous as to give to the temple a life of perhaps three thousand years; during which its ground plan persisted without change. The first builder in burnt brick was Ur-Engur, though his work had soon to be restored by his grandson. But below Ur-Engur's masonry we find mud-brick walls of at least three different periods, the earliest of which must go back to a very remote antiquity. Of the surviving structure the greater part is due either to Kudur-Mabug, about 2000 B.C., or to Kuri-Galzu, about 1600 B.C. So careful was each royal builder to preserve the lines of the old temple that he seems to have given express orders to his bricklayers, when carrying out the necessary destruction of the ruinous old walls, to leave at least one course of bricks *in situ* in order to guide them in their work. Consequently we may find as many as three courses of brickwork directly superimposed, yet each of a different date, and covering between them a period of perhaps one thousand five hundred years. In three of the service chambers an interesting discovery was made. Below the mud floor we found a layer of broken stone vases, the inscriptions upon which showed that they had been dedicated in the temple by native or by foreign kings. It would appear that at the time of some disaster, city and temple had fallen into the hands of an enemy, who had deliberately smashed the objects dedicated in the shrine; a subsequent restorer had thrown out the valueless fragments and utilized them as a bedding for his new floor. Broken though they are, these carved and inscribed fragments in alabaster, marble, and other

stones give us an extraordinarily useful record of the temple and illustrate in a most valuable way the art of different early periods. This long-lived shrine was, about 600 B.C., entirely remodelled by Nebuchadrezzar. The king preserved the central sanctuary with its five small chambers, only adding to it a projecting wing on either side of the doorway. But he did away with all the service chambers that lay before the shrine, levelling their ruins with débris and laying down over them a brick pavement. Between the new wings he made a smaller upper courtyard, separated by a step of mud brick, once probably overlaid with bronze, from a much larger courtyard which extended across the whole front of the temple. In the upper court, immediately before the door of the shrine, we found the brick altar with offering-table before it, and behind it a footstool for the officiating priest. The bitumen with which it was thickly covered showed that it had once been overlaid with metal plates. This radical alteration in the form of the building obviously corresponds to a change in ritual introduced by the king, and we can hardly fail to connect the archaeological evidence that we have here with the literary record of the Old Testament, according to which Nebuchadrezzar ordered a form of public worship in honour of the god. At Ur the lower courtyard is clearly intended for an assembly of worshippers; the upper courtyard with its altar must have been reserved for the priests. Immediately inside the door of the sanctuary we find the remains of the base on which stood the cultus image, which would have been visible through the darkness of the shrine to the worshippers outside. This same arrangement—and presumably, therefore, this same ritual—was preserved in the Persian period, but there we have in addition one feature not found in Nebuchadrezzar's building. A brick drain runs under the pavement right across the upper courtyard. It begins at a short distance from one projecting wing of the building, passes before the altar, and then turns at right angles towards the lower court, where it breaks away. It is not in the position in which one would expect to find a mere water drain, nor does there seem any reason for conducting such right across the sacred area. It may very well be that the explanation is to be sought in Herodotus' description of the temple of Bel at Babylon, a description which applies with remarkable accuracy to the shrine at Ur. Herodotus speaks of the statue on its golden throne inside the door of the shrine, and of the altar overlaid with gold standing immediately outside the door—an altar reserved for the lesser sacrifices. Close to this, he says, was a larger altar of blood sacrifices. May it not be that the drain in our Persian building was connected with such an altar, and was laid down expressly that it might carry the sanctifying blood of the victims across the sacred area between the altar and the congregation?

In the temple many tablets were found, though nothing constituting a temple library has yet come to light. The most interesting objects discovered were, perhaps, the collection of jewellery discovered under the floor of the Persian sanctuary, the hoard consisting of a gold statue, bracelets, earrings, brooches, etc., and great numbers of beads in semi-precious stone, and some bronze and silver vessels. A number of tombs of the Neo-Babylonian and of the Persian time excavated outside the Temenos limits produced some jewellery, an interesting series of terra-cotta figures, and a quantity of pottery invaluable for chronological purposes. Below the Ziggurat in a gateway of the Temenos wall, reconstructed by Nabonidus (*circiter* 530 B.C.), was found a stone statue of Entemena, King of Lagash soon after 3000 B.C. The statue is headless. The head was broken off in antiquity, and the fracture is worn smooth and polished. It is probable that the figure was set up as a trophy after some campaign in which Ur had been victorious over the rival city, and it may well have been beheaded purposely and as a symbol of conquest. Imperfect as it is, the well-cut figure with a long Sumerian inscription across its back and shoulders is an extremely important example of the primitive art of Mesopotamia.

The area excavated as yet is but a very small fraction of that occupied by the city's ruins, and a vast amount remains to be done before we shall know all there is to be known about the history of Ur. Fortunately our initial efforts have not been without success, and the two scientific bodies who in collaboration are financing this work of research have been encouraged to carry it further. Digging will be resumed next autumn, and it is hoped that next season will not be the last, but that the expedition may continue in the field for several years to come. The necessarily heavy expenditure on such work will be repaid if we can recover, as we have every hope of doing, a much fuller knowledge of the beginnings of civilization in Mesopotamia, of its connection with early man in other countries of the Near East, and of the origins of the religion in which we have a share. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, before making any observations at all of my own on the extremely interesting and instructive paper that we have heard, I am going to ask Sir Frederic Kenyon if he will say a few words. We are so glad to see him here, and shall be very glad to hear him.

Sir FREDERIC KENYON: Sir Maurice, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I will not detain you long; but I am glad to have the opportunity of congratulating Mr. Woolley publicly, as I have done previously privately, on what I regard as a very successful first season of his work at Ur. Perhaps I may be allowed to say a few words to explain

what it was the Museum had in mind when it started on this work in Mesopotamia towards the end of the war. Seventy or eighty years ago, when the first great discoveries were made in the valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris in the time of Layard and Rawlinson, people were mainly interested in discovering objects. The whole subject was new, and things like the great bulls and lions and tablets were in themselves objects of immediate interest, new as art and new as history, and for a time that was sufficient. Now and for some years past, alike in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and elsewhere, archæologists have been trying to get their knowledge into shape, to connect up the various civilizations and the various periods that have been investigated, and in particular to trace the whole thing back as far as possible towards its commencement. This has been going on in several different directions; where people began by being interested in the great statues of Rameses and Thothmes, the papyri and furniture of the middle and later empire, they have been pushing back enquiries right to the first dynasty of Egypt, and even beyond it to the pre-dynastic period. Similarly in Crete: Sir Arthur Evans' work there has pushed back our knowledge of art, history, and civilization hundreds, even thousands of years. Similarly in Babylonia: we have been working back through the period of the later Babylonian Empire, that of Nebuchadrezzar; through the Assyrian kingdom; and through the earlier Babylonian Empire, the Accadian and Sumerian periods—all the time with the object of trying, if possible, to get to the origins of civilization. No one knows how it will turn out—whether we shall find that civilization started, so to speak, independently from several different points; whether we shall find that its origin was in one or other of these main centres, either on the Nile, or on the Euphrates and Tigris; or whether we shall find some common centre from which all these spread out. At present no one, I am sure, would venture to prophesy what the result will be, but we want to carry out investigations in these various fields whenever opportunity serves, and to see where our knowledge will take us. That is one of the principal objects with which the British Museum took the opportunity before the end of the war, while the army was still in occupation in Mesopotamia, to start work on some of these earlier sites. There are many of them known by name which promise good results. Ur was known, if only by the connection with Abraham: there were others, like Erech, Lagash, and Nippur, where work had been done and sites identified. Any of these might repay further investigation, and the general conclusion from the preliminary excavations that have been made was that we could not do better than choose the site of Ur. We knew that it had an early history: it might even throw light upon Old Testament history and the connection with Abraham. It might carry us back to a quite indefinite

antiquity. Thus, when, after the first preliminary work had been done by Mr. Campbell Thompson and Dr. Hall, Dr. Hall was required by his duties in the Museum, we were very fortunate in being able to secure Mr. Woolley, who had done such excellent work for the Museum at Carchemish, the Hittite site, before the war. We were very fortunate to secure him to undertake a fresh campaign. (Hear, hear.) We were also fortunate in getting the co-operation of our friends in America. (Applause.) They had been at work in the Mesopotamian valley before, had made enquiries and might have worked independently; but they were anxious to work in co-operation with the British Museum, on terms which were advantageous to all of us. They were able to assist with a larger contribution of money; we were able to assist with a larger contribution of men, and with the good-will of the place—from our position in Mesopotamia—and I should like to say that this co-operation has been wholly harmonious, and wholly satisfactory, I think I may say, to both parties. (Applause.) We are all anxious to go on with the work for the present. Next season's work is, I hope, assured; but from what we have heard this afternoon you will understand that Ur is a very big site. You cannot dig a great deal of it in the months that are available for working in Mesopotamia in one year or two years, and digging is always more or less of a lucky-bag business. You never can tell when you will get your great results, and it would be a thousand pities if we were not able to carry on a site like this until it is substantially completed. Then we shall know what the history of this early site is, and if it does not throw considerable light upon the early history of Babylonia we shall be very much surprised and very much disappointed. But we must not always expect to get a great deal of results in the nature of objects. This season I think we have done very reasonably well. You have seen a number of objects of considerable interest, and a good many you have not seen—a good deal of pottery, which develops the history of art, and more of those tablets, inscribed cones, and so on. You have seen that we have got some jewellery of a later period, a considerable number of maceheads, and other inscribed and engraved objects; that one statue—the headless statue of Entemena—and that very charming little gold figure which was found in one of the treasures, the beauty of which one can hardly appreciate without seeing it at close quarters. That, I think, is a fairly good body even of small objects, quite apart from the history of the buildings that has been revealed in the way Mr. Woolley has explained. In another season we may be more lucky—or less. We may light upon the library of the palace, and find hundreds of thousands of tablets—as have been found at Nippur and elsewhere—containing early Sumerian texts like the Creation and Deluge story, and others which may be historical,

literary, or business; or we may have a season of finding building remains without being very successful in the matter of objects. That lies on the knees of the gods. It is not the fault of the explorer if he is not fortunate in the number of objects found in one particular year: what does depend on the explorer is the scientific and intelligent excavation of the site, so as to bring out the whole historical value of it, and to see that no important object is overlooked. There, I am sure, we have done well, and as long as Mr. Woolley is able to go on in command we shall continue to do well. I should therefore like to express my hope that it will be possible to continue these excavations, and carry them on in a fully scientific way until we finish them; and I hope we shall have Mr. Woolley for the leader as long as possible. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: One of Mr. Woolley's first slides explained some of the excavations done by Dr. Hall a year ago. Dr. Hall, I believe, is with us this afternoon, and we shall be very glad if he will say a few words.

Dr. HALL: I will not detain you more than a few minutes. I should merely like very much to congratulate my successor at Ur on the interesting lecture which he has given and the very interesting slides which he has shown us, and I also thank him for the kind way in which he has spoken of my own work at Ur. I am glad, too, that he has kept up the tradition which I started of lecturing to the Central Asian Society on the British Museum excavations in Babylonia, a tradition that we hope may continue. As some of you may possibly remember the lecture which I delivered in this hall two years ago on my work of 1919, you will also recollect that I excavated not only at Ur but also in the neighbouring site at El-Obeid. There we hope that Mr. Woolley may next year also take up my preceding work, and find many more interesting things. One thing I should like to draw attention to in the fine photographs he showed us: the pictures of the different levels in the building which he discovered, which are interesting illustrations of the excavator's art. Mr. Woolley is well known to us for the work in Egypt and Carchemish as being, so to speak, a connoisseur of brick walls. I think that he possibly loves nothing better in excavating than this extraordinarily interesting tracing-out of ancient walls from the different levels at which they are superimposed upon one another, and what they tell of the building by different kings at all stages of the history of a great building like that at Ur, or the various buildings at el-Amarnah, which he excavated two years ago for the Egypt Exploration Society, in succession to Professor Peet. For myself, in the temple-building "B" which he showed you on his plan, found by me and described to you last year, I was not so much troubled with these different levels, which bring out the greatest skill

of the excavator, and give him the greatest anxiety that he should make no mistake in digging them out. I am glad in a way that I was not so troubled. All I had to deal with, after the original building, were some comparatively unimportant walls all of late date, and very easy to distinguish from the early ones. We thought this building was originally a palace. This shows how successive work can develop previous ideas about a site. We thought it was the palace of the king called É-harsag, the "House of the Mountain," because we found in one part of it a pavement with the bricks of the king, stating that this was the "House of the Mountain." But this year contradictory evidence was found in the walls, where bricks were found and deciphered by Mr. Sidney Smith as commemorating the building of the *temple*. The architect, Mr. Newton, also was convinced that the building was probably rather part of the temple than the palace; and if one accepts that view, one wonders why it was that the bricks stating that this building was part of the "House" or palace of the king, were also found in it. That is one of the little problems which Mr. Woolley and his associates will have to settle next year. I will not detain you any longer except to say that I am sure we all, members of the Society and visitors, have fully appreciated one thing; and that is, the excellence of the photographs which Mr. Woolley has shown us. They have shown you admirably what a well-excavated building looks like during the process of excavation. (Applause.)

Colonel FITZWILLIAMS: Mr. Chairman, might I say a word? I would like to just join, as a member of the army of occupation, in thanking Mr. Woolley for what he has shown us to-day. When I was last at Ur of the Chaldees very little of what has been shown on the screen was exposed, and I would like, as a member of the army of occupation, to thank him, and the other people connected with him.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not know if Mr. Campbell Thomson will say a few words to us about the part he has played in the exploration. I think he was the first after the war to begin exploration. Perhaps he has left. Is there anyone else would wish to comment on what we have heard? If not, I think it really remains for us only to thank Mr. Woolley for his lecture. It has indeed been a thrilling lecture, full of deep interest. He has given us almost bowing acquaintance with some of those early dynasts—Ur-Engur, I think we saw his portrait; I am not sure we did not see his autograph, although I suppose he employed a scribe. But it really has been a wonderful illustration on what has been done in the way of excavation in recent years. I had no idea that the mound which was all that remained of Ur a little while ago had been so far exposed to view. It reminds me of what I have seen of some of the ancient Greek cities in Asia

Minor, that by patient excavation have been exposed so that we can all see exactly how they were formed. We have been taken back into very remote antiquity. Mr. Woolley referred to Nebuchadrezzar as quite a recent sovereign compared with those of whom he spoke in another part of his lecture, who indeed lived a thousand or two years before; so we have been given a line through a very long period of history; and Sir Frederic Kenyon has enabled us to understand what he and others in authority are really driving at. We want to know something about the origin of our race, and where it really came from; and in pursuing this wonderful quest, as we understand that he intends to pursue it still further, he will have indeed a great audience—the audience of the whole educated world—and I think that no portion of his audience will be more interested in the progress made than will the Central Asian Society, which has already, indeed, had the advantage of two admirable lectures. Our interest has been keenly excited: it will certainly be still further aroused by what we shall all see in the British Museum when the exhibition of objects discovered at Ur is open to our view; and I am sure that you will all join in expressing by your applause the thanks which are certainly due from us for one of the most interesting lectures that we have heard, and which will long remain in our memory. I ask you to express your thanks. (Applause.)

ANNUAL DINNER

LORD MILNER ON THE FUTURE OF PALESTINE

THE Right Hon. Sir M. de Bunsen presided at the annual dinner of the Society held in the Edward VII. Rooms, Hotel Victoria, on July 4, when Lord Milner was the chief guest of the Society.

The Chairman, in proposing the Guests of the Society, said that he felt greatly honoured by being in the chair and following the succession of those who had sat there in recent years. He felt he was entering upon the work of the Chairmanship of the Society at a time when its pioneer work had been done, and when it was not only well launched on its career, but was approaching maturity. It was still growing, and growing rapidly, though not so rapidly perhaps as they could wish. Indeed, he took the opportunity of saying how greatly it would assist the Society in its growth if every member would try to bring an additional member to join their ranks. Although they had a goodly list of members, they could do with a good many more. The success the Society had already achieved and its prospects for the future were due in the first place to the efforts of a certain number of members who had spared no pains to promote its welfare and to increase its usefulness. It was also due to the very great and perhaps increasing interest which they were all bound to take in Asiatic affairs. That, of course, had always been the case for our country, but perhaps never more so than at the present moment. Books had been written lately pointing out a kind of gulf growing between non-white people and the white people of the world. Possibly what had been said on this matter had been exaggerated. There was a good deal of talk of Pan-Islamism and Asiatic Nationalism, and of the solidarity which they were told was growing up in the minds of all non-white people, binding them together in a kind of alliance or sympathetic understanding as against the white races of the world. He did not know how far that view was exaggerated, or if there was any such feeling of solidarity on the part of non-white communities; but, anyhow, it behoved this country, which had always had its eyes fixed on the Asiatic people, to study these questions and be prepared to meet them as they developed, in the same sympathetic spirit that it had always shown toward the legitimate aspirations of Asiatic nations. (Cheers.) We had no wish

to check those legitimate aspirations, but, on the contrary, we wished to help them, and it ought to be the case that whatever our relations with them might be, they would look upon us as their natural friends and allies. That, he believed, was what we ought to aim at, and he thought that the importance of watching Eastern affairs even more closely than before was one of the factors in the interest which had been taken in the Society and increasing its membership. People felt that by belonging to it they were able to follow this development, because it included amongst its members so many who spoke with real knowledge and authority on so many of those problems which were coming to the front, and who could tell them what was happening in the different countries they grouped under the heading, which they made a very elastic one, of Central Asia.

This was their fourth dinner since the war, and it was a great pleasure to see so many gathered there, ladies as well as gentlemen. Perhaps not so many years ago it would have been quite an unusual sight to see a number of ladies at the dinner of a society such as that, and certainly their presence that evening very much brightened the proceedings. (Cheers.) At the first dinner after the war, which was held in 1920, their President, Lord Curzon, took the chair, and delivered a speech which all those who heard it would remember. Lord Meston was the other speaker that day, and he also made a very interesting speech. In the following year Lord Carnock was in the chair, and Lord Chelmsford made the speech of the evening; while last year Lord Peel, the Secretary of State for India, was in the chair, and Lord Ronaldshay was the principal guest. They were indeed fortunate and honoured in having as their principal guest one who could most worthily take his place by the side of those he had mentioned—**LORD MILNER**. (Cheers.) Briefly referring to the highly distinguished career of Lord Milner, the Chairman said that when he was Secretary of State for the Colonies in the War Cabinet he was brought into specially close connection with Near Eastern affairs, being a member of the special Cabinet Committee which dealt with them. He was already a master of the subject, and his knowledge and experience were of the greatest use to the Government, which was mainly influenced in these matters by his counsel. Since then he had been closely associated once more with Egypt, and the report of his commission on the subject of our policy therein had been recognized as outlining the only satisfactory solution of the difficulties in that country. Why was it that the country so hung upon Lord Milner's words? It was very much because he was a man of such very independent judgment, who did not follow any master, but studied every subject for himself and then gave us the advantage of his conclusions, which were founded on his own vast experience on the matters on which he wrote. Probably many of them had seen

his last book on "The Questions of the Hour," which in many ways offered them much consolation. Their guest that evening was not a pessimist—and if he, with all his knowledge, was not a pessimist, there was no reason why any of those who listened to him that evening should be a pessimist. Lord Milner pointed out that our resources were still vast, and not so much depleted as we thought them. If they were properly handled and utilized, there was much we could do even if trade was languishing. We could do much to promote the growth of some of our Crown Colonies; we could do much even in promoting industries at home. He (the Chairman) had derived much hope and satisfaction from the reading of this valuable book. They were honoured by Lord Milner's presence, and they gave him a most hearty welcome. (Cheers.) The other guest of the Society that evening was their outgoing Chairman, Lord Carnock. (Cheers.) He had been in office for five years, and the success of the Society was closely bound up in their minds with his activity as Chairman. Not only had he showed an unceasing interest in the work of the Society, but he had brought to bear upon it fine personal characteristics, such as his unfailing courtesy, which had made him an ideal Chairman. They greatly deplored his departure from the Chair, and felt that it was a great loss to the Society, and they would never forget all that he had done for it. He was glad to be able to say, however, that Lord Carnock had agreed to remain on the Council, and that it was his intention to maintain his interest in their proceedings just as much as when he occupied the Chair.

Viscount MILNER, who was received with hearty applause, said that when he accepted the honour of being their guest, he did not anticipate that the duty of responding to the toast would fall to one whose knowledge of Central Asia was so small as his own. His personal acquaintance with Asia was limited to the south-western end—to what he might perhaps call, roughly speaking, the Arab end. But the Society, he understood, was not too particular in the matter of geographical limits, especially in the case of their guests, and he proposed to take advantage of that generosity to devote his remarks to one corner of Asia, and that which touched work we had done in another country with which he had some little first-hand acquaintance: he meant Palestine.

I do so (continued Lord Milner) the more readily because I feel a growing concern about the trend of public opinion in this country with regard to our position in Palestine. The views which I may express are not at present popular, and it is quite possible that they will not commend themselves to the majority of those who are here to-night. But as I am your guest, I am sure that if I

express them with becoming modesty, you will give me a tolerant hearing. I have paid two visits to Palestine since the war—one in the spring of 1920, and another and longer visit in the spring of 1922. What I saw on the latter occasion—the contrast which the country presented to its condition only two years before, when the traces of war were everywhere visible—the progress which had been made in the short interval under British administration, filled my British heart with pride. (Cheers.) It was not altogether a novel experience. I have heard from trustworthy witnesses, and in some countries I have seen with my own eyes, what a few years of decent, honest administration may do for a country blasted and ruined by decades, and sometimes by centuries, of misgovernment. But if it was not a novel experience, it was certainly a striking illustration of a very old principle. Elated by what I had seen, it was something of a shock to me when I returned to this country to find that so many of my friends were in the doldrums about Palestine, and that there was a very lugubrious view prevailing in regard to our position there. That was about a year ago; since then the gloom seems to me only to have deepened. Frankly, I think the gloom is not justified. Your Chairman has said I am not a pessimist; well, I do not know that I am very specially an optimist either. At any rate, in despite of things which might tend to make me one, I am not a pessimist in regard to Palestine. Mind you, I do not say for a moment that we have not many things to discourage us in that country. It is in no way a bed of roses for the British administrator; but if we were to lose heart and to come out of every country which was not a bed of roses, and where we had to face difficulties, and even a considerable amount of dissatisfaction, I cannot help thinking that the confines of the British Empire, and the sphere of British influence in the world, would be considerably reduced. (Cheers.)

Now, I know I may be told—indeed, I have been told: "Your impressions are twelve months old, and things have got much worse to-day." I am not sure of that; in some respects, at any rate, they have not got worse, but very much better. The burden on the British taxpayer of the discharge of our duty as trustees in Palestine has been greatly lessened. It amounted to something like four millions a year when I was there first, and I then ventured to predict that it would steadily diminish until it finally disappeared. It is diminishing faster than I anticipated, and this year it is only one and half millions. Next year it will be much less. My forecast having so far been justified, I cannot regard the state of affairs as disappointing. When I was first there, there was a very considerable British army in the country, for we could not at that stage get on without it. When I was there the second time, the Army was very greatly reduced, but

even then it amounted to four thousand or five thousand men. In the past twelve months it has been still further reduced, and I believe that at the present time it does not amount to more than one thousand men.

But it can be said: "Yes, that is all very well, but politically the outcry against the Balfour Declaration and British policy generally has grown stronger and stronger." Well, all I can say is that it was in full blast already when I was there. The arguments and misconceptions which I hear about that country to-day I heard from all the leaders of the opposition on the spot a year ago. They did not convince me then, and they do not convince me now. May I say at once that I am as innocent as the babe unborn of any desire to be drawn into this controversy? When I went to Palestine for the first time, I went to take a rest and have a real holiday after six months of exceedingly hard work. When I went the second time, I went as an ordinary tourist, wishing to see things quietly and enjoy myself. If I was drawn into the controversy in some measure, it was only because I could not help it, because I was bombarded with petitions and requests to meet deputations, and because I could not in common courtesy refuse to do so. When I had to meet these deputations, when I had to listen, I did my best to try and get at the truth, and to form an unbiassed judgment as to what amount of foundation there was for the grievances to which I was compelled to listen. The conclusion I came to was that the people I saw were protesting not against something which had happened or was happening, but against something that they had been told was going to happen. The policy they denounced was not the policy of the British Government as clearly expressed by Mr. Churchill and embodied in the repeated declarations of responsible British Ministers. It was not the policy of the British Government, but it was what some extreme Zionist organizations in America had told them was the policy of the British Government. When they, not to my surprise, carried their threat of non-co-operation into effect, it was because they had been misled by deliberate mischief-makers, not always indigenous, and had been led to believe that their country was going to be taken away from them and given to the Jews, and that Palestine was to come under a purely Jewish administration. That view having been hammered into them month after month, naturally they were thoroughly impregnated with it, and it is not surprising that they have now taken the course which it was always to be feared they might take, and have refused the share which has been offered them in the government of their own country, first as a majority of non-official members of the Legislature, and then again as an advisory committee.

Now I greatly deplore that attitude on their part, and I should be

the last to deny that it is a great embarrassment to the British Administration; but what I do feel is that the very worst way out of that embarrassment would be for us to wobble in the face of an agitation which, however natural, and whatever allowances we may readily make for it, has yet no genuine grievance behind it. (Cheers.) I think the Palestine Arabs are crying out before they are hurt. I cannot better explain what I think than by recalling the latest declaration of the British Government on the subject, which was made only the other night in Parliament by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, and which is a declaration of the policy actually being carried out in Palestine by the British Administration there, unless it has entirely altered its action and attitude since I was in the country:

“His Majesty's Government is charged with the duty of facilitating the development by Jews of a Jewish national home in that country; but the creation of a Jewish State or Government is no part of such policy. As trustees for the country, on behalf of the League of Nations, it is the object of the British Government and of the British Administration in Palestine to promote harmony and development of all races and creeds there, and to prevent the dominion of any one of them over another.”

Now, speaking as one who has always been a sympathizer with Arab aspirations, I think the Arabs of Palestine ought to be satisfied with that. Moreover, I believe the majority of them will be satisfied when they find that the British Government is as good as its word, and that the coming of the Jews does not involve any injury to them, but does promote the development of their country in a manner in which, but for the energy and capital of the newcomers, it could not be promoted for decades, even if ever it could be promoted at all in the same degree. The only way, as it seems to me, for us to meet this opposition and these unfounded stories, is to go on quietly exercising a just and impartial administration, and thus cutting at the roots of the agitation and gradually destroying the fabric of illusion on which it is based. You may excite a people for a certain time by the picture of terrible evils which are going to be inflicted on them, but you cannot continue to excite them for ever if, as a matter of fact, these terrible evils never come about. It may be that the Jews and Arabs will never learn to love one another. But it is one thing to say that, and quite another to say that they will never be able to cohabit peacefully the same country under a fair and impartial administration. That is a proposition which must surely be very astounding to anyone who has seen, as most of you have seen, how mutually antagonistic races and creeds manage to live together under such an administration, especially in the motley East. I know that the success of our policy in Palestine is dependent upon the maintenance

of firm and impartial government; but the success of any policy in that country is dependent upon that prerequisite. If Palestine is not to become one more storm centre in an already sufficiently chaotic world, there absolutely must be a disinterested Government at the head to keep the peace, not only between the Jew and the Arab, not only between the Moslem and the Christian, but also between different denominations of Christians themselves. To suppose that the country in its present state of civilization could be successfully run on the principle of self-determination, if that means democratic government of the British type, is surely to imagine a vain thing.

You may say: "Well, if that is so, why complicate the situation, already difficult, by raising the Jewish question?" My answer is that the Jewish question raised itself. There was a large Jewish population in Palestine long before we went there. In recent years there has been a large and steadily increasing Jewish immigration. Moreover it is a great mistake to underestimate the strength of feeling of the Jews throughout the world on this subject or the tremendous attraction which Palestine has for the most tenacious race on earth. I know, we all know, many Jews to whom that sentiment does not appeal; but there are millions of them scattered all over the world to whom it does appeal most powerfully. It is a growing and powerful movement which must be regarded at any rate with respect. It is one for which I personally have a great deal of sympathy, and my belief is that the recognition accorded to it by Great Britain has gone a very long way to strengthen that regard for us which is cherished by the Jewish race throughout the world, I mean that portion of it which still clings strongly to its racial and religious traditions. This regard for Great Britain is a source of strength which it may be difficult to estimate, but at any rate is far from being a matter of little consequence to an Empire the flag of which is flown in all parts of the world. This question affects not only the Jews who are settled in Palestine, or even the comparatively small number of their race, perhaps a few hundred thousand, who may contemplate going there. There are millions of Jews throughout the world who may never go to Palestine themselves, and may never want to go, but for whom it is a point of honour and of sentiment, and very deep sentiment, that those of their race who do go there should enter the country, not as aliens, but as men returning to the home of their ancestors, to which they are linked by many sacred attachments. It is reasonable that they should not enter it as aliens, but should go there as to their home—not as strangers, but as nationals, and should receive the rights of full citizenship from their first landing upon the soil of the Holy Land. That is a sentiment which I believe can receive complete satisfaction without the slightest injustice to the other inhabitants of the land. It seems

to me that since, rightly or wrongly, the British Government has made this concession to Jewish sentiment, we are in a position to call upon the Arabs, as long as their own rights are strictly safeguarded, as we have promised they shall be, not to thwart the declared policy of Great Britain. (Cheers.) Let it be remembered that, so far as the Arab world as a whole is concerned, it owes an immeasurable debt to Great Britain. (Cheers.) The aspirations of the Arabs could never have come even within sight of realization, and can never be even partially realized in the future, without the help that Great Britain has afforded and is affording. And so far as the Arabs of Palestine are concerned, it cannot be admitted that its six hundred thousand or seven hundred thousand present inhabitants are, as the extremists claim, alone entitled to determine the future of a country which in truth belongs not to them only but to the whole world. We are entitled to remind them that they owe it to us that they have been liberated from Turkish tyranny, that their civil rights are better guarded than ever before, and that they have any political rights at all.

The last word I should like to say on this subject I say with emphasis, and perhaps you will think with unnecessary emphasis, because I am advocating an unpopular cause. It is that the proper policy of this country is to hold on steadily to the course which it has laid down, despite all this pothor; to carry out the policy it has proclaimed, not in the sense in which the enemies of that policy interpret it, but in the sense in which it has again and again been interpreted by British statesmen. If we do that, we shall only have to possess our souls in patience for a few years until the progress already so marked in Palestine completes the answer to the pessimist, and we shall no longer be tempted to make an inglorious abandonment of the trusteeship we accepted, but shall find in the recuperation of that country, in its growth and development, the reward we have found for similar work elsewhere, and add to the prestige and honour of the British name. (Loud Cheers.)

Sir EDWARD PENTON gave the toast of the retiring Secretary, Colonel A. C. Yate, and took the opportunity to trace briefly the history of the Society. He said that during the war only a few stalwarts were left behind to manage the Society. It was typical of the courtesy and consideration which Colonel Yate always extended to his colleagues that he wrote him a letter when he was in the thick of his work for the Government, and with little prospect of being released for months and perhaps years to come, asking whether he would agree to his taking the Honorary Secretaryship, as he thought he might have the leisure and opportunity to revive its fortunes. The great services both Sir Charles and Colonel Yate had rendered to the Society from its establishment were too manifest to allow it to

miss that opportunity. All through the early years both of them had been strong supporters and active participators in the proceedings. Colonel Yate was no less eager in his attendance than his brother Sir Charles, often coming up from Shropshire to attend their meetings, and also wielding a facile pen in many of our periodicals touching the subjects which interested the Society, and finally taking in hand their *Journal* and adding to it such comments which made it popular throughout the whole area in which their researches extended. (Cheers.) On his appointment as Honorary Secretary he proceeded to render the Society great and lasting services. The first was to secure the services of Lord Carnock as Chairman, and he became to him what Alexander Hamilton was to Washington. The war left behind a great number of new problems to be faced, and Colonel Yate took advantage of the opportunity to rope in and interest a great many men returning from the East. He made the United Service Club yield its quota of great soldiers, and then went across the road and secured the co-operation of distinguished Pro-consuls at the Athenæum. He also obtained the assistance of Mr. Stephenson, who walked daily round St. James's Square with a bundle of bankers' orders, and compelled everybody he met interested in the East to sign one at the nearest convenient lamp-post. (Laughter.) Colonel Yate, on becoming Honorary Secretary, found them at a low ebb in membership, and he and Captain Stephenson added over three hundred members to their rolls in a couple of years. (Cheers.) The Society continued to grow, and they had a subscription list which enabled them to pay their way and even to invest a little money against a rainy day. Colonel Yate retired from the Honorary Secretaryship on account of the state of his health, but they were delighted to see him amongst them that night. They thanked him for the services he had rendered, and they wished him long life and prosperity, and were assured of his continued interest in the Society. (Applause.)

COLONEL YATE, who was enthusiastically received, said that he appreciated very much the great honour they had done him. It was true when he took up the Honorary Secretaryship that he did drop some hint that he thought the Society could be a bigger thing than it was then; thus he laid down a challenge which he himself had to take up. If he had brought new members to their ranks and had sought for a higher standard for their lectures, he had done no more than place at the disposal of the Society the information and results of study which some forty years of connection with the East had given him. Colonel Yate paid warm tribute to the services of the Assistant Secretaries, first of Miss Phillips, and at present of Miss Kennedy. Living away in Shropshire, he could not possibly carry out the work

without the valuable assistance which they had afforded. He also referred to the assistance given by the Chairmen, the late Sir Henry Trotter and Lord Carnock, and to those who together with Mr. Stephenson had assisted in widening the appeal of the Society and suggesting methods of increasing the membership. The Royal Geographical Society and the Royal Asiatic Society had both been helpful, and so had *The Near East*. He particularly mentioned General Sir Charles Monro, Sir Francis Younghusband, Sir Charles Yate, Sir Edmund Barrow, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Sir Gilbert Clayton, Sir Reginald Wingate, and notably Mrs. Waller Sawyer, despite her ~~troubles in Ireland~~, in this connection. He reminded the members that Lady Trotter had presented to the Society the Asiatic books of her late husband, and that the library of which this was the nucleus now contained between five hundred and six hundred volumes. He quoted the warm tribute Lord Curzon paid to the Society when he took the chair at the annual dinner in 1920. He made the suggestion that the Society should establish a gold medal to be awarded to the man who each year had done the best service to the British Empire in the countries which they studied. He thought this adoption of a method employed by some other Societies would be beneficial, and would help to stimulate interest in the proceedings of the Central Asian Society.

THE FRONTIERS OF ASIATIC TURKEY

THE following note on "The Frontiers of Asiatic Turkey" has been accepted by the Council for publication in the *Journal*:

ALTHOUGH the frontiers of Asiatic Turkey have not yet been recognized by the Powers, and only partially delimited by the Turks themselves, a stage has now been reached when we may consider Anatolia as a definite geographical and political entity; by taking stock of the existing situation and by appreciating the various factors and possibilities which tend to modify that situation, we may hope to arrive at an approximation of the final settlement of its frontiers.

The Anatolian Peninsula, washed on its northern, western, and southern shores by three seas, and having its eastward land approaches blocked by the Armenian mountain massif and the Syrian desert, forms a geographical unit which would appear at first sight to present an ideal field for the maker of boundaries. The political factors in the case, however, go far to negate these geographical advantages.

Anatolia has formed throughout the centuries a bridge for alternating currents of peaceful intercourse and warlike enterprise between East and West. Persian, Greek, Roman, Turk, Mongol, and Crusader armies have in turn swept across its plateaux and gorges, while in the intervals of time caravans used its highways and defiles to exchange the products of Asia for the wares of Europe.

Apart from these waves of war and commerce, Anatolia has long been subject to an ebb and flow of population due to external and internal religious persecution. Thus Sephardim Jews from Spain, Circassian Muslims from the Caucasus, and Albanians and Pomaks from the Balkans, have been transplanted to the "well-guarded lands" of the Sultans, while more recently hundreds of thousands of Orthodox and Armenian Christians have left those lands in consequence of Muslim fanaticism.

The result of all this age-long human intercourse, both in peace and war, has been to scatter over Anatolia a confused mixture of peoples and sects which far exceeds in complexity and interest the proverbial ethnic tangle of the Balkan Peninsula.

The wonder is that out of all these heterogeneous elements a "Turkish nation" has been evolved which, in spite of external war and internal revolt, of military defeat and administrative corruption, has to-day successfully asserted its right to live within boundaries of

approximately its own dictation. That such a state of affairs has come to pass only the most bigoted "anti-Turk" will still deny; its most eloquent testimony is the fact that the representatives of this new Turkey are still, in the summer of 1923, maintaining successfully their claims in the face of all Europe's opposition.

As regards frontiers, the Turks have been wise enough to restrict their claims to those outlined in their *Misak-i-Milli*, or National Pact, drawn up and signed on January 28, 1920, by the members of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies in Constantinople. It is significant that, in the treaties which Turkey has signed with Soviet Russia, the Caucasian Republics, and the Ukraine, it is expressly stipulated that "the term *Turkey* signifies the territories comprised by the National Pact drawn up on January 28, 1920." This pact contained six Articles, which were laid down as the essential conditions of a "just and lasting peace." The first two Articles referred to the territorial extent of Asiatic Turkey, while the remaining four dealt with Western Thrace, the security of the seat of the Caliphate, the rights of minorities, and the economic and juridical independence of Turkey from foreign interference. The first two Articles are worth quoting in full:

ARTICLE 1.

The ultimate destinies of those portions of the Ottoman Empire which are populated exclusively by an Arab majority, and which on the conclusion of the Armistice on October 30, 1918, were in the occupation of enemy forces, shall be decided according to the free vote of the inhabitants of the territories in question.

Those parts of the Empire, whether inside or outside the line fixed by the said Armistice, which are inhabited by an Ottoman Muslim majority, whose elements, united in religion, in civilization, and in aim, are imbued with sentiments of mutual respect of each other's racial and social rights, constitute a whole which does not admit of any practical or equitable division.

ARTICLE 2.

The inhabitants of the three *sanjags* of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, having already since their liberation affirmed their desire to return to the mother-country, shall, if necessary, decide their destiny by a second plebiscite.

In the following pages it will be seen what interpretation has been put on the first two Articles of the National Pact, and how they have affected Turkey's frontier policy.

Since the signature of the National Pact, "Nationalist Turkey" has signed the following treaties with foreign Powers, in addition to

the various armistices which she has concluded, such as the one with France in May, 1920, with Armenia in December, 1920, and at Mudania in October, 1922:

- (a) *March 1, 1921.*—Turco-Afghan Treaty, signed at Moscow.
- (b) *March 16, 1921.*—Treaty of Moscow with Soviet Russia.
- (c) *October 13, 1921.*—Treaty of Kars with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.
- (d) *October 20, 1921.*—The Franklin-Bouillon Convention signed with France at Angora.
- (e) *January 2, 1922.*—Turco-Ukranian Treaty signed at Angora.

The Turco-Afghan Treaty does not directly concern the frontiers of Asiatic Turkey, but it is of considerable interest to the British Empire, and was obviously inspired by the Government of Soviet Russia. This is all the more apparent from the fact that it was signed at Moscow a fortnight before the signature of the Turco-Russian Treaty, and was probably made a condition for the signature of the latter document. The only territorial interest of the Turco-Afghan Treaty is that it recognizes the independence of the Central Asian States of Bokhara and Khiva.

The Treaty of Moscow, signed on March 16, 1921, between the Angora Government and Soviet Russia, marks the partial fulfilment of Turkey's aspirations regarding the provinces of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, outlined in Article 2 of the National Pact. These provinces had twice been wrested from Turkey by the Russian armies in 1829 and 1877.

The plebiscite mentioned in Article 2 of the National Pact was, of course, never carried out, but a convenient compromise was effected, by means of which Russia retained the northern half of the Batum province, including the town of Batum, as far as a point on the coast ten miles south of that town, while Turkey obtained the remainder of the province and the whole of the provinces of Kars and Ardahan, except for a small corner of the latter province (west of Alexandropol), which she ceded to the Soviet Republic of Armenia. This frontier is outlined in Article 1 of the treaty, and described in detail in one of its appendices.

An important feature of the Moscow Treaty was its recognition of the independent Republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. These States are specifically mentioned in Articles 2 and 3 of the treaty. In Article 2 Turkey agreed to renounce in favour of Georgia her rights to the town and harbour of Batum and to that portion of the Batum *liva* lying north of the frontier described in Article 1, on condition that Turkish goods would enjoy free trade in passing through Batum.

In Article 3 the contracting parties agreed to establish an "autono-

mous territory of Nakhchivan," under the protection of Azerbaijan, and outlined its boundaries in an Appendix. This Article also enacted that the final trace of the northern boundary of this territory would be "rectified by a technical commission composed of representatives of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia." As Soviet Russia was not to be represented on this commission, it appears that the Turks did not recognize Russian sovereignty over these buffer States.

The remaining thirteen Articles of the Turco-Russian Treaty are of minor interest, but Article 15 throws a curious light on the relations between the Moscow Government and the Trans-Caucasian Republics. This Article runs as follows:

"Russia undertakes to take the necessary steps with the South Caucasus Republics to enforce the Articles of this Turco-Russian Treaty, relating to these Republics, in the treaties that will be made between them and Turkey."

Seven months after the signature of the Moscow Treaty its provisions were modified and incorporated in a more extensive instrument, known as the Treaty of Kars, which marks a stage of relative finality in the stabilization of Turkey's north-eastern frontier; for this Treaty recognized the political independence of the chain of autonomous buffer States between the Black Sea and the Caspian, which now separate the former empires of the Sultan and the Tsar.

The Turkish and Russian texts of the Kars Treaty are both available. The former has been officially published by the Angora Government; the latter appeared semi-officially in a Tiflis paper, the *Pravda Gruzii*, of October 21, 1921.

The Treaty was signed at Kars on October 13, 1921, between the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on the one hand, and the Socialist Soviet Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on the other. It is curious to note that Moscow was represented this time not as a principal, but only as an assenting party.

The Treaty of Kars ratified generally the provisions of the Moscow Treaty, repeating almost word for word the territorial clauses regarding the north-eastern frontier of Turkey. It reaffirmed the establishment of the autonomous territory of Nakhchivan under the sovereignty of Azerbaijan, and definitely delimited its frontiers, so presumably the Boundary Commission mentioned in Article 3 of the Moscow Treaty had completed its labours satisfactorily. Considerable confusion has arisen regarding the boundaries of this territory, but the text of the Kars Treaty is quite clear on the subject. The Kars Treaty further indicates where the Georgian-Armenian and Armenian-Azerbaijan frontiers meet the north-eastern frontier of Turkey.

The Turco-Ukrainian Treaty, concluded at Angora on January 2, 1922, merely reaffirmed the main provisions of the Moscow and Kars Treaties.

Within a week of the signature of the Kars Treaty Turkey succeeded in settling temporarily the vexed question of her Syrian frontier. Lured by the *ignis fatuus* of economic concessions, M. Franklin-Bouillon, the special envoy of the President of the French Republic, signed a Convention at Angora on the night of October 19/20, 1921, by which France handed back to Turkey the province of Cilicia, as well as a portion of the Aleppo *vilayet*. By Article 8 of the Angora Convention, Turkey and Syria were separated by one of the most extraordinary frontiers ever traced. This frontier runs eastwards from south of Payas, on the Gulf of Alexandretta, cutting the Baghdad Railway just north of Meidan Ekbes. Thence, passing south of Killis, it meets the railway again at the station of Choban Bey, north-east of Aleppo. From Choban Bey the frontier runs for 240 miles *along* the Baghdad Railway as far as its present eastern terminus at Nisibin, from whence the frontier runs E.N.E. to meet the Tigris just south of Jezire-ibn-Omer. The railway was to remain on Turkish soil, but its exploitation, as far west as the Taurus, was, under Article 10, to be conceded to a "French group." Both Turkey and Syria were to have the right of using the Baghdad Railway for troop movements over the whole sector from Meidan Ekbes via Muslimiya to Nisibin.

It is hardly conceivable that such a frontier or such an arrangement can be regarded as permanent. The Turco-Syrian frontier, although confirmed at Lausanne, will probably be delimited afresh by a separate convention after the signature of peace between the Allies and Turkey.

Between the Tigris and the Araks lies the mountain mass of Northern Kurdistan, across which no post-war frontiers have yet been drawn to divide Turkey from Persia and Iraq. The Turco-Persian frontier was demarcated by an International Boundary Commission in 1913-14, and follows in the main a well-defined watershed between the Tigris and Araks basins. Turkey would gain nothing by modifying it, so it is unlikely to be altered.

The least defined sector of Turkey's Asiatic frontier is that which borders on Iraq in the mountains of Kurdistan. This boundary is, for the time being, nominally assumed to be the northern boundary of the old Mosul *vilayet*, between the Tigris and the Persian frontier. In actual fact it is a debatable "no man's land," a zone of wild border country, in which Kurdish tribes, Turkish agents, and Arab and Chaldean levies carry on intermittent irregular warfare. Thus Rowanduz, situated more than thirty miles south of the Mosul-Van boundary, has been more or less effectively occupied by Kurdish tribal levies in Turkish pay for two years, and these were only ejected as a result of military operations in April, 1923. It is hoped, however, that a Boundary Commission will succeed in demarcating amicably the Turco-Iraq frontier within nine months of the signature of the Treaty of Peace between the Powers and Turkey.

If the settlement of both the Syrian and Iraq frontiers is to be effected by diplomatic methods, such a settlement depends, so far as the Turks are concerned, on the interpretation to be placed on Article 1 of their National Pact.

According to this Article the Turks would appear to have definitely surrendered all claim to the *vilayets* of Yemen and Nejd, the three *vilayets* of Iraq (Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra), the four *vilayets* of Syria (Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, and Lebanon), with the independent *livas* (or *sanjags*) of Zor and Jerusalem. This would reduce Turkey to a total of fifteen *vilayets*, of which two are in Europe and thirteen in Asia.

That, however, is not the limit of the Turkish claims. On October 12, 1922, a circular memorandum was issued to all *vilayets* signed by Ahmed Munir Bey, the Under-Secretary of State for the Interior at Angora. This circular contained a list of seventeen *vilayets* and forty-seven independent *livas* which were to be officially recognized as comprising "the territories actually administered by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey."

In addition to the fifteen *vilayets* mentioned above, this document included the *vilayet* of Mosul, with its three *livas* of Mosul, Kirkuk, and Suleimaniya, and the *vilayet* of Aleppo, including the *qazas* of Alexandretta, Antioch, Beilan, Idlib, Munbij, and Jebel Seman, which are definitely south of the Franklin-Bouillon frontier, and in French occupation. It also includes the independent *liva* of Zor, most of which is within the French mandated territory. This document is clear proof, if any were necessary, that the Syrian frontier which the Turks agreed to in October, 1921, did not satisfy their claims a year later, and that they still lay claim to the whole of the Mosul *vilayet*. The fact is that the first Article of the National Pact admits of various interpretations as to which districts are "inhabited by an Ottoman Muslim majority," and which by an Arab majority.

The Angora Press of June 4, 1923, reproduced a telegram from Mardin to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, purporting to express the desire of 250,000 inhabitants of the neighbouring territories that the southern frontier of Turkey would be carried southwards to the Euphrates, or at least to the Jebel Abdul Aziz. This piece of propaganda gives us an inkling of Turkish ambitions. The Euphrates frontier would probably be demanded if the Turks were to regain the entire Mosul *vilayet*, while they might be content with the Jebel Abdul Aziz (thirty miles south of the present frontier at Ras-el-Ain) should they only obtain a slight rectification of their boundary in Southern Kurdistan. In either case the whole of the Baghdad Railway, up to its terminus at Nisibin, would come well within Turkish territory.

All we can say is that the present frontiers of Turkey coterminous with Syria and Iraq have not yet been stabilized, and that they repre-

sent only the minimum Turkish demands. The maximum claims of Turkey in this respect are apparently represented by the southern boundaries of the Aleppo and Mosul *vilayets*, or at any rate some line across Northern Syria and Iraq approximating possibly to the 36th degree of north latitude. This would give to Turkey Aleppo and Mosul, both of which towns she still considers as forming part of her national territories. This question is, however, still *sub judice*, and we can only hope that it may be settled satisfactorily by diplomatic means.

To sum up, it may be said that the eastern sector of Turkey's Asiatic frontier, from the Black Sea past Mount Ararat to south-west of Lake Urmia, is now definitely delimited, while its southern sector, between the highlands of Kurdistan and the Mediterranean, still remains unsettled. Here we have an interesting field of endeavour for the boundary makers of the future, and one with which the interests of the British Empire are closely associated.

THE "MILITARISTS" OF CHINA

By J. O. P. BLAND

ANYONE who has studied, even cursorily, the course of events in the Far East since the Chinese Revolution of 1911, must have been impressed by the assertion, persistently recurring in the Press, that the unsatisfactory condition of affairs in China is primarily due to the machinations of individuals or political groups described as "militarists." Similarly, most of the publicists and journalists who, since the Washington Conference, have sought to elucidate the Far Eastern situation, concur in attributing Japan's foreign policy, wheresoever it comes into conflict with American or British ideas, to schemes deep-laid by Japanese "militarists." No doubt, to the uninitiated, the general impression thus conveyed is that the progress of peaceful prosperity and international good-will in both countries is prevented by the presence of powerful parties within the State, whose aims are aggressive and predatory, and who, like the Prussian, have a class bias in favour of war, for war's sake and the hope of glory. All serious students of Far Eastern affairs are, however, aware that this impression is wholly erroneous. They know, in the first place, that there exists in China no class in any sense equivalent to the old Samurai caste of Japan, and that to apply one and the same word to describe China's provincial satraps and the leaders of the Satsuma-Choshu clans in Dai Nippon, is evidence either of ignorance or confused thinking.

Before examining the results of this confused thinking upon the situation in China, however, it may be well to recall to mind the fact, that the prevalent misapplication of terms such as "militarism" and "reactionary" is one of many natural consequences of a war-weary world's emotional welcome to the Wilsonian, or feminist type of political idealism, and to its impulsive acceptance of the plausible catchwords which, after the Great War, gave a semblance of reality to the dream of a new era of universal disarmament and "self-determination." During the Washington Conference, the word "militarism," with reference to European peoples or policies, became a term of reproach, frequently applied by "forward-looking" doctrinaires to any nation or political group whose opinions were opposed to their own "progressive" gospel of political idealism. Since then, by popular usage, the scope of this term of reproach has

been enlarged, so that to-day we find it freely used by politicians and publicists, all the world over, to denounce anyone, at home or abroad, with whom they may differ concerning the best way of making the world free for their particular brand of democracy. Many of the world's most eminent Treaty makers, before and since Versailles, have apparently acted upon the assumption that the law of self-preservation had been brought to an end, or at least suspended indefinitely, by the war that was to end all wars. Nevertheless, it persists; and, as a result of the conflict between this persistence and the pure gospel of "self-determination," such measures as any Government may be compelled, as of old, to take for purposes of national security, are warmly denounced as "militarism," not only by its critics and competitors abroad, but by its political rivals and opponents at home. China is by no means the only country in which the denunciation of "militarism" has become a war-cry and a weapon, very serviceable and convenient for the purposes of the "Outs" in their perennial struggle with the "Ins." But the sincerity of those who use it will seldom bear close scrutiny. No nation, for example, has been more active and eloquent than the United States in professing a desire for universal disarmament and in denouncing as "militarism" the defensive measures and forces which France, Poland, and other European countries consider necessary for their national security. Nevertheless, public opinion in America complacently accepts an unprecedented naval programme and sees no reason for proclaiming its faith in the results of the Washington Conference (as England has done) by scrapping any warships before the strict letter of the law requires her to do so.

A glance at the present-day polemics of international politics throws into clear relief the fact that, when progressive publicists speak of militarism, they give to the word an arbitrary significance, dependent upon its particular application. How otherwise can we explain the attitude of British Liberal and Labour leaders, who denounce as Imperialism and militarism the measures which France has been compelled to take against defaulting Germany, while they regard with benevolent complacency the aggressive activities of the Soviets' conscripted Red Army in Manchuria, Mongolia, and elsewhere? How otherwise account for the fact that, in the United States, public opinion has been led to regard a policy of rapid naval expansion as imperatively necessary to the national security, and at the same time to denounce as "militarism" the policy of economic penetration on the Asiatic mainland, which the rulers of Japan consider essential to their country's very existence, since their people have been excluded from the White Man's continents?

The fact of the matter is that the idealists and Internationalists, zealous and impatient for the millennium of their dreams, either

ignore the fundamental truth, that the right of the weak to self-determination can never prevail against the right of their stronger neighbours to act upon the elemental instinct of self-preservation. In the world of realities, self-determination, like the principle of the innate equality of all men, depends for its application upon circumstances and, in the last resort, upon force. It is a curious characteristic of the "International" quality of mind that it recognizes and tacitly sanctions the use of force by those, be they Irish assassins or Soviet dictators, who pay lip-service to "democratic" ideals, but denounce as militarism any force organized and exercised for the defence of people or principles which it dislikes.

From this digression, let us return to our muttons—viz., the alleged militarists of China. At the outset of this article, I observed that a very widespread impression has been created in England and America to the effect that the present financial and administrative chaos and civil strife in China are solely due to the ascendancy in the body politic of certain political factions described by their opponents (the Outs) as militarists; moreover, that, if these disturbing elements could be disintegrated and deprived of their armed forces, the foreign-educated progressives of Young China might be relied upon to establish and maintain law, order, and good government.

This impression, as I have said, is wholly false; its genesis and general acceptance abroad are chiefly due to the skilful propaganda of the "Western-learning" groups of Chinese officials and aspirants whose unconcealed ambition it is, by the aid of America's moral and material support, to get the government of the country into their own hands. It is not surprising that these groups, which represent the best organized, most vocal, and keenest elements of Young China's Intelligentsia, and which enjoy a practical monopoly of access to the foreign Press, should have been able to enlist sympathy abroad for political aspirations which they are ever at pains to set forth in an attractive guise of democratic idealism. But what does surprise every disinterested observer of the situation is, that the majority of the foreign Press in China, and of the resident correspondents of English and American journals, should have failed to expose the obvious motives and the perilous policy which underlie Young China's persistent appeals for sympathy in their alleged struggle against militarism. The omission may to some extent be due to the fact that most of the inland correspondents of the Treaty Ports' foreign Press are either missionaries or school-teachers, vocationally inclined to sympathize with the political aspirations of the "Western-learning" type of politician. Moreover, a great deal of Young China's propaganda work is done through the Press, in America and England, with the help of well-known journalists, professors, and political advisors in Chinese pay, whose collective

opinion as experts naturally carries considerable weight. Many of these have undoubtedly been selected for the posts they hold because of their avowed sympathy for the kind of political idealism, combined with shrewd business instincts, which distinguishes "Westernized" mandarins of the modern type.

Making every allowance, however, for these factors in the situation, and for the reasonable readiness of foreigners on the spot to encourage any individual or group which seems to offer even a remote hope of bringing order and stable government out of chaos, it is still difficult to understand why nearly all the authors or recent works on the Far East (mostly American), and the majority of foreign journalists there resident, should endorse Young China's continual denunciations of "militarism" as the cause of their country's present plight. For it must be evident to anyone who has closely followed the fortunes of the warring factions since the end of the dictatorship of Yuan Shih-k'ai, that every political adventurer who emerges therefrom, by luck or some quality of leadership, can only vindicate his claims to place and power by surrounding himself with an armed force recruited from the bandits and loafers of his district. But the political adventurer of China is not, and never has been, a militarist in any accepted sense of the term, and his hiring rabble are no more soldiers than are the gunmen of Southern Ireland or the *bandilleros* of Mexico. The root of trouble in China is not militarism, but the incorrigible greed for wealth displayed not only by the military governors but by the civilian mandarins at Peking—a rapacity far more omnivorous than anything that the country knew under the benevolent despotism of the Manchus.

It is not necessary for the purposes of this article to describe at length the various ways and means by which a widespread misconception of the situation in China has been created. Two or three passages taken at random from recent numbers of *The Times* may serve, however, to show what a multitude of sins may be covered by "militarism," as denounced by Young China aspirant. I select *The Times*, only because its news service from the Far East is usually fuller than that of other papers, and also because the news and views reported by its correspondents at Peking and Hongkong may generally be regarded as fairly representative of the opinions of the British communities at these centres.

On January 23, *The Times* correspondent at Peking telegraphed the points of a speech delivered by the Inspector-General of Customs (Sir F. Aglen) before the directors of the Anti-Opium Association. After drawing attention to the fact that opium is being freely grown in China and smuggled into the large cities, with the connivance (he might well have said "under the direction") of provincial and military officials, Sir Francis suggested the creation of a Government

monopoly of the drug, with a view to the better regulation of an ineradicable traffic. To this proposal certain Chinese members of the Association objected, on the ground that "the abuses were due to the illegal practices of the militarists." At the same time they were of opinion that "with the restoration of a stable Central Government, the national demand for the suppression of the opium traffic would certainly be realized." As a matter of self-evident fact, of course, the substitution of a Government entirely composed of "Western-learning" politicians for the predatory officials who now control the collection of provincial revenues, would no more abolish opium in China than a suppression of the Republican forces in Ireland would abolish whisky.

In another article, describing the bankrupt condition of China's railways, the same correspondent observed that, while the net earnings of the Pukou Railway for the past half-year were no less than \$7,000,000, the whole of this sum had disappeared, and not a penny was available for paying the interest and amortization of the foreign loans with which the line was built. This money, he says, may be assumed to have "gone into the pockets of the militarists." Nevertheless, he admits, "as a disagreeable feature of the constant negotiations relating to the provision of funds, the indifference with which the Ministry of Communications viewed the prospects of default." Now, the Ministry in question is not composed of "militarists"; nevertheless, it is notorious that in the matter of rapacity and maladministration of public funds it has never had anything to learn from the hungriest of Tuchuns. Another curious feature of the railway situation, reported in the same article, is that the Peking-Hankow line has fallen upon evil days, because "Wu Pei-fu annexes the receipts of a considerable section." For, be it noted, this General Wu, according to the same correspondent, is "one of the few patriots in sight," and was, until quite lately, the most prominent champion of Young China's "anti-militarist" programme!

Turning from the north to the south, the condition of affairs at Canton, after the rout of General Chen by the rabble forces of Yunnan and Kwangsi, is described by the Hongkong correspondent of *The Times* (January 17) in the following typical passage:

"Canton is without officials. The Labour leaders are jubilant, and have telegraphed to Sun Yat-sen to return immediately as their champion and appoint his staunchest henchman, Wu Hon-min, as Civil Governor. Labour is predominant in Canton, but it is unlikely that the Kwangsi and Yunnan *militarists* will leave the fruits of their successes to others. Sun Yat-sen's first problem is, therefore, how to placate and shake off *his allies*. [My italics.]

"Chen's defeat was mainly attributable to lack of funds, where-

with to pay his troops, owing to the depreciation in Canton currency. Sun Yat-sen, seeing his opportunity, *supplied the disaffected soldiery with money.*"

Sun Yat-sen, be it observed, is the shining light of Young China's professed republicanism, a "distinguished leader of the Constitutional cause," and according to Dr. Reinsch,* "a true Chinese Liberal." The fact that the only Government he has ever been able to evolve at Canton, with a fair field and much favour, has been a "military Government," eternally at war with Peking and with its neighbours, has never affected his claim to be regarded as the sworn foe of "militarism," any more than his intimate relations with Japanese *soshii* and financiers at the time of the Revolution prevented him from subsequently denouncing the Peking Government's insatiable appetite for Japanese loans. It is interesting to observe that within a month of General Chen's defeat, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce at Hongkong was again anxiously discussing measures "for putting an end to the pernicious exploits of political adventurers" and ridding the household of the "wolf of militarism." In fact, wheresoever two or three are gathered together to promote the interests of the "Western-learning" section of Mandarindom, the catchword inevitably emerges, ubiquitous, and wholly indifferent to the obvious fact that the warfare which is devastating China is a purely civil strife for sordid personal ends, between the "Ins" and the "Outs."

Considered in this light, all the persistent denunciations of "militarism" by the leaders of the "Outs" and their supporters, native and foreign, assume another aspect, easily reconcilable with a very definite and far-seeing policy, which was clearly manifested, to all but the wilfully blind, by China's delegates at the Washington Conference. This policy was originally framed by the group of Kuo Min-tang malcontents and "Western-learning" Intellectuals, who followed the fortunes of Sun Yat-sen, Tang Shao-yi, and Wu Ting-fang into the Cantonese wilderness, after the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai, in 1916. Its obvious purpose is to get the control of the Government of China into its own hands, and, with this object in view, to secure the sympathy of public opinion in England and America, and eventually their financial and material support. The first-class brains of the young men who have had the direction of Young China's active propaganda at and since the Washington Conference, were not slow to perceive that, in denouncing as "militarists" the Chihli faction at Peking and the Tuchuns in the provinces, while at the same time they appealed to the friendly Powers for protection against the "militarism" of Japan, they were likely to kill two very succulent

* Formerly American Minister at Peking, and now financial adviser to the Chinese Government.

birds with one stone. They reckoned, cleverly enough, on the British and American publics' ignorance of Far Eastern affairs and on the tendency now prevalent among the better informed official circles to disregard any uncomfortable features in the situation which might conflict either with the fashionable ideals of forward-looking "Liberalism," or with the vested interests of "big business." Therefore, at Washington, Young China attributed all the prevalent disorder and distress in China to the "militarism" of the Tuchuns, and professed their desire and their ability, with America's benevolent assistance, to establish a Government on Wilsonian lines, one in which "right will reign, reason will rule, justice will prevail, and happiness will be the pursuit of life." They cheerfully overlooked, and their hearers ignored, the fact that the leaders of Young China's so-called Constitutionalist party have had ample opportunity and a free hand to apply their theories to the business of government at Canton, and that the results have been, if anything, more hopelessly chaotic than in the north. Sun Yat-sen and his friends of the "Independent Military Government" have proved themselves to be just as lacking in public spirit and administrative capacity as the Northern Tuchuns, while in the matter of "squeezing" there has been nothing to choose between them. Regardless of the sufferings of the people, both groups of officials have displayed the same insatiable appetite for money, the same feverish haste to feather their own nests, before the Powers are compelled, in their own interests, to intervene and to prevent the bankruptcy of the country, by insisting on effective and honest administration of its revenues and expenditure.

The politicians and publicists who direct Young China's propaganda possess sufficient knowledge of international affairs to enable them to perceive that when this inevitable intervention takes place, rivalries and jealousies between the foreign Powers are bound to create a delicate, if not a critical, situation. It is clear that, anticipating this situation, their present object is the same as that of every Chinese Government in the past—namely, to stimulate and increase these rivalries and jealousies, in the hope of bringing about a war, from which they expect China to derive considerable advantages, and not the least of these, they foresee, will be their own undisputed accession to rulership, as the party identified with Western principles of democracy and progress. In pursuing this policy, they have derived, and are deriving, considerable assistance from a certain section of the Press in America and Great Britain, which makes little concealment of its desire to see America take up arms against Japan, partly on grounds of precautionary national policy, and partly for the protection of China against "militarist" aggression.

To every dispassionate observer of the realities of the situation, it

must be evident that friendly relations between America and Japan are essential to the maintenance of peace in the Far East. It must also be admitted that, in pursuing a policy of economic expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia, the rulers of Japan are acting under pressure of vital necessity far greater than that which has impelled the United States to safeguard the nation's future security by occupying the Philippines, and fortifying the Panama Canal. Nevertheless, thanks to the propagandist activities of Young China, the impression has insidiously been created in the public mind, of a gratuitously aggressive and "militarist" Japan, at whose door the civilized world may rightly lay the blame for the conflict, if and when it comes.

It requires no vivid imagination to perceive the advantages which, in this case, Chinese diplomacy hopes to gain by following the traditional policy of setting one barbarian against the other. When the Peking Government decided, after much hesitation, to throw in its lot with the Allies against Germany in 1917, they turned their knowledge of international affairs to good account in applying the ancient adage about thieves falling out. On the one hand, by denouncing their financial obligations to Germany and by seizing the property of German and Austrian subjects, and on the other by obtaining suspension of the Boxer indemnity and securing other benefits from the Allies, they reaped a goodly harvest, in return for what actually amounted to their benevolent neutrality. The experience thus gained has not been lost. In the event of war between America and Japan, it is safe to predict that the political faction which happens to be in power at Peking will speedily declare itself, in a flood of eloquence, on the American side, and then proceed to wipe out, by a stroke of the pen, the burden of the Japanese loans with which their predecessors have kept themselves in power, and their supporters in funds, since 1915.

In pursuing this policy, Young China is evidently convinced that it is backing the winning horse, and looks forward to the day when the United States victorious will not only relieve China of all further trouble with her Japanese creditors, but will stand forth before the world as the champion of the Chinese Government, in the hands henceforth of the "Western-learning" mandarins, the glib lawyers and politicians who profess their faith (without works) in the blessings of democratic institutions. The policy underlying Young China's propaganda is sufficiently obvious, and in the light of its unmistakable purposes the real significance is revealed of all its world-wide appeals for help against the "militarism" of Japan on the one hand, and that of its political rivals in China on the other.

For the present, the facile catchword finds daily utterance in the British and American Press, and, like other stock phrases, will no

doubt preserve its hypnotic force until it has run its course and been replaced by some other fallacy in tabloid form. But sooner or later the truth must prevail and the fact be recognized, that the sorry plight of China has been brought about, not by militarism, but solely by the insatiable money-lust of the official class, more flagrant and uncontrolled under the new régime than ever it was under the Manchu dynasty. To this official corruption, the root cause of China's impending bankruptcy, "our own correspondents" in the Far East seldom allude, or if they do, they mention it incidentally, in terms of gentle deprecation, as an accidental fly in the political ointment. No doubt, like Sancho Panza, they prefer "to speak no word of halters in the house of the hanged."

THE ITALIAN COLONY OF ERITREA

BY MAJOR H. WILBERFORCE-BELL

THERE are few parts of the world less known to Englishmen than the interesting Italian possession called "Colonia Eritrea," where communications are only now in a state of fairly adequate development, where steamship connections are few and uncertain, and where we are permanently represented by a single Englishman, representative of a well-known firm. And yet such foreign possessions should not be unknown to us—a race of colonizers—for they contain much that it is profitable for an administrator to see, and some of them at least afford lessons from which no nation should be too proud to learn. We English are rather inclined to imagine that our methods of colonizing and of ruling subject peoples are the best possible, and that our systems of development cannot well be improved. Each such country, of course, has its own particular problems to be solved; but when all allowances have been made, the Englishman who visits Eritrea is apt to be at times a little out of conceit with himself, and it is likely that there are few who would not declare, after a stay in the colony, that the Italian has to be considered in his possessions abroad before a just appreciation can be formed of his nation as a whole.

The author recently enjoyed the pleasure of staying for a short time in Eritrea, and his only fear is that within the small compass of this article he may fail to do justice to all that he saw. The area of the colony is about 45,800 square miles, which are situated between the Soudan on the north and west, the Red Sea on the east, and Abyssinia and French Somaliland on the south. Its principal port is Massowa, and the seat of government is Asmara, situated about seventy miles inland. The seaboard stretches from Cape Kasar to Cape Dumeirah, a length of 670 miles. From Daddato, where the frontiers of Eritrea, Abyssinia, and French Somaliland join, to the Endeli River the boundary runs almost parallel to the coast, and about forty miles from it. But the whole of this coastal strip, and similarly as far as Cape Kasar in the north, is sparsely populated and unproductive. Its climate is distinctly unpleasant and hot, and it constitutes some 26,000 square miles of almost barren country. Hence the colony's revenue does not cover expenditure of administration, and it is primarily what the Italians call a "political colony."

Historically Eritrea is not without considerable interest. In mediæval times it probably formed part of that kingdom ruled over by

the legendary "Prester John," but previous to those days it is likely that the port of Massowa was the only place of real historical importance. The ancient Greeks had indeed conquered that part of the coast of Northern Africa, and had penetrated inland, leaving a colony and the worship of Mars behind them. A warrior is the only person of consequence in Abyssinia now, and perhaps this is but a result of Greek civilization. The unknown author of the "Periplus of the Erythræan Sea" (which was written about the year A.D. 70 by a Greek merchant, a forerunner of our "merchant adventurers" of a later age) visited Massowa, which was then known as Adulis. The modern village of Zula, a short distance to the south of Massowa, preserves the ancient Greek name of this old port, and the unknown writer has quite a lot to say about it.

He tells us: "Below Ptolemais of the Hunts (*i.e.*, Er-Rih Island), at a distance of about 3,000 *stadia**, there is Adulis, a port established by law, lying at the inner end of a bay that runs in towards the south. Before the harbour lies the so-called 'Mountain Island,' about 200 *stadia* seaward from the very head of the bay, with the shores of the mainland close to it on both sides. Ships bound for this port now anchor here because of attacks from the land. They used formerly to anchor at the very head of the bay, by an island called Diodorus†, close to the shore, which could be reached on foot from the land; by which means the barbarous natives attacked the island. Opposite Mountain Island, on the mainland twenty *stadia* from shore, lies Adulis, a fair-sized village, from which there is a three days' journey to Coloe‡, an inland town and the first market for ivory. From that place to the city of the people called Auxumites§, there is a five days' journey more; to that place all the ivory is brought from the country beyond the Nile to the district called Cyneum (the modern Senaar), and thence to Adulis. Practically the whole number of elephants and rhinoceros that are killed live in the places inland, although at rare intervals they are hunted on the sea coast, even near Adulis. Before the harbour of that market town, out at sea on the right hand, lie a great many little sandy islands called Alalæ||, yielding tortoise-shell, which is brought to market there by the fish-eaters. And about 800 *stadia* beyond there is another deep bay¶, with a great mound of sand piled up at the mouth of the entrance, at the bottom of which the obsidian stone is found, and this is the only place where it is produced. These places, from the calf-eaters to the other Berber country, are governed by Zoscales, who is miserly in his ways and

* About five and a half miles.

† Now called Taulud Island.

‡ The modern Kohaito.

§ Auxum (or Axum) is the ancient capital of Abyssinia, where its kings are still "crowned."

|| Now called the Dahalak Archipelago.

¶ Probably Hauakl Bay.

always striving for more, but otherwise upright and acquainted with Greek literature. There are imported into these places undressed cloth made in Egypt for the Berbers, robes from Arsinoë*; cloaks of poor quality dyed in colours; double-fringed linen mantles; many articles of flint glass, and others of *murrhine*, made in Diospolis†; and brass which is used for ornaments, and in cut pieces instead of coin; sheets of soft copper, used for cooking utensils, and cut up for bracelets and anklets for the women; iron which is made into spears and used against the elephants and other wild beasts, and in their wars. Besides these, small axes are imported, and adzes and swords; copper drinking cups, round and large; a little coin for those coming to the market; wine of Laodicea and Italy, not much; olive oil, not much; for the king, gold and silver plate made after the fashion of the country, and for clothing, military cloaks, and thin coats of skin, of no great value. Likewise from the district of Ariaca‡ across this sea, there are imported Indian iron and steel, and Indian cotton cloth; the broad cloth called *monache*, and that called *sagmatogene*, and girdles, and coats of skin, and mallow-coloured cloth, and a few muslins and coloured lac. There are exported from these places ivory, and tortoise-shell, and rhinoceros horn. The mosé from Egypt is brought to this market from the month of January to September—that is, from Tybi to Thoth; but seasonably they put to sea about the month of September. From this place the Arabian Gulf trends towards the east, and becomes narrowest just before the Gulf of Avalites§."

So much for the ancient history of Eritrea nineteen hundred years ago, and we are given in the "Periplus" such a picture that we can easily imagine the inhospitable and sparsely populated country before it gave place gradually to the progressive influences of civilization, depriving the wild animals of their birthright, but making the evidences of man something more than a few well-worn tracks linking up a few thickly populated towns. In later days Massowa and Eritrea sank in importance, and except for the sailing from that port of the Abyssinian expedition to conquer Aden and the Yemen early in the sixth century, and the arrival there in 1520 of a Portuguese fleet, nothing of more than local interest was enacted there until the middle of the nineteenth century.

It was the Emperor John of Abyssinia, who had been crowned at Axum in 1872, who prevented Abyssinia and Eritrea from becoming a part of Egypt. Mehemet Ali, after conquering the Soudan, negotiated with Turkey for the lease of Massowa. His successor, Ismail, established himself before 1875 along the whole of this part of the African coast, and it was only after being twice defeated by

* Ancient Suez, so called after the wife of Ptolemy.

† Probably Thebes.

‡ Kathiawar and Cutch in India.

§ The modern Zeyla, in British Somaliland.

the Emperor John, and after Egypt's relinquishment of the Soudan as a result of the Mahdi's insurrection of 1884, that the Egyptian menace disappeared. It was the Egyptians who were in control of Massowa when in 1868 part of Sir Robert Napier's force landed there prior to its advance into Abyssinia, which was destined to lead to the victory of Magdala, and the subsequent withdrawal of the English from the country. This withdrawal, and the disappearance of the Egyptians from the stage of Abyssinian affairs, rendered possible the Italian colonization of Eritrea.

Italy first secured her footing in 1869, when the Rubattino Steamship Company purchased Asab, at the southernmost end of the Eritrean coast, from a local chief, on the successful construction of the Suez Canal, and the consequent complete change brought about in the relationship of the Red Sea ports with the world's commerce. Some thirteen years later the Italian Government occupied Beilul and Massowa. But they found that to hold these places was valueless without their holding some of the highlands as well. And so they began to think of advancing to more salubrious altitudes. But the Abyssinians were on the alert, and the first Italian troops in the colony were surrounded near Dogali (a little place now on the Massowa-Asmara railway) by an overwhelming number of Abyssinians, who exterminated them after an heroic resistance. The graves of these brave Italian soldiers are now a landmark for miles, and not even the hill near by, from which the Emperor John is said to have watched the battle, is more conspicuous. The fallen Italians were soon replaced, their enemies were brought to a standstill, and, other diversions supervening, the Abyssinian opposition to Italian interests upon their borders diminished in intensity. The Italians gradually extended their territory inland, and on January 1, 1890, their possessions in this part of the world became known as "Colonia Eritrea." But they had been going on too fast, and wished to establish a protectorate over Abyssinia, which the proud people of that country much resented.

In 1889 they had drawn up a treaty with Menelek, John's successor. By this Treaty of Ucciali, the Italian protectorate over Abyssinia was announced in a clause which provided that the employment of Italy in treating of all matters between Abyssinia and other nations was agreed to by Menelek. But shortly afterwards Menelek denounced this clause, and each party made accusations of bad faith against the other, which resulted two or three years later in a resort to arms. The Abyssinians crossed the Eritrean frontier, but two actions fought at Koatit and Senafé went in favour of the Italians, who advanced to Adowa.

Early in 1896, an Italian force of four brigades under General Baratieri, consisting of 8,000 white and 6,500 native troops and 56

guns, came in touch with an Abyssinian army numbering over 100,000 men, and the resulting action was an Italian disaster. They lost 4,000 men killed, 2,000 prisoners, and the whole of their guns, and only an inadequate water supply compelled Menelek to retire. Meanwhile General Baldissera arrived with reinforcements, and a force besieged at Addi Grat was relieved; but when peace was concluded six months afterwards at Adis Ababa, the Treaty of Ucciali was annulled, and Menelek's complete independence recognized. And so matters have since remained politically, although in 1902 the province of Kunama was surrendered by Abyssinia to form part of Eritrea.

During the Great War internal strife in Abyssinia ensured the immunity of Eritrea from attack, but at one time a Mohammedan rising in favour of Turkey seemed likely to involve the whole of Northern Africa in a religious war. This threat happily passed without being realized, and Italy has been free to develop the colony in which she takes so much pride.

Every maritime country has a "gate," or principal port of entry. Thus Portugal has Lisbon; the United States has New York; France has Le Havre in the north and Marseilles in the south; India has Bombay; and similarly Massowa is the "gate" of Eritrea. It is not a pleasant port, and it has the evil reputation of being the hottest place on the Red Sea. Certainly the author has no wish to test the accuracy of this dictum by visiting other Red Sea ports between the months of April and October, for in May and July he found Massowa almost unbearable. The modern harbour is not without beauty. Beyond it are the high Eritrean and Abyssinian mountains, and the Mountain Island described by the author of the "Periplus" is certainly an object of majestic beauty still. There is a causeway connecting Taulud Island with the mainland. Here the author is constrained to contest with the ancients the name which they gave to this island. "Diodorus" must surely have been adopted in irony, for it is difficult to imagine a gift which possesses less divine attributes than this hot and sandy island. Rank vegetation grows in the shallow waters which surround it; heat radiates from its very soil; and when a breath of wind stirs by any chance the oppressive atmosphere above it, the accompanying dust is almost stifling. As if all these discomforts were not enough wherewith to plague the unhappy mortal whose lot is cast in Massowa, the place is subject to severe earthquakes, the most recent of which, taking place a year or two ago, has rendered unsafe nearly every building which was left standing. So every evening, when the sun goes down, hundreds of Arabs and others "trek" across the island to the sandy plain beyond, where temporary erections ensure at least that they will not be crushed by masonry in the event of another earthquake taking place. The ancient Greeks were

somewhat mixed in their divinities when they named the island "Diodorus"!

The government offices, the railway station, and the only passable hotel are built upon the island of Taulud. But none of them are objects of art, and the more imposing building of the Banca d'Italia does not compensate for Massowa's architectural deficiencies. The view from the island in the early morning is extremely beautiful, when the tinges of dawn serve to show up Mountain Island in singular contrast, and the water between is still, save for occasional birds flying across it, and fishermen upon it plying their profession from inflated skins, as probably their ancestors did thousands of years ago.

Massowa is connected with Asmara, the capital of the colony, by a railway which is seventy-four miles in length, and at Ghinda, forty-four miles along the line, the ascent to the highlands can really be said to begin. The flat part of the journey has nothing to recommend it, since it passes through country void of all scenic interest—excepting, of course, the monuments at Dogali. Its hills and hillocks are treeless, its rivers and streams are dry, and it is what it appears to be, namely, a haunt for the jackal, the hyæna, and the wild pig. But beyond Ghinda the hills become mountains of singular grandeur, and the gradual change of climate due to increasing elevation is almost momentarily perceptible. It is a wonderful piece of engineering—this broad-gauge mountain railway. It winds its way among the mountains ever upwards, and occasionally the traveller looks out upon a sheer drop of hundreds of feet to the bed of a ravine far below. Between Ghinda and Asmara are twenty-nine tunnels, one of which is over 800 yards in length. The Italians may well be proud of this railway. Its construction is at places on the engineering border of safety, and yet it is perfectly secure. It is like the Kalka-Simla railway, only much more so, or like a mountain line in Switzerland or Northern Italy, and its principal drawback is its want of strategic value, for a train may only weigh thirty tons—engine and rolling stock included—to perform in safety its stiff climb from tropical heat to temperate coolness. The journey is one of six hours, and trains run three days a week each way.

Asmara is situated almost on the edge of the highland plateau which extends through Eritrea and Abyssinia. It is nearly 8,000 feet above the level of the sea, and climatically and otherwise—excepting for the absence of trees—is like a piece of Italy set in Africa. All who can do so build for themselves villas, of which no two are alike. And the residential part of Asmara is a soothing sight in July and August, when the villas are surrounded by every sort of flower, and the scent of the honeysuckle takes the thoughts back to summer days in England. The soil of Eritrea is very fertile, and almost anything grows there. Florally speaking, there are no seasons, and the violet

is very nearly a "perennial." But Asmara is unfinished in appearance. It possesses a fine Government House, good government buildings, and an imposing opera house, but many private buildings are unfinished—a legacy, no doubt, of the years of the Great War—and heaps of building débris lie everywhere. No doubt the time will come when an efficient municipality will remove these abuses. The town is well planned on the European model, and electric light and hot and cold water are not the least of Asmara's attractions. The Franciscans are on the point of completing a fine cathedral, and to see them at work in habit and cowl carried one back to mediæval Europe. The church is characteristic, and with its chancel ceiling painted to represent a starlit sky, it has all the air of what a new English church must have looked like during the Early English, Decorated, and Perpendicular Periods of our architecture. But the Italian Government is not bigoted, for it has presented to the Coptic and Mohammedan communities a church and a mosque, both noble in appearance, which has done much to increase their popularity with the natives.

There is an important bacteriological laboratory at Asmara, where it is said that the first successful introduction of the monkey's thyroid gland to a human being was effected, and the hero of this incident is pointed out to the curious—with what accuracy, I am unable to say.

Besides being the headquarters of the Government of the colony, Asmara is also the chief town of the province of Hamasen, and the remaining seven provinces are situated around the central district. Cheren, the chief town of the province of the same name, is perhaps the principal place in the colony after Asmara. The railway now extends to it, and its successful button industry is likely to lead to an increase in its importance. It is at a somewhat lower altitude than Asmara, and access to it by railway is a great advantage. Gold has been found in the colony, but the possibilities in this line have not been fully exploited, and an English firm of prospectors has, it is said, not been allowed to develop further the mines.

Communications generally are poor throughout the colony, and road-making is done chiefly by the Eritrean Battalions, who dislike the six months annually which they have to put in of this fatigue when they are not fighting in Tripoli or serving elsewhere. The Eritrean soldier has of recent years been much used in Tripoli—not always with success, for his discipline is not up to a high standard. But he is a brave soldier, and as the career of a warrior is about the only one looked up to by the Abyssinians, there is no dearth of recruits. A battalion goes to Tripoli or to Italian Somaliland for six months at a time, and the families of those killed in action are given, not a pension, but "blood money" for the fallen, the Government assuming the place of the slayer for the purpose.

There are about 4,000 Italians in Eritrea, and they form the bulk of the petty traders in Asmara, though Indians, Abyssinians, and Arabs are the principal shopkeepers in the native quarter. There are also Italian colonists engaged throughout the more habitable parts of the colony in farming and agriculture. But all land taken up for this or any other Government purpose is well paid for, and the Italians, by their fair dealing with the native, have got him entirely on their side, and have earned his respect. Quite recently the Governor, Marchese Cherina Ferroni, who was formerly a naval officer, and whom the author had the privilege of meeting, was obliged to make room for a nominee of Signor Mussolini's, Doctor Gasparini, and it is said that the colonists are likely in some cases to be dispossessed of their farms. There is considerable perturbation in the colony just at present on the subject. The proper development of Eritrea appears to want an intensifying of the scheme of settling the Italian upon the land, which is very productive, and the more of it that can be put under systematic cultivation, the better.

The Eritrean native is really an Abyssinian, and he has all the virtues and failings of that people. He is dignified and pleasant to meet, and his Coptic branch of Christianity is a distinct link between him and the Italian. But his Christianity is of a low order, and is considerably mixed with paganism. He is virile, and on ceremonial occasions the man who has killed a lion has the right to wear the mane round his face; such a man is a great hero. The Abyssinian has no ear for music, and the weird sound occasioned by the music in the throng of a chief's retainers has not been heard elsewhere by the author. The "band" consists of three or four men, each of whom plays one note in turn, like the hand system of ringing a peal of bells. The party will go for hours upon a road in this way, the chief seated upon a mule surrounded by his retainers carrying rifles or spears, and preceded by the "band." The Eritrean women are regarded as are all Eastern women. They wear their hair tied in a series of plaits, worked back over the head. As a result their heads look rather a ploughed field, for in between each plait (and there are from ten to fifteen of these) the top of the head shows. They carry their infants in a skin decorated with shells, which is tied on the back, round the waist, and over the shoulders, keeping the baby warm and allowing its head to stick out of the top and its feet out of the sides. Most of the men wear a Coptic cross suspended round the neck by a cord, on which can also often be seen a long silver instrument, which is used to supplement soap and water in the ears. They are a homely people, these Abyssinians, but very cruel to their animals. A R.S.P.C.A. is very badly needed in Eritrea. They are generally illiterate, and only a few of them have been educated by the Franciscans.

It is a curious sight to see a crowd of them sitting around a village

letter-reader, who reads aloud what each letter contains, in such a way that such a thing as a secret cannot exist, and a scandal is likely very soon to become a commonplace. But this institution is eternally Eastern! The Italian likes the Abyssinian. Some Italians have Abyssinian wives and families, and some who have married twice have both Italian and Abyssinian families. Such a remark as "This is my Abyssinian family, and this is my Italian daughter," is not altogether rare. All the same, there is no general intermarriage between the two peoples, and the social relations are a compromise between our system in India and that adopted by the Portuguese in Goa. But a white man can wander about the colony in perfect safety; and it is necessary to know something of conditions in the neighbouring countries of Abyssinia and Somaliland to understand all that this remark signifies.

At Senafé there is an English cemetery, of which the officer commanding the troops in Eritrea, Tenente Colonnello Frusci, kindly gave the author a photograph. It depicts the grave of Colonel Dunn, V.C., of the 33rd Duke of Wellington's Regiment, who was accidentally killed there while out shooting during our Abyssinian campaign against Theodore. Senafé was used as an advanced base, but was not at the time, of course, Italian territory. Judging from the photographs, the graves are well cared for, but the author had not the opportunity to visit them himself. He learnt that the last Englishman to pay a visit to them was a naval officer in the earlier days of the Great War.

There are some Eritrean memories which will never fade—the pleasant railway journey away from the heat up the mountains; the bracing atmosphere of the highlands; the kindly welcome of the Italians; the courteous bearing of the Abyssinians; the flowers and the honeysuckle; and the Franciscans building their cathedral. And not least of all, perhaps, the humour of an old Italian priest, whose age was said to be 92, and who spent much time drinking coffee in the restaurant towards the evening of his days. He had had an eventful life which he took a delight in recounting. He had been captured by the Mahdi, and had spent ten years in durance vile. After he had been five years in this unhappy condition, his captors took pity on him and gave him an Abyssinian girl to wife. At this point in its recital his story stopped, and the question then naturally asked him was, "And what did you do?" To which he invariably replied, "I did my duty!" But he left us none the wiser after all. And, yet again, there is another thought. The good wine of Capri can be obtained very cheaply in Eritrea, and there is plenty of it. What a contrast with conditions there nineteen hundred years ago, when the writer of the "Periplus" was moved to say that at Massowa there was "of the wine of Italy—not much"!

REVIEWS

LANDS OF THE THUNDERBOLT. By the Earl of Ronaldshay, P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E. Constable and Co.

It is a truism that the busiest men have the most time to spare. We need therefore feel no surprise that, while occupied in the arduous task of governing Bengal, Lord Ronaldshay found time to travel in the countries with which this volume deals, and during his journeys to amass a large store of interesting and instructive information. He shares, perhaps, the view of a distinguished statesman of last century to the effect that the best holiday is to be found in a change of occupation.

The book deals with the States, known to Europeans as Sikkim and Bhutan, in the Eastern Himalaya, and with the Tibetan district, known as the Chumbi Valley, that presses forward like a wedge between them. Here and there intervene chapters which give information concerning the origin and development of the Buddhist religion.

Sikkim is fairly well known. Its cool, pure air, its scenery, grand and beautiful beyond description, and the charm of its people, combine to render it, in spite of leeches and torrential rain, a popular playground for Europeans from the plains of Bengal. The author possesses in a high degree the faculty of observation, the power of understanding the import of what he sees, and—what is no less important—the ability to place the result graphically before his readers. He has also visited one of the most interesting places in Sikkim—the highly venerated monastery of Tashiding, which has but seldom been explored by travellers.

In the Chumbi Valley, too, the author had the good-fortune to vary the ordinary round of travel by seeing a Tibetan oracle in action. The setting of this scene is well described, the tremors of the seer, the increasing violence of the crashing cymbals, the two-edged sword, the low, guttural prophecies painfully choked out, and the final collapse when “he fell back limp and motionless as a corpse, propped hideously against the back of the throne.”

A journey to Jongri and beyond, along the base of the great snow mountains, shows us the autumnal beauties of high altitudes in Sikkim. The description of sky, mountain, and forest is admirable.

A brief synopsis of the recent history of Bhutan prefaces the portion of the book that deals with Lord Ronaldshay's visit to this

country, the interior of which has hitherto been but little visited by Europeans or Indians. We find ourselves in a mediæval world. The castle of twelfth-century England with its barbican, its bailey and its keep, is found in each of the larger *dzongs*, for Bhutan is even now in the feudal stage, both as regards its government and the life of its people. Among other places visited were *Duk-gye Dzong*, the cliff-bound *Tak-tsang* monastery and the massive *dzong* at *Paro*, whose chief entertained the party with true Bhutanese hospitality.

The chapters on Buddhism deal *inter alia* with the life of Buddha, the earlier and later doctrines, the University of Nalanda, and modern Lamaism. It is evident that the author has made a careful study of this branch of his subject, and has consulted trustworthy authorities. An exceptionally good chapter on "The Outstanding Glory of Buddhism" concludes the volume.

It was not to be expected that a book of this kind should escape imputations of error. The travels occurred in the brief intervals of a busy life, and the traveller had of necessity not sufficient time to thread the intricacies of the history and language of Tibet and her neighbours. Accordingly we find *Damthang* translated as "The Meadow of Mud," whereas the rendering "Mud Flat" is at once more correct and more descriptive. *Tak-tshang* might preferably be rendered "The Tiger's Lair" rather than "The Tiger's Nest," for the word *tshang* has a wide application. The Dharma Raja of Bhutan is not *Druk Gye-po*, but *Shaptung Rimpo-che*. The phonetic rendering of Punaka's summer resort is, in the writer's opinion, *Tashi Chö-dzong* rather than *Tassi-chu Jong*. And it may be permitted to doubt whether this place can be accurately described—though often so described in the past—as the summer capital of the country, for neither the Maharaja of Bhutan nor his Council go into residence there. *Fadung* in Sikkim might preferably be spelt *Podang*, the Sikkimese pronunciation of *Potrang*, the Tibetan word for palace.

On the historical side we are told something of the Dalai Lama's flight to India, but hardly enough to enable us to understand the inner purport of this event.

It is natural that the author should notice the machine-like work of the prayer-wheel, remarking that "truly the vain repetitions of the Pharisees pale into insignificance before this prodigious outpouring." There is no doubt a measure of justice in this, but to the people themselves the prayer-wheel and the other symbols of their Faith mean far more than this mechanical output would seem to suggest. It is only fair to add that in general the author's comments show an understanding sympathy as well as a keen insight.

"Lands of the Thunderbolt" is written in an attractive style, and is furnished with illustrations of an unusually high order.

C. B.

PATIALA AND THE GREAT WAR. Printed by the India Society, London, 1923.

This little book is an admirably written and excellently illustrated summary of the services in the Great War of the premier Punjab State under the inspiration of its gallant ruler H.H. Major-General Sir Bupendra Singh. The loyalty of the great Sikh house of Patiala to the Crown and Government of Great Britain had been proved in every crisis of the Indian Empire, beginning from 1809, when the State first came into direct relations with the British Government in India. The services of the Patiala State and its princes had been of great value in the Sikh wars, the Sepoy Mutiny, the Afghan wars, and the various frontier campaigns. These services had brought credit to the State and honour to its rulers. But they were eclipsed by the record of loyalty and valour established in the Great War—a record which transcends that of any Native State in India, with the possible exception of Jammu and Kashmir. The Native States of India, being still under direct personal government, respond in a way which the Western mind can hardly conceive to the inspiration and impelling force of their rulers; and when that ruler is a prince, endowed with the personality of the present Maharaja of Patiala, the results achieved are indeed remarkable. What the Maharaja asked his people to do in connection with the war was aptly summed up by him in his appeal at a great recruiting Durbar:

"Give all thou canst,
High Heaven rejects the love
Of nicely calculated less or more."

His Highness and his people translated those words into action. The Imperial Service troops—cavalry and infantry—were among the first to take the field and won glory for themselves and honour for their prince by their services in Egypt, Palestine, and Mesopotamia.

Soon 10,000 men were mobilized for the Imperial Service troops, expanded to meet war requirements, and the subsidiary forces, such as Camel Corps (three), Mule Corps (two), and other valuable transport. But apart from these, the State furnished some 18,000 recruits—nearly all combatants, and the majority of them Jat Sikhs of fine fighting qualities—to the Indian Army. A contribution of 28,000 men, from a State with a population of one and a half millions, was an achievement only equalled by Jammu-Kashmir, and our gallant ally, Nepal.

The Maharaja might have pleaded that his resources in manpower should be conserved for his own regiments. But that was not his conception of his duty to the King-Emperor. The writer of this review was at the time directing the recruiting campaign in the Punjab, which in four years produced 350,000 combatants

for the Indian army; and he can confidently say that Patiala's example was a great source of strength and support to him in those critical years, especially in its influence among the Sikhs, from whom 90,000 fighting men were raised out of a total population of about two and a half millions. In those days the Akalis had not been heard of; the Sikhs were proud of the part they were playing as "pillars of the Empire." The Maharaja, on the outbreak of the war, had been among the first of the Indian princes to offer his personal services, and early in October, 1914, left with his troops for the Western front. Serious illness compelled him to return from Aden, but that disappointment was a blessing in disguise, for His Highness was able to render greater services to the Empire in directing and stimulating the war efforts of his people, and setting a fine example of loyalty to his brother princes down to May, 1918, when he left for Europe to represent India in the Imperial Conference and War Cabinet. That mission brought him into contact with most of the great statesmen and commanders who were directing the movements of the Allied forces in the final struggle for victory, and His Highness had the good-fortune to visit both the Western and the Palestine fronts when Haig, Foch, and Allenby were preparing for that great last push.

It was appropriate that an Indian prince who had mobilized all the resources of his State in men, money, and materials, in the service of the King-Emperor, should be an eye-witness of the preparations for the final struggle in the two great theatres of war. The Maharaja returned to his State in September, and threw himself with enthusiasm into the recruiting campaign which was still in full swing when the armistice brought the glad news of Germany's complete collapse.

The writer, who was then Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, received a telegram of congratulation from the Maharaja, and quotes from page 501 of the book the reply he sent to His Highness: "Delighted to receive Your Highness's congratulations. Armistice terms just published show completeness of our victory. Heartily congratulate Your Highness on Patiala's splendid contribution to the Punjab war effort, on participation by Patiala troops in the final triumph in Palestine and Mesopotamia, and on the inspiring example set by Your Highness as premier prince of the Punjab at all stages of the conflict." About 1,000 of the soldiers of Patiala gave up their lives in the Allied cause. The State emerged from the struggle with a brighter lustre and prouder traditions, and the prince, who set such a splendid example of loyal service, won laurels such as had fallen to none of his many distinguished ancestors. He has now the Order of the Grand Cross or Grand Commander of the Royal Victorian Order, the Star of India, the Indian Empire and the British Empire, besides several of the highest foreign orders. They all sit well on his manly breast, for they have been well earned by personal devotion in the

service of the King-Emperor, the appeal that will always meet with a response from the loyal princes and peoples of India.

M. F. O'DWYER.

THE ADVENTURES OF HAJJI BABA. By James Morier. (New Edition.) Humphrey Milford. Oxford University Press. World's Classics Series.

It has been said that anyone wishing to obtain a general knowledge of Persia should read two books—Curzon's "Persia" and Morier's "Adventures of Hajji Baba"; and it is certain that few Europeans have so thoroughly grasped the peculiarities of the Persian character, and that none has succeeded so well in depicting them as did James Morier in his delightful romance.

It is now almost exactly a century ago that the book was first published, and though contact with Europeans has added a thin veneer of Western civilization, at least among the official classes, the main characteristics of the Persians, their manners and customs and modes of thought remain substantially as they were when Morier knew them. As a picture of Persian life, "Hajji Baba" is without a rival, and we heartily commend it to every student of the East who has not already read it. It should, in fact, appeal to a larger circle of readers, for apart from the entertaining adventures of the hero, an educated Persian acquaintance of mine, who was asked to criticize the book when first translated into Persian, surprised us with the comment that "it gave such an excellent description of Europeans"—perhaps a novel point of view to most Englishmen, but one that might help us "to see ourselves as others see us." We therefore welcome the addition of this diverting story to the World's Classics Series published by the Oxford University Press. The volume is edited, with an introduction and a few explanatory notes, by Mr. C. W. Stewart, and includes the original footnotes of the Author in the editions published in 1824 and 1835. It is a handy size for the pocket (6 inches by 4), and in spite of the small space occupied by its 450 pages, the print is clear and easily read. A small map showing the principal places mentioned in the text is added at the end of the volume.

J. A. D.

ADVENTURES IN THE NEAR EAST, 1918-1922. By A. Rawlinson, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O. (late Lieut.-Colonel R.G.A. and Commander R.N.V.R.). Melrose. 25s. net.

In this book Lieut.-Colonel "Toby" Rawlinson, brother of the Commander-in-Chief in India, tells the story of his adventures in Persia, Baku, and Eastern Anatolia. The book is very sensibly divided into three parts, each of which is sponsored by a distinguished

soldier, the commander for the time being under whom the author was employed.

In his preface, Colonel Rawlinson, by throwing himself on the generosity of his readers, goes some way to disarm criticism. He may be very sure that they will suffer him gladly, not only on account of the variety of his experiences but also for the simple and straightforward way in which he tells of them. Unfortunately, however, the many minor inaccuracies which occur in Part I. of the book somewhat detract from its historical value. Except that it would be a misfortune to be deprived of Colonel Rawlinson's own account of his share in the evacuation of Baku, in charge of a ship full of munitions and manned by a Bolshevik crew, it would have been better, perhaps, had Part I. been altogether omitted. While passing through Mesopotamia on his way to Kazvin, Colonel Rawlinson seems to have been ready to accept as fact any idle gossip as to past events or present conditions. Incidentally it will irritate many of his readers to find the Shatt-el-Arab constantly referred to as "the Euphrates."

The author is not strictly correct in stating that the real object of "Dunsterforce" was the keeping of Persia from the Turk. The original rôle of the force was to proceed to Transcaucasia to organize the tribes of the district and the refugees from the Russian Caucasian army into a disciplined force. With this it was hoped that German influence might be prevented from extending across the Caspian, among the Turkman tribes and so on through Afghanistan to India. Also it was desired to prevent a large quantity of cotton, which was lying on the eastern shore of the Caspian, from being transported across that sea to Germany, where it was urgently required. The force was to be self-contained on arrival at its destination. When it was found impossible for it to carry out its mission it was retained in Persia and given the task of holding North-West Persia and Caspian Sea. The protection of the road from Mesopotamia to Enzeli then became necessary, owing to the country being famine-stricken and supplies negligible.

The author himself will probably regret, on further reflection, that he has permitted himself some rather "cheap" sneers at the expense of various administrative staff officers at headquarters and on the lines of communication. On his part, he seems to have been rather prone to leave the troops under his command to look after themselves at times when it might be thought that their comfort and safety should have been his chief concern. With a larger military experience he would no doubt have realized that an officer owes a duty to the troops under his command greater than that which he owes to himself, or even to a superior commander who unnecessarily risks his life, without escort, in a hostile country.

It is also very much to be regretted that the book ends on a note

of complaint as to the treatment which the author received as regards his pension and compensation. Presumably he was dealt with in accordance with the regulations formulated by the Ministry of Pensions, which are usually considered to have been generous. It cannot be expected that any officer who chose to carry about with him on service such unauthorized equipment as a private battery of machine-guns should have a right to compensation from the State in the event of their being lost.

With this exception, the two last parts of the book are wonderful reading. These, respectively, cover the two periods during which Colonel Rawlinson was employed on special service in Eastern Anatolia, supervising the disarmament of the Turkish forces and investigating the conditions obtaining in those regions. While this portion of the book reads like the finest romance, it will be valued by many for the clearness and moderation with which the author describes the various happenings along the old Turko-Russian frontier. At that time the Supreme Council at Versailles was endeavouring to formulate a policy on which to base a settlement of the conflicting claims of Armenians, Georgians, Kurds, and Tartars. These nations were, however, already seriously infected by the germ of "self-determination," and were experiencing all the usual symptoms of the disease as it appears in the Near and Middle East—massacre, looting, rapine, and atrocity.

Colonel Rawlinson relates how his suspicions that the Turks were not intending to carry out the provisions of the Armistice terms were confirmed, and tells of his escape to Batum to report. Of great interest are the accounts of his visits to local Kurdish chiefs, in his attempt to probe local feeling and conditions. At the end of Part II. he tells of his orders to evacuate the members of his mission, while he himself returned to Constantinople, bearing with him a copy of the National Pact handed to him by Mustapha Kemal Pasha. It is not stated whether this copy was identical with the terms of the Pact as subsequently published to the world. The point is of interest.

After a brief visit to England, Rawlinson was again dispatched to Anatolia. On this occasion he had received secret verbal instructions to endeavour to see Mustapha Kemal in person and find out what terms of peace the Turks were expecting to obtain. Judging by his account of the interviews which he had with the Commander-in-Chief in Constantinople and with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in London, it seems that the Government then in power had no idea as to what it intended to do with the victory which had been so hardly won by its soldiers in the East. It is apparent that there was some doubt as to whether the Allies were still in a position to dictate terms. For this equivocal position those at home, notably the Labour Party, who so loudly and insistently called for immediate and hasty demobi-

lization, must be held largely responsible. But the Government, which weakly gave in to ignorant clamour and failed to retain the military strength necessary to enforce the terms granted to the defeated enemy, can certainly not be acquitted of blame. No surprise will be felt at the bitter words wrung from the author when, in degradation and disgust, he and his brave companions were flung into the common jail at Erzeroum, by an enemy who had been beaten to his knees and had been ready to accept any reasonable terms only twenty-eight months previously.

Colonel Rawlinson has an easy style and a command of descriptive language of much beauty. In a few simple phrases he is able to make his reader see the enchanting freshness of a grassy, flower-strewn orchard, in which he and his companions rested after experiencing the rigours of a march over a rocky, snowbound mountain pass. He seems to make one hear the tragic sweetness of a violin, played by his fellow-captive, a Russian aristocrat, who lay dying in his cell in the Erzeroum jail, where "both he and his wife and child grew daily weaker, but who would pour out his whole suffering soul in purest melody," while the Armenian prisoners in their ragged filth, sang the old songs of their country, "to which they would impart an amount of plaintive sorrow and sentimental pathos in proportion to the misery of their present condition and the hopelessness of their future prospects." No more poignant story has been written than that of the sufferings of the "little army" in captivity. Plain and unvarnished, in simple language, the sickening, sordid, but proud story is detailed. And one wonders how many others of our men suffered similar torture and starvation both before and after the Armistice, nor ever returned to give an account of the horrors to which they were subjected. Admirably and courageously written in the author's *apologia* for those responsible for his confinement. That he can still plead, with all the earnestness at his command, "that the inevitable policy of our country must always be to establish friendly relations with Turkey," proves the broadmindedness, the courage and the honour of a very gallant man. There is here a moral for those who, by a vacillating policy, allowed the fruits of victory to slip from their grasp, and who in the end found themselves in the position of having to grant to a once penitent foe whatever terms of peace he, in his new rôle of vain-glorious conqueror, felt disposed to demand.

E. J. B.

OBITUARIES

COLONEL J. G. KELLY, C.B.

COLONEL KELLY, one of the original members of this Society and, for some years, also a member of its Council, died in London on June 20, 1923. From the prominent part which he played in the relief of Chitral in March - April, 1895, he was long known as "Chitral" Kelly. He was born on November 28, 1843, received his first Commission on September 11, 1863, and joined the Indian Staff Corps on August 30, 1867. He seemingly saw no active service till 1891, when he took part in the Hazara and (2nd) Miranzai Expeditions. For these he received a medal with two clasps.

In March, 1895, chance threw in his way as strenuous a bit of work as a frontier soldier could desire. Kelly at that moment was commanding the 32nd Pioneers at Gilgit. On March 22 he received orders by telegram from Calcutta to take command of the Gilgit District and to co-operate in the relief of Chitral with another force marching straight from India via the Malakand Pass and Dir under General Sir Robert Low. Chitral was held by a garrison commanded by Captain C. P. Campbell, of the Central India Horse, whose death in May last in California was recorded in *The Times* of June 27, 1923. Campbell's second in command was Captain C. V. F. Townshend, also of the Central India Horse, and now best known as the resolute defender of Kut-el-Amara in Mesopotamia during the European War of 1914-18. It is not proposed, indeed it is out of the question, to follow Colonel Kelly throughout his remarkable and laborious march from Gilgit to Chitral. The story of it has been told by Sir George Robertson, by the two Younghusbands, by Lieutenant W. G. L. Beynon, and by Mr. H. C. Thomson. The frontispiece of Mr. Younghusband's book reproduces the officers of the column which relieved, and that of Thomson's book the officers of the garrison which defended, Chitral. Two of the former, Lieutenants Cobbe (now Lieut.-General Sir A. S. Cobbe, V.C.) and Moberly (now Brigadier-General F. J. Moberly, C.B.) are members of the Central Asian Society.

For his services in relieving Chitral Colonel Kelly received the thanks of the Government of India and the Companionship of the Bath, and was made an A.D.C. to the Queen. He subsequently held

the post of Colonel on the Staff at Sialkot, and retired in 1900. He died at the age of seventy-nine. His funeral took place at Romsey Abbey, after a service at St. Philip's, Earl's Court Road, on June, 23, 1923.

A. C. Y.

SIR EVAN JAMES, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

Sir Evan James was one of the original members of the Central Asian Society and had served on its Council for many years. As far back as 1885 he had intended to travel in Central Asia with his fellow-member of the Indian Civil Service, A. D. Carey. But being unable to obtain leave in that year he had to abandon the project; and he then formed the idea of exploring Manchuria, which in those days was unknown beyond the coastline and the main trade routes. The results of the journey which he carried out in 1886 were published in his book "The Long White Mountain," which was the standard book on Manchuria for many years and opened the eyes of the world to the rich possibilities of that fertile and populous country.

James, after a long and distinguished service in India, undertook many other journeys in different parts of the world, mostly in pursuit of his main interest, natural history; and he never fulfilled his original intention of travelling in Central Asia. But he always took a keen interest in the Central Asian Society, and long after his health had seriously broken down he made a point of attending the meetings of the Council and listening to the addresses.

F. E. Y.

CHAIRMEN OF COUNCIL SINCE 1901

- 1901-02. GENERAL SIR THOMAS GORDON, K.C.B., K.C.I.E.
1902-04. THE RIGHT HON. SIR A. C. LYALL, G.C.I.E., K.C.B., I.C.S.
1904-06. COLONEL SIR THOMAS HOLDICH, K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E.
1906-07. GENERAL SIR EDWARD COLLEN, G.C.I.E., C.B.
1907-08. VALENTINE CHIROL, ESQ. (NOW SIR V. CHIROL.)
1908-14. THE RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF RONALDSHAY, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.
1914-17. THE RIGHT HON. SIR MORTIMER DURAND, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I.,
K.C.I.E.
1917-18. COLONEL SIR HENRY TROTTER, K.C.M.G., C.B.
1919-23. THE RIGHT HON. LORD CARNOCK, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,
G.C.V.O., ETC.
1923. THE RIGHT HON. SIR MAURICE DE BUNSEN, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.

NOTICES

Library.—The Council wish to thank Lady MacGregor for a valuable gift of books from the library of the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor, and Colonel Etherton for a copy of his book "Across the Roof of the World."

Books received for review:

"Adventures in the Near East." By A. Rawlinson, C.M.G.

"The Semitic Religions." By D. M. Kay, M.C.

"The Adventures of Hajji Baba." By James Morier
(World's Classics Series).

Contributors only are responsible for their statements in the *Journal*.

It may be of interest to members of this Society to learn that one of our members, Mr. F. W. Chardin, late Assistant Political Officer, Government of Iraq, is a partner in the Overseas Bureau for Travel, 88, Pall Mall, S.W. This bureau makes a speciality of booking passages to, and arranging travel accommodation in, Egypt and the Near East, and has been entrusted by the Nairn Transport Company of Beyrout with the booking of passages by the overland mail route between Haifa, Damascus, and Baghdad.

LIST OF MEMBERS
OF
THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

CORRECTED TO MARCH, 1922

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL, 1921-22

Hon. President:

THE RT. HON. THE MARQUIS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, P.C., K.G., G.C.S.I.,
G.C.I.E., F.R.S., ETC.

Chairman of Council:

1921. THE RT. HON. LORD CARNOCK, P.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,
K.C.I.E.

Vice-Presidents:

- 1919. SIR EVAN JAMES, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.
- 1920. LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.
- 1920. GENERAL SIR E. BARROW, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.
- 1921. COLONEL SIR CHARLES YATE, BART., C.S.I., C.M.G., M.P.
- 1921. SIR HUGH BARNES, K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O.
- 1921. LIEUT.-COLONEL A. C. YATE.
- 1921. SIR EDWARD PENTON, K.B.E.

1920. Hon. Treasurer: SIR EDWARD PENTON, K.B.E.

1921. Hon. Secretaries: { LIEUT.-COLONEL A. C. YATE.
 { G. C. STEPHENSON, ESQ.

Members of the Council:

- 1920. GENERAL SIR REGINALD WINGATE, BART., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., G.B.E.,
K.C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.L.
- 1920. CAPTAIN THE HON. W. G. A. ORMSBY-GORE, M.P., D.L.
- 1920. E. R. P. MOON, ESQ.
- 1920. A. L. P. TUCKER, ESQ., C.I.E.
- 1920. THE RT. HON. SIR MAURICE W. E. DE BUNSEN, BART., P.C., G.C.M.G.,
G.C.V.O., C.B.
- 1921. G. C. STEPHENSON, ESQ.
- 1921. GENERAL SIR C. C. MONRO, BART., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G.,
A.D.C.GEN.
- 1921. SIR MICHAEL O'DWYER, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.
- 1921. MISS ELLA SYKES.
- 1921. COLONEL C. B. STOKES, C.I.E.

Assistant Secretary:

MISS M. N. KENNEDY.

OFFICES: 74, GROSVENOR ST., W. 1.

LIST OF MEMBERS

The names marked with an asterisk are of those who have served on the Council. The names in capitals are those of present Members of Council. Names in italics are those of Councillors resident in India. The names marked with a dagger are those of original Members.

A

- 1910. Sir Abdul Qaiyum, Khan Bahadur Sahibzada, K.C.I.E., Assistant Political Officer, Khaiber, Peshawar, N.-W.F. India.
- 1921. Acland, Captain P. Dyke, attd. Aviation Dept., Vickers Ltd., Vickers' House, Broadway, Westminster, S.W. 1.
- 1920. Adye, Maj.-Gen. Sir J. K., K.C.M.G., C.B., etc., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
- †Aglionby, Captain A.
- 1921. Ahmed Bey Hassanein, F.R.G.S., c/o Royal Geographical Society, Kensington Gore, S.W. 7.
- 1916. Ainscough, Thomas M., O.B.E., H. M. Senior Trade Commissioner in India, Post Box 683, Calcutta.
- 1919. Alexander, Y. Patrick, F.R.G.S., 2, Whitehall Court, S.W.1.
- 1922. Alexander, Major J. U. F. C., Chantry House, Eccleston Street, S.W. 1.
- 1920. Allchin, Geoffrey C., Oxford and Cambridge Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
- 10 1920. Allen, W. E. D., Commonwood House, Chipperfield, Herts.
- 1920. Allenby, Field Marshal the Rt. Hon. the Viscount, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., etc., Cairo, Egypt.
- 1921. Altham, Lieut.-General Sir E. A., K.C.B., C.M.G., Prior's Barton, Winchester.
- 1921. Antonius, George, Department of Education, Jerusalem.
- 1922. Armitage-Smith, Sidney A., C.B., 29, York Terrace, Regent's Park, N.W. 1.
- 1920. Ashton, Captain F. T., c/o Postmaster, Basra.
- 1920. Austin, Lieut. A. P. M., c/o Ministry of Finance, Baghdad.

B

- 1908. *Baddeley, J. F., 34, Bruton Street, W. 1.
- 1921. Badger, Kenneth Howard Collins, Goring Heath, Reading.
- 1917. Bahrein, The Political Agent, Persian Gulf.
- 20 1910. Bailey, Major F. M., C.I.E., 7, Drummond Place, Edinburgh, N.B.
- 1914. Baillie, J. R., 1, Akenside Road, Hampstead, N.W.
- 1906. *Bailward, Brig.-Gen. A. C., R.A. (ret.), 57, Egerton Gardens, S.W. 3.

1920. Balfour, Lt.-Col. F. C. C., C.I.E., M.C., Caledonian Club, Charles Street, S.W. 1.
1920. Ballard, Mrs. C. R., Hadham Mill, Much Hadham, Herts.
1916. Baluchistan, The Hon. the Agent to the Governor-General and Chief Commissioner, Quetta.
1918. Banks, Mrs. M. M., Hornton Cottage, Hornton Street, W. 8.
1920. Bannerjee, Gauranga Nath, M.A., Ph.D., B.L., (Professor of Ancient History, Calcutta University), 107/11, Mechua Bazar Street, Calcutta.
1921. Bannister, T. H. C., Stanmore Hall, Stanmore, Herts.
1920. Barman, Maharaj Kumar J. C. Deb, Comilla, Tipperah.
- 30** 1920. Barman, Col. Thakur Mohin Chandra Deb, Agartala, Tripura State, Bengal.
1905. *BARNES, Sir Hugh Shakespear, K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., 29, Campden House Court, W. 8. Vice-President.
1921. Barnett, Mrs. L., 8, Royal Crescent, W. 11.
1922. Barrett, Field Marshal Sir A. A., G.C.B., K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, W. 1.
1918. BARROW, General Sir Edmund, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., India Office, S.W. 1; Artillery Mansions, S.W. 1. Vice-President.
1920. Barstow, Captain A. E., M.C., 15th Sikhs, United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1921. Bartlett, P. E., Indo-European Telegraph Department, Persian Section, c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Bombay.
1922. Barrington-Ward, F. T., K.C., 8, Green Street, Park Lane, W. 1.
1920. Base, Edward H., 5, Station Road, Lowestoft.
1919. Bateman, H. G., F.R.G.S., c/o Messrs. Booth, Billing and Co., Bradford.
- 40** 1920. Beale, Captain C. T., c/o High Commissioner, Baghdad; E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1921. Beattie, Dr. J. Hamilton, United University Club, Suffolk Street, S.W. 1.
1921. Beatty, Colonel Commandant G. A. H., 1st Cavalry Brigade, Risalpur, N.-W. F. P., India.
1910. Beauclerk, Lord Osborne de Vere, Brooks's Club, 4, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.
1920. Bell, B. H., Law Courts, Baghdad.
- Bell, James, 107, Godolphin Road, Shepherd's Bush, W.
1921. Bell, Sir Charles, K.C.I.E., C.M.G., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1907. Benn, Colonel R. A. E., C.I.E., Resident, Jeypore, Rajputana, India.
- *†Bennett, Sir T. J., C.I.E., Harwarton House, Speldhurst, Kent.
1921. Bennett, Captain S. G., M.C., 8, St. Albans Crescent, Bournemouth.
- 50** 1921. Bentinck, Major A. D. W., Coldstream Guards, 53, Green Street, Park Lane, W.
1910. Bigg-Wither, Lt.-Col. F., I.A., Fron, Nr. Flint, N. Wales.

1921. Bingham, Captain D'Arcy, 109th Infantry, I.A., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., Bombay.
1921. Bingley, Lieut.-General Sir A. H., K.C.I.E., C.B., Simla, India; United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1921. Birch, Lt.-Col. J. M., D.S.O., 20, Bina Gardens, S.W. 5.
1920. Blacker, Captain L. V. S., Queen Victoria's Own Corps of Guides, Junior Naval and Military Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1921. Blackwood, J. H., 37, Paternoster Row, E.C. 4.
1916. Bombay, Sec. to Govt. Political Dept., Bombay, India.
1919. Bone, H. Peters, 5, Hamilton Mansions, Kings Gardens, Hove, Sussex.
1921. Bonham-Carter, Sir Edgar, K.C.M.G., C.I.E., 5, Hyde Park Square, W. 2.
- 60** 1921. Bosanquet, Sir O. V., K.C.I.E., 1, Vicarage Gardens, Kensington, W. 8.
1921. Bourdillon, B. H., I.C.S., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
1922. Bourke, D. R. S., Indian Forest Service, Feltimore, Harlow, Essex.
1921. Bowman, H. E., C.B.E., Director of Education, Jerusalem.
1921. Braham, Captain G. N., M.C. (Mesopotamian Civil Administration), 61, Oxford Street, Southampton.
1922. Bramley, Colonel P. B., C.I.E., O.B.E., D. G. Police, Palestine.
1922. Brasher, C. G., 23, Victoria Square, Clifton, Bristol.
1920. Bray, Major F. E., M.C., 21, Evelyn Gardens, S.W. 7.
1920. Bray, Major N. N. E., M.C., Political Dept., Govt. of India, c/o Political Secretary, India Office, S.W. 1.
1921. Brideut, Lieut.-Col. S. H., O.B.E., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
- 70** 1921. Bright, Captain L. L., Junior Naval and Military Club, 94, Piccadilly, W. 1; Equatorial Batt., Egyptian Army, c/o Postmaster, Khartoum.
1920. Bros, Major H. Alwyn (R. of O.) Travellers' Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
1920. Browne, Claude M., 10, Queensberry Place, S.W. 7.
1921. Browne, Lt.-Col. H. H. Gordon, D.S.O., 17, Bardwell Road, Oxford.
1916. †Bruce, Brig.-Gen. C. D., Army and Navy Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
1920. Brunskill, Major G. S., 135, Sloane Street, S.W.
1920. Buchanan, Sir G. C., K.C.I.E., Kt., 16, Victoria Street, S.W.
- †Buchanan, W. A., The Cottage, Knebworth, Herts.
1921. Buchanan, Mrs., 32, Elsworth Road, Hampstead, N.W. 3.
1921. Buckley, Brig.-Gen. B. T., C.B., C.M.G., Army and Navy Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
- 80** 1921. Bullard, R. W., C.I.E., Colonial Office; East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1921. Bunbury, Captain N. L. St. P., 106th Hazara Pioneers, Fort Sandeman, Baluchistan, India.
1919. BUNSEN, The Rt. Hon. Sir Maurice de, Bart., P.C., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., 3, Portland Place, W. 1. M. of C.

1919. Burdwan, The Hon. Sir Bijay Chand Mahtab, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., T.O.M., Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of, The Palace, Bardwan, Bengal, India.
1921. Burn, Major A. H., O.B.E., 59th Scind Rifles; United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
1921. Burn-Murdoch, Major I., O.B.E., Officers' Club, Aldershot.
1914. Bury, C. Howard, Bath Club, Dover Street, W. 1.
1920. Busk, H. Gould, F.G.S., Dodnash Lodge, East Bergholt, Suffolk.
1921. Butler, F. H. C., South End, St. Cross, Winchester.
1920. Buxton, Leland W. W., 45, Kensington Park Gardens, W. 11.
- 90** 1921. Buxton, Dr. P. Alfred, Dept. of Health, Government House, Jerusalem.

C

1920. Cameron, Major G. S., M.C., Dy. Director of Agriculture, Lower Baghdad, Mesopotamia.
1918. Campbell, John MacLeod, Glen Saddell, Carradale, Argyll.
1922. Campbell, Captain W. F. C., I.A., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
1907. †Carey, A. D., I.C.S., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1920. Carey, Lieut.-Col. A. B., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E., c/o Director of Public Works, Baghdad; 52, The Close, Norwich.
1920. Carleton, Col. the Hon. Dudley, 21, Upper Berkeley Street, W. 1.
1919. CARNOCK, The Rt. Hon. Lord, P.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., 53, Cadogan Gardens, S.W. 3. Chairman of C.
1922. Carnock, Lady, 53, Cadogan Gardens, S.W. 3.
1921. Carver, Captain F. E., O.B.E., The Moot, Downton, Salisbury.
- 100** 1921. Carver, Mrs. L. M., The Moot, Downton, Salisbury.
1921. Castells, Captain E., 6th Gurkha Rifles, c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., 16, Charing Cross, S.W. 1.
1920. Chakravati, Professor Nilmani, M.A., 18, Sitaram Ghosh Street, Calcutta.
1921. Chamier, Captain A., O.B.E., 55, Warwick Road, S.W. 5.
1921. Champain, Brig.-Gen. H. B., C.B., Oak Lodge, Ham Common, Surrey.
1921. Chapman, Captain A. J. B., I.A.R.O., c/o Messrs. Lloyd's Bank, 72, Lombard Street, E. 6.
1921. Chardin, Captain F. W., 20, Empress Avenue, Woodford Green, Essex.
1920. Charge, H. L., Mayfair, Upper Terrace Road, Bournemouth.
1923. Chatterjee, K. N., B.A., 12, Madan Mohan Chatterjee Lane, Calcutta.
1921. Cheeseman, Allan, 147, Croxted Road, Dulwich, S.E.
- 110** 1921. Chelmsford, The Rt. Hon. Viscount, P.C., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., G.C.M.G., G.B.E., etc., 116, Eaton Square, S.W. 1.
1920. Chesney, G. M., 69, Courtfield Gardens, S.W. 5.

1920. Childs, W. J., The Quadrangle, Foreign Office, Whitehall, S.W.
 1903. *Chirol, Sir Valentine, Kt., 34, Carlyle Square, Chelsea, S.W. 3.
 1920. Chitty, Christopher, 24, East Heath Road, Hampstead, N.W.
 1920. Chondhurry, R. G. K., M.A., B.L., Zemindar, Tako, 24, Parganaks Dt., Calcutta.
 1918. Christie, Miss A., 40, Ovington Street, S.W. 3.
 1920. Christie, Miss E. R., F.R.G.S., Cowden Castle, Dollar, N.B.
 1921. Churchill, The Rt. Hon. Winston Spencer, M.P., Colonial Office, Downing Street, S.W. 1.
 1920. Clayton, Brig.-Gen. Sir Gilbert F., K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 120 1920. Clayton, Brig.-Gen. W. W., Director Special Section, Public Security Dept., War Office, Cairo.
 1919. Coales, Oliver R., H.B.M. Consul-General, Shanghai, China; R. Societies Club, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.
 1920. Cobbe, Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. S., V.C., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O., India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1; 3, Onslow Gardens, S.W.
 1920. Cole, Major J. J. B., F.R.G.S., Rifle Brigade, Travellers' Club, Pall Mall.
 1918. Collis, Mrs., 17, Hamlet Gardens, Ravenscourt Park, W. 6.
 1921. Colvin, Ian, 38, The Ridgeway, Wimbledon, S.W.
 1921. Colvin, George, 38, The Ridgeway, Wimbledon, S.W.
 1921. Colvin, Mrs., 38, The Ridgeway, Wimbledon, S.W.
 1920. Connal-Rowan, Major J. F. Meiklewood, Gargunnoch, Stirlingshire; Bath Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
 1920. Cooke, Captain R. S., Dalnottarhill, Old Kilpatrick, N.B.
 130 1922. Cooper, Captain E. S. Storey, M.C., c/o Eastern Bank, Ltd., Bombay.
 1920. Cornwallis, Col. Kinahan, C.B.E., D.S.O., F.R.G.S., Adviser to the Ministry of Interior, Baghdad; Carlton Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1921. Coryndon, Sir Robert Thorne, K.C.M.G., Governor and C-in-C., Uganda Protectorate; Athenæum Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1920. Costello, Brig.-Gen. E. W., V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O., 12, Cardinal Mansions, S.W. 1.
 1920. Costello, Mrs. E. W., 12, Cardinal Mansions, S.W. 1.
 1919. Cowell, Mrs. M., 26, St. George's Court, Queen's Gate, S.W. 7.
 1908. Cox, Major-Gen. Sir Percy Z., G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., High Commissioner, Baghdad.
 1920. Crawford, Lt.-Commander C., R.N., c/o Admiralty, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
 1921. Cree, Thomas D., O.B.E., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 65, Cornhill, E.C.
 1914. Crewdson, Major W. T. O., R.F.A., Queen Anne's Mansions, S.W. 1.
 140 1921. Cronyn, Sub-Lieutenant St. John, H.M.S. *Tetrarch*, Queens-town.
 1907. Cuninghame, Sir William J., K.C.S.I., I.C.S. (ret.), East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

1922. Cunliffe-Owen, Lieut.-Colonel F., C.M.G., Army and Navy Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1907. *CURZON of KEDLESTON, The Rt. Hon. the Marquis, P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Hackwood, near Basingstoke, Hants; 1, Carlton House Terrace, S.W. 1. Hon. President.

D

1921. Daly, Captain T. Denis, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Rafoed, Leamington; Bath Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
 1908. Daukes, Major C. T., C.I.E., Political Department, Government of India, Loralai, Baluchistan, India.
 1921. Davies, J. Fisher, c/o Messrs. the Imperial Bank of Persia, Basra, Mesopotamia.
 1921. Davies, R., Standard Oil Company of New York, Rue Rakovska, 127, Sofia.
 1906. Davis, W. S., Coglan House, Longhope, Glos.
 1918. Davis, Mrs., 46, Sussex Gardens, Hyde Park, W. 2.
 150 1920. Deedes, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Wyndham H., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., Civil Sec. Palestine Government, Government House, Jerusalem.
 1921. Dickson, Colonel W. E. R., C.M.G., C.I.E., Caledonian Club, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
 1919. Digby, Bassett, F.R.G.S., 49, Elm Park Mansions, Park Walk, Chelsea, S.W.
 1906. Dobbs, Sir H. R. C., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., I.C.S., Simla, India; East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
 1903. *Donoughmore, The Earl of, 5, Chesterfield Gardens, W. 1.
 1910. Douglas, Lieut.-Colonel H. A., The Vicarage, Langton Green, near Tunbridge Wells.
 1920. Douglas, Major-Gen. J. A., C.M.G., C.I.E., Ashmore Lodge, Cold Ash, near Newbury, Berks.
 1922. Dowson, V. H. W., Mesopotamian Agricultural Department, Trinity Hall, Cambridge.
 1921. Drower, C. Stefana, Credit Lyonnais Bank, 14, Cockspur Street, S.W. 1.
 1910. Drummond, Miss, Kensington Palace Mansions, W. 8.
 160 1921. Duggan, C. E., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Karachi, India.
 1921. Duncan, J. A. L., Bath Club, Dover Street, W. 1.
 1920. Dunsterville, Col. K. S., C.B., 12, Oakwood Court, Kensington, W.
 1920. Dunsterville, Major-Gen. L. C., C.B., The Cronk, Port St. Mary, Isle of Man.
 1903. *†Durand, Colonel A. G. A., C.B., C.I.E., 31, Park Lane, W. 1.
 1907. *Durand, The Right Hon. Sir H. Mortimer, P.C., G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Penmayne House, Rock, Wadebridge, Cornwall.
 1920. Dyer, Brig.-General R. E. H., C.B., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

E

1921. Edmonds, Major C. J., East India United Service Club,
16 St. James's Square, S.W. 1., c/o High Commissioner,
Baghdad.
1920. Egerton, Lieut. Gen. Sir R. G., K.C.B., K.C.I.E., 43, Cheyne
Court, S.W. 3.
1921. Elger, L.C., A.M.I. Mech. E., Queen's House, Kingsway,
W.C. 2.
- 170** †Elphinstone, Lord, Carlton Club, 94, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1921. Elsmie, Major-General A. M. S., 27, Woodville Gardens,
Ealing, W. 5.
1920. Empson, C., 1, Driffeld Terrace, The Mount, York.
1911. Etherton, Lieut.-Colonel P., H.B.M. Consul-General,
Kashgar.
1918. Evans, T. Herbert, St. David's, Lisvane, Glam.

F

1920. Fardell, Mrs. H. A., 16, Brechin Place, S.W. 7.
1921. Farrer, Hon. C. C., 100, Palace Gardens Terrace, Ken-
sington, W. 8.
1919. FitzHugh, Capt. J. C., D.S.O., M.V.O., c/o Messrs. Cox and
Co., 16, Charing Cross.
1921. Flaxman, H. T. M., O.B.E., Assistant Divisional Adviser,
Mosul, Mesopotamia.
1915. Flower, Hon. E., Durrow Castle, Durrow, Queen's County,
Ireland.
- 180** 1916. Forbes, Sir George Stuart, K.C.S.I., Athenæum Club, Pall
Mall, S.W. 1.
1921. Forbes, Dowager Lady, Ladies' Park Club, 32, Knights-
bridge, S.W. 1.
1920. Forbes, Mrs. Muriel, Naval and Military Hotel, Harrington
Road, S.W.
1921. Forster, M. Courtier, 96, Vineyard Hill, Wimbledon, S.W.
1920. Fowle, Major T. C., I.A., H.B.M. Consul, Seistan and Kain,
East Persia.
1921. Fraser, Commander Bruce A., R.N., Whitecroft, Nailsworth,
Glos.
1921. Fraser, Captain D. de M. S., Political Dept. Govt. of India,
c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.
1920. Fraser, E., 14, Chester Street, S.W. 1.
1920. Fraser, M. F. A., F.R.G.S., Beaufort, Knaphill, Nr.
Woking.
1916. Fraser, Sir Stuart M., K.C.S.I., C.I.E., c/o Messrs. H. S.
King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.
- 190** 1922. Fraser, Major-General Sir T., K.C.B., c/o Messrs. Cox and
Co., 16, Charing Cross, S.W.
1921. Fraser, W. M., c/o Messrs. R. G. Shaw and Co., Winchester
House, Old Broad Street, E. C.
1921. Fremantle, Lieut.-Colonel F. E., T.D., O.B.E., M.P., Bed-
well Park, Hatfield.

1921. Frost, Lieut.-Colonel F. D., C.B.E., M.C., I.A., 22, The Beach, Walmer.
 1920. Fuller, Captain N. B., M.B.E., Cavendish Club, 119, Piccadilly, W. 1.

G

1908. Gabriel, Lieut.-Colonel Vivian, C.V.O., C.S.I., Marlborough Club, 52, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1920. Ganguly, Manomohan B. E., M.R.A.S., 50, Raja Raj Bulbul Street, Calcutta.
 1919. Garbett, C. C., C.I.E., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
 1920. Garbett, Captain R. B. L., c/o High Commissioner, Baghdad ; c/o The Eastern Bank, Crosby Square, E.C. 3.
 1920. Garland, Major Herbert, O.B.E., M.A., Agent for Mesopotamia, The Residency, Cairo.
200 1913. Garrard, S. H., Cavalry Club, Piccadilly ; Welton Place, Daventry, Northants.
 1920. Gaster, Dr. M., 193, Maida Vale, W. 9.
 1919. Gaulter, Mrs., 152, Earl's Court Road, S.W. 5.
 1909. Gearon, Miss S., Ladies' Empire Club, 69, Grosvenor Street, W. 1.
 1921. Geary, Mrs., c/o National, Provincial and Union Bank of England, Ltd., 67, Bishop's Road, W. 2.
 1920. Geden, Rev. A. S., Royapettah, Harpenden, Herts.
 1922. Gillman, Major-General Sir Webb, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., R.F.A., 17, Hill Street, Berkley Square, W. 1 ; Royal Military Academy, Woolwich.
 1919. Goold-Adams, Col. Sir H. E. F., K.B.E., C.M.G., Jamesbrook, Middleton, Co. Cork ; United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1920. Gorbould, Captain Roland, R.A.O.C., F.R.G.S., c/o Sir C. R. McGrigor, Bart., and Co., 39, Pantons Street, Haymarket.
 1920. Gordon, Lieut.-Col. P. J., O.B.E., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
210 1920. Gourlay, W. R., Government House, Calcutta.
 1920. Gowan, Captain C. H., M.C., 13th Hussars, Cavalry Club, Piccadilly.
 1920. Graham, Colonel R. J. D., Dunalastair, North Inch, Perth.
 1919. Grant, H. D., F.R.G.S., F.R.A.S., Automobile Club, S.W. 1.
 1921. Grant, Sir A. Hamilton, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Brooks's Club, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.
 1921. Gray, Lawrence, c/o Irrigation Department, Baghdad.
 1920. Gregson, Lieut.-Col. E. G., C.M.G., C.I.E., Buncrana, Rake, Liss, Hants.
 1920. Grey, Lieut.-Col. W. George, Solars, Chiddingfold, Surrey.
 1920. Grieve, Captain A. McLeod, 3rd Black Watch, 21, Queen's Crescent, Edinburgh.
 1920. Griffin, Captain A. C., O.B.E., R.E., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.

- 220** 1921. Grove White, Major M. FitzG., D.S.O., O.B.E., R.E., R.E. Office, Maryhill Barracks, Glasgow.
 1921. Gumbley, Douglas W., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

H

1920. Hadow, Major H. R., 15th Sikhs, United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1920. Hall, Captain A. H., O.B.E., Annfield, Rothesay, Scotland.
 1922. Hall, H. R., D.Litt., F.S.A., British Museum, Bloomsbury, W.C.
 1920. Harapvasad, Mahamohopadhyaya, Shastri, C.I.E., F.A S.B., 26, Pataldanga Street, Calcutta.
 1920. Hardinge, The Rt. Hon. Sir A., G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Coldharbour, West Hoathley, Sussex.
 1918. Harford, Frederic Dundas, C.V.O., 49, Egerton Gardens, S.W. 3.
 1921. Harker, O. Allan, Indian Police, 18, Portsea Place, W. 2.
 1921. Harris, F. I., c/o Messrs. Imperial Ottoman Bank, Kermanshah.
230 1921. Harris, Captain L. J., O.B.E., 20, King's Gardens, N.W. 6.
 1920. Haughton, Major H. L., 36th Sikhs, c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
 1921. Hauser, Captain S. B., c/o The High Commissioner, Baghdad.
 1920. Hay, Captain W. R., Assistant Political Agent, Chitral, N.-W.F., India.
 1920. Headley, R. H., India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
 1920. Hendley, Major-Gen., M.B., C.S.I., Hon. Surgeon to H.M. the King, Caxton, near Cambridge.
 1921. Hiles, Major M., O.B.E., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
 1919. Hill, Lt. H. Brian, F.R.G.S., c/o Messrs. King, Hamilton & Co., Calcutta, India.
 *†Holdich, Colonel Sir Thomas H., K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E., C.B., Parklands, Merrow, Surrey.
 1921. Holt, Major A. L., M.B.E., M.C., R.E., c/o Director of Railways, Baghdad.
240 1919. Hope, Miss T. M., Crix, Hatfield Peverel, Witham, Essex.
 1921. Horridge, J., Haverholme, Bramhall, Cheshire.
 1921. Horsfield, Captain R., c/o Director of Railways, Baghdad.
 1921. Hotson, J. E. B., I.C.S., Sukkur, Sind, India.
 1920. Houstoun, G. L., The Farm, Kyrenia, Cyprus.
 1908. Howell, Lieut.-Col. E. B., C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1; Foreign Office, Delhi-Simla, India.
 1920. Hubbard, Lieut.-Col., Royal Aero Club, 3, Clifford Street, W. 1.
 1921. Hughes, J. A., M.C., 67, Castletown Road, W. 14.

1922. Humphrys, Major Francis H., C.I.E., H. B. M. Minister,
Kabul, Afghanistan.
1921. Hunt, Captain J. M., 87th Punjabis, I.A., The Red Cottage,
Baschurch, Shrewsbury.
- 250** 1921. Hunt, Captain W. E., Hillside, Bath.
1920. Hunter-Weston, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Aylmer, K.C.B., D.S.O.,
D.L., M.P., 2, Culford Gardens, S.W. 8; Hunsterton,
West Kilbride, N.B.
1918. Hunter, Mrs., 81, Holland Park, W. 11.

I

1916. India, Foreign and Political Department of Government,
Delhi.
1906. India, Secretary of State for, India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
1915. Ingram, Captain M. B., Foreign Office, Whitehall, S. W.,
Cavendish Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1919. Inman, Miss H. M., 12, Sloane Terrace Mansions, S.W. 1.

J

1921. Jacob, General Sir Claud W., K.C.B., Chief of the General
Staff in India, Simla, India.
- *†JAMES, Sir Evan, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Glenshee, Cambridge
Park, Twickenham. Vice-President.
- †Jardine, Mrs., 25, Nevern Place, S.W. 5.
- 260** 1921. Jardine, R. F., Assistant Political Officer, Dohuk, Mosul.
- *†Jardine, W. E., C.I.E., I.C.S., The Residency, Gwalior,
Central India.
1920. Jeffreys, Major J. F. D., I.A., Political Officer, Kut-el-
Amarah, Mesopotamia.
1919. Jeejeebhoy, Lieut. J. P. B., F.R.G.S., Pedder Road, Bombay.
1920. Jhalawar, H. H. Maharaj Rana Sri Bhawani Singh, Sahib
Bahadur of, K.C.I.E., Jhalrapatan, Rajputana.
1921. Joyce, Lieut.-Col. P. C., C.B.E., D.S.O., Army and Navy
Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.

K

1920. Kay, Professor D. M., "Kildonan," St. Andrew's, Fife, N.B.
1920. Keeling, E. H., M.C., United University Club, 1, Suffolk
Street, S.W. 1.
- 1907.†*Kelly, Col. J. G., C.B., 1, West Cromwell Road, Kensing-
ton, S.W. 5.
1913. Kemp, Miss, 26, Harley House, Regent's Park, N.W. 1.
- 270** 1921. Kennett, Mrs. Barrington, Remenham, Wraysbury, Bucks.
1921. Kerr, Captain E. Teviott, I.A., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and
Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.
1920. Kettlewell, Captain L., D.S.O., Stourpaine Vicarage, Bland-
ford.
- †King, Sir H. Seymour, K.C.I.E., 25, Cornwall Gardens,
S.W. 7.

1922. Kirk, Captain F. C. de L., 5th Batt. K.A.R., Northern Frontier, Kenya Colony, Africa.
 1922. Knapton, A. G. H., Rope Hill, Lymington.
 1922. Knollys, Major Denis E., 19th Punjabis, c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
 1918. Kuwait, The Political Agent, Persian Gulf.

L

1921. Ladd, W. E., Post Box 39, Baghdad.
 1921. Laidlaw, Lieut. R. E. F., Royal Munster Fusiliers, attd. Egyptian Army. c/o Postmaster, Khartoum.
280 1920. Laithwaite, John G., 39, Bryanston Street, Portman Square, W. 1.
 1904.†*Lamington, The Rt. Hon. Lord, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., 26, Wilton Crescent, S.W. 1.
 1920. Lane, D. A., R.R. No. 1, St. Anne's, Ontario, Canada.
 1921. Lane, Lieut.-Colonel W. B., C.I.E., C.B.E., I.M.S., 35, Addison Way, Golder's Green, N.W. 11.
 1920. Lang, Commander G. H., D.S.O., R.N., 13, Abbey Court, Abbey Road, N.W.
 1920. Law, Bimala Charan, M.A., B.L., F.R.H.S., M.R.A.S., 24, Sukea's Street, Calcutta.
 1920. Law, Narendra Nath, M.A., B.L., P.R.S., 96, Amherst Street, Calcutta.
 1921. Lee, W. H., M.C., Wymondham, Hythe, Kent.
 1920. Lees, Captain G. Martin, M.C., D.F.C., E. I United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
 1921. Lees, Mrs. H. L., F.R.G.S., Rowchester, Hale, Altrincham, Cheshire.
290 1921. Lee-Warner, Captain W. Hamilton, S.S.C.S., Singapore.
 1920. Léon, M. Henri M., Ph.D., L.L.D., 8, Taviton Street, Gordon Square, W.C.
 1921. Leslie, Lieut. L., Shropshire L.I., The Barracks, Shrewsbury.
 1920. Leveson-Gower, Col. C., C.M.G., C.B.E., 13, Cottessmore Gardens, Kensington, W. 8.
 1921. Lloyd, Captain H. I., M.C., O.B.E., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
 1921. Lloyd, Major C. G., C.I.E., M.C., Bath Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
 1908. *Lloyd, H. E., Sir George A., G.C.I.E., D.S.O., Government House, Bombay.
 1912. Loch, Major P. G., I.A., Political Dept., Government of India, c/o Messrs. The Alliance Bank of Simla, Ltd., Simla, India.
 1921. Loch, Lieut.-Colonel G. H., C.I.E., I.A. (retd.), United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1908. Lockhart, Lady, C.I., 187, Queen's Gate, S.W. 7.
300 1920. Longrigg, Major S. H., Political Officer, Kirkuk, Mesopotamia.
 1918. Lovett, Major-General Beresford, C.B., C.S.I., Hillside, Harvey Road, Guildford.

1921. Lovett, Sir H. Verney, K.C.S.I., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1920. Lewis, H. R., I.A., Underhill, London Road, Camberley.
 1921. Lubbock, Brig.-General G., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E., 26, Cadogan Gardens, S.W.
 1909. Lyall, Major R.A., I.A., 3rd Kashmir Rifles, c/o Messrs. Grindlay & Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
 1921. Lynch, Stephen, c/o Euphrates and Tigris S.N. Co., 3, Salter's Hall Court, E.C.
 1922. Lynden-Bell, Captain L. A., M.C., 2nd Seaforth Highlanders, Meerut, U.P., India.
 1922. Lytton, Rt. Hon. the Earl of, Knebworth House, Knebworth.

M

1909. *Macartney, Sir George, K.C.I.E., Les Vaux, St. Saviour's, Jersey, Channel Isles. M. of C.
 310 1915. McCoy, Mrs., c/o Messrs. Glyn, Mills, and Co., 67, Lombard Street, E.C. 3.
 1921. McGrath, Lieut.-Colonel A. T., 43, South Audley Street, W. 1.
 1920. McGrath, Mrs. Rosita Forbes, 43, South Audley Street, W. 1.
 1920. MacGregor, Lady, Hampton Court Palace, Hampton Court.
 1922. Machray, Robert, 78, Cromwell Road, S.W. 7.
 1921. McIntyre, Captain H. M. J., I.A., No. 8 Mountain Battery, Landi Kotal, Peshawar, India.
 1921. Mackarness, H. J. C., Travellers' Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1921. Mackay, F. F., Leigh Vineries, Wimborne, Dorset.
 1920. Mackenzie, Lady M. M. Owen, 6, Chesham Street, S.W. 1.; Brantham Court, Suffolk.
 1920. Mackie, Captain J. B., Castle Cary, Somerset.
 320 1921. Mackintosh, C. A. G., Ministry of Finance, Egypt; Bath Club, Dover Street, W. 1.
 1906. *McMahon, Lieut.-Colonel Sir H., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., 59, Pont Street, S.W. 1. M. of C.
 1920. McNearne, Captain H. D., Political Officer, Mosul.
 1920. Macpherson, C. F., c/o Messrs. Gray, Mackenzie and Co., Basra.
 1920. McRobert, Sir Alexr., Douneside, Tarland, Aberdeenshire.
 1921. Makant, Captain R. K., M.C., Gilnow Lodge, Bolton, Lancs.
 1903. *Malcolm, Major-General Sir Neill, K.C.B., D.S.O., Singapore, S.S.
 1921. Malleson, Major-General Sir Wilfrid, K.C.I.E., C.B., Foxhurst, Ashvale, Surrey.
 1921. Marklew, E. G., 23, Richmond Road, W. 2.
 1920. Marling, Sir Charles, K.C.M.G., British Legation, Copenhagen.
 330 1920. Marrs, Major R., C.I.E., c/o Messrs. Grindlay & Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
 1921. Marshall, Justice J. E., Egyptian National Court of Appeal, Zamaleh, Gezira, Cairo.

1920. Massy, Col. P. H. Hamon, C.B.E., United Service Club, Pall Mall.
1921. Mathews, Captain L. Gard, F.R.G.S., Colonial Service, British Somaliland; 2, Napier Terrace, Plymouth.
1920. Mathieson, Wilfred, Minchinhampton, Glos.
1920. May, Major W. R. S., C.I.E., Twyford House, Alnmouth.
1912. Medlicott, Lieut.-Colonel H., Cavalry Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1920. Mellor, Donald, 180, The Grove, Wandsworth, S.W. 18.
1920. Meston, The Right Hon. Lord, K.C.S.I., etc., Hurst, Cookham Dene, Berks.
1921. Meyer, Sir William S., G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., 42, Grosvenor Gardens, S.W. 1.
- 340** 1920. Michell, Roland, C.M.G., 22, Lansdowne Crescent, W. 11.
1920. Millard, W. S., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W.
1922. Milne, George, I.C.S., Craigellie, Lonmay, Aberdeenshire.
1921. Minchin, H. C., Gorsedene, Farnham, Surrey.
1920. Minchin, Captain H. C. Stephens, Gorsedene, Farnham, Surrey.
1921. Moberly, Brig.-General F. J., C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., P.S.C., Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defence, 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.
1920. Mocatta, Major V. E., O.B.E., 14th Hussars, 31, Great Cumberland Place, W.
1920. Molony, Wm. O'Sullivan, Christ Church, Oxford.
1921. Monro, General Sir C. C., Bart., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., A.D.C.Gen., 20, Egerton Gardens, S.W. M. of C.
1920. Monteath, D. Taylor, O.B.E., India Office, Whitehall, S.W.
- 350** 1921. Monteath, G., I.C.S., Buckerell Lodge, Honiton, Devon.
1920. Mookerji, Dr. Radhakumad, M.A., Ph.D., Professor, Mysore University, Mysore.
1903. *Moon, E. R. P., 6, Onslow Gardens, S.W. 7. M. of C.
1921. Moore, Captain J. H., Walton Grange, Swindon, Wilts.
1920. More, Major J. C., D.S.O., 51st Sikhs (F.F.), Political Agency, Kuwait, Persian Gulf.
1921. Morgan, C. Stuart, c/o Messrs. Strick, Scott and Co., Ltd., Baghdad.
1920. Morison, Sir Theodor, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Overdale, Lindisfarne Road, Newcastle-on-Tyne.
1921. Mousley, Captain E. O., R.F.A., Oxford and Cambridge Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1920. Mukhopadhyaya, Panchanana (Hon. Presidency Magistrate), 46, Bechu Chatterji Street, Calcutta.
1920. Mules, Sir Chas., C.S.I., M.V.O., O.B.E., 29, Bramham Gardens, S.W. 5.
- 360** 1920. Mumm, Arnold L., F.R.G.S., 112, Gloucester Terrace, W. 2.
1920. Murchison, C. K., M.P., Hargrave Hall, near Kimbolton, Huntingdon.
1921. Murphy, Lieut.-Colonel C. C. R., 83rd Infantry, I.A., Cannanore, Malabar, India; Army and Navy Club, Pall Mall, S.W.

1921. †Murray, John, M.A., D.L., J.P., F.S.A., 50A, Albemarle Street, Piccadilly, W. 1.
 1920. Murray, Major S. G. C., C.I.E., I.A., c/o High Commissioner, Baghdad.
 1921. Muspratt, Colonel S. F., C.S.I., D.S.O., A.D.C., 12th Cavalry, I.A., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1920. Mylles, Captain C. C., M.C., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
 1915. Mylne, Miss Nina, 14, Old Square, Lincoln's Inn, W.C. 2.
 1916. Mysore, The Hon. the Resident, Bangalore, S. India.

N

1920. Napier, Major A. Harper, I.M.S., c/o Marshall, Terne, N. Queensferry, N.B.
370 1921. Nariman, R. K., M.I.C.E., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1921. Newton, Mrs. Frances E., 156, Sloane Street, S.W. 1.
 1922. Nicolson, Major the Hon. F. A., 15th Hussars, 53, Cadogan Gardens, S.W. 3.
 1922. Nightingale, Colonel M. R. W., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
 1920. Noel, Major E., C.I.E., D.S.O. (Political Dept. Govt. of India), Travellers' Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1920. Noel, Major J. B. L., M.G.C.
 1920. Noone, H. V. V., c/o Messrs. R. G. Shaw and Co., Winchester House, Old Broad Street, E.C. 3.
 1921. Norbury, Major P. F., D.S.O., I.A., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1921. Northcote, D. S., 23, Royal Avenue, Chelsea, S.W. 3.
 1916. North-West Frontier Province. The Hon. the Chief Commissioner, Peshawar, India.

O

- 380** 1920. O'Connor, Captain K. K. O., M.C., 14th Sikhs, c/o Deputy Commissioner, Abbotabad.
 1921. O'Connor, Captain R. L., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
 1906. O'Connor, Major W. F. T., R.A., C.I.E., H.B.M. Consul, Shiraz, Persia.
 1920. O'Dwyer, Sir Michael F., G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., 26, Brechin Place, S.W. 7. M. of C.
 1905. Oliver, Captain D. G., 67th Punjabis, Junior United Service Club, Charles Street, S.W. 1.
 1921. Olver, Lieut.-Colonel A., C.B., C.M.G., c/o Messrs. Holt and Co., Whitehall Place, S.W.
 1920. Orgill, Captain T. C., 2, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge.
 1920. ORMSBY-GORE, Major the Hon. W. G. A., M.P., J.P., D.L., F.R.G.S., 5, Mansfield Street, Cavendish Square, W. 1. M. of C.
 1921. Outlaw, Captain W. H., 40, Charles Street, Berkhamstead.

P

1920. Parker, Lieut.-Col. A. C., D.S.O., Governor of Sinai Peninsula, Arish, Sinai.
- 390** 1920. Parr, E. Robert, Black Birches, Hadnall, Shrewsbury.
1920. Patranavis, S. C., B.A., Sub-Registrar, Kendna P.O., Dt. Mymensingh, Bengal.
1908. Payne, Mrs. Wood, 101, Philbeach Gardens, S.W. 5.
1921. Pead, T. D., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1920. Pearce, Captain M. Channing, Cintra, Swanage, Dorset.
1921. Peek, Sir Wilfrid, Bart., D.S.O., 2, Clarendon Place, W. 2.
- †Peel, The Viscount, 52, Grosvenor Street, W. 1.
1921. Pedder, Captain G. R., 13th Hussars, East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1907. Pemberton, Col. E. St. Clair, R.E. (ret.), Pyrland Hall, Taunton; B. 6, The Albany, Piccadilly, W. 1.
- *†PENTON, Sir E., K.B.E., 2, Cambridge Terrace, Regent's Park, N.W. 1. Vice-President and Hon. Treasurer.
- 400** 1920. Peralta, Miss Louise, 45, Powis Square, W. 11.
- †Perowne, Lieut.-Col. J. T. Woolrych, 32, Lowndes Square, S.W.
1921. Perry, Miss C. E., 185, Clarence Gate Gardens, N.W. 1.
1919. Philby, H. St. John, C.I.E., I.C.S., c/o High Commissioner, Jerusalem.
1921. Phillips, Miss L. B., 9, Rosslyn Mansions, S. Hampstead, N.W. 3.
1908. Phipson, H., 10, Hyde Park Mansions, N.W. 1.
1920. Pickthall, Captain C. M., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1920. Pickthall, Mrs. W. M., c/o Ladies' Army and Navy Club, Burlington Gardens, W. 1.
- *†Picot, Lieut.-Colonel H. P., Indian Army (ret.), 86, Ebury Street, S.W. 1, Junior United Service Club. M. of C.
- 410** 1921. Pitcairn, G. D., White Cottage, Amport, Andover.
1920. Platt, Sir T. Comyn, 47, Cadogan Place, S.W. 1.
1920. Popham, Lieut.-Colonel E. Leyborne, D.S.O., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., Bombay.
1922. Price, Brig.-Gen. C. H. Uvedale, C.B., D.S.O., I.A. (ret.), 7, Rothsay Road, Bedford.
1921. Prichard, J., Judicial Department, Baghdad; Wick, Glamorganshire, Wales.
1921. Prior, Mrs. Upton, Ethorpe, Gerrard's Cross, Bucks.
1921. Pulley, Major H. C., O.B.E., I.A., c/o Eastern Bank, 4, Crosby Square, E.C.

R

1910. Raines, Lady, 46, Sussex Gardens, Hyde Park, W. 2.
1916. Rajputana, The Hon. the Agent to the Governor-General, The Residency, Mount Abu, Rajputana, India.
1921. Ralston, Major W. H., 47th Sikhs, c/o Messrs. T. Cook and Son, Ludgate Circus, E.C.

1920. Rawlinson, General The Lord, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G.,
Commander-in-Chief, India.
- 420** 1922. Rawlinson, Colonel Alfred, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., The
Cottage, Oxgate Lane, Cricklewood, N.W.
1922. Rawlinson, Mrs., The Cottage, Oxgate Lane, Cricklewood,
N.W.
1921. Ready, Major-General F. F., C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Lynch House, Winchester.
1921. Redl, Lieut.-Colonel E. A. F., C.M.G., C.I.E., The Sycamores,
Newick, Sussex; Naval and Military Club, 94, Picca-
dilly, W. 1.
1922. Renshaw, Captain C. M., I.A., East India United Service
Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1920. Reynardson, Capt. H. Birch, 1st Oxford and Bucks L.I.,
14, Lancaster Gate Terrace, W. 2.
1912. Richmond, Mrs. Bruce, 3, Sumner Place, S.W.
1919. Ridgeway, Col. R. Kirby; V.C., C.B., United Service Club,
Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1921. Rivett-Carnac, Captain H. G., I.A., East India United
Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1922. Roberts, Captain A. H., 87, Victoria Street, Westminster, S.W.
- 430** 1922. Roberts, Captain G. H., I.A., Club of Western India,
Poona.
1921. Roberts-Goddard A., Royal Aero Club, Clifford Street,
W. 1.
1921. Robertson, Field-Marshal Sir William R., Bart., G.C.B.,
G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., D.S.O., etc., 88, Westbourne
Terrace, W. 2.
1921. Robertson, Algar, 26, Porchester Terrace, W. 2.
1921. Robertson, Miss R., 26, Porchester Terrace, W. 2.
1921. Robertson, Miss V., 26, Porchester Terrace, W. 2.
1920. Robinson, Captain F. A., M.C., R.A.M.C., The Vicarage,
Holme on Spalding Moor, Yorks.
1920. Rodd, Major W. J. P., D.S.O., R.A.O.C., 27, Sussex
Gardens, W. 2.
- *†RONALDSHAY, The Earl of. Vice-President.
1920. Rooker, S. K., M.C., 63, St. James's Street, S.W.
- 440** 1914. Rose, Archibald, C.I.E., 46, Abingdon Villas, Kensington,
W. 8.
1921. Rundle, Captain C. A. Grant, M.C., c/o Messrs. Henry
S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.
1920. Rynd, Major F. F., D.S.O., R.A., United Service Club,
Pall Mall, S.W.

S

1918. Salvati, Signor M. N., Via Lamarmora 41, Torino, Italy.
1920. Sammadar, J. N., F.R.E.S., Patna College, Patna, India.
- Sampson, A. C., M.C., 1, Elgin Court, Elgin Avenue, W. 9.
- †Sandbach, General A. E., D.S.O., R.E., Naval and Military
Club, 94, Piccadilly, W. 1.
- Schomberg, Lieut.-Colonel R. C. F., D.S.O., Seaforth High-
landers, Caledonian Club, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

1918. Shah, Sirdar Ikbal Ali, 33, Cornwallis Crescent, Clifton, Bristol.
1920. Shakespear, Lieut.-Colonel J., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., 15, Alexandra Court, W. 9.
- 450** 1920. Shakespear, Col. L. Waterfield, C.B., C.I.E., Deputy Inspector-General, Assam Rifles, Shillong, Assam.
1920. Shastri, Professor Ashutosh, 23/1, Beniatola Lane, Calcutta.
1921. Shepherd, Miss E., 66, Queen's Gate, S.W. 7.
1920. Sheppard, Captain E. W., O.B.E., M.C., War Office, Whitehall, S.W.
1922. Sheppard, Sir William D., K.C.I.E., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1919. Silberrad, C. A., I.C.S., "Sunnycroft," Buckhurst Hill, Essex.
1920. Simpson, J. Alexr., India Office, Whitehall, S.W.
1921. Simpson, B. Lenox, c/o British Legation, Peking, China.
1920. Sircar, Ganapati, 69, Beliaghata Main Rd., Calcutta.
1920. Skrine, F. H., C.S.I., 147, Victoria Street, S.W.
- 460** 1920. Slater, Captain A., I.A.R.O., c/o Messrs. Cox & Co., Charing Cross.
1920. Slater, Mrs. E. M., 13, Dawson Place, W. 2.
1920. Smith, A. L. F., M.V.O., Baliol College, Oxford.
1920. Smith, Captain Godwin, c/o Messrs. Richards, Thynne and Co., 130, Tooley Street, S.E.
1922. Snelling, Captain C. G., I.A., Indian Political Dept., Quetta, Baluchistan; United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
1921. Soane, Major E. B., C.B.E., East India United Service Club, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1921. Spencer, Dr. Gordon, St. James's Vicarage, Preston, Lancs.
1916. Spranger, John Alfred, 2nd. Lieut. R.E., 4, Via Michele, Florence, Italy.
1920. Stanham, Major H. F., R.A., Western Command, Chester.
1922. Stanley, Lieut.-Colonel J. H., C.B.E., Royal Societies' Club, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.
- 470** 1917. H.M. Stationery Office, Princes Street, S.W. 1 (Journal subscriber).
1921. Starkie, Mrs. Maud, 3, Aldford Street, Park Lane, W. 1.
1919. Stebbing, E. P., Hawthornden Castle, Lasswade, Midlothian.
1909. Stein, Sir Aurel, K.C.I.E., Ph.D., D.Litt., D.Sc. Superintendent Arch. Survey, Frontier Circle, N.W.F. Province, India.
1920. STEPHENSON, G. C., 99, Inverness Terrace, W. 2. M. of C. Joint Hon. Sec.
1921. Stephen, Major F. W., M.C., Royal Societies' Club, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.
1921. Stevenson, Lieut.-Colonel K. L., R.A.O.C., G.H.Q., Baghdad.
1920. Stewart, C. W., 3, Newburgh Road, Acton.
1920. Stewart, G., M.P., House of Commons, Westminster; Whiteholme, Hoylake, Cheshire.
1920. Stirling, Lieut.-Col. W. F., D.S.O., The Residency, Jaffa, Palestine.

- 480** 1907. STOKES, Colonel C. B., C.I.E., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1. M. of C.
 1903. Stoner, J. J., 19, Kensington Court, W. 8.
 1921. Storrs, Mrs. F. E., 65, Chester Square, S.W. 1.
 1921. Sutton, Major-General H. C., C.B., C.M.G., 9, Elvaston Place, S.W. 7.
 1921. Swan, L. M., c/o Ministry of Finance, Baghdad.
 1920. Swettenham, Sir F. A., G.C.M.G., C.B., 43, Seymour Street, W. 1.
 1920. Sydenham, The Rt. Hon. Lord, of Combe, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., etc., The Priory, Lamberhurst, Kent.
 1920. Sykes, Lady, Sledmere, Malton.
 †SYKES, Miss Ella, 26, St. George's Court, S.W. 7. M. of C.
 1905. Sykes, Miss Ethel R., 29, Trevor Square, Knightsbridge, S.W. 7.
490 1904. Sykes, H. R., Lydham Manor, Bishop's Castle, Shropshire.
 1907. Sykes, Brigadier-General Sir Percy M., K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G., Villa Bel Évent, Dinard, Brittany.

T

1920. Tagore, Profulla Nath, 1, Durpondrian Tagore Street, Calcutta.
 1921. Tainish, Lieut.-Col. J. R., Railway Directorate, Baghdad.
 1920. Talbot, Colonel the Hon. G. Milo, C.B., Bifrons, Canterbury.
 1903. Tanner, Miss, 8, Cavendish Place, Bath.
 1920. Tatton, R. Grey, 2, Somers Place, Hyde Park, W. 2.
 1908. Taylor, Arthur Boddam, c/o Mesopotamia Persia Corp., Teheran, Persia.
 1919. Teague-Jones, Major R., 80, Philbeach Gardens, S.W. 5.
 1919. Teichman, Eric, C.I.E., Sitka, Chislehurst, Kent; British Legation, Peking, China.
500 1920. Temple, Lt.-Col. Sir Richard, Bart., C.B., C.I.E., F.S.A., The Nash, Worcester.
 1922. Tennant, Hon. Mrs., St. Anne's Manor, Sutton, Loughborough.
 1905. Thomas, F. W., Ph.D., India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
 1921. Thomas, Captain H. Prichard, 126th Baluchistan Regt., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Charing Cross.
 1921. Thomas, Major E. C., Ray Lodge, Lingfield.
 1921. Thomas, Roger, Agricultural Directorate, Baghdad.
 1922. Thompson, Captain David, 15th Lancers, I.A., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1; c/o Messrs. The Alliance Bank of Simla, Ewart House, Bombay.
 1920. Thomson, J. S., L.C.S., c/o Commercial Bank of Scotland, 62, Lombard St., E.C.
 1921. Thomson, Colonel Sir W. M., K.C.M.G., C.B., M.C., Cardrona, Dunblane, Perthshire.
 1919. Thorburn, Major H. Hay, c/o Messrs. Grindlay & Co., Bombay.
510 1921. Thornton, Lieut.-Col. C. E., C.M.G., 16th Cavalry, I.A. (ret.), 31, Sydney Street, Chelsea, S.W. 3.
 1922. Thorpe, Miss M., 25, Pembridge Gardens, Notting Hill Gate, W. 11.

1922. Thuillier, Major L. C., I.A. (Survey of India), c/o Messrs. T. Cook and Son, Ludgate Circus, E.C.
 1908. Tod, Colonel J. K., C.M.G., Standlynch, Four Marks, Hants.
 1921. Todd, Captain H. I., Imperial Police, 45, Lee Road, Blackheath, S.E. 3.
 1921. Tomlinson, A. G., c/o Messrs. Hills Bros. Co., Basra, Persian Gulf.
 1921. Tozer, P. H. S., Junior Constitutional Club, Piccadilly.
 1920. Trench, Rev. A. C., M.C., Chaplain's Office, Bolarun, Deccan, India.
 1920. Trott, Captain A. C., 5th Devon Regt., St. John's College, Cambridge.
 1919. Trotter, Lady, 18, Eaton Place, S.W. 1.
520 1908. *TUCKER, A. L. P., C.I.E., Hayes, Northiam, Sussex. M. of C.
 1920. Tudor Pole, Major W., 61, St. James's Street, S.W.
 1921. Tweedie, Mrs. Alec, 2, Whitehall Court, S.W. 1.
 1920. Tyler, H. H. F., C.I.E., I.C.S., c/o Imperial Bank of India, Madras.

V

1921. Valyi, Felix, 115, St. James's Court, Buckingham Gate, S.W. 1.
 1905. Vanderbyl, P. B., B4, The Albany, Piccadilly, W. 1.
 1919. Van Ness, Major W. Waters.
 1920. Varma, Raj Kumar N. Chandra Deb, Comilla, Tipperah, India.
 1920. Vasu, Rai Sahib Nagendra N., Prachyavadya Maharnara, 9, Visvakosha Lane, Bagbazar, Calcutta.
 1922. Venning, E. G., Liskcard, Cornwall.
530 1920. Vidyabhusan, Amulya Charon, Professor, Vidyashagar College, 82, Maniktola Street, Calcutta.

W

1921. Waley, A., Alderhurst, Englefield Green, Surrey.
 1921. Waley, Captain E. G. S., 14, Oxford Square, W. 2.
 1921. Wallace, Lieut.-Colonel C. L. Willoughby, 209, Ashley Gardens, S.W. 1.
 1921. Wallace, Mrs. E. F., 64A, Sinclair Road, Kensington, W. 14.
 1920. Waller, Major A. G., I.A., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Indian Dept., Charing Cross.
 1911. Waller, Miss D., 32, Knightsbridge, S.W. 1.
 1911. Waller-Sawyer, Mrs., 32, Knightsbridge, S.W., and Moystown House, Belmont, King's Co., Ireland.
 1921. Walpole, Mrs. Horace, 15, Bruton Street, W. 1; Heckfield Place, Basingstoke, Hants.
 1922. Walpole, C. A., O.B.E., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
540 †Walton, Sir Joseph, M.P., Reform Club, 104, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1922. Wapshare, Lieut.-General Sir Richard, K C.B., C.S.I., c/o Messrs. The Alliance Bank of Simla, Bombay, India.

1921. Warburton, H. G., I.C.S. (ret.), Holmesdale, Fleet, Hants.
1921. Ward, Colonel J. S., C.I.E., D.S.O., M.B.E., Port Director, Basra.
1920. Ward, Captain W. Kingdon, F.R.G.S., c/o Royal Geographical Society, Kensington Gore, S.W. 7.
1920. Ward, W. R., O.B.E., Union Club, Trafalgar Square, and c/o Imperial Bank of Persia, 25, Abchurch Lane, E.C.
1905. Watson, Lt. Col. John William, I.M.S., c/o Messrs. Grindlay, Groome and Co., Bombay.
1920. Watson, Sir Logie P., c/o Messrs. Cooper, Allen & Co., Cawnpore, India.
1921. Watson-Armstrong, Captain W. J. M., c/o Bank of Montreal, Vancouver City, B.C.
1921. Webb, Captain W. F., attd. Indian Political Dept., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
- 550** 1920. Webb-Ware, Lieut.-Col. F., C.I.E., F.R.G.S., Fort Anne Hotel, Douglas, Isle of Man.
1921. Weir, Major J. L. R., Indian Political Dept., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
1921. Wellcome, Henry S., 6, Gloucester Gate, Regent's Park, N.W., and Khartoum.
1921. Weldon, Captain S. W., The Retreat, Palmer's Green, Alderman's Hill, N.; East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1920. Wheatley, H., Govt. Quinine Factory, Naduvatam, India.
- †Whitbred, S. H., 11, Mansfield Street, W. 1.
1920. Whitehorne, Captain Cecil, M.C., The Welch Regiment, Junior United Service Club, Charles Street, S.W.
1922. Wightwick, Major H. M., Bombay Political Service, c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Bombay.
1921. Wigley, Captain P. J. R., M.C., I.A., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1920. Wigram, Rev. Dr. W. A., Watling House, St. Albans.
- 560** 1921. Wilkinson, Captain L. C. R., R.A., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co. (R.A. Branch), Charing Cross, S.W.
1921. Willeox, Sir W. H., K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G., F.R.C.P., 40, Welbeck Street, W. 1.
1921. Williams, Robert, 35, Prince's Gardens, S.W. 7; Park House, Drumoak, Aberdeenshire.
1921. Williams, Captain L., O.B.E., 25, Harley House, Regent's Park, N.W. 1.
1921. Williamson, Dr. H., 10, Carlyle Mansions, Cheyne Walk, Chelsea, S.W. 3.
1920. Willingdon, H. E. Lord, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Government House, Madras.
1921. Wilkinson, Hon. Mrs., Dringhouses Manor, York.
1921. Willoughby, Brig.-Gen. M. E., C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
1920. Wilson, Lieut.-Col. Sir Arnold T., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.; c/o Messrs. Strick, Scott and Co., Mohammerah, Persian Gulf.

1920. Wilson, Major W. C. F., I.A., Mesopotamian C. S., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament St., S.W. 1.
- 570** 1916. Wilson, Lieut.-Colonel James Alban, D.S.O., 8th Gurkhas, c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament St., S.W.
1921. Wilson, W., c/o Messrs. The Imperial Bank of Persia, 25, Abchurch Lane, E.C. 4.
1919. Wilson-Johnstone, Lieut.-Colonel W. E., C.I.E., D.S.O., c/o War Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
1920. WINGATE, General Sir Reginald, Bart., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., G.B.E., etc., Knockenhair, Dunbar. M. of C.
1921. Wishart, G., Muirbrow, Hamilton, N.B.
1912. Woods, H. C., 171, Victoria Street, S.W. 1.
1918. Worthington, A. B. Bayley, Town Thorns, Rugby.
1921. Wright, Captain S. A., M.C., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

Y

- *†YATE, Lieut.-Colonel Arthur C., Beckbury Hall, Shifnal, Shropshire. Vice-President and Hon. Sec.
1905. *YATE, Colonel Sir Charles E., Bart., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.L., M.P., 17, Prince of Wales Terrace, W. 8. Vice-President.
- 580** 1916. Yorke, Mrs. R. F., F.R.G.S., M.R.I., F.R.S.A. Ladies' Imperial Club, 17, Dover Street, W. 1; 22, Craven Hill, W. 2.
- *†YOUNGHUSBAND, Lieut.-Col. Sir Francis E., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., 3, Buckingham Gate, S.W. 1. Vice-President.
1918. Young, General H. G., C.I.E., D.S.O., etc., Tobercooran, Carmoney, Co. Antrim, Ireland.
1921. Young, Rev. R. A., 20, Great Peter Street, Westminster.

JOURNAL SUBSCRIBERS

Army and Navy Club.
 Cairo. Middle East Section, Royal Air Force.
 Calcutta. Imperial Library.
 London Library.
 Mosul-Department of Education.
 New York. American Museum of National History.
 Rome. Instituto per l'Oriente.
 Royal Geographical Society.
 Royal United Service Institution.
 H.M. Stationery Office.
 Tokyo. Dr. G. E. Morrison's Library.
 Tokyo. South Manchuria Railway Company.

RULES

OF

THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

1. THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY was founded in 1901 for the encouragement of interest in Central Asia by means of lectures, the reading of papers, and discussions.

2. Persons who desire to join the Society shall be proposed by one Member and seconded by another, and shall then be balloted for by the Council. Ladies are admissible.

3. The Secretary shall in all cases inform Members of their election.

4. The Annual Subscription of Members shall be £1.

5. The Council shall have power to remit subscriptions in special cases in which such remission shall appear expedient.

6. All subscriptions are due on election, and thereafter annually, but if the election takes place in November or December, the second annual payment will not become due till the expiration of the succeeding year; thus if a person be elected in November, his second subscription will not be due till the second January following.

7. Every person elected a Member of the Society shall make the payment due thereon within two calendar months after the date of election, or if abroad within six months after election; otherwise the election shall be void unless the Council in any particular case shall extend the period within which such payments are to be made.

8. Annual subscriptions shall be due on the tenth day of January in each year; and in case the same shall not be paid by the end of the month, the Treasurer or Secretary shall be authorized to demand the same. If any subscriptions remain unpaid at the Anniversary Meeting of the Society, the Treasurer shall apply by letter to those Members who are in arrear. If the arrears be not discharged by the 1st of January following such application the Member's name as a defaulter shall be suspended in the meeting room, and due notice be given to the Member in question of the same. The name shall remain suspended, unless in the interval the arrears be discharged, until the Anniversary Meeting next ensuing, when, if the subscription be not paid, the defaulter will cease to be a Member of the Society.

9. A Member, who is not in arrears, may at any time resign¹

membership by notice in writing, but such notice of resignation must reach the Secretary before the 1st of January, otherwise the subscription for the current year will be payable.

10. A Member's resignation shall not be valid, save by a resolution of the Council, until he has paid up all his arrears of subscription; failing this he will be considered as a defaulter, and dealt with in accordance with Rule 8.

11. The Officers of the Society shall be: (1) The Honorary President, (2) the Chairman of the Council, (3) eight Vice-Presidents, (4) the Honorary Treasurer, and (5) the Honorary Secretary, all of whom must be Members of the Society. In addition to these there shall be an Assistant Secretary.

12. The Chairman shall be elected by the Council, and shall hold office for one year from the date of his election. He shall be eligible for re-election on the expiration of his tenure of office.

13. The Honorary President shall be elected by the Council, and shall hold office for five years, and shall be eligible for re-election. The Vice-Presidents shall be elected by the Council, and shall hold office for four years. Two shall retire annually by rotation, and not be eligible for re-election as such until after the expiration of one year. They are eligible on retirement for re-election on the Council.

13a. The Honorary Treasurer and the Honorary Secretary shall be elected at the Anniversary Meeting, on the nomination of the Council, for two years, and are eligible for re-election.

14. The Assistant Secretary shall hold office during the pleasure of the Council.

15. The Chairman, as head of the Society, shall have the general supervision of its affairs. He will preside at Meetings of the Council, conduct the proceedings, give effect to resolutions passed, and cause the Rules of the Society to be put in force. He shall, ex officio, be a Member of the Council and of all Committees, and may at any time summon a Meeting of the Council.

16. The Honorary Treasurer shall receive all moneys, and shall account for them. He shall not make any payments (other than current and petty cash expenses) without the previous order of the Council. He shall, ex officio, be a Member of the Council and of all Committees. He shall exercise a general supervision over the expenditure of the Society, and shall prepare and submit to the Auditors at the expiration of each year a statement showing the receipts and expenditure of the Society for the period in question. All cheques must be signed by him, or in his absence by any Member of the Council acting for him.

17. The Honorary Secretary shall, in the absence of the Chairman,

exercise a general control over the affairs of the Society, and shall, *ex officio*, be a Member of Council and of all Committees.

18. The Honorary Secretary shall attend the Meetings of the Society and of the Council and record their proceedings. He shall conduct the correspondence and attend to the general business of the Society, and shall attend at the Rooms of the Society at such times as the Council may direct. He shall superintend the persons employed by the Society, subject to the general control of the Council. He shall be competent on his own responsibility to discharge small bills, but any account exceeding the amount of Five Pounds shall, except in cases of great urgency, be submitted for approval to the Council before payment. He shall have the charge, under the general direction of the Council, of printing and publishing the Transactions of the Society.

19. The Assistant Secretary shall act generally under the orders of the Hon. Secretary, and if at any time the latter is prevented by illness or any other cause from attending to the duties of his office, the Assistant Secretary shall act in his absence; but in the case of prolonged absence the Council shall have power to make such special arrangements as may at the time be considered expedient.

20. There shall be a Council consisting of the Vice-Presidents and twelve Members of the Society, exclusive of the Chairman but inclusive of the Honorary Officers of the Society.

21. The Members of Council as aforesaid shall be elected at the Anniversary Meeting on the nomination of the Chairman in Council, subject to any amendment of which due notice has been given, as provided in Rule 23.

22. There shall be prepared and forwarded to every Member in Great Britain, together with the notice as to the Anniversary Meeting, a list containing the names of persons so nominated to serve on the Council for the ensuing year, together with any other names, should they be proposed and seconded by other Members, a week's notice being given to the Secretary. The List of Members nominated as aforesaid shall be first put to the Meeting, and, if carried, the amendments (if any) shall not be put.

23. Of the Members of Council other than those referred to in Rules 12 and 13—*i.e.*, the Officers—three shall retire annually by seniority. They shall be eligible for re-election.

24. Should any vacancy occur among the Honorary Officers or other Members of Council during the interval between two Anniversary Meetings, such vacancy may be filled up by the Council.

25. The Ordinary Meetings of Council shall be held not less than once a month from November to June inclusive.

26. Special Meetings of Council may be summoned under the

sanction of the Chairman, or in his absence by a circular letter from the Secretary.

27. Three Members of the Council shall constitute a quorum.

28. At Meetings of Council the Chair shall be taken by the Chairman, and in his absence the Senior Member present shall take the Chair. The decision of any matter shall rest with the majority, and in case of an equality of votes the Chairman shall have the casting vote in addition to his ordinary vote.

29. Committees may be appointed by the Council to report on specific questions, and unless otherwise stated three shall form a quorum. Such Committees shall be authorized to consult persons not members of the Society.

30. Ordinary General Meetings are for hearing and discussing papers and for addresses, but no resolutions other than votes of thanks for papers read shall be passed at such meetings except by permission of the Chairman.

31. Special General Meetings are for considering and dealing with matters of importance, such as the making or amendment of its Rules, or questions seriously affecting its management and constitution. No business shall be transacted at such meetings except that for which they are summoned, and of which notice has been given.

32. The Anniversary Meeting for receiving and considering the Annual Report of the Council and Auditors, and dealing with the recommendations contained therein for the appointment of Members of the Council and Officers for the ensuing year, and for hearing the President's Address (if any), and deliberating generally on the affairs of the Society, shall be held in June of each year. But no resolution seriously affecting the management or position of the Society, or altering its Rules, shall be passed unless due notice shall have been given in the manner prescribed for Special General Meetings.

33. Ordinary Meetings shall be convened by notice issued to accessible Members, and as a general rule they shall be held on the third Thursday in each month from November to May, both inclusive, the Thursday of Easter, Whitsuntide, and Christmas weeks being excepted. At such meetings, and also at the Anniversary Meeting, but not at special General Meetings, each Member of the Society shall have the privilege of introducing, either personally or by card, two visitors.

34. Ten Members shall form a quorum.

The Accounts shall be audited annually by an Auditor nominated by the Council. The employment of a professional Auditor shall be permissible. The Report presented by the Auditor shall be read at the next ensuing Anniversary Meeting.

LIST OF MEMBERS
OF
THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

CORRECTED TO MARCH 1, 1923

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL, 1922-23

Hon. President:

THE MOST HON. THE MARQUIS CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I.,
G.C.I.E., F.R.S., ETC.

Chairman of Council:

1921. THE RT. HON. LORD CARNOCK, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E.

Vice-Presidents:

1920. LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.

1920. GENERAL SIR E. BARROW, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.

1921. COLONEL SIR CHARLES YATE, BART., C.S.I., C.M.G., M.P.

1921. SIR HUGH BARNES, K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O.

1921. LIEUT.-COLONEL A. C. YATE.

1921. SIR EDWARD PENTON, K.B.E.

1922. THE RT. HON. THE EARL OF RONALDSHAY, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

1922. GENERAL SIR C. C. MONRO, BART., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G.

1922. Hon. Treasurer: SIR EDWARD PENTON, K.B.E.

1921. Hon. Secretaries: { LIEUT.-COLONEL A. C. YATE.
 { G. C. STEPHENSON, ESQ.

1922. Hon. Librarian: R. L. S. MICHELL, ESQ., C.M.G.

Members of the Council:

1920. GENERAL SIR REGINALD WINGATE, BART., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., G.B.E.

1920. THE RT. HON. SIR MAURICE W. E. DE BUNSEN, BART., P.C., G.C.M.G.,
G.C.V.O., C.B.

1921. G. C. STEPHENSON, ESQ.

1921. SIR MICHAEL O'DWYER, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

1921. MISS ELLA SYKES.

1921. COLONEL C. B. STOKES, C.I.E.

1922. THE RT. HON. SIR ARTHUR HARDINGE, G.C.M.G.

1922. SIR EDGAR BONHAM-CARTER, K.C.M.G., C.I.E.

1922. LIEUT.-COLONEL F. E. FREMANTLE, T.D., O.B.E., M.P.

Assistant Secretary:

MISS M. N. KENNEDY.

OFFICES: 74, GROSVENOR ST., W. 1.

LIST OF MEMBERS

The names marked with an asterisk are of those who have served on the Council. The names in capitals are those of present Members of Council. Names in italics are those of Councillors resident in India. The names marked with a dagger are those of original Members.

A

- 1910. Sir Abdul Qaiyum, Khan Bahadur Sahibzada, K.C.I.E., Assistant Political Officer, Khaiber, Peshawar, N.-W.F. India.
- 1921. Acland, Captain P. Dyke, attd. Aviation Dept., Vickers Ltd., Vickers' House, Broadway, Westminster, S.W. 1.
- 1922. Acworth, Captain J. P., 28th Cavalry F.F., I.A., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Bombay.
- 1921. Ahmed Bey Hassanein, F.R.G.S., Ahmed Pacha Hassanein Street, Kosouret El Shawam, Cairo.
- 1916. Ainscough, Thomas M., O.B.E., H. M. Senior Trade Commissioner in India, Post Box 683, 11, Clive Street, Calcutta.
- 1919. Alexander, Y. Patrick, F.R.G.S., 2, Whitehall Court, S.W.1.
- 1922. Alexander, Major J. U. F. C., Chantry House, Eccleston Street, S.W. 1.
- 1920. Allchin, Geoffrey C., Oxford and Cambridge Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
- 1920. Allen, W. E. D., Commonwood House, Chipperfield, Herts.
- 1920. Allenby, Field-Marshal the Rt. Hon. the Viscount, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., etc., Cairo, Egypt.
- 1921. Altham, Lieut.-General Sir E. A., K.C.B., C.M.G., Prior's Barton, Winchester.
- 1921. Antonius, George, Department of Education, Jerusalem.
- 1922. Armitage-Smith, Sidney A., C.B., 29, York Terrace, Regent's Park, N.W. 1.
- 1923. Armstrong, Captain F. H. C., O.B.E., 67th Punjabis, Levertton, Boston, Lines.
- 1920. Austin, Lieut. A. P. M., c/o Ministry of Finance, Baghdad.

B

- 1908. *Baddeley, J. F., 34, Bruton Street, W. 1.
- 1917. Bahrein, The Political Agent, Persian Gulf.
- 1910. Bailey, Major F. M., C.I.E., 7, Drummond Place, Edinburgh, N.B.
- 1914. Baillie, J. R., 1, Akenside Road, Hampstead, N.W.
- 20** 1906. *Bailward, Brig.-Gen. A. C., R.A. (ret.), 57, Egerton Crescent, S.W. 3.
- 1920. Balfour, Lt.-Col. F. C. C., C.I.E., M.C., Caledonian Club, Charles Street, S.W. 1.
- 1920. Ballard, Mrs. C. R., Hadham Mill, Much Hadham, Herts.
- 1922. Bampton, Major J. H. H., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
- 1922. Bampton, R. E. Fitz-Symons, Mohammerah, Persian Gulf.

1920. Banerjee, Gauranga Nath, M.A., Ph.D., B.L. (Professor of Ancient History, Calcutta University), 107/1, Mechua Bazar Street, Calcutta.
1918. Banks, Mrs. M. M., Hornton Cottage, Hornton Street, W. 8.
1923. Banks, R. Mitchell, K.C., M.P., House of Commons, Westminster, S.W. 1.
1921. Bannister, T. H. C., Stanmore Hall, Stanmore, Herts.
1920. Barman, Col. Thakur Mohin Chandra Deb, Agartala, Tripura State, Bengal.
1905. *BARNES, Sir Hugh Shakespear, K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., 29, Campden House Court, W. 8. Vice-President.
1922. Barnes, Sir George Stapylton, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Foxholm, Cobham, Surrey.
1921. Barnett, Mrs. L., 8, Royal Crescent, W. 11.
1922. Barnham, Henry D., C.M.G., 29, De Vere Gardens, Kensington, W. 8.
1922. Barrett, Field-Marshal Sir A. A., G.C.B., K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, W. 1.
1921. Barrington-Ward, F. T., K.C., 8, Green Street, Park Lane, W. 1.
1913. BARROW, General Sir Edmund, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., India Office, S.W. 1; Artillery Mansions, S.W. 1. Vice-President.
1922. Barrow, Lieut.-General Sir George, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Commander of the Legion of Honour, c/o Mrs. Cleg-horn, Hawthorndene, Chiddingfold, Surrey.
1920. Barstow, Captain A. E., M.C., 15th Sikhs, United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1921. Bartlett, P. E., Indo-European Telegraph Department, Persian Section, c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Bombay.
- 40** 1920. Base, Edward H., 5, Station Road, Lowestoft.
1919. Bateman, H. G., F.R.G.S.
1922. Bax-Ironside, Sir Henry, K.C.M.G., C.B., 23, Grosvenor Place, S.W. 1.
1923. Bayley, Lieut.-Colonel E. C., C.I.E., O.B.E., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1920. Beale, Captain C. T., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.; Imperial Ottoman Bank, Hamadan, Persia.
1921. Beattie, Dr. J. Hamilton, United University Club, Suffolk Street, S.W. 1.
1921. Beatty, Colonel Commandant G. A. H., 1st Cavalry Brigade, Risalpur, N.-W. F. P., India.
1910. Beauclerk, Lord Osborne de Vere, Brooks's Club, 4, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.
1922. Belgrave, C. Dalrymple, c/o The Secretariat, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanganyika Territory, E. Africa.
1920. Bell, B. H., Law Courts, Khartoum, Sudan.
1922. Bell, H. T. Montague, Thatched House Club, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.; "Near East," Devonshire Square, E.C.
1921. Bell, Sir Charles, K.C.I.E., C.M.G., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

1907. Benn, Colonel R. A. E., C.I.E., Residency, Jeypore, Rajputana, India.
- *†Bennett, Sir T. J., K.C.I.E., Harwarton House, Speldhurst, Kent.
1921. Bennett, Captain S. G., M.C., 8, St. Albans Crescent, Bournemouth.
1922. Bennett, John G., 1, Sloane Avenue, Chelsea, S.W. 3.
1921. Bentinck, Major A. D. W., Coldstream Guards, Levy Headquarters, Baghdad.
1923. Berry, Major E. S., O.B.E., Divisional Adviser, Baqubah, Iraq.
1922. Biggane, P., India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1
1910. Bigg-Wither, Lt.-Col. F., I.A., c/o Messrs. N. Scott and Co., Post Box 103, Rangoon.
1921. Bingham, Captain D'Arcy, 109th Infantry, I.A., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., Bombay.
- 60** 1921. Bingley, Lieut.-General Sir A. H., K.C.I.E., C.B., The Old Cottage, Cranleigh, Surrey.
1921. Birch, Lt.-Col. J. M., D.S.O., 20, Bina Gardens, S.W. 5.
1922. Birdwood, General Sir W. R., Bart., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., C.I.E., D.S.O., A.D.C. Genl., G.H.Q. Northern Army, Rawalpindi, India.
1920. Blacker, Major L. V. S., O.B.E., Queen Victoria's Own Corps of Guides, Junior Naval and Military Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1922. Blackett, Captain A. T., Palestine Gendarmerie, Ludd, Palestine.
1921. Blackwood, J. H., 37, Paternoster Row, E.C. 4.
1922. Bois, Captain H. E., Iraq Levies, E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
1919. Bone, H. Peters, 5, Hamilton Mansions, King's Gardens, Hove, Sussex.
1921. BONHAM-CARTER, Sir Edgar, K.C.M.G., C.I.E., 5, Hyde Park Square, W. 2. M. of C.
1923. Booker, Captain William, Royal Fusiliers, 1st Yemen Infantry, c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., 16, Charing Cross, S.W. 1.
1922. Borrie, Dr. David, O.B.E., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
- Bosanquet, Sir O. V., K.C.I.E., 1, Vicarage Gardens, Kensington, W. 8.
1921. Bourdillon, B. H., I.C.S., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
1922. Bourke, D. R. S., I.F.S., Instructor, Forest College, Dehra Dun, U.P., India.
1922. Bower, Sir Graham, K.C.M.G., Studwell Lodge, Droxford, Hants.
1921. Bowman, H. E., C.B.E., Director of Education, Jerusalem.
1921. Braham, Major G. N., M.C. (Mesopotamian Civil Administration), Baghdad.
1922. Bramley, Colonel P. B., C.I.E., O.B.E., D. G. Police, Palestine.
1922. Brasher, C. G., 23, Victoria Square, Clifton, Bristol.

1920. Bray, Major F. E., M.C., 21, Evelyn Gardens, S.W. 7.
 1920. Bray, Major N. N. E., O.B.E., M.C., Political Dept., Govt. of India, c/o Political Secretary, India Office, S.W. 1.
80 1921. Bridcut, Lieut.-Col. S. H., O.B.E., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
 1922. Bridges, Lieut.-Colonel E. J. (late 14th Hussars), 8, Sloane Terrace Mansions, S.W. 1.
 1921. Bright, Captain L. L., Junior Naval and Military Club, 94, Piccadilly, W. 1; Equatorial Batt., Egyptian Army, c/o Postmaster, Khartoum.
 1922. Brock, Wing-Commander H. Le M., Royal Air Force, Kenley, Surrey.
 1920. Bros, Major H. Alwyn (R. of O.) Travellers' Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1922. Brown, Mrs. Wynyard, Cooper's Hill Farm, Eversley, Surrey.
 1920. Browne, Claude M., 10, Queensberry Place, S.W. 7.
 1921. Browne, Lt.-Col. H. H. Gordon, D.S.O., 17, Bardwell Road, Oxford.
 †Bruce, Brig.-Gen. C. D., Army and Navy Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1920. Brunskill, Major G. S., M.C., 18, Talbot Square, Hyde Park, W. 2.
 1922. Brunskill, Captain B. A. S., M.C., 39th Larwhal Rifles, Lansdowne, India.
 1920. Buchanan, Sir G. C., K.C.I.E., Kt., 16, Victoria Street, S.W.
 †Buchanan, W. A., The Cottage, Knebworth, Herts.
 1921. Buchanan, Mrs., 32, Elsworth Road, Hampstead, N.W. 3.
 1921. Bunbury, Captain N. L. St. P., 106th Hazara Pioneers, Fort Sandeman, Baluchistan, India.
 1919. BUNSEN, The Rt. Hon. Sir Maurice de, Bart., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., 3, Portland Place, W. 1. M. of C.
 1919. Burdwan, The Hon. Sir Bijay Chand Mahtab, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., T.O.M., Maharajahdhiraja Bahadur of, The Palace, Bardwan, Bengal, India.
 1921. Burn, Major A. H., O.B.E., 59th Scind Rifles, United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1921. Burn-Murdoch, Major I., O.B.E., Officers' Club, Aldershot.
 1914. Bury, Colonel C. Howard, Bath Club, Dover Street, W. 1.
 1920. Busk, H. Gould, F.G.S., Dodnash Lodge, East Bergholt, Suffolk.
100 1922. Buss, Squadron Leader K. C., R.A.F., Air Headquarters, British Forces in Iraq, Baghdad.
 1921. Butler, F. H. C., South End, St. Cross, Winchester.
 1920. Buxton, Leland W. W., 45, Kensington Park Gardens, W. 11.
 1921. Buxton, Dr. P. Alfred, Dept. of Health, Government House, Jerusalem.

C

1922. Cadogan, Lieut.-Commander Francis, R.N. (ret.), Hatherop Castle, Fairford, Glos.
 1922. Calder, N., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

1920. Cameron, Major G. S., M.C., Dy. Director of Agriculture, Lower Baghdad, Mesopotamia.
1922. Campbell, Captain W. F. C., I.A., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
- + Carey, A. D., I.C.S., Hotel National, Montreux.
1920. Carey, Lieut.-Col. A. B., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E., c/o Director of Public Works, Baghdad; 52, The Close, Norwich.
1920. Carleton, Col. the Hon. Dudley, 21, Upper Berkeley Street, W. 1.
1919. CARNOCK, The Rt. Hon. Lord, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., etc., 53, Cadogan Gardens, S.W. 3. Chairman of C.
1922. Carnock, The Lady, 53, Cadogan Gardens, S.W. 3.
1922. Carroll, Colonel F. Fitzgerald, D.S.O., A.M.S., Dy. Director of Medical Services, Northern Command, York.
1921. Carver, Captain F. E., O.B.E., The Moot, Downton, Salisbury.
1921. Carver, Mrs. L. M., The Moot, Downton, Salisbury.
1921. Castells, Captain E., 6th Gurkha Rifles.
1920. Chakravati, Professor Nilmani, M.A., 18, Sitaram Ghosh Street, Calcutta.
1921. Chamier, Captain A., O.B.E., 55, Warwick Road, S.W. 5.
1921. Champain, Brig.-Gen. H. B., C.B., Oak Lodge, Ham Common, Surrey.
- 120** 1922. Channer, Captain G. O. de R., 7th Gurkha Rifles, c/o National Bank of India, Bombay.
1921. Chapman, Captain A. J. B., I.A.R.O., c/o Messrs. Lloyd's Bank, 72, Lombard Street, E.C. 3.
1921. Chardin, Captain F. W., 20, Empress Avenue, Woodford Green, Essex.
1920. Charge, H. L., Mayfair, Upper Terrace Road, Bournemouth.
1922. Charlesworth, Martin, Jesus College, Cambridge.
1921. Chelmsford, The Rt. Hon. Viscount, G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., G.C.M.G., G.B.E., etc., 116, Eaton Square, S.W. 1.
1920. Chesney, G. M., 69, Courtfield Gardens, S.W. 5.
1920. Childs, W. J., The Quadrangle, Foreign Office, Whitehall, S.W.
1903. *Chirol, Sir Valentine, Kt., 34, Carlyle Square, Chelsea, S.W. 3.
1920. Chitty, Christopher, 24, East Heath Road, Hampstead, N.W.
1918. Christie, Miss A., 7, Stewart's House, Chelsea, S.W. 3.
1920. Christie, Miss E. R., F.R.G.S., Cowden Castle, Dollar, N.B.
1921. Churchill, The Rt. Hon. Winston Spencer, 2, Sussex Square, W. 2.
1920. Clayton, Brig.-Gen. Sir Gilbert F., K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1922. Clayton, Captain J. N., R.G.A., Ministry of Defence, Baghdad.
1919. Coales, Oliver R., H.B.M. Consul-General, Shanghai, China; R. Societies Club, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.
1920. Cobbe, Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. S., V.C., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O., India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1; 3, Onslow Gardens, S.W.

1920. Cole, Major J. J. B., F.R.G.S., Rifle Brigade, Travellers' Club, Pall Mall.
1923. Collas, Major F. J., O.B.E., M.C., R.F.A. (ret.), St. Heliers, Jersey.
- 140** 1918. Collis, Mrs., 17, Hamlet Gardens, Ravenscourt Park, W. 6.
1921. Colvin, Ian, 38, The Ridgeway, Wimbledon, S.W.
1921. Colvin, George, 38, The Ridgeway, Wimbledon, S.W.
1921. Colvin, Mrs., 38, The Ridgeway, Wimbledon, S.W.
1920. Connal-Rowan, Major J. F. Meiklewood, Gargunnoch, Stirlingshire; Bath Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1920. Cooke, Captain R. S., Dalnottarhill, Old Kilpatrick, N.B.
1922. Cooper, Captain E. S. Storey, M.C., c/o Eastern Bank, Ltd., Bombay.
1922. Cooper, Mrs. Bruce, Overcourt, Bisley, Glos.
1923. Cornwall, Lieut.-Colonel, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., R.A., Constantinople.
1920. Cornwallis, Col. Kinahan, C.B.E., D.S.O., F.R.G.S., Adviser to the Ministry of Interior, Baghdad; Carlton Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1921. Coryndon, Sir Robert Thorne, K.C.M.G., Government House, Nairobi, Kenya Colony, Africa.
1920. Costello, Brig.-Gen. E. W., V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.
1920. Costello, Mrs. E. W., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.
1919. Cowell, Mrs. M., 14, Billiter Street, E.C.
1908. Cox, Major-Gen. Sir Percy Z., G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., High Commissioner, Baghdad.
1920. Craufurd, Lt.-Commander C., R.N., c/o National Bank of India, Aden.
1921. Cree, Thomas D., O.B.E., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 65, Cornhill, E.C.
1914. Crewdson, Major W. T. O., R.F.A., Queen Anne's Mansions, S.W. 1.
1921. Cronyn, Sub-Lieutenant St. John, R.N., Naval and Military Club, 94, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1907. Cuninghame, Sir William J., K.C.S.I., I.C.S. (ret.), East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1922. Cunliffe-Owen, Lieut.-Colonel F., C.M.G., Army and Navy Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
- 160** 1907. *CURZON OF KEDLESTON, The Rt. Hon. the Marquis, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Hackwood, near Basingstoke, Hants; 1, Carlton House Terrace, S.W. 1. Hon. President.

D

1921. Daly, Captain T. Denis, Royal Welch Fusiliers, Bath Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1908. Daukes, Major C. T., C.I.E., Political Department, Government of India, Loralai, Baluchistan, India.
1921. Davies, J. Fisher, East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

1906. Davis, W. S., Cogan House, Longhope, Glos.
 1918. Davis, Mrs., 46, Sussex Gardens, Hyde Park, W. 2.
 1920. Deedes, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Wyndham H., C.M.G., D.S.O.
 1922. Devonshire, The Duke of, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., etc.,
 Colonial Office, Downing Street, S.W.
 1922. Dew, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Armine, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., United
 Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1921. Dickson, Colonel W. E. R., C.M.G., C.I.E., Isle Tower,
 Holyrood, Dumfries.
 1919. Digby, Bassett, F.R.G.S., The Old Tannery House, Rick-
 mansworth, Herts.
 1922. Ditchburn, Major A. H., O.B.E., East India United Service
 Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
 1906. Dobbs, Sir H. R. C., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., I.C.S., East India
 United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
 1908. *Donoughmore, The Earl of, 5, Chesterfield Gardens, W. 1.
 1910. Douglas, Lieut.-Colonel H. A., The Vicarage, Langton
 Green, near Tunbridge Wells.
 1920. Douglas, Major-Gen. J. A., C.M.G., C.I.E., Ashmore Lodge,
 Cold Ash, near Newbury, Berks.
 1922. Dowson, V. H. W., Department of Agriculture, Baghdad.
 1921. Drower, C. Stefana, Credit Lyonnais Bank, 14, Cockspur
 Street, S.W. 1.
 1910. Drummond, Miss, Kensington Palace Mansions, W. 8.
 1921. Duggan, C. E., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Karachi, India.
 180 1921. Duncan, J. A. L., Bath Club, Dover Street, W. 1.
 1920. Dunsterville, Col. K. S., C.B., 12, Oakwood Court, Kensing-
 ton, W.
 1920. Dunsterville, Major-Gen. L. C., C.B., The Cronk, Port
 St. Mary, Isle of Man.
 1903. *†Durand, Colonel A. G. A., C.B., C.I.E., 47; Egerton
 Gardens, S.W. 3.
 1907. *Durand, The Right Hon. Sir H. Mortimer, G.C.M.G.,
 K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Penmayne House, Rock, Wadebridge,
 Cornwall.
 1920. Dyer, Brig.-General R. E. H., C.B., Ashtonfields, Ashton
 Keynes.
- E
1922. Eadie, Major J. I., D.S.O., 97th Infantry, I.A., Ministry of
 Defence, Baghdad.
 1921. Edmonds, Major C. J., East India United Service Club,
 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.; c/o High Commissioner,
 Baghdad.
 1920. Egerton, Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. G., K.C.B., K.C.I.E., 43, Cheyne
 Court, S.W. 3.
 1921. Elger, L.C., A.M.I. Mech. E., Queen's House, Kingsway,
 W.C. 2.
 †Elphinstone, Lord, Carlton Club, 94, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1921. Elsmie, Major-General A. M. S., 27, Woodville Gardens,
 Ealing, W. 5.
 1922. Emmerson, Captain C. A., R.A.M.C., 59, Oakley Street,
 Chelsea, S.W. 3.

1920. Empson, C., The White House, Fulford, York.
 1911. Etherton, Lieut.-Colonel P., H.B.M. Consul-General,
 Kashgar.

F

1922. Fagan, Sir Patrick, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., I.C.S., East India
 United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
 1920. Fardell, Mrs. H. A., 16, Brechin Place, S.W. 7.
 1922. Farrell, W. Jerome, M.C., East India United Service Club,
 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
 1921. Farrer, Hon. C. C., 100, Palace Gardens Terrace, Ken-
 sington, W. 8.
 1919. FitzHugh, Capt. J. C., D.S.O., M.V.O., c/o Messrs. Cox and
 Co., 16, Charing Cross.
 200 1921. Flaxman, H. T. M., O.B.E., Assistant Divisional Adviser,
 Mosul, Mesopotamia.
 1916. Forbes, Sir George Stuart, K.C.S.I., Athenæum Club, Pall
 Mall, S.W. 1.
 1920. Forbes, Mrs. Muriel, Naval and Military Hotel, Harrington
 Road, S.W.
 1920. Fowle, Major T. C., I.A., H.B.M. Consul, Seistan and Kain,
 East Persia.
 1921. Fraser, Commander Bruce A., R.N., Whitecroft, Nailsworth,
 Glos.
 1921. Fraser, Captain D. de M. S., Political Dept. Govt. of India,
 c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1920. Fraser, E., 14, Chester Street, S.W. 1.
 1920. Fraser, M. F. A., F.R.G.S., Beaufort, Knaphill, Nr. Woking.
 1922. Fraser, Major W. A. K., D.S.O., M.C., Kabul, Afghanistan.
 1916. Fraser, Sir Stuart M., K.C.S.I., C.I.E., c/o Messrs. H. S.
 King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1921. Fraser, W. M., c/o Messrs. R. G. Shaw and Co., Winchester
 House, Old Broad Street, E. C.
 1921. Fremantle, Lieut.-Colonel F. E., T.D., O.B.E., M.P., Bed-
 well Park, Hatfield.
 1923. French, Bt.-Major B. R., D.S.O., 1st Yemen Infantry,
 United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1922. French, J. C., I.C.S., East India United Service Club, 16,
 St. James's Square, S.W.
 1922. Frew, Rev. Dr. Robert, D.D., c/o Club de Constantinople,
 Pera, Constantinople.
 1921. Frost, Lieut.-Colonel F. D., C.B.E., M.C., I.A., 46, Napier
 Road, Allahabad, U.P., India.
 1920. Fuller, Captain N. B., M.B.E., Cavendish Club, 119, Picca-
 dilly, W. 1.
 1923. Furse, Major R. D., D.S.O., 18, Hanover Terrace, W. 8.

G

1908. Gabriel, Lieut.-Colonel Vivian, C.V.O., C.S.I., Marlborough
 Club, 52, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1919. Garbett, C. C., C.M.G., C.I.E., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and
 Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.

- 220** 1913 Garrard, Major S. H., Cavalry Club, Piccadilly; Welton Place, Daventry, Northants.
 1919. Gaulter, Mrs., 152, Earl's Court Road, S.W. 5.
 1909. Gearon, Miss S., Ladies' Empire Club, 69, Grosvenor Street, W. 1.
 1921. Geary, Mrs., c/o National, Provincial and Union Bank of England, Ltd., 67, Bishop's Road, W. 2.
 1920. Geden, Rev. A. S., Royapettah, Harpenden, Herts.
 1922. Gilkes, Captain G., R.F.A., G.H.Q. British Army in Constantinople, Constantinople.
 1922. Gillman, Major-General Sir Webb, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., R.F.A., Royal Military Academy, Woolwich.
 1922. Goldie, Major Henry, c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Alexandria.
 1919. Goold-Adams, Col. Sir H. E. F., K.B.E., C.M.G., Jamesbrook, Middleton, Co. Cork; United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1920. Gorbould, Captain Roland, R.A.O.C., F.R.G.S., 11, Harvard Street, Montclair, New Jersey, U.S.A.
 1920. Gordon, Lieut.-Col. P. J., O.B.E., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1922. Gore, Major F. L., 113th Infantry, I.A., Ministry of Defence, Baghdad.
 1920. Gourlay, W. R., C.I.E., 23, Old Court Mansions, W. 8.
 1922. Govan, Mrs. D. M., 60, Bickenhall Mansions, W. 1.
 1920. Gowan, Captain C. H., M.C., 13th Hussars, Cavalry Club, Piccadilly.
 1920. Graham, Colonel R. J. D., Dunalastair, North Inch, Perth.
 1921. Grant, Sir A. Hamilton, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Brooks's Club, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.
 1921. Gray, Lawrence, c/o Irrigation Directorate, Baghdad.
 1922. Gray, Mrs. R. M., 3, Holford Road, N.W. 3.
 1922. Greatwood, H. E., 123rd Outram Rifles, I.A., c/o Messrs. Grindlay, Groome and Co., Bombay.
240 1922. Green, Colonel Bernard C., C.M.G., T.D., 59, Buckingham Gate, S.W. 1.
 1920. Gregson, Lieut.-Col. E. G., C.M.G., C.I.E., Bunerana, Rake, Liss, Hants.
 1920. Gray, Lieut.-Col. W. George, Solars, Chiddingfold, Surrey.
 1920. Grieve, Captain A. McLeod, 3rd Black Watch, 21, Queen's Crescent, Edinburgh.
 1920. Griffin, Captain A. C., O.B.E., R.E., Deputy Director of Railways, Iraq Railway Directorate, Baghdad.
 1921. Grove White, Major M. FitzG., D.S.O., O.B.E., R.E., R.E. Office, Maryhill Barracks, Glasgow.
 1921. Gumbley, Douglas W., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

H

1920. Hadow, Major H. R., 15th Sikhs, United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1922. Haig, Lieut.-Colonel Sir T. W., K.C.I.E., C.B., North Lodge, St. Leonards-on-Sea, Sussex.

1920. Hall, Captain A. H., O.B.E., Annfield, Rothesay, Scotland.
1922. Hall, H. R., D.Litt., F.S.A., British Museum, Bloomsbury, W.C.
1922. Hallinan, Captain T. J., R.A.M.C., 77, Southside, Clapham Common, S.W.
1920. Harapvasad, Mahamohopadhyaya, Shastri, C.I.E., F.A.S.B., 26, Pataldanga Street, Calcutta.
1920. HARDINGE, The Rt. Hon. Sir A., G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Coldharbour, West Hoathley, Sussex. M. of C.
1918. Harford, Frederic Dundas, C.V.O., 49, Egerton Gardens, S.W. 3.
1921. Harker, O. Allan, Indian Police, 18, Portsea Place, W. 2.
1921. Harris, F. J., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
1921. Harris, Captain L. J., O.B.E., c/o Director of Works, Jerusalem.
1922. Harrison, Captain Cyril, East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
1920. Haughton, Lieut.-Colonel H. L., 36th Sikhs, c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
- 260** 1921. Hauser, Captain S. B., "Gleniffer," Weston-super-Mare, Somerset.
1920. Hay, Captain W. R., Assistant Commissioner, Bannu, N.-W.F.P., India.
1922. Haycraft, Sir Thomas Wagstaffe, Chief Justice, Jerusalem, Palestine.
1920. Headley, R. H., India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
1922. Henderson, Lady, D.B.E., 17, West Eaton Place, S.W.
1920. Hendley, Major-Gen. H., C.S.I., Hon. Surgeon to H.M. the King, Caxton, near Cambridge.
1922. Henry, Colonel Sir W. D., C.I.E., V.D., 6^o, Bickenhall Mansions, W. 1.
1921. Hiles, Major M., O.B.E., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
1919. Hill, Lt. H. Brian, F.R.G.S., c/o Messrs. King, Hamilton and Co., Calcutta, India.
1923. Hill, Sir Claude H. A., K.C.S.I., C.I.E., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.
1923. Hilleary, Mrs., 2, Tregunter Road, S.W. 10.
1923. Hindmarsh, Captain J. H. L., 119th Infantry, I.A., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
1922. Hogarth, D. G., C.M.G., D.Litt., 20, St. Giles, Oxford.
- *†Holdich, Colonel Sir Thomas H., K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E., C.B., Parklands, Merrow, Surrey.
1922. Holt, Captain V., c/o High Commissioner, Baghdad.
1921. Holt, Major A. L., M.B.E., M.C., R.E., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1919. Hope, Miss T. M., Crix, Hatfield Peverel, Witham, Essex.
1921. Horridge, J., Haverholme, Bramhall, Cheshire.
1921. Hotson, J. E. B., I.C.S., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., Post Box, 93, Bombay.
1920. Houstoun, G. L., The Farm, Kyrenia, Cyprus.

- 280** 1908. Howell, Lieut.-Col. E. B., C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1; Foreign Office, Delhi-Simla, India.
1921. Hughes, J. A., M.C., 67, Castletown Road, W. 14.
1922. Humphrys, Major Francis H., C.I.E., H.B.M. Minister, Kabul, Afghanistan.
1921. Hunt, Captain J. M., 87th Punjabis, I.A., The Red Cottage, Baschurch, Shrewsbury.
1921. Hunt, Captain W. E., Hillside, Bath.
1920. Hunter-Weston, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Aylmer, K.C.B., D.S.O., D.L., M.P., 2, Culford Gardens, S.W. 3; Hunsterton, West Kilbride, N.B.
1918. Hunter, Mrs., 81, Holland Park, W. 11.

I

1922. Inchcape of Strathraiver, The Right Hon. Lord, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., 122, Leadenhall Street, E.C. 3.
1916. India, Foreign and Political Department of Government, Delhi.
1906. India, Secretary of State for, India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
1915. Ingram, Captain M. B., Foreign Office, Whitehall, S.W.
1922. Ingrams, W. H., Chake Chake, Pembu, Zanzibar.
1922. Ironside, Major-General Sir Edmund, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., The Staff College, Camberley.

J

1921. Jacob, General Sir Claud W., K.C.B., Chief of the General Staff in India, Simla, India.
- *†JAMES, Sir Evan, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Glenshee, Cambridge Park, Twickenham. Vice-President.
1922. James, Lieut.-Colonel Hon. Cuthbert, O.B.E., M.P., 3, Ormonde Gate, Chelsea, S.W.
- †Jardine, Mrs., 25, Nevern Place, S.W. 5.
1921. Jardine, R. F., Assistant Political Officer, Dohuk, Mosul.
- *†Jardine, W. E., C.I.E., I.C.S., The Residency, Gwalior, Central India.
1922. Jelf, Arthur, Malayan C.S.; Athenæum Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
- 300** 1920. Jhalawar, H. H. Maharaj Rana Sri Bhawani Singh, Sahib Bahadur of, K.C.I.E., Jhalrapatan, Rajputana.
1923. Joy, Lieut. G. A., 1st Yemen Infantry, Sheikh Othman, Arabia.
1921. Joyce, Lieut.-Col. P. C., C.B.E., D.S.O., Army and Navy Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.

K

1920. Kay, Professor D. M., "Kildonan," St. Andrew's, Fife, N.B.
1920. Keeling, E. H., M.C., United University Club, 1, Suffolk Street, S.W. 1.
- 1907.†*Kelly, Col. J. G., C.B., 1, West Cromwell Road, Kensington, S.W. 5.

1913. Kemp, Miss, 26, Harley House, Regent's Park, N.W. 1.
 1921. Kennett, Mrs. Barrington, Remenham, Wraysbury, Bucks.
 1921. Kerr, Captain E. Teviott, I.A., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1920. Kettlewell, Captain L., D.S.O., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., 16, Charing Cross, S.W.
 †King, Sir H. Seymour, K.C.I.E., 25, Cornwall Gardens, S.W. 7.
 1922. Kirkpatrick, Lieut.-General Sir George M., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Naval and Military Club, 94, Piccadilly, W. 1.
 1922. Kirk, Captain F. C. de L., 5th Batt. K.A.R., Northern Frontier, Kenya Colony, Africa.
 1922. Knapton, A. G. H., Rope Hill, Lymington.
 1922. Knollys, Major Denis E., 19th Punjabis, c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.

L

1921. Ladd, W. E., Post Box 39, Baghdad.
 1921. Laidlaw, Lieut. R. E. F., Army and Navy Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1920. Laithwaite, John G., India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
 1922. Lake, Lieut.-Colonel M. C., 1st Yemen Infantry, Aden.
 1904.†*Lamington, The Rt. Hon. Lord, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., 26, Wilton Crescent, S.W. 1.
320 1920. Lane, D. A., R.R. No. 1, St. Anne's, Ontario, Canada.
 1921. Lane, Lieut.-Colonel W. B., C.I.E., C.B.E., I.M.S., 35, Westholm, Addison Way, Golder's Green, N.W. 11.
 1920. Lang, Commander G. H., D.S.O., R.N., 13, Abbey Court, Abbey Road, N.W.
 1920. Law, Narendra Nath, M.A., B.L., P.R.S., 96, Amherst Street, Calcutta.
 1921. Lee, W. H., Wymondham, Hythe, Kent; Railways, Shuaibah, Iraq.
 1920. Lees, Captain G. Martin, M.C., D.F.C., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
 1921. Lees, Mrs. H. L., F.R.G.S., 1, Prince's Row, Buckingham Gate, S.W.
 1921. Lee-Warner, Captain W. Hamilton, S.S.C.S., Singapore.
 1920. Léon, M. Henri M., Ph.D., LL.D., 8, Taviton Street, Gordon Square, W.C.
 1921. Leslie, Lieut. L., Shropshire L.I., The Barracks, Shrewsbury.
 1922. Lester, G. A., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co. (F), 16, Charing Cross, S.W.
 1920. Leveson-Gower, Col. C., C.M.G., C.B.E., 13, Cottesmore Gardens, Kensington, W. 8.
 1922. List, J. N., M.C., A.M.I.C.E., c/o Messrs. T. Cook and Sons, Ludgate Circus, E.C.
 1921. Lloyd, Captain H. I., M.C., O.B.E., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
 1921. Lloyd, Major C. G., C.I.E., M.C., Bath Club, Piccadilly, W. 1; The Abbey, Penally, Pem.

1908. *Lloyd, H. E., Sir George A., G.C.I.E., D.S.O., Government House, Bombay.
1912. Loch, Major P. G., I.A., Political Dept., Government of India, c/o Messrs. The Alliance Bank of Simla, Ltd., Simla, India.
1921. Loch, Lieut.-Colonel G. H., C.I.E., I.A. (retd.), United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1908. Lockhart, Lady, C.I., 187, Queen's Gate, S.W. 7.
1920. Longrigg, Major S. H., Political Officer, Mesopotamia.
- 340** 1918. Lovett, Major-General Beresford, C.B., C.S.I., Hillside, Harvey Road, Guildford.
1921. Lovett, Sir H. Verney, K.C.S.I., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.
1920. Lowis, H. R., I.A., 2, Woodland Road, Upper Norwood, S.E. 19.
1921. Lubbock, Brig.-General G., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E., Furze Hill, Marguretting, Essex.
1922. Lumby, Major A. F. Rawson, 69th Punjabis, Army Headquarters, Delhi, India.
1909. Lyall, Lieut.-Colonel, R.A., I.A., 3rd Kashmir Rifles, c/o Messrs. Grindlay & Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
1923. Lyell, E. T. R., 19, Comeragh Road, W. 14.
1921. Lynch, Stephen, c/o Euphrates and Tigris S.N. Co., 3, Salter's Hall Court, E.C.
1922. Lynden-Bell, Captain L. A., M.C., 2nd Seaforth Highlanders, Meerut, U.P., India.
1922. Lytton, H.E. the Earl of, Calcutta.

M

1909. *Macartney, Sir George, K.C.I.E., Les Vaux, St. Saviour's, Jersey, Channel Isles.
1922. Macdonald, Lieut.-Colonel F., I.A. (ret.), East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
1922. M'Cleverty, Major P. H., 20th D. C. O. Infantry, I.A., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
1915. McCoy, Mrs., c/o Messrs. Glyn, Mills, and Co., 67, Lombard Street, E.C. 3.
1921. McGrath, Lieut.-Colonel A. T., 43, South Audley Street, W. 1.
1920. McGrath, Mrs. (Rosita Forbes), 43, South Audley Street, W. 1.
1920. MacGregor, Lady, Hampton Court Palace, Hampton Court.
1922. Machray, Robert, 78, Cromwell Road, S.W. 7.
1921. McIntyre, Captain H. M. J., I.A., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Charing Cross, S.W.
1921. Mackarness, H. J. C., Travellers' Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
- 360** 1921. Mackay, F. F., Leigh Vineries, Wimborne, Dorset.
1920. Mackenzie, Lady M. M. Owen, 6, Chesham Street, S.W. 1. Brantham Court, Suffolk.
1923. Mackenzie, J. M., M.C., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.

1920. Mackie, Captain J. B., Castle Cary, Somerset.
1921. Mackintosh, C. A. G., Bath Club, Dover Street, W. 1.;
Gezira Gardens, Cairo.
1906. *McMahon, Lieut.-Colonel Sir H., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., 59,
Pont Street, S.W. 1.
1922. MacMichael, H. A., c/o Civil Secretary, Khartoum.
1920. McNearnie, Captain H. D., East India United Service Club,
16, St. James's Square, S.W.
1922. Maconochie, R. R., I.C.S., British Legation, Kabul.
1920. Macpherson, C. F., c/o Messrs. Gray, Mackenzie and Co.,
Basra.
1908. *Malcolm, Major-General Sir Neill, K.C.B., D.S.O., Singa-
pore, S.S.
1921. Malleson, Major-General Sir Wilfrid, K.C.I.E., C.B., Fox-
hurst, Ashvale, Surrey.
1922. Mann, Alexander, 64, Lancaster Gate, W. 2.
1922. Mann, J. S., Hazeldene, South Hill, Bromley.
1921. Marklew, E. G., 23, Richmond Road, W. 2.
1920. Marling, Sir Charles, K.C.M.G., H.B.M. Embassy, The
Hague.
1920. Marrs, Major R., C.I.E., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54,
Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
1921. Marshall, Justice J. E., Egyptian National Court of Appeal,
Zamaleh, Gezira, Cairo.
1923. Martin, Lieut. R., 1st Yemen Infantry, Sheikh Othman,
Arabia.
1922. Martin, Miss F., Valnino, Sedalia, California.
1920. Massy, Col. P. H. Hamon, C.B.E., United Service Club,
Pall Mall.
1920. Mathieson, Wilfred, Minchinhampton, Glos.
1920. May, Major W. R. S., C.I.E., Twyford House, Alnmouth.
1912. Medlicott, Lieut.-Colonel H., Cavalry Club, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1922. Mélas, Major G., Devonshire Club, St. James's Street, S.W.
1920. Mellor, Donald, 180, The Grove, Wandsworth, S.W. 18.
1920. MICHELL, Roland, C.M.G., 22, Lansdowne Crescent, W. 11.
Hon. Librarian.
1920. Millard, W. S., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament
Street, S.W.
1922. Mills, E., Royal Societies' Club, St. James's Street, S.W.
1922. Milne, George, I.C.S., Craigellie, Lonmay, Aberdeenshire.
1922. Milne, J. L., c/o Messrs. Shaw, Wallace and Co., Post Box
70, Calcutta.
1922. Milnes-Gaskell, The Lady Constance, 47, Pont Street, S.W.
1920. Minchin, Captain H. C. Stephens, c/o Messrs. Cox and Co.,
Charing Cross, S.W.
1921. Moberly, Brig.-General F. J., C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., P.C.S.,
Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defence, 2,
Whitehall Gardens, S.W.
1920. Mocatta, Major V. E., O.B.E., 14th Hussars, 31, Great
Cumberland Place, W.
1922. Moens, Colonel A. M., C.M.G., D.S.O., India Office, White-
hall, S.W.

1920. Molony, Wm. O'Sullivan, Christ Church, Oxford.
1921. Monro, General Sir C. C., Bart., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G.,
A.D.C.Gen., 20, Egerton Gardens, S.W. Vice-President.
1920. Monteath, D. Taylor, O.B.E., India Office, Whitehall, S.W.
1921. Monteath, G., I.C.S., Buckerell Lodge, Honiton, Devon.
- 400** 1922. Montgomery, Major-General Sir A. A., K.C.B., Pitchford
Hall, Shropshire.
1920. Mookerji, Dr. Radhakumad, M.A., Ph.D., Professor, Mysore
University, Mysore.
1908. *Moon, E. R. P., 6, Onslow Gardens, S.W. 7. M. of C.
1921. Moore, Captain J. H., Walton Grange, Swindon, Wilts.
1922. Moore, Major Arthur, 9, Chester Terrace, Eaton Square,
S.W.
1920. More, Major J. C., D.S.O., 51st Sikhs (F.F.), Political
Agency, Kuwait, Persian Gulf.
1921. Morgan, C. Stuart, c/o Messrs. Strick, Scott and Co., Ltd.,
Old Broad Street, E.C.
1920. Morison, Sir Theodor, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Overdale, Lindis-
farne Road, Newcastle-on-Tyne.
1922. Morland, Major W. E. T., D.S.O., M.C., Army and Navy
Club, 36, Pall Mall, S.W.
1922. Morrison, A. B., c/o Messrs. Shaw, Wallace and Co.,
Bombay.
1921. Mousley, Captain E. O., R.F.A., Oxford and Cambridge
Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1920. Mukhopadhyaya, Panchanana (Hon. Presidency Magistrate),
46, Bechu Chatterji Street, Calcutta.
1920. Mules, Sir Chas., K.C.S.I., M.V.O., O.B.E., 29, Bramham
Gardens, S.W. 5.
1920. Mumm, Arnold L., F.R.G.S., 112, Gloucester Terrace, W. 2.
1920. Murchison, C. K., M.P., Hargrave Hall, near Kimbolton,
Huntingdon.
1921. Murphy, Lieut.-Colonel C. C. R., 83rd Infantry, I.A., Can-
nanore, Malabar, India; Army and Navy Club, Pall
Mall, S.W.
- †Murray, John, M.A., D.L., J.P., F.S.A., 50A, Albemarle
Street, Piccadilly, W. 1.
1920. Murray, Major S. G. C., C.I.E., I.A., c/o High Commissioner,
Baghdad.
1921. Muspratt, Colonel S. F., C.S.I., D.S.O., A.D.C., 12th Cavalry,
I.A., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
1915. Mylne, Miss Nina, Blenheim Cottage, Nuffield, Henley-on-
Thames.
- 420** 1916. Mysore, The Hon. the Resident, Bangalore, S. India.

N

1922. Nalder, L. F., C.B.E., C.I.E., Savile Club, 107, Piccadilly,
W. 1.
1920. Napier, Major A. Harper, I.M.S., c/o Marshall, Terne, N.
Queensferry, N.B.
1921. Nariman, R. K., M.I.C.E., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co.
9, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.

1921. Newton, Mrs. Frances E., 156, Sloane Street, S.W. 1.
 1922. Nicolson, Major the Hon. F. A., M.C., 15th Hussars, 53, Cadogan Gardens, S.W. 3.
 1922. Nightingale, Colonel M. R. W., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W. 1.
 1923. Nightingale, Major G. W., M.C., 1st Yemen Infantry, Army and Navy Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1920. Noel, Major E., C.I.E., D.S.O. (Political Dept. Govt. of India), Travellers' Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1920. Noel, Major J. B. L., c/o Royal Geographical Society, Kensington Gore, S.W. 1.
 1920. Noone, H. V. V., c/o Messrs. R. G. Shaw and Co., Winchester House, Old Broad Street, E.C. 3.
 1921. Norbury, Major P. F., D.S.O., I.A., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1922. Norris, Captain David, C.B., C.M.G., R.N., c/o Admiralty, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
 1921. Northcote, D. S., 23, Royal Avenue, Chelsea, S.W. 3.

O

1922. Oatway, Captain S. H., 93rd Burma Infantry, c/o Messrs. T. Cook and Son, Ludgate Circus, E.C.
 1920. O'Connor, Captain K. K. O., M.C., 14th Sikhs, c/o Deputy Commissioner, Abbotabad.
 1921. O'Connor, Captain R. L., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
 1906. O'Connor, Lieut.-Colonel W. F. T., C.I.E., R.A., British Legation, Nepal, India.
 1922. Oddie, Philip, M.C., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
 1920. O'Dwyer, Sir Michael F., G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., 26, Brechin Place, S.W. 7. M. of C.
440 1921. Olver, Lieut.-Colonel A., C.B., C.M.G., c/o Messrs. Holt and Co., Whitehall Place, S.W.
 1920. *Ormsby-Gore, Major the Hon. W. G. A., M.P., J.P., D.L., F.R.G.S., 5, Mansfield Street, Cavendish Square, W. 1.
 1922. Osmond, Captain W. R. Fiddes, R.A., United University Club, Suffolk Street, S.W. 1.
 1921. Outlaw, Captain W. H., 40, Charles Street, Berkhamstead.

P

1920. Parker, Lieut.-Col. A. C., D.S.O., Governor of Sinai Peninsula, Arish, Sinai.
 1920. Parr, E. Robert, Black Birches, Hadnall, Shrewsbury.
 1908. Payne, Mrs. Wood, 101, Philbeach Gardens, S.W. 5.
 1921. Pead, T. D., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
 1922. Peake, Bay, Inspector-General of Gendarmerie, Aman, Transjordan.

1920. Pearce, Captain M. Channing, Cintra, Swanage, Dorset.
 1921. Pedder, Captain G. R., 13th Hussars, East India
 United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square,
 S.W. 1.
 1921. Peek, Sir Wilfrid, Bart., D.S.O.
 1922. Peel, E. G. B., East India United Service Club, 16, St.
 James's Square, S.W. 1.
 †Peel, The Viscount, 52, Grosvenor Street, W. 1.
 1907. Pemberton, Col. E. St. Clair, R.E. (ret.), Pyrland Hall,
 Taunton.
 *†PENTON, Sir E., K.B.E., 2, Cambridge Terrace, Regent's
 Park, N.W. 1. Vice-President and Hon. Treasurer.
 1920. Peralta, Miss Louise, 45, Powis Square, W. 11.
 †Perowne, Lieut.-Col. J. T. Woolrych, 32, Lowndes
 Square, S.W.
 1919. Philby, H. St. John, C.I.E., I.C.S., c/o Aman, Trans-
 jordan.
 1921. Phillips, Miss L. B., 9, Rosslyn Mansions, S. Hampstead,
 N.W. 3.
460 1908. Phipson, H., 10, Hyde Park Mansions, N.W. 1.
 1920. Pickthall, C. M., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's
 Square, S.W. 1.
 1920. Pickthall, Mrs. W. M., c/o Ladies' Army and Navy Club,
 Burlington Gardens, W. 1.
 *†Picot, Lieut.-Colonel H. P., Indian Army (ret.), 86,
 Ebury Street, S.W. 1, Junior United Service Club.
 M. of C.
 1921. Pitcairn, G. D., White Cottage, Ampport, Andover.
 1920. Platt, Sir T. Comyn, 47, Cadogan Place, S.W. 1.
 1920. Popham, Lieut.-Colonel E. Leyborne, D.S.O., c/o Messrs.
 Grindlay and Co., Bombay.
 1922. de Pouquet, Lieut.-Commander J. B., O.B.E., R.N., c/o
 Crown Agents to the Colonies, Millbank, S.W.
 1922. Price, Brig.-Gen. C. H. Uvedale, C.B., D.S.O., I.A. (ret.),
 The Mount, Winterbourne, Nr. Bristol.
 1921. Prichard, J., Judicial Department, Baghdad; Wick, Glamor-
 ganshire, Wales.
 1921. Prior, Mrs. Upton, Ethorpe, Gerrard's Cross, Bucks.
 1921. Pulley, Major H. C., O.B.E., I.A., c/o Eastern Bank,
 4, Crosby Square, E.C.

R

1923. Raglan, The Lord, Queen Anne's Mansions, St. James's
 Park, S.W.
 1910. Raines, Lady, 46, Sussex Gardens, Hyde Park, W. 2.
 1921. Ralston, Lieut.-Colonel W. H., 47th Sikhs, c/o Messrs. T.
 Cook and Son, Ludgate Circus, E.C.
 1922. Ramsay, Lieut.-Colonel Sir John, K.C.I.E., 1, Cleveland
 Terrace, W. 2.
 1920. Rawlinson, General The Lord, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G.,
 Commander-in-Chief, India.

1922. Rawlinson, Colonel Alfred, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., The Cottage, Oxgate Lane, Cricklewood, N.W.
1921. Ready, Major-General F. F., C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., Lynch House, Winchester.
1921. Redl, Lieut.-Colonel E. A. F., C.M.G., C.I.E., The Sycamores, Newick, Sussex; Naval and Military Club, 94, Piccadilly, W. 1.
- 480** 1923. Relton, T. L., Southernhay, Warmingham, Surrey.
1920. Reynardson, Capt. H. Birch, 1st Oxford and Bucks L.I., 2, Devonshire Terrace, Hyde Park, W. 2.
1922. Richards, Captain E. I. G., Army Educational Corps, School of Education, Wellington, S. India.
1912. Richmond, Mrs. Bruce, 3, Sumner Place, S.W.
1923. Ridding, Miss, 15, Vicarage Gate, W. 8.
1922. Ridge-Jones, I., M.C., Health Directorate, Ministry of Interior, Baghdad.
1919. Ridgeway, Col. R. Kirby, V.C., C.B., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1904. Ridgeway, Rt. Hon. Sir West, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., LL.D., etc., 37, Threadneedle Street, E.C.
1921. Rivett-Carnac, Captain H. G., I.A., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1922. Roberts, Captain A. H., Palace Chambers, Bridge Street, Westminster, S.W.
1921. Roberts-Goddard "Yaverland," Palace Road, Streatham, S.W.
1921. Robertson, Field-Marshal Sir William R., Bart., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., D.S.O., etc., 88, Westbourne Terrace, W. 2.
1921. Robertson, Algar, 26, Porchester Terrace, W. 2.
1921. Robertson, Miss R., 26, Porchester Terrace, W. 2.
1921. Robertson, Miss V., 26, Porchester Terrace, W. 2.
1923. Robertson, Sir Benjamin, K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., India Office, Whitehall, S.W.
1920. Robinson, Captain F. A., M.C., R.A.M.C., The Vicarage, Holme on Spalding Moor, Yorks.
1922. Roche, Lady, Stoneleigh House, Buckingham.
1920. Rodd, Major W. J. P., D.S.O., R.A.O.C.
- *†RONALDSHAY, The Earl of, Snelsmore House, Newbury. Vice-President.
- 500** 1920. Rooker, S. K., M.C., 63, St. James's Street, S.W.
1914. Rose, Archibald, C.I.E., 46, Abingdon Villas, Kensington, W. 8.
1922. Roys, Rear-Admiral Percy, C.M.G., R.N., 20, Chelsea Park Gardens, S.W. 3.
1921. Rundle, Captain C. A. Grant, M.C., c/o Messrs. Henry S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.
1922. Ruthven, Colonel Hon. A. G. Hore, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Cavalry Club, Piccadilly, W.
1920. Rynd, Major F. F., D.S.O., R.A., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.

S

1922. Sampson, A. C., M.C., 1, Elgin Court, Elgin Avenue, W. 9.
 1923. Samuel, Miss M. Sylvester, 19, Cadogan Place, S.W. 1.
 †Sandbach, General A. E., C.B., D.S.O., R.E., Naval and Military Club, 94, Piccadilly, W. 1.
 1923. Sandeman Major D., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides, Peshawar, India.
 1923. Scarlett, Major Hon. P. G., M.C., War Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
 1922. Scott, Lieut.-Colonel Norman, C.I.E., I.M.S. (ret.), Eastcott, Hatfield, Herts.
 1922. Scott-Moncrieff, Major-General Sir G. K., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.I.E., R.E., 31, Ladbroke Square, W. 11.
 1922. Seton, Sir Malcolm, K.C.B., 26, Upper Park Road, N.W. 3.
 1918. Shah, Sirdar Ikbāl Ali, c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, S.W.
 1920. Shakespear, Lieut.-Colonel J., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., 15, Alexandra Court, W. 9.
 1920. Shakespear, Col. L. Waterfield, C.B., C.I.E., Sutton Cottage, Sutton Valence, Kent.
 1923. Shakespear, Lieut.-Colonel W. F., I.A. (ret.), Auckland, New Zealand.
 1921. Shepherd, Miss E., 66, Queen's Gate, S.W. 7.
 1922. Sheppard, Sir William D., K.C.I.E., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
520 1919. Silberrad, C. A., I.C.S., Park House, Combe Martin, N. Devon.
 1920. Simpson, J. Alexr., India Office, Whitehall, S.W.
 1921. Simpson, B. Lenox, c/o British Legation, Peking, China.
 1920. Sircar, Ganapati, 69, Beliaghata Main Rd., Calcutta.
 1922. Skrine, Clarmont Perceval, I.C.S., c/o Messrs. King, King and Co., Bombay.
 1920. Skrine, F. H., C.S.I., 147, Victoria Street, S.W.
 1920. Slater, Captain A., I.A.R.O., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Charing Cross.
 1920. Slater, Mrs. E. M., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament Street, W. 1.
 1920. Smith, A. L. F., M.V.O., Balliol College, Oxford.
 1920. Smith, Captain Godwin, Royal Auto Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1922. Snelling, Captain C. G., I.A., Indian Political Dept., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1921. Spencer, Dr. Gordon, St. James's Vicarage, Preston, Lancs.
 1922. Spencer, Hugh, C.I.E., I.C.S. (ret.), 5, Clifton Gardens, W. 9.
 1922. Spencer, Mrs. Mowbray, 5, Clifton Gardens, W. 9.
 1916. Spranger, John Alfred, 2nd. Lieut. R.E., 4, Via Michele, Florence, Italy.
 1922. Stack, Major-General Sir Lee O. Fitz M., K.B.E., C.M.G., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
 1920. Stanham, Major H. F., R.A., Michen Hall, Shackleford, Godalming.

1922. Stanley, Lieut.-Colonel J. H., C.B.E., Royal Societies' Club, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.
1917. H.M. Stationery Office, Princes Street, S.W. 1 (Journal subscriber).
1921. Starkie, Mrs. Maud, 3, Aldford Street, Park Lane, W. 1.
- 540** 1923. Steel, Colonel R. A., C.M.G., C.I.E., The Red House, Watlington, Maidstone.
1909. Stein, Sir Aurel, K.C.I.E., Ph.D., D.Litt., D.Sc. Superintendent Arch. Survey, Frontier Circle, N.-W.F. Province, India.
1920. STEPHENSON, G. C., 99, Inverness Terrace, W. 2. M. of C. Joint Hon. Sec.
1921. Stephen, Major F. W., M.C., Royal Societies' Club, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.
1921. Stevenson, Lieut.-Colonel K. L., R.A.O.C., G.H.Q., Ordnance Depot, York.
1920. Stewart, C. W., 3, Newburgh Road, Acton.
1923. Stewart, F. W., M.C., Koraput, Vizapatam, Madras.
1920. Stewart, G., M.P., House of Commons, Westminster; Whiteholme, Hoylake, Cheshire.
1923. Stewart, S. F., C.I.E., India Office, Whitehall, S.W.
1920. Stirling, Lieut.-Col. W. F., D.S.O., The Residency, Jaffa, Palestine.
1907. STOKES, Colonel C. B., C.I.E., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1. M. of C.
1921. Storrs, Mrs. F. E., 65, Chester Square, S.W. 1.
1922. Strong, Kenneth, Royal Scots Fusiliers, Ciledhow Hall, Roundhay, Leeds.
1921. Sutton, Major-General H. C., C.B., C.M.G., 9, Elvaston Place, S.W. 7.
1921. Swan, L. M., c/o Ministry of Finance, Baghdad.
1920. Swettenham, Sir F. A., G.C.M.G., C.B., 43, Seymour Street, W. 1.
1920. Sydenham, The Rt. Hon. Lord, of Combe, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., etc., The Priory, Lamberhurst, Kent.
1920. Sykes, Lady, Sledmere, Malton.
- †SYKES, Miss Ella, 26, St. George's Court, S.W. 7. M. of C.
1905. Sykes, Miss Ethel R., 29, Trevor Square, Knightsbridge, S.W. 7.
- 560** 1904. Sykes, H. R., Lydham Manor, Bishop's Castle, Shropshire.
1907. Sykes, Brigadier-General Sir Percy M., K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G., Athenæum Club, Pall Mall, S.W.

T

1921. Tainish, Lieut.-Col. J. R., Railway Directorate, Baghdad.
1922. Talbot, Colonel F., 40, Queen's Gate Terrace, S.W. 7.
1920. Talbot, Colonel the Hon. G. Milo, C.B., Bifrons, Canterbury.
1903. Tanner, Miss, 8, Cavendish Place, Bath.
1920. Tatton, R. Grey, 2, Somers Place, Hyde Park, W. 2.
1908. Taylor, Arthur Boddam, c/o Mesopotamia Persia Corp., Tehran, Persia.

1919. Teichman, Eric, C.I.E., Sitka, Chislehurst, Kent; British Legation, Peking, China.
1920. Temple, Lt.-Col. Sir Richard, Bart., C.B., C.I.E., F.S.A., India Office, Whitehall, S.W.
1922. Tennant, Hon. Mrs., St. Anne's Manor, Sutton, Loughborough.
1905. Thomas, F. W., Ph.D., India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
1921. Thomas, Captain H. Prichard, 126th Baluchistan Regt., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Charing Cross.
1921. Thomas, Major E. C., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
1922. Thomas, Captain B. S., O.B.E., Aman, Transjordan.
1921. Thomas, Roger, Agricultural Directorate, Baghdad.
1922. Thompson, Captain David, 15th Lancers, I.A., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1; c/o Messrs. The Alliance Bank of Simla, Ewart House, Bombay.
1920. Thomson, J. S., I.C.S., Greenham Common, Newbury.
1921. Thomson, Colonel Sir W. M., K.C.M.G., C.B., M.C., Cardrona, Dunblane, Perthshire.
1919. Thorburn, Major H. Hay, c/o Messrs. Grindlay & Co., Bombay.
- 580** 1921. Thornton, Lieut.-Col. C. E., C.M.G., 16th Cavalry, I.A., The Heath, Hindhead, Surrey.
1922. Thorpe, Miss M., 25, Pembridge Gardens, Notting Hill Gate, W. 11.
1922. Thuillier, Major L. C., I.A. (Survey of India), c/o Messrs. T. Cook and Son, Ludgate Circus, E.C.
1908. Tod, Colonel J. K., C.M.G., Standlynch, Four Marks, Hants.
1921. Todd, Captain H. I., Imperial Police, 45, Lee Road, Blackheath, S.E. 3.
1921. Tomlinson, A. G., c/o Messrs. Hills Bros. Co., Basra, Persian Gulf.
1921. Tozer, P. H. S., Junior Constitutional Club, Piccadilly.
1920. Trench, Rev. A. C., M.C., Chaplain's Office, Bolarun, Deccan, India.
1920. Trott, Captain A. C., 5th Devon Regt., St. John's College, Cambridge.
1919. Trotter, Lady, 18, Eaton Place, S.W. 1.
1922. Trotter, Miss Angela, 18, Eaton Place, S.W.
1922. Trotter, Miss Jacqueline, 18, Eaton Place, S.W.
1908. *Tucker, A. L. P., C.I.E., Hayes, Northiam, Sussex.
1923. Turner, Colonel A. J., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.A., Junior United Service Club, Charles Street, S.W.
1921. Tweedie, Mrs. Alec, 2, Whitehall Court, S.W. 1.
1923. Twining, Lady, 48, Prince's Gate, S.W. 1.
1920. Tyler, H. H. F., C.I.E., I.C.S., c/o Imperial Bank of India, Madras.

V

1921. Välyi, Felix, 115, St. James's Court, Buckingham Gate, S.W. 1.
1905. Vanderbyl, P. B., B4, The Albany, Piccadilly, W. 1.

1920. Varma, Raj Kumar N. Chandra Deb, Comilla, Tipperah, India.
- 600** 1911. Vaughan, Mrs., 32, Knightsbridge, S.W.
1922. Venning, E. G., Liskcard, Cornwall.
1922. Vickery, Lieut.-Colonel C. E., C.M.G., D.S.O., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.

W

1921. Waley, A., Alderhurst, Englefield Green, Surrey.
1922. Waley, R. P. S., Royal West Kents, Alderhurst, Englefield Green, Surrey.
1921. Waley, Captain E. G. S., 14, Oxford Square, W. 2.
1923. Walker, Colonel Sir James, C.I.E., V.D., 7, Grosvenor Street, W. 1.
1921. Wallace, Lieut.-Colonel C. L. Willoughby, 209, Ashley Gardens, S.W. 1.
1921. Wallace, Mrs. E. F., c/o Messrs. Smythe and Co., 40, Queen Street, E.C.
1920. Waller, Major A. G., I.A., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Indian Dept., Charing Cross.
1911. Waller-Sawyer, Mrs., 32, Knightsbridge, S.W.
1921. Walpole, Mrs. Horace, 15, Bruton Street, W. 1; Heckfield Place, Basingstoke, Hants.
1922. Walpole, C. A., O.B.E., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
- †Walton, Sir Joseph, M.P., Reform Club, 104, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
1922. Wapshare, Lieut.-General Sir Richard, K.C.B., C.S.I., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W.
1921. Warburton, H. G., I.C.S. (ret.), Holmesdale, Fleet, Hants.
1920. Ward, Captain F. Kingdon, F.R.G.S., c/o Royal Geographical Society, Kensington Gore, S.W. 7.
1921. Ward, Colonel J. S., C.I.E., D.S.O., M.B.E., Port Director, Basra.
1920. Ward, W. R., O.B.E., Union Club, Trafalgar Square, and c/o Imperial Bank of Persia, 25, Abchurch Lane, E.C.
1905. Watson, Lt. Col. John William, I.M.S., c/o Messrs. Grindlay, Groome and Co., Bombay.
- 620** 1920. Watson, Sir Logie P., c/o Messrs. Cooper, Allen and Co., Cawnpore, India.
1921. Watson-Armstrong, Captain W. J. M., Post Office, Irvine's Landing, Pender Harbour, B.C.
1921. Webb, Captain W. F., att'd. Indian Political Dept., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
1920. Webb-Ware, Lieut.-Col. F., C.I.E., F.R.G.S., West Hill, Castletown, Isle of Man.
1921. Weir, Major J. L. R., Indian Political Dept., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.
1921. Weldon, Captain S. W., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.

1921. Wellcome, Henry S., 6, Gloucester Gate, Regent's Park, N.W., and Khartoum.
1920. Wheatley, H., Govt. Quinine Factory, Naduvatam, India.
- †Whitbred, S. H., 11, Mansfield Street, W. 1.
1922. Whitehead, Rt. Rev. H., D.D., Much March, Gloucester.
1920. Whitehorne, Captain Cecil, M.C., The Welch Regiment, Junior United Service Club, Charles Street, S.W.
1922. Whittal, Major G., M.C., Oxford and Bucks L.I., G. H. Q., British Army in Constantinople, Turkey.
1923. Whittal, T. E., c/o Messrs. T. W. Whittal and Co., Constantinople.
1922. Wickham, Captain E. T. R., British Legation, Kabul.
1922. Wightwick, Major H. M., Bombay Political Service, c/o Messrs. Cox and Co., Bombay.
1921. Wigley, Captain P. J. R., M.C., I.A., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
1920. Wigram, Rev. Dr. W. A., Watling House, St. Albans.
1923. Wilberforce-Bell, Major H., I.A., Assistant Resident, Aden, Arabia.
1921. Wilkinson, Captain L. C. R., R.A., c/o Messrs. Cox and Co. (R.A. Branch), Charing Cross, S.W.
1921. Willcox, Colonel Sir W. H., K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G., F.R.C.P., 40, Welbeck Street, W. 1.
- 640** 1921. Williams, Robert, 35, Prince's Gardens, S.W. 7; Park House, Drumoak, Aberdeenshire.
1921. Williams, Captain L., O.B.E., Ardua, Denbridge Road Bickley, Kent.
1922. Williams, Dr. H., 9, Tite Street, Chelsea, S.W. 3.
1921. Williamson, Captain H., I.M.S., 1, Church Road, Rangoon, Burma.
1921. Wilkinson, Hon. Mrs., Dringhouses Manor, York.
1921. Willoughby, Brig.-Gen. M. E., C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W.
1920. Wilson, Lieut.-Col. Sir Arnold T., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., E. I. United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W.; c/o Messrs. Strick, Scott and Co., Mohammerah, Persian Gulf.
1920. Wilson, Major W. C. F., I.A., Mesopotamian C. S., c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament St., S.W. 1.
1916. Wilson, Lieut.-Colonel Sir James Alban, D.S.O., 8th Gurkhas, c/o Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 54, Parliament St., S.W.
1921. Wilson, W., New Oxford and Cambridge Club, Stratton Street, W. 1.
1919. Wilson-Johnstone, Lieut.-Colonel W. E., C.I.E., D.S.O., c/o War Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1.
1920. WINGATE, General Sir Reginald, Bart., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., G.B.E., etc., Knockenhair, Dunbar. M. of C.
1922. Winterton, The Earl, 4, Wilton Street, Grosvenor Place, S.W. 1.
1921. Wishart, G., Muirbrow, Hamilton, N.B.
1912. Woods, H. C., 171, Victoria Street, S.W. 1.

1923. Worth, Captain J. G., 1st Yemen Infantry, Sheikh Othman, Arabia.
 1918. Worthington, A. B. Bayley, Town Thorns, Rugby.
 1921. Wright, Captain S. A., M.C., East India United Service Club, 16, St. James's Square, S.W. 1.
 1922. Wright, Colonel G., C.B.E., D.S.O., R.A. (ret.), United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 1922. Wynn, Wing-Commander W. E., O.B.E., United Service Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.

Y

660

- *†YATE, Lieut.-Colonel Arthur C., Beckbury Hall, Shifnal, Shropshire. Vice-President and Hon. Sec.
 1905. *YATE, Colonel Sir Charles E., Bart., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.L., M.P., 17, Prince of Wales Terrace, W. 8. Vice-President.
 1916. Yorke, Mrs. R. F., F.R.G.S., M.R.I., F.R.S.A. Ladies' Carlton Club, Chesterfield Gardens, W. 1; 17, Dover Street, W. 1; 22, Craven Hill, W. 2.
 1922. Younan, Lieut.-Colonel A. C., I.M.S., c/o Messrs. H. S. King and Co., 9, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
 *†YOUNGHUSBAND, Lieut.-Col. Sir Francis E., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., 3, Currant Hill, Westerham. Vice-President.
 1918. Young, General H. G., C.I.E., D.S.O., etc., Tobercooran, Carnmoney, Co. Antrim, Ireland.
 1921. Young, Rev. R. A., St. Saviour's Clergy House, Roath, Cardiff.

JOURNAL SUBSCRIBERS

Army and Navy Club.
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 Calcutta. Imperial Library.
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 Royal Geographical Society.
 Royal United Service Institution.
 H.M. Stationery Office.

RULES

OF

THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

1. THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY was founded in 1901 for the encouragement of interest in Central Asia by means of lectures, the reading of papers, and discussions.

2. Persons who desire to join the Society shall be proposed by one Member and seconded by another, and shall then be balloted for by the Council. Ladies are admissible.

3. The Secretary shall in all cases inform Members of their election.

4. The Annual Subscription of Members shall be £1.

5. The Council shall have power to remit subscriptions in special cases in which such remission shall appear expedient.

6. All subscriptions are due on election, and thereafter annually, but if the election takes place in November or December, the second annual payment will not become due till the expiration of the succeeding year; thus if a person be elected in November, his second subscription will not be due till the second January following.

7. Every person elected a Member of the Society shall make the payment due thereon within two calendar months after the date of election, or if abroad within six months after election; otherwise the election shall be void unless the Council in any particular case shall extend the period within which such payments are to be made.

8. Annual subscriptions shall be due on the tenth day of January in each year; and in case the same shall not be paid by the end of the month, the Treasurer or Secretary shall be authorized to demand the same. If any subscriptions remain unpaid at the Anniversary Meeting of the Society, the Treasurer shall apply by letter to those Members who are in arrear. If the arrears be not discharged by the 1st of January following such application the Member's name as a defaulter shall be suspended in the meeting room, and due notice be given to the Member in question of the same. The name shall remain suspended, unless in the interval the arrears be discharged, until the Anniversary Meeting next ensuing, when, if the subscription be not paid, the defaulter will cease to be a Member of the Society.

9. A Member, who is not in arrears, may at any time resign his

membership by notice in writing, but such notice of resignation must reach the Secretary before the 1st of January, otherwise the subscription for the current year will be payable.

10. A Member's resignation shall not be valid, save by a resolution of the Council, until he has paid up all his arrears of subscription; failing this he will be considered as a defaulter, and dealt with in accordance with Rule 8.

11. The Officers of the Society shall be: (1) The Honorary President, (2) the Chairman of the Council, (3) eight Vice-Presidents, (4) the Honorary Treasurer, and (5) the Honorary Secretary, all of whom must be Members of the Society. In addition to these there shall be an Assistant Secretary.

12. The Chairman shall be elected by the Council, and shall hold office for one year from the date of his election. He shall be eligible for re-election on the expiration of his tenure of office.

13. The Honorary President shall be elected by the Council, and shall hold office for five years, and shall be eligible for re-election. The Vice-Presidents shall be elected by the Council, and shall hold office for four years. Two shall retire annually by rotation, and not be eligible for re-election as such until after the expiration of one year. They are eligible on retirement for re-election on the Council.

13a. The Honorary Treasurer and the Honorary Secretary shall be elected at the Anniversary Meeting, on the nomination of the Council, for two years, and are eligible for re-election.

14. The Assistant Secretary shall hold office during the pleasure of the Council.

15. The Chairman, as head of the Society, shall have the general supervision of its affairs. He will preside at Meetings of the Council, conduct the proceedings, give effect to resolutions passed, and cause the Rules of the Society to be put in force. He shall, ex officio, be a Member of the Council and of all Committees, and may at any time summon a Meeting of the Council.

16. The Honorary Treasurer shall receive all moneys, and shall account for them. He shall not make any payments (other than current and petty cash expenses) without the previous order of the Council. He shall, ex officio, be a Member of the Council and of all Committees. He shall exercise a general supervision over the expenditure of the Society, and shall prepare and submit to the Auditors at the expiration of each year a statement showing the receipts and expenditure of the Society for the period in question. All cheques must be signed by him, or in his absence by any Member of the Council acting for him.

17. The Honorary Secretary shall, in the absence of the Chairman,

exercise a general control over the affairs of the Society, and shall, ex officio, be a Member of Council and of all Committees.

18. The Honorary Secretary shall attend the Meetings of the Society and of the Council and record their proceedings. He shall conduct the correspondence and attend to the general business of the Society, and shall attend at the Rooms of the Society at such times as the Council may direct. He shall superintend the persons employed by the Society, subject to the general control of the Council. He shall be competent on his own responsibility to discharge small bills, but any account exceeding the amount of Five Pounds shall, except in cases of great urgency, be submitted for approval to the Council before payment. He shall have the charge, under the general direction of the Council, of printing and publishing the Transactions of the Society.

19. The Assistant Secretary shall act generally under the orders of the Hon. Secretary, and if at any time the latter is prevented by illness or any other cause from attending to the duties of his office, the Assistant Secretary shall act in his absence; but in the case of prolonged absence the Council shall have power to make such special arrangements as may at the time be considered expedient.

20. There shall be a Council consisting of the Vice-Presidents and twelve Members of the Society, exclusive of the Chairman but inclusive of the Honorary Officers of the Society.

21. The Members of Council as aforesaid shall be elected at the Anniversary Meeting on the nomination of the Chairman in Council, subject to any amendment of which due notice has been given, as provided in Rule 23.

22. There shall be prepared and forwarded to every Member in Great Britain, together with the notice as to the Anniversary Meeting, a list containing the names of persons so nominated to serve on the Council for the ensuing year, together with any other names, should they be proposed and seconded by other Members, a week's notice being given to the Secretary. The List of Members nominated as aforesaid shall be first put to the Meeting, and, if carried, the amendments (if any) shall not be put.

23. Of the Members of Council other than those referred to in Rules 12 and 13—i.e., the Officers—three shall retire annually by seniority. They shall be eligible for re-election.

24. Should any vacancy occur among the Honorary Officers or other Members of Council during the interval between two Anniversary Meetings, such vacancy may be filled up by the Council.

25. The Ordinary Meetings of Council shall be held not less than once a month from November to June inclusive.

26. Special Meetings of Council may be summoned under the

sanction of the Chairman, or in his absence by a circular letter from the Secretary.

27. Three Members of the Council shall constitute a quorum.

28. At Meetings of Council the Chair shall be taken by the Chairman, and in his absence the Senior Member present shall take the Chair. The decision of any matter shall rest with the majority, and in case of an equality of votes the Chairman shall have the casting vote in addition to his ordinary vote.

29. Committees may be appointed by the Council to report on specific questions, and unless otherwise stated three shall form a quorum. Such Committees shall be authorized to consult persons not members of the Society.

30. Ordinary General Meetings are for hearing and discussing papers and for addresses, but no resolutions other than votes of thanks for papers read shall be passed at such meetings except by permission of the Chairman.

31. Special General Meetings are for considering and dealing with matters of importance, such as the making or amendment of its Rules, or questions seriously affecting its management and constitution. No business shall be transacted at such meetings except that for which they are summoned, and of which notice has been given.

32. The Anniversary Meeting for receiving and considering the Annual Report of the Council and Auditors, and dealing with the recommendations contained therein for the appointment of Members of the Council and Officers for the ensuing year, and for hearing the President's Address (if any), and deliberating generally on the affairs of the Society, shall be held in June of each year. But no resolution seriously affecting the management or position of the Society, or altering its Rules, shall be passed unless due notice shall have been given in the manner prescribed for Special General Meetings.

33. Ordinary Meetings shall be convened by notice issued to accessible Members, and as a general rule they shall be held on the second Thursday in each month from November to May, both inclusive, the Thursday of Easter, Whitsuntide, and Christmas weeks being excepted. At such meetings, and also at the Anniversary Meeting, but not at special General Meetings, each Member of the Society shall have the privilege of introducing, either personally or by card, two visitors.

34. Ten Members shall form a quorum.

The Accounts shall be audited annually by an Auditor nominated by the Council. The employment of a professional Auditor shall be permissible. The Report presented by the Auditor shall be read at the next ensuing Anniversary Meeting.

